The BBC’s Portrayal of India: An Analysis of how the International News Coverage of India Changed in the Digital Era by Thumpakattu, Joshy
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Thumpakattu, Joshy (2021). The BBC’s Portrayal of India: An Analysis of how the
International News Coverage of India Changed in the Digital Era. (Unpublished Doctoral 
thesis, City, University of London) 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/27033/
Link to published version: 
Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, 
University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights 
remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to.
Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, 
educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. 
Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a 
hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is 
not changed in any way. 
City Research Online
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
CAN FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT SUPPORT 
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND 














Doctor of Philosophy in Law 
CITY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 










The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has been hailed as a 
‘framework for reconciliation’ on which states and indigenous peoples can build harmonious 
relationships. However, during the negotiations of UNDRIP’s text, some argued that its impact 
would be constrained by the adoption of a cultural rights framework over an unambiguous 
recognition of the right to self-determination.  
 
This thesis investigates the implementation of a key provision of UNDRIP: the requirement on 
states to consult with indigenous peoples in order to obtain their consent before approving 
measures or policies that would impact on indigenous rights, asking whether weak 
interpretations of indigenous self-determination under a multicultural model of rights are 
constraining the reconciliatory potential of prior consultation. It provides a theoretical analysis 
of prior consultation, drawing from indigenous critiques of human rights based multiculturalism 
and western theories of dispute resolution, and applying a decolonial theoretical framework. 
The theoretical analysis is grounded in case studies that illustrate how prior consultation is 
being implemented in Peru and Canada.  
 
This thesis concludes that two different conceptualisations of FPIC have emerged: the ‘general 
rule’ approach, which is based on the right to self-determination and generally favoured by 
indigenous peoples; and the ‘multiculturalist approach’, which views FPIC as a facet of 
multicultural democracy. This latter approach is generally favoured by states, whose practice 
in this regard will shape the future development of FPIC as an international legal norm. 
However, this ‘multiculturalist approach’ is unlikely to lead to reconciliation because it 
constrains indigenous self-determination within a colonial imbalance of epistemic, political and 
economic power that overwhelmingly benefits the state.  
 
In contrast, this thesis puts forward a dispute resolution approach which reimagines prior 
consultation as a duty to forge consensus. Such an approach, based on mutual respect and 
collaboration between peoples, may be more likely to contribute to reconciliation because it 
sidesteps commonly-held concerns that indigenous consent will be wielded as a unilateral 
right of veto, and recognises indigenous self-determination more fully. Viewing prior 
consultation through the lens of dispute resolution also suggests that mediation may offer a 
range of tools to counterbalance structural disadvantages that indigenous peoples face within 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 
 
There are an estimated 350-500 million indigenous people globally,1 making up around 5-6% 
of the world’s total population.2  Indigenous peoples are culturally diverse, speaking around 
4000 of the world’s almost 6700 languages.3 Despite strong efforts on behalf of indigenous 
peoples to maintain their cultures and ways of life, they routinely suffer from marginalisation, 
poverty and human rights violations.4 For centuries indigenous peoples have been defending 
their own physical and cultural survival from violence, discrimination, forced assimilation and 
dispossession of their lands. Living across all regions of the world, indigenous people own, 
occupy or use around a quarter of global land, and safeguard up to 80% of the worlds’ 
biodiversity.5 Furthermore, indigenous territories are often rich in natural resources, making 
indigenous peoples particularly vulnerable to the impacts of extractivist development models 
that stand in direct contrast to most indigenous development paradigms.6  
 
In the face of this physical and cultural violence, indigenous peoples have consistently 
asserted their right to exist as independent societies, free to determine their own futures and 
priorities for development. As Chapter 3 will relate, it is only relatively recently that indigenous 
peoples have been able to leverage international law to support them in this struggle. For 
centuries after colonisation began, the work of European international legal theorists justified 
and enabled appropriation of indigenous land and resources, and the oppression of 
 
1 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ (UNESCO, 7 September 
2017) <https://en.unesco.org/indigenous-peoples> accessed 6 June 2020.   
2  Umberto Cattaneo Rishabh Kumar Dhir, ‘Implementing the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 
169: Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable and Just Future’ (2020) Report 
<http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_735607/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 27 July 2020.  
3  United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ‘Indigenous Languages Backgrounder’ (United Nations 
Department of Public Information 2018) <https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-
content/uploads/sites/19/2018/04/Indigenous-Languages.pdf> accessed 25 August 2020.  
4 Dwane Mamo (ed), The Indigenous World 2020 (34th Edition, Indigenous Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 
2020) <https://www.iwgia.org/en/resources/indigenous-world> accessed 25 August 2020., 21. 
5  ‘Indigenous Peoples’ (World Bank) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/indigenouspeoples> accessed 13 
February 2021. 
6  Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (eds), Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to Globalization 
(New Expanded Edition, University of California Press 2007).; Cathal Doyle and Andrew Whitmore, Indigenous 
Peoples and the Extractive Sector: Towards a Rights-Respecting Engagement (Tebtebba, PIPLinks and Middlesex 
University 2014).; UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Fifth Session 9-13 July 2012 
‘Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, with a focus on the 
extractive industries’ (30 April 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2. 
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indigenous peoples by European powers.7 In the 1920s, the attempts of indigenous peoples 
to assert their independent and self-governing status fell on deaf ears at the League of 
Nations, who considered that conflict between indigenous peoples and state governments 
were an internal matter and not of international concern.8 Later, during the post-war 
decolonization period, states considered that indigenous peoples would benefit from the 
independence of former colonial territories, and would eventually become assimilated into the 
general population of new states.9 However, indigenous peoples were insistent on maintaining 
their own distinct ways of life, and - faced with continued human rights violations and 
discrimination - cooperated with one another to finally make their voices heard.  
 
The global movement of indigenous peoples gained traction in the 1970s, and expertly utilised 
the United Nations system to shape international legal protections for indigenous people.10 In 
1971, the Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities appointed Martínez Cobo as Special Rapporteur to undertake a 
Study on the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations. His landmark report 
(published between 1981-84) investigated the condition of indigenous peoples across the 
world and set forth recommendations for protection of indigenous people’s human rights 
following extensive input from indigenous advocates. In 1982, the UN Economic and Social 
Council established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP).11 This committee 
of experts provided a focus for the indigenous movement to collaborate and promote their 
agenda, and resulted in the early drafts of UNDRIP.   
 
In 1985, the General Assembly established the UN Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Peoples, to 
provide financial assistance to enable indigenous representatives to participate in WGIP.12 In 
1995, the Commission on Human Rights established an open-ended Working Group on the 
Draft Declaration (WGDD), which was composed of states’ representatives, non-state actors, 
 
7 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
8 ‘Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations Human Rights System Fact Sheet’ (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2013) No. 9, Rev.2 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5289d7ac4.html> accessed 
19 February 2021.;  Grace Li Xiu Woo, ‘Canada’s Forgotten Founders: The Modern Significance of the 
Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Application for Membership in the League of Nations’ 2003 Law, Social Justice & Global 
Development Journal <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2003_1/woo/> accessed 27 July 2020. See 
Chapter 3.  
9 Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: How It 
Came to Be and What It Heralds.’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009). 
10 Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009).  
11 Study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations ECOSOC Res 1982/34 (7 May 1982)  
12  United Nations Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations, UNGA Res 40/131 (13 December 1985). 
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academics and indigenous people themselves.13 This group met annually until 2006, when the 
draft UNDRIP was adopted by the Human Rights Council and submitted to the General 
Assembly.14 Following some tense behind-the-scenes negotiation, the enormous efforts of 
indigenous grassroots activists and high-level representatives culminated in the adoption of 
UNDRIP by the UN General Assembly on 13th September 2007.15   
 
The adoption of UNDRIP represents a remarkable achievement: it protects a wide range of 
economic, cultural, social and political rights of indigenous peoples, as individuals and - 
crucially - as collective groups. Although the text inevitably contains compromise and 
limitations, the text of UNDRIP ‘breaks new ground’ in international law.16 Through UNDRIP 
the international community of states recognised indigenous peoples’ rights to self-
determination and autonomous self-government; such recognition is the first time that the right 
to self-determination has been recognised explicitly in relation to a sub-national group.17  
UNDRIP’s focus on collective rights is also extremely significant. As Xanthaki has commented, 
‘The Declaration also put an end to discussions about the recognition - or non-recognition - of 
collective rights for sub-national groups in current international law.’18  
 
Whilst the text is based on compromise and does not fulfil all the ambitions of many within the 
indigenous movement, it was welcomed as a basis for future discussion and action.19 It was 
 
13 Establishment of a working group of the Commission on Human Rights to elaborate a draft declaration in 
accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 49/214 of 23 December 1994, UNHCR Res 1995/32 
(3 March 1995) (adopted without a vote). ; Establishment of a working group of the Commission on Human Rights 
to elaborate a draft declaration in accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 49/214, ECOSOC 
Res 1995/32 (25 July 1995).  
14 Working group of the Commission on Human Rights to elaborate a draft declaration in accordance with paragraph 
5 of the General Assembly resolution 49/214 of 23 December 1994’, UNHRC Res 1/2 (29 June 2006).  
15 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007) 
(adopted by 143 votes to 4; 11 abstentions). Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America 
voted against adoption, and the 11 abstentions were by Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, 
Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine. All States that voted against UNDRIP have 
now indicated their support. 
16 Mauro Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions?’ (2011) 13 
International Community Law Review 413., 434. 
17 Mauro Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 957.; 
Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments 
Feature: Reflections on a Decade of International Law’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 27.  
18 Xanthaki (n 17)., 30. 
19 Ban Ki-moon, ‘Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the Adoption of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/2016/Docs-
updates/Statement-SG-IDWIP-2007.pdf> accessed 29 January 2021.; Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, ‘Message of Victoria 
Tauli-Corpuz, Chairperson of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, on the Occasion of the  Adoption 
by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
<https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/2016/Docs-updates/Statement-Press-Release-IDWIP-
2007.pdf> accessed 29 January 2021.; Adelpho Regino Montes and Gustavo Torres Cisneros, ‘The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Foundation of a New Relationship between Indigenous 
Peoples, States and Societies’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: 




hailed by the United Nations as ‘a triumph for justice and human dignity’ that establishes ‘a 
universal framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity, well-being and rights of 
the world's indigenous peoples’.20 Importantly for this thesis, it was expressly intended to 
promote greater harmony between indigenous peoples and states, after centuries of 
colonisation and oppressive and discriminatory policies towards indigenous peoples.21 
 
Despite its ‘soft law’ status,  Barelli has argued that the UNDRIP has significant implications 
for states both in its own right and through the progressive interpretation of international 
treaties such as ICCPR, ICESCR, ILO C107 and ILO C169.22 In the years since its adoption, 
the UNDRIP has played a significant role in providing a normative baseline for countries, 
intergovernmental organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations in their 
approach to indigenous peoples,23 including as the basis for initiatives that seek to bring about 
reconciliation between indigenous peoples and the state.24 However, over 13 years later many 
tensions remain, and there is still a gulf between indigenous rights in theory and their 
implementation and enjoyment in practice.25  
 
1.2 The focus of this thesis: free, prior and informed consent and the mining sector 
 
 
20 ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx> accessed 13 February 
2021. 
21 For example, two paragraphs of the Preamble of UNDRIP state: ‘Concerned that indigenous peoples have 
suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, 
territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in 
accordance with their own needs and interests’, and ‘Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous 
peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous 
peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good faith.’ 
UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007). 
22 Barelli, ‘Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System’ (n 17). 
23 Felipe Gómez Isa, ‘The UNDRIP: An Increasingly Robust Legal Parameter’ (2019) 23 The International Journal 
of Human Rights 7. 
24 UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Twelfth Session 15-19 July 2019 ‘Efforts to 
implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2 September 2019) UN Doc 
A/HRC/EMRIP/2019/3/Rev.1. 
25 Examples of the implementation gap are discussed in Reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, e.g. UNGA ‘Rights of indigenous peoples, including their economic, social and cultural rights 
in the post-2015 development framework’ (6 August 2014) UN Doc A/69/267; UNHRC ‘Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Victoria Tauli Corpuz’ (11 August 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/52; 
UNHRC  ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya. Addendum: The 
Status of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Panama’ (3 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.1; UNHRC ‘Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya Addendum: The Situation of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights in Peru with Regard to the Extractive Industries (3 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.3.  
For a critical examination of the position of indigenous peoples in Canada, the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand, see Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent McNeil (eds), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: 
Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart 2009). For a discussion of various indigenous rights strategies and 
the failure of legal and political victories to necessarily translate into practice, see Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise 
of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke University Press 2010).  Morgan gives a socio-legal 
account of the impact of the indigenous rights movement on international discourse on indigenous rights, whilst 
cautioning that the legal framework is insufficient to produce change - see Rhiannon Morgan, Transforming Law 
and Institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights (Ashgate 2011). 
27 
 
This thesis focuses on one aspect of UNDRIP: the principle that States have a duty to 
effectively consult indigenous peoples in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) before making decisions, policies or actions which would affect their rights.26 In 
particular, it focuses on Article 32 of UNDRIP, which is most relevant to states’ duties in the 
context of mining projects.  
 
The principle of ‘prior consent’ had previously been included in both the International Labor 
Organization conventions on indigenous populations, in relation to relocation of indigenous 
communities from their lands.27 ILO C169, which sought to overturn the assimilationist nature 
of ILO C107, also included a requirement for states to consult with indigenous populations on 
legislative or administrative measures that would directly affect their rights, ‘with the objective 
of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.’28 The UNDRIP expanded on 
the provisions of ILO C169, specifically referring to FPIC in the context of projects on their 
lands and  placing the requirement in the context of indigenous peoples’ ‘right to determine 
and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories 
and other resources’. Furthermore, the UNDRIP, as a General Assembly resolution, was 
significant because 144 countries had voted for it. Previously, ILO C169 had only been ratified 
by 22 countries, and so its geographical reach and significance for international standard-
setting was much more limited.29  
 
Article 32 is particularly relevant in relation to extraction projects on indigenous territories. The 
ever-pressing demand for natural resources often results in devastating impacts on 
indigenous communities – causing displacement, jeopardising health and means of 
subsistence, destroying areas rich in biodiversity and with spiritual significance for indigenous 
communities, undermining indigenous governance institutions, and violation of cultural and 
property rights, Additionally, extractive projects are tied to an increase in sexual violence 
against indigenous women by workers, and frequently result in conflict between indigenous 
 
26 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007) Arts 10, 19, 29 and 32. The Declaration contains two 
instances in which FPIC must be obtained by states: Article 10 prohibits relocation of indigenous peoples without 
their free, prior and informed consent, and Article 29 prevents storage of hazardous waste on indigenous lands 
without their FPIC. Article 19 requires states to ‘consult in order to obtain’ FPIC before adopting or implementing 
administrative or legislative measures that would affect them. Articles 11 require redress for indigenous peoples if 
their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property is taken without their FPIC, and Article 28 provides redress 
if traditional lands, territories and resources have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without 
FPIC.  
27 International Labor Organization Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other 
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (adopted 26 June 1957, entered into force 2 June 
1959) (C107 – Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention) Art 12; International Labor Organization Convention 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 
September 1991) (C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention) Art 16.  
28 C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention Art 6. 
29 Barelli, ‘Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System’ (n 17). 
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communities, mining companies, and the state, leading to violence and criminalisation of land 
defenders.30 Mining impacts a significant proportion of indigenous territory worldwide; for 
example a 2020 study concluded that mining now impacts 20% of indigenous land in the 
Amazon.31 Consequently, mining activity is a prominent source of conflict: out of 651 mining-
related environmental conflicts registered on the EJOLT Atlas, 316 involved indigenous 
communities.32  However, there are signs that the mining sector is coming to accept FPIC as 
a means to secure social license to operate and reduce community conflicts which have costly 
implications for project planning and execution.33 
 
Since UNDRIP’s adoption, the international recognition and implementation of FPIC 
consultation has gathered pace, and it is emerging as an international legal norm.34 However, 
States have shown reluctance to fully respect FPIC, instead emphasising the need to consult 
with indigenous communities without requiring their consent to actually be obtained. Thus, the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights has pronounced that the obligation to consult (and not 
to obtain consent) constitutes a general principle of international law,35 and Szablowski has 
opined that ‘in global policy circles relating to extractives, it seems that FPIC is everywhere 
discussed, but it is not much of an exaggeration to say that it is practiced virtually nowhere.’36  
Much of the literature on FPIC now focuses on how to operationalise it in practice; many 
analyses of specific FPIC consultation processes have been carried out which highlight the 
challenges of implementation. These include delineating the obligations on states, challenging 
unsupportive legal frameworks; defining who should be consulted and how consent is judged; 
the need for education, partnerships and skills-building for indigenous peoples, particularly 
 
30 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya Extractive 
industries operating within or near indigenous territories (11 July 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, paras. 30-55;  
UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya Extractives industries 
and indigenous peoples (1 July 2013) A/HRC/24/41; Doyle and Whitmore (n 6).   
31 Patricia Quijano Vallejos and others, ‘Undermining Rights: Indigenous Lands and Mining in the Amazon’ 
<https://www.wri.org/publication/undermining-rights> accessed 24 January 2021.  
32 EJOLT, ‘EJAtlas | Mapping Environmental Justice’ (Environmental Justice Atlas) <https://ejatlas.org/> accessed 
24 January 2021. 
33 See for example, International Council on Mining and Metals, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Mining: Position 
Statement’ (ICMM 2013) May.; ICMM, Indigenous Peoples and Mining: Good Practice Guide (2nd edn, ICMM 
2015) <https://www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/social-and-economic-development/9520.pdf> accessed 
19 November 2020. 
34 Cathal M Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2015). 
35 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment of November 28, 2007 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 172 (28 November 207); Case of the 
Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment of August 12, 2008 (Interpretation of the Judgement on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 185 (12 August 
2008).  
36 David Szablowski, ‘Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector? 
Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice’ (2010) 30 Canadian Journal of Development Studies 
/ Revue canadienne d’études du développement 111. 
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around their knowledge of indigenous rights; and the need for companies and states to cede 
control of the process and decision-making to indigenous peoples themselves.37 
 
1.3 Key issues 
 
This thesis seeks to develop on this growing literature by investigating whether key debates 
or assumptions that were evident during the negotiation of the UNDRIP may now be 
influencing the implementation of FPIC in practice, in ways that constrain its potential to bring 
about one of the fundamental aims of the indigenous movement: indigenous self-
determination. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, indigenous self-determination is a 
prerequisite to meaningful reconciliation between indigenous societies and the state. Thus, 
forms of FPIC that constrain indigenous self-determination may not succeed in resolving 
conflict and bringing about the new, harmonious relationships envisaged by UNDRIP’s 
authors.  
 
This section briefly highlights three of the significant issues that are relevant to this thesis.  
 
1.3.1 Human rights or self-determination as the basis for indigenous rights 
 
During the UNDRIP’s negotiation, there was a debate within the indigenous movement and 
academic circles as to whether indigenous negotiators should place indigenous rights within 
the paradigm of established human rights (and in particular, the right to culture), or whether 
they should emphasise their fundamental claim to self-determination as autonomous and self-
governing peoples – a claim which was viewed by states as a threat to their political unity and 
territorial integrity.38 The distinction was important, because the adoption of a human rights 
 
37 See, for example,  Indigenous Peoples, ‘Making FPIC – Free , Prior and Informed Consent – Work : Challenges 
and Prospects for Indigenous Peoples FPIC Working Papers , Forest Peoples Programme June 2007’.; Nina 
Kantcheva, ‘Designing the Consultation Process to Develop Guidelines for Implementing FPIC and Providing 
Recourse’ (UN-REDD Programme 2011).; Shalanda Baker, ‘Why the IFC’s Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
Policy Does Not Matter (yet) to Indigenous Communities Affected by Development Projects’ (2012) 30 Wisconsin 
Int’l L J 668.; Ana Maria Esteves, Daniel Franks and Frank Vanclay, ‘Social Impact Assessment: The State of the 
Art’ (2012) 30 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 34.; Cathal Doyle and Jill Cariño, ‘Making Free Prior & 
Informed Consent a Reality and the Extractive Sector’ (2013) <[www.piplinks.org/makingfpicareality]> accessed 15 
January 2017.; Philippe Hanna and Frank Vanclay, ‘Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples and the Concept of Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent’ (2013) 31 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 146.; Sango Mahanty and 
Constance L McDermott, ‘How Does “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” (FPIC) Impact Social Equity? Lessons 
from Mining and Forestry and Their Implications for REDD+’ (2013) 35 Land Use Policy 406.; Stuart R Butzier and 
Sarah M Stevenson, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Sacred Sites and Traditional Cultural Properties and the Role 
of Consultation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (2014) 32 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 297.;  
38  Engle (n 25).; Andrew Erueti, ‘The Politics of International Indigenous Rights’ (2017) 67 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 569.; Dwight Newman, ‘Interpreting Fpic in Undrip’ (2020) 27 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 233. 
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framework implied an acknowledgement of the incorporation of indigenous peoples under the 
authority of the state.39   
 
Indigenous rights were already treated within the UN in the context of human rights, non-
discrimination and the right of minorities to participate in the life of the state whilst maintaining 
their own cultures and traditions.40 Amongst prominent indigenous rights advocates, Professor 
James Anaya, who in 2008 became the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, recognised the potential for human rights to provide a firm legal basis for indigenous 
peoples’ rights to cultural identity, land, autonomy and participation in state decision-making, 
including .41 On the other hand, Engle has argued that the movement’s strategic adoption of 
the more acceptable cultural rights framework during the 1990s detracted from the crucial 
issues which originally motivated the movement, such as structural discrimination and a lack 
of autonomy, and she warned that this decision may constrain future attempts to achieve 
indigenous self-determination in practice.42 Ultimately, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
UNDRIP is considered to have provided a right to internal self-determination to indigenous 
peoples, exercised within the context of the nation state.43 
 
Similarly, the way that FPIC is conceptualised will shape the way in which it is implemented. 
Doyle has examined the different bases for FPIC, noting that it can be understood as a means 
through which indigenous peoples can exercise a general right to self-determination; as a 
safeguard of other more specific rights such as the right to culture, to practice traditional 
means of subsistence or to collectively own property; and as a means of ensuring effective 
and non-discriminatory participation in state decision-making.44 According to Doyle, an 
understanding of FPIC that is rooted in the right to self-determination has potential to transform 
the balance of power between indigenous peoples and states. Perhaps unsurprisingly, states 
 
39 Erueti (n 38).; Duane Champagne, ‘UNDRIP (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples): 
Human, Civil, and Indigenous Rights’ (2013) 28 Wicazo Sa Review 9. 
40 For example, CERD, General Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples (18 August 1997) UN Doc 
CERD/C/51/misc 13/Rev 4.; for an overview of how cultural rights standards applied to indigenous peoples prior to 
UNDRIP’s adoption, see Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-
Determination, Culture and Land (Cambridge University Press 2010)., 196-204. 
41 S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press 2004).;  
S James Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural State’ 
(2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 13.;  
S James Anaya, Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination 
in the Post-Declaration Era’, Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2009).;    
42 Engle (n 25).; Karen Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
in the Context of Human Rights’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 141. 
43 Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions?’ (n 16). 
44 Doyle (n 34)., 129-159. 
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are reluctant to do so, and Doyle comments that the extent of FPIC’s success will depend on 
indigenous peoples themselves continuing to assert their rights at every level of society.45  
 
1.3.2 The influence of multiculturalism on the implementation of FPIC 
 
The idea of multiculturalism has been influential in the development of the minority rights 
regime of the late Twentieth Century, as a means of managing a rise in intra-state conflicts 
between different ethnocultural groups. Principles of human rights, democracy, equality, non-
discrimination and good governance have been relied on by powerful states and the 
international non-governmental organisations as the basis for developing peaceful and 
prosperous societies. A key principle is that of effective participation – that all individuals and 
groups within a society have a voice in the policy decisions and legislative measures that affect 
them. 
 
Such principles are referenced in Article 46 of the UNDRIP, which permits restrictions of the 
rights in UNDRIP only insofar as they are ‘determined by law and in accordance with 
international human rights obligations’,46 and in a manner that is ‘non-discriminatory and 
strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a 
democratic society.’ Additionally, UNDRIP must be interpreted ‘in accordance with the 
principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good 
governance and good faith.’47 Furthermore, as shall be explored further in Chapter 5, the 
structure of the UNDRIP which draws on both individual and collective rights protection within 
the context of a culturally non-homogenous but superordinate state bears a strong 
resemblance to the model of human rights based multiculturalism proposed by Will Kymlicka. 
This model was an attempt to provide a liberal rationalisation of the emerging minority and 
human rights regime in the late twentieth century.48 
 
Indigenous rights, and FPIC in particular, have been conceptually and positively linked to the 
practice of multiculturalism by proponents of indigenous rights, UN bodies, states, and judicial 
bodies.49  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has taken a lead in developing 
case law on the application of FPIC, has stated that  ‘Respect for the right to consultation of 
 
45  ibid. 
46 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 46.2. 
47 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 46.3. 
48 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press 1995). 
49 Xanthaki (n 40). 252-256;  Paul Patton, ‘Philosophical Justifications of Indigenous Rights’ in Corinne Lennox and 
Damien Short (eds), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (Routledge). 
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indigenous and tribal communities and peoples is precisely recognition of their rights to their 
own culture or cultural identity...which must be assured, in particular, in a pluralistic, 
multicultural and democratic society.’50 To Anaya, the model of indigenous rights that was 
developed through ILO C169 and the then draft declaration ‘advances a multicultural model 
of political ordering and incorporation of indigenous peoples into the fabric of the state’ in a 
manner that generally accords with Kymlicka’s model.51 Additionally Stavenhagen has said 
that the challenge of UNDRIP is now ‘to renew the usefulness of a people’s right to self-
determination in the era of democratic multiculturalism’,52 as well as the UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues’ statement that ‘Many of the rights in the Declaration will require new 
approaches to global issues, such as development, decentralization and multicultural 
democracy.’53 
 
However, there are those who view the conflation of indigenous rights and multiculturalism to 
be problematic. Champage has argued that  
 
The UNDRIP plan reduces indigenous rights and values to an invitation to participate 
in a more fully inclusive multicultural nation-state….  Unfortunately, multicultural 
nation-states, just like their mono-cultural predecessors, will be institutionally incapable 
of addressing the values, interests, and social organization of indigenous peoples.54 
 
In relation to FPIC specifically, Rodríguez-Garavito views the development of the international 
legal principle of free, prior and informed consultation as only one part of an international 
‘process comprised of the global juridification of difference—a process that I have termed 
ethnicity.gov—which reflects the dominant type of multiculturalism and governance that 
dominates in the era of neoliberal globalization’.55 Indeed, Rodriguez-Garavito deems FPIC to 
represent an entirely new approach, saying ‘FPIC’s rise and impact in regulations and disputes 
about indigenous rights have been so profound that instead of merely constituting a legal 
 
50 Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador Judgement of June 27, 2012 (Merits and 
Reparations) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 245 (27 June 2012), para 159.  See also  Case 
of the Case of the Community Garifuna Triunfo de la Cruz and its members v Honduras Judgement of October 8 
2015 (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 305 (8 October 2015) 
paras 158, 261. 
51 Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples’ (n 41)., 15. 
52  Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘Making the Declaration Work’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making 
the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009)., 364.
  
53 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf> 
accessed 29 January 2021., 2. 
54 Champagne (n 39).  
55  César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Ethnicity.Gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior 
Consultation in Social Minefields’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 263., 304. 
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figure, it entails a new approach to ethnic rights and multiculturalism, with its own language 
and rules’.56 In his view, this approach to FPIC will further reinforce imbalances of power that 
continue the legacy of colonialism that has caused such suffering to indigenous peoples, and 
has the effect of depoliticising and neutralising dissent. FPIC, he argues, represents only ‘a 
last recourse—a last inconvenience in the way of death—to which indigenous peoples cling 
in the face of all odds … in their struggle against collective annihilation.’57   
 
1.3.3 The role of FPIC in reducing conflict 
 
There is a general assumption within the development and human rights community that 
consultation processes will result in the better inclusion of minorities in state decision-making, 
leading to the protection of minority rights and the reduction of conflict.58  However, recent 
research is highlighting obstacles that are currently standing in the way of such an outcome. 
For example, Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer have drawn attention to restrictive 
interpretations of FPIC in domestic law which contrast with the more comprehensive and 
inclusive processes demanded by indigenous peoples. Furthermore, they highlight three 
preconditions necessary if participatory processes are to lead to conflict transformation: ‘state 
institutions capable of justly balancing the diverse interests at stake; measures that reduce 
power asymmetries within consultations; and joint decision-making processes with binding 
agreements’.59  
 
Several authors have argued that FPIC processes are unlikely to lead to reconciliation if they 
are designed without mechanisms to link the social demands of indigenous communities to 
wider institutional reform which resolves and provides remedies for the underlying causes of 
conflict. Otherwise, consultation processes could simply reproduce social conflict as the 
issues raised during FPIC consultations fall into an ‘institutional vacuum’,60 resulting in 
 
56 ibid., 268. 
57 ibid., 305. 
58  E.g. See UNPFII, Sixth Session, 14-25 May 2007 ‘Report on the sixth session (14-25 May 2007)’ UN Doc 
E/2007/43, E/C.19/2007/12., para 21 which states: ‘Through free, prior and informed consent, future conflicts can 
be avoided and the full participation of indigenous peoples in consultation mechanisms, environmental impact 
assessments and sociocultural impact assessments can be ensured.’ 
This view is also being embraced by the private sector, which increasingly views consultation processes as a 
means to reduce the costs of opposition to projects through the achievement of a social licence to operate. Lisa J 
Laplante and Suzanne A Spears, ‘Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in the 
Extractive Sector’ (2008) 11 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 69. Juliette Syn, ‘The Social License: 
Empowering Communities and a Better Way Forward’ (2014) 28 Social Epistemology 318.; Ana Maria Esteves, 
Daniel Franks and Frank Vanclay, ‘Social Impact Assessment: The State of the Art’ (2012) 30 Impact Assessment 
and Project Appraisal 34. 
59 Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Riccarda Flemmer, ‘Conflict Transformation through Prior Consultation? Lessons 
from Peru’ (2015) 47 Journal of Latin American Studies 811. 
60 Roger Merino, ‘Re-Politicizing Participation or Reframing Environmental Governance? Beyond Indigenous’ Prior 
Consultation and Citizen Participation’ (2018) 111 World Development 75., 82. 
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disillusionment and disengagement on the part of indigenous communities. Guzman-Gallegos 
has argued that this requires the state to take on a new role as mediator between different 
sociocultural groups and to foster a political culture of negotiation rather than acting as a 
‘facilitator for the agendas of elites’.61 Such recommendations were also reflected in Oxfam’s 
report, which also highlighted the need, separate from robust FPIC procedures, for states to 
implement fora for dialogue and consensus-building with indigenous peoples on urgent 
problems, and to develop comprehensive reparations plans for past violations of rights to be 
included in the FPIC process.62   Furthermore, Stetson explicitly links the process of 
institutional reform with a project of decolonisation, arguing that in order to reduce conflict over 
natural resources, the state must recognise that its structures and institutions are developed 
according to a Eurocentric logic which has exploited indigenous people and lands for 
economic gain. Henceforth, Stetson argues that states should include indigenous peoples in 
the planning and implementation of sustainable development projects in ways which includes 
indigenous notions of development and modernity.63  
 
Recently, authors have begun to analyse FPIC consultation as a form of deliberative 
democracy.64 Ilizarbe has noted that the indigenous movement fundamentally challenges the 
very nature of citizenship and who is deemed a member of the political community, requiring 
a ‘transformation of the state and democracy from within’.65 Sanborn and Paredes have 
observed that FPIC in Peru is an attempt to institutionalise intercultural dialogue - and that 
whilst in the short term this may lead to increased conflict, there may be potential for longer-
term success. However, they caution that a barrier to this progress is the inability of  the ‘state, 
political elites and other sectors of society, to recognise the indigenous peoples as citizens 
with full rights, and, at the same time, to recognise them as different from most’.66 Furthermore, 
Sanborn and Parades note that FPIC processes operate across important differences in 
language, culture and relationship to the land, and comment that ‘protecting the collective 
rights of minorities is not easy for a multicultural society.’67 Implementation of FPIC is therefore 
 
61 Maria A Guzman-Gallegos, ‘Conflicting Dilemmas: Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Indigenous 
Populations in South America’ (NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 2014). 
62 Due Process of Law Foundation, ‘Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consultation and Consent in Latin America’ 
(Due Process of Law Foundation and Oxfam 2015) 
<http://dplf.org/sites/default/files/executive_summary_consultation_2015_web_02-17-2016_c.pdf> accessed 29 
January 2021. 
63  George Stetson, ‘Oil Politics and Indigenous Resistance in the Peruvian Amazon: The Rhetoric of Modernity 
Against the Reality of Coloniality’ (2012) 21 Journal of Environment & Development 76. 
64 Alejandro Santamaría Ortiz, ‘La consulta previa desde la perspectiva de la negociación deliberativa’ [2016] 
Revista Derecho del Estado 227.; Nicolas Pirsoul, ‘The Deliberative Deficit of Prior Consultation Mechanisms’ 
(2019) 54 Australian Journal of Political Science 255.; Carmen Ilizarbe, ‘Intercultural Disagreement: Implementing 
the Right to Prior Consultation in Peru’ (2019) 46 Latin American Perspectives 143.;  
65  Ilizarbe (n 64)., 146. 
66 Cynthia A Sanborn and Alvaro Paredes, ‘Consulta Previa: PERÚ’ (2014) Spring., 21. 
67 ibid., 21. 
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a complex task, and it is perhaps unsurprising that there is dissatisfaction amongst indigenous 
people across the world as to how it is being operationalised.68   
 
 Pirsoul suggests that a key factor in the current limitations of FPIC is a ‘deliberative deficit’ in 
the consultation process, in which the ‘deliberative ideal of exchange of ideas between equals 
is reduced to a game of persuasion’.69 Both Pirsoul and Ilizarbe highlight the ‘democratic 
deficit’ that exists within these mechanisms, highlighting the disadvantaged position of 
indigenous people due to their lack of access to information, the treatment of indigenous 
representatives as ‘subordinate actors’ within the dialogue, and the problem of ensuring that 
indigenous elites do not dominate at the expense of the democratic participation of 
communities, merging their varied individual interests into a collective whole. Additionally, they 
draw attention to an imbalance of epistemic power, in which indigenous people’s worldviews 
are deemed to be less legitimate and rational – and therefore less persuasive – that those of 
state officials and other non-indigenous actors. This imbalance is further compounded by their 
inferior political and socioeconomic status, as well as by lack of recognition for indigenous 
legal systems.70 These analyses reveal the complex imbalances of power that are at play 
during the FPIC process. They also suggest that, if FPIC is to be effective as a tool for reducing 
conflict, there is a pressing need to design consultation mechanisms with a view to overcoming 
the considerable disadvantages that indigenous communities face.  
 
1.4 Objective and Contribution 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse whether (and how) a multiculturalist framing of FPIC is 
constraining its potential as a tool for indigenous self-determination, which is understood by 
this thesis to be an essential foundation for reconciliation between indigenous peoples and 
the state. As set out above, much of the literature is focused on the practical challenges that 
FPIC poses, whereas in contrast, this thesis seeks to contribute to a relatively small body of 
work that investigates the relationship between FPIC, multiculturalism and the reduction of 
conflict between indigenous peoples and the state.71  In taking a critical stance, this thesis 
 
68 Due Process of Law Foundation (n 62).; UNHRC Thirty Ninth Session 10-28 September 2018 ‘Free, prior and 
informed consent: a human rights-based approach Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (10 August 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/62, paras 60 and 61.  
69 Pirsoul (n 64)., 266. 
70 Ilizarbe (n 64).; Pirsoul (n 64). 
71 For example, Lorenza B Fontana and Jean Grugel, ‘The Politics of Indigenous Participation Through “Free Prior 
Informed Consent”: Reflections from the Bolivian Case’ (2016) 77 World Development 249.; Hans Morten Haugen, 
‘Participation and Decision-Making in Non-Dominant Communities. A Perspective from Civic Republicanism’ 
(2016) 23 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 306. Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 59).; Ilizarbe 
(n 64).; Lisbet Christoffersen, ‘Contextualizing Consent: Spaces for Repression, Resistance, and Accommodation 
in Bolivia’s TIPNIS Consultation’ (2020) 15 Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 105.;  
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does not seek to denigrate the significant achievements of the global indigenous movement 
in negotiating the UNDRIP’s adoption, but to respond to Engle’s call to ‘shore up its fragile 
architecture’ by critically examining UNDRIP, as ‘an important site for the ongoing struggle 
over the meaning of human rights, the dominance of human rights as the basis of justice, and 
the extent to which it might be mined or abandoned for alternative, transformative strategies.’72   
 
In response to this challenge, Chapters 3 and 4 of thesis theoretically analyse what it considers 
to be the issue central to the conflict between indigenous peoples and states: that of 
indigenous self-determination and its conflictual relationship with state sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political unity. These chapters examined the extent to which the human rights 
paradigm, as understood through Kymlicka’s influential model of human rights based 
multiculturalism, can sufficiently reconcile these two apparently opposing claims, or whether 
alternative strategies are necessary.  Chapter 5 builds on this theoretical analysis, applying it 
to the ambiguous text of Article 32 of UNDRIP to understand how an underlying presumption 
in favour of the human rights based multiculturalism, particularly amongst states, has 
influenced both the text of Article 32 and its subsequent interpretation.  
In addition to the theoretical question posed by Engle, this thesis also contributes to answering 
a question posed by Doyle towards the end of his monograph on FPIC. Doyle pointed to the 
need for  
 
greater consideration of the role which recognising the right to give or withhold consent 
can play in altering the rights-constraining power dynamics between indigenous 
peoples and external actors… as well as what conditions are necessary for a good 
faith intercultural dialogue between the industry, States and indigenous peoples to 
occur.73     
 
Doyle’s use of the word ‘intercultural’, as opposed to ‘multicultural’ is prescient, because it 
speaks to the difference between an equal exchange between cultures rather than a 
hierarchical ordering of the states and indigenous peoples. Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis 
examine the practice of FPIC in Peru and Canada respectively, to evaluate multiculturalist 
approaches to implementation of FPIC and to understand whether the theoretical assumptions 
underlying the normative framework of FPIC, discussed in Chapters 3 to 5, are now affecting 
 
72 Engle (n 42). 
73 Cathal M. Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent, Routledge Research in Human Rights Law (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2015). P282 
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its implementation.74 This analysis provides insights into the impact of political, epistemic and 
economic power imbalances on the quality of FPIC consultation procedures as well as their 
substantive outcomes.  
 
Chapter 8 attempts to propose a pragmatic solution to the power imbalances that are inherent 
in a multiculturalist approach to FPIC, whilst also providing insights into the reasons why states 
must recognise the ‘right to say no’ if FPIC consultation outcomes are to be fair and long-
lasting. In doing so, it seeks to make a practical contribution to improving the future practice 
of FPIC in the context of a multicultural state. To this end, it draws from mediation and 
negotiation theory, and makes a contribution to a nascent body of work applying these theories 




1.5.1 Indigenous peoples 
 
There is no universally agreed definition of indigenous peoples.76 UNDRIP does not offer a 
definition, in recognition of the importance of self-identification and to reflect the breadth and 
variety of indigenous cultures: strict interpretations of a definition may prevent some 
indigenous peoples from relying on rights which ought to protect them, particularly where the 
political context is not conducive.77 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also taken 
 
74 See Section 1.6.2 below for an explanation of why these two countries were chosen as the case studies in this 
research project.  
75 Michael Coyle, ‘Transcending Colonialism? Power and the Resolution of Indigenous Treaty Claims in Canada 
and New Zealand’ (2011) 24 New Zealand Universities Law Review 596.; Michael Coyle, ‘Negotiating Indigenous 
Peoples’ Exit from Colonialism: The Case for an Integrative Approach Discourse and Negotiations across the 
Indigenous/Non-Indigenous Divide’ (2014) 27 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 283.; Ciaran 
O’Faircheallaigh, Negotiations in the Indigenous World: Aboriginal Peoples and the Extractive Industry in Australia 
and Canada (1st edition, Routledge 2015).; Michael Coyle, ‘Shifting the Focus: Viewing Indigenous Consent Not 
as a Snapshot But As a Feature Film’ (2020) 27 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 357. 
76 Various definitions of indigenous peoples have been put forward, for example in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) 
‘Note by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, on 
Criteria which Might be Applied when Considering the Concept of Indigenous Peoples’ (21 June 1995) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1995/3; UNCHR (Sub-Commission) Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. 
Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the Concept of “Indigenous People”’ (10 June 1996),  UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2; 
B Kingsbury, ‘“Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy’ 
(1998) 92 The American Journal of International Law 414.; Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human 
Rights (Manchester University Press 2002)., 33-60; Jeff Corntassel, ‘Who Is Indigenous? “Peoplehood” and 
Ethnonationalist Approaches to Rearticulating Indigenous Identity’ (2003) 9 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 75.  
77 Benedict Kingsbury has argued for a purposive approach and proposes essential and indicative criteria for 
determining who is indigenous to allow for the variation between peoples.   Kingsbury’s model proposes self-
identification as a distinct ethnic group; experience of or vulnerability to disruption or exploitation; long connection 
with the region; and the wish to retain a distinct identity as essential factors. Other factors that strongly suggest 
indigeneity include non-dominance in national or regional society; close cultural connection with land; historical 
continuity in the region; linguistic, socio-economic or cultural distinctivenes from the non-indigenous population; 
being regarded as indigenous by the non-indigenous population and government administration.  Developing a 
flexible definition is important in the context of some states such as China claiming that indigeneity is inextricably 
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a flexible approach, when it held that the Saramaka tribe could be deemed ‘indigenous’ under 
international law. The Saramaka, as descendants of African slaves brought to Suriname by 
Europeans in the 17th Century, were not indigenous to the territory. However, the Court 
decided that they should be categorised as indigenous on the basis of their similar 
characteristics to indigenous tribes, considering such factors as distinct social structure, 
economy and their spiritual relationship with their territory. In fact, the special spiritual, cultural 
and economic relationship to land is held to be a key factor in determining the indigenous 
nature of a group.78  
 
Perhaps the most often-cited definition - and the one that shall be used in this thesis - is that 
of Martinez Cobo, in his ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations’. This defines indigenous peoples as those: 
 
 which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to 
future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of 
their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal systems.79 
 
1.5.2 The distinction between FPIC and consultation 
 
Throughout this thesis there are references to FPIC and also to ‘consultation’, ‘FPIC 
consultation’ or ‘prior consultation’. As will be further discussed in Chapter 5, there are many 
views as to the obligations that Article 32.2 of the UNDRIP place on states, and whether it 
constitutes a right of veto for indigenous communities.80 In this thesis, ‘consultation’ or ‘prior 
consultation’ refers to the broad process by which states engage with indigenous communities 
 
linked to European colonialism, and that therefore international law on indigenous peoples is applicable solely in 
states which underwent European colonialism. States such as India argue that giving preferential rights to specific 
peoples on the basis of prior occupancy of land may exacerbate existing conflict; in Africa, there is a hesitation to 
recognise only some communities as indigenous for similar reasons. See Kingsbury (n 76). However, this thesis 
focuses on Peru and Canada, both of which recognise the existence of indigenous peoples within their territorial 
borders – although there are still disagreements over who is classed as indigenous, even in these contexts.   
78 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname (n 35), paras 78 – 84.  
79 UNCHR ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations Final Report (last part) 
submitted by the Special Rapporteur Mr José Martínez Cobo’ (30 September 1983) UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, para 379. 
80 Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights’ (2011) 22 European 
Journal of International Law 165.;  Doyle (n 34).; Mauro Barelli, ‘Development Projects and Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land: Defining the Scope of Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ in Corinne Lennox and Damien Short (eds), 
Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (Routledge 2016). 
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before taking a decision that may impact on their rights, to understand their concerns and hear 
their suggestions. The purpose of consultation may vary – for example, it may be intended 
that the state must weigh and consider the views of indigenous communities in its decision, or 
to use this information to take action to mitigate impacts. It may also be undertaken with the 
objective of reaching agreement, or even in rare cases in order to actually obtain consent 
before any action is taken.  
 
‘FPIC’ in this thesis describes the decision of an indigenous community to consent to a 
proposed measure, prior to the measure being approved by the state. FPIC requires that the 
community has been informed, by having access to adequate information about the measure 
on which to base a decision. FPIC also requires that the community is free to make a decision, 
without coercion of any kind.81 In practice, authors have noted the practical challenges of 
meeting these criteria in the context of language and cultural barriers, financial pressures, 
violence and threats of criminality, and project timeframes which limit the ability of indigenous 
communities to engage according to their traditional decision-making processes.82 In reality, 
authors have also noted that there are very few instances in which there is a clear obligation 
on the state in domestic legislation to actually obtain consent.83 Therefore this thesis defines 
an ‘FPIC process’ or ‘FPIC consultation’ as one in which the state consults indigenous peoples 
with the objective of obtaining their consent, but may or may not require consent to be 




The question of what the right to self-determination entails in the context of indigenous peoples 
is explored in depth in Chapter 3. As will be seen, the right to self-determination was 
recognised in Article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICECSR, and at first was understood to confer 
a right on the population of a state or former colonial territory to ‘determine its own political 
status and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’ In the late 
Twentieth Century, the concept of ‘internal self-determination’ developed to refer to the right 
 
81 UNPFII Fourth Session 16-27 May 2005 ‘Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples (New York, 17-19 January 2005)’ (17 February 2005) UN 
Doc.E/C.19/2005/3, para 45; UNHRC Thirty Ninth Session 10-28 September 2018 ‘Free, prior and informed 
consent: a human rights-based approach Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (10 
August 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/62. 
82 Doyle and Cariño (n 37).; Szablowski (n 36).; Marilyn Machado and others, ‘Weaving Hope in Ancestral Black 
Territories in Colombia: The Reach and Limitations of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation and Consent’ (2017) 
38 Third World Quarterly 1075. 
83 Notable exceptions to this are the Philippines and in Australia’s Northern Territories. Both these jurisdictions 
have legislated to require FPIC to be obtained prior to the approval of extractive projects on indigenous territory. 
However, even these examples are imperfect, and in the main states are preferring legal frameworks that require 
consultation, but not a requirement for FPIC to be obtained. See Doyle (n 34). 194-201. 
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of a sub-national people to pursue these objectives within the structures of a democratic state. 
In the context of this thesis, the ‘right to self-determination’ is used to express this idea as it 
has been elaborated for indigenous peoples, particularly by Anaya who has described that it 
has both remedial and substantive aspects.84 However, this thesis argues that the right to self-
determination should not be solely understood through a human rights frame, but should also 
emphasise its politically charged nature as well as the possibility of its expression in ways 




Reconciliation is also explored further in Chapter 3. Drawing from both indigenous writing and 
the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, this thesis views ‘reconciliation’ (sometimes referred 
to as ‘deep reconciliation’) as a political process centred on dialogue, in which parties that 
were in a state of conflict work together to transform unjust systems and structures so that 
they can live harmoniously alongside one another in mutually beneficial relationship of respect.  
This ‘deep reconciliation’ contrasts with ‘coexistence’, which refers to a more superficial state 
in which there may be an absence of overt conflict, but in which the underlying root cause of 




1.6.1 The Challenge of Researching Indigenous Issues 
 
Linda Tuhiwai-Smith, a Māori academic specialising in indigenous education and research 
methodologies, writes ‘we [indigenous peoples] are the most researched people in the 
World.’85 Her book, Decolonising Methodologies, forcefully demonstrates how European 
scientific research on indigenous peoples is inextricably linked with imperialism, privileging 
European knowledge as ‘truth’ and positioning indigenous peoples as the object of research 
– the ‘other’ to be examined and judged through European eyes and for their own purposes.  
In this sense, indigenous research shares a similarity with critical theory, which seeks to bring 
a benefit to the research participants, rather than simply aiming to acquire knowledge for its 
own sake.86 Tuhiwai-Smith writes passionately about the detrimental impact of this research 
on indigenous peoples – the appropriation of their knowledge and cultural heritage and the 
 
84 Anaya, Charters and Stavenhagen (n 41). 
85 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (2nd edn, Zed Books 
2013)., 7. 
86 Shawn Wilson, Research Is Ceremony: Indigenous Research Methods (Fernwood Publishing Co Ltd 2008)., 37. 
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degradation of their self-worth and ways of life. She argues for indigenous research to be 
carried out by indigenous peoples, according to their own knowledge systems.  
   
This thesis acknowledges that there is a danger of contributing to the colonial legacy of 
appropriation of indigenous knowledge systems. Additionally, it recognises that it is not for 
non-indigenous researchers to speak on behalf of indigenous peoples. Therefore this thesis 
does not make indigenous peoples its research subject, but instead turns attention onto 
Eurocentric Modernity/Coloniality, and the ways that it expresses itself in the context of FPIC. 
It attempts to engage with the work of indigenous authors in a way that listens to and ‘speaks 
with’87 their voices as much as possible, whilst maintaining an awareness of pervasive 
Eurocentric logic both within the mind of the researcher and within much of the literature on 
UNDRIP. On the other hand, there is also a risk ‘romanticising’ indigenous knowledge and 
presenting it as homogenous body of knowledge when in fact, there are many different 
indigenous perspectives. To reflect this, efforts have been made to represent different 
indigenous viewpoints in the discussion on self-determination, multiculturalism, FPIC and 
mediation.  
 
1.6.2 The Methodology of this Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of critical theoretical analysis of the influence of ideas about 
multiculturalism on both the conceptualisation of FPIC and its implementation. The research 
has been conducted through a critical, decolonial theoretical framework that is discussed in 
Chapter 2. It draws from work of decolonial authors such as Walter Mignolo,88 Arturo 
 
87 Catherine Walsh, ‘“Other” Knowledges, “Other” Critiques: Reflections on the Politics and Practices of Philosophy 
and Decoloniality in the “Other” America’ (2012) 1 TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production 
of the Luso-Hispanic World. 
88  Walter D Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America (1st edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2005).; Walter Mignolo, Local 
Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton University Press 
2012).; Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options (Duke 
University Press 2012).; Walter D Mignolo and Arturo Escobar (eds), Globalization and the Decolonial Option 
(Reprint edition, Routledge 2013). 
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Escobar,89 Enrique Dussel,90 Anibal Quijano,91 Ramon Grosfoguel92 and Catherine Walsh.93 
These authors seek to develop postcolonial debates, which they argue are largely anchored 
in the Eurocentric philosophy of Marx and Foucault, to include analysis based on Latin 
American and indigenous philosophy, and expand concepts such as Chakrabarty’s notion of 
provincializing Europe94 by advocating techniques such as border thinking, borrowing from the 
writing of Gloria Anzaldua.95  This approach fits well with the theme of indigenous rights, given 
the relevance of colonial history to the current situation of inequality and discrimination that 
indigenous peoples face, the global/local (‘translocal’ or ‘glocal’) nature of indigenous 
movement,96 and the claims of indigenous people themselves that decolonisation is crucial for 
reconciliation to occur.97  
 
Decolonial writers (as well as those from other methodological approaches) have argued 
against the requirement for - or even the possibility of - strict objectivity on the part of the 
researcher, particularly on questions of social justice.98 The decolonial approach is strongly in 
this vein, arguing that researcher/activists ought not remain neutral on issues that perpetuate 
legacies of colonialism and cause harm to ‘subaltern’ groups.99 Santos has outlined a project 
 
89 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (With a New preface 
by the author edition, Princeton University Press 2011). Mignolo and Escobar (n 88). 
90 Enrique Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics (Duke University Press 2009).; Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of 
Liberation (Aquilina Martinez ed, Wipf & Stock Publishers 2003). 
91  Anibal Quijano, ‘Paradoxes of Modernity in Latin America’ (1989) 3 International Journal of Politics, Culture, and 
Society 147.; Anibal Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America’ (2000) 1 Nepantla: Views 
from South 533. 
92 Ramón Grosfoguel, ‘Race and Ethnicity or Racialized Ethnicities? Identities within Global Coloniality’ (2004) 4 
Ethnicities 315.; Ramón Grosfoguel, ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: 
Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality’ (2011) 1 TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral 
Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World.; Ramón Grosfoguel, ‘Decolonizing Western Uni-Versalisms: 
Decolonial Pluri-Versalism from Aimé Césaire to the Zapatistas’ (2012) 1 TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of 
Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World. 
93 Catherine Walsh, ‘Shifting the Geopolitics of Critical Knowledge’ (2007) 21 Cultural Studies 224.; Walsh (n 87). 
94 Ajay Skaria, ‘The Project of Provincialising Europe: Reading Dipesh Chakrabarty’ (2009) 44 Economic and 
Political Weekly 52. 
95  Gloria Anzaldua, Norma Cantu and Aida Hurtado, Borderlands / La Frontera: The New Mestiza (4 edition, Aunt 
Lute Books 2012).  
96 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense : Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 
(2nd ed., Cambridge University Press] 2002).; Ruth Trinidad Galván, ‘Chicana/Latin American Feminist 
Epistemologies of the Global South (Within and Outside the North): Decolonizing El Conocimiento and Creating 
Global Alliances’ (2014) 6 Journal of Latino-Latin American Studies (JOLLAS) 135. 
97 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (1st edn, David Bunnett Books 1999).; 
Mander and Tauli-Corpuz (n 6).; Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition (University Of Minnesota Press 2014). 
98 Marc Mason, ‘On Objectivity and Staying “Native”’ in Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason and Kirsten McConnachie 
(eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods (1st edn, Routledge 2019) 
<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780429952814> accessed 4 November 2020.; Ranjan Datta, 
‘Decolonizing Both Researcher and Research and Its Effectiveness in Indigenous Research’ (2018) 14 Research 
Ethics 1.; Flavia Monceri, ‘Beyond Universality: Rethinking Transculturality and the Transcultural Self’ (2019) 14 
Journal of Multicultural Discourses 78. 
99 Walter D Mignolo, ‘Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom’ (2009) 26 Theory, 
Culture & Society 159. 
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of ‘the sociology of emergence’,100 in which academics take seriously the efforts of subaltern 
groups to use law for emancipatory ends, rather than dismissing their efforts as being overly 
idealistic or too insignificant to bring about lasting change. The role of the scholar is to join the 
dots between different counter-hegemonic actions, so that each does not appear as an 
isolated exception, but as part of a global effort to de-centre existing hegemonic practices. Put 
another way, the goal is to shed light on the ‘plural forms of resistance and embryonic legal 
alternatives arising from the bottom the world over.’101 At the same time, hegemonic forms of 
law should be critiqued and deconstructed, to erode their assumed legitimacy. Thus, the aim 
of scholars who take this approach is intensely practical: to build on nascent alternatives in 
the hope that, in time, emancipatory laws and practices can be developed to replace those 
which currently dominate.102  In this vein, this thesis views FPIC as an emancipatory project 
led by and for indigenous peoples, and seeks to understand the extent to which Eurocentric 
worldviews are now constraining its emancipatory effect.  
 
The use of indigenous political philosophy as a foundation for critiquing human rights based 
multiculturalism and the UNDRIP is in keeping with the decolonial methodology to think from 
the ‘periphery’, to critically analyse Eurocentric legal and philosophical frameworks through 
the values and perspectives of the oppressed group, and to ‘decentre’ assumptions and 
systems that whilst claiming to be universal, are in fact just one way of viewing the world. As 
a western researcher, this endeavour is inevitably limited by the researcher’s ability to think 
beyond their own culture and epistemic perspective, and the line between appropriation and 
appreciation is ever-present.103 This thesis represents an endeavour to self-reflectively 
‘decolonise the mind’ and to ‘unlearn’ familiar liberal ideals of the Global North by placing them 
in an intercultural dialogue with the critiques of the Global South.104 The purpose is to help 
create space for ‘alternative’ ‘emancipatory’ conceptualisations and practices of FPIC to 
emerge, that  are rooted in indigenous epistemologies.  
 
In order to undertake theoretical analysis in a decolonial fashion, this thesis deliberately draws 
from the work of indigenous authors and some non-indigenous authors who are supportive of, 
 
100 Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed), Another Knowledge Is Possible; beyond Northern Epistemologies (Verso 
2008). 
101  Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization from Below: 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press 2005)., 12. 
102 ibid.,18. 
103 The author is extremely thankful to indigenous thinkers and activists whose writings have challenged and 
enriched her thinking during this research, and acknowledges that the vast majority of these works were written 
predominantly for an indigenous audience.  
104 Santos, Another Knowledge Is Possible; beyond Northern Epistemologies (n 100).; Santos, Toward a New Legal 
Common Sense (n 96).;  Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide 
(Paradigm 2014).  
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and familiar with, the objectives of indigenous activists. Like all groups, indigenous viewpoints 
are diverse, and the sources used represent a range of views about the potential of 
multiculturalism and the UNDRIP to protect indigenous rights. In addition, the analysis of 
UNDRIP’s content draws from primary sources, particularly the various revisions of the 
UNDRIP draft and official statements made by country representatives at the UN, in addition 
to commentary by indigenous and non-indigenous people involved in the drafting process and 
legal analysis by human rights scholars.  
 
The theoretical analysis is grounded by its use of two desk-based case studies that investigate 
whether underlying multiculturalist assumptions are impacting the implementation of FPIC in 
Peru and Canada.  Whilst the usefulness of case studies is contested,105 case studies can 
provide a deeper understanding of complex interactions between the law and its subjects,106 
producing a more holistic and nuanced understanding of situations and events, and the 
different viewpoints of various actors and observers within them.107  
 
The reasons for the choice of Canada and Peru are as follows: First, both countries have 
indicated their support for UNDRIP, with Peru taking a lead in advocating the adoption of 
UNDRIP at UNGA, and Canada indicating its qualified support in 2010, and its full support in 
2016. Both countries are multicultural democracies with a history of European colonisation 
and relatively advanced legal frameworks on indigenous peoples’ rights. Extractive 
development, and mining in particular, is a significant part of both countries’ economies. Both 
countries have a difficult history of conflict between indigenous peoples and the state, whilst 
at the same time being states that consider UNDRIP (and FPIC) to be a key foundation for 
resetting their relationship with indigenous peoples and protecting indigenous peoples’ rights. 
However, the two countries have taken different approaches to implementing FPIC: in the 
case of Peru the framework is legislative. On the other hand, as a common law country, 
Canada’s legal framework relies on the development of case law based on the historic 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the Crown. Whilst this thesis is not intended to 
provide a comparative analysis of these two approaches, it enables an exploration of whether 
similar issues related to multiculturalism are evident in both cases.  
 
 
105 Aikaterini Argyrou, ‘Making the Case for Case Studies in Empirical Legal Research’ (2017) 13 Utrecht Law 
Review 95. Making the case for case studies in Empirical legal research.  
106  Kathleen M Eisenhardt and Melissa E Graebner, ‘Theory Building From Cases: Opportunities And Challenges’ 
(2007) 50 Academy of Management Journal 25.  
107 Jane Lewis and Carol McNaughton Nicholls, ‘Design Issues’ in Jane Ritchie and others (eds), Qualitative 
Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (2nd edn, SAGE Publications Ltd). 
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The illustrative examples of specific consultations were chosen in order to provide insight into 
consultations that could be considered as best case scenarios for FPIC in the two countries, 
because this research is concerned with assessing the reconciliatory potential of the 
multiculturalist approach to FPIC at its most effective. In Peru, the legal framework is such that 
there is little variation in the procedures involved in individual prior consultations. Illustrative 
examples of consultations were therefore chosen due to their illustrating in some way, a 
landmark development in the practice of FPIC. In Canada, where the regulatory environment 
enables more variation, illustrative examples were chosen that highlighted novel institutional 
mechanisms which increased indigenous community’s control of the process, in order to 
provide insight into whether FPIC is promoting indigenous self-determination.   
 
The case studies use a variety of primary sources, such as legislation and government 
decrees, official indigenous and non-indigenous government records, official records of 
consultation plans and agreements, social media accounts and websites of indigenous 
communities, NGO blogs and reports, and reports by observers who were present at the 
consultation in question.  These are complemented by secondary sources such as media 
articles and academic writings. These were selected to include a variety of perspectives from 
the main actors concerned - particularly of state government and indigenous communities 
involved. Texts in Spanish were translated by the author, with assistance from Spanish 
speakers who have lived in Peru particularly to clarify cultural meaning where this was unclear.   
One of the disadvantages of case studies is a lack of generalisability to other situations. Rather 
than focus solely on one case study, it was decided to investigate three examples of FPIC 
consultation in two countries. The intention was not to make direct comparisons, but to deepen 
understanding of the complexities that can arise during consultation, and to gain an indication 
of whether the theoretical limitations of multiculturalist understandings of FPIC identified 
earlier on in the thesis are observable in practice.  It was not practically feasible to undertake 
field research for six different illustrative examples, but the breadth of information readily 
available online nevertheless made it possible to gain a relatively in-depth understanding of 
the cases from a distance. Furthermore, in the analysis of the case studies, reference has 
been made to other research on FPIC in the countries which corroborates the observations 
made.   
 
Following the case studies, Chapter 8 utilises three mediation models to explore whether 
mediation could provide a means of tempering the influence of the multiculturalist approach to 
FPIC on the FPIC process - in particular, to try to mitigate imbalances of power. This research 
intends to reflect on the limitations of non-indigenous strategies for dialogue that may be 
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employed in the context of FPIC.108 In doing so, this thesis recognises that by and large such 
approaches are based in non-indigenous knowledges, and may not be considered appropriate 
for use by specific indigenous communities. The rights-based and interests-based models 
were chosen because ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ are often considered to be integral to the FPIC 
process as a basis for discussions.  The narrative model of mediation is not as widely known. 
However, it permits an alternative analysis of how power operates within dialogue processes, 
and specifically deals with the impact of epistemic injustice as well as the potential for finding 




1.7 Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 provides greater detail on the theoretical framework that underpins this thesis, and 
its methodological implications. It explores the relationship between the decolonial approach, 
which is a specifically Latin American critique of the colonial legacy,109 and similar approaches 
such as postcolonial studies and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). 
Although there are many similarities, the decolonial approach offers greater emphasis on the 
importance of the early colonial period in Latin America to the creation of the modern world 
system and its engagement with indigenous and other marginalised epistemologies within 
Latin America.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the premise that indigenous peoples and the state exist in a condition of 
intractable conflict, whose root cause is the inability to reconcile indigenous claims for self-
determination with the sovereignty, political unity and territorial integrity of the state. It also 
introduces UNDRIP as a ‘framework for reconciliation’ and examines Eurocentric and 
indigenous ideas on what is required for reconciliation to occur. By tracing the status of 
indigenous peoples in international law over the centuries, it shows how the source of the 
conflict between indigenous peoples and states has been entrenched in the international 
normative framework. Finally, drawing from human rights scholars and indigenous political 
 
108 Additionally, the researcher considers that it would be inappropriate for a non-indigenous author to base such 
an analysis in indigenous models of negotiation or dispute resolution with which she is not intimately familiar and 
without the involvement and consent of the indigenous communities in question.  
109 Different authors refer to ‘decolonial’ approaches and the ‘Modernity/Coloniality’ school to indicate a specific 
body of work based on the writing of Anibal Quijano and Walter Mignolo, which analyses the colonial legacy from 
a Latin American perspective. In this thesis, I will mainly refer to the ‘decolonial approach’. 
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philosophy, it examines how the recognition of the right to self-determination in Article 3 of 
UNDRIP may be constrained by interpreting it solely through the lens of human rights. It 
argues that if the right to self-determination it is to enable a process of reconciliation, it will 
need to be interpreted in a way that engages with indigenous ideas and retains its power to 
challenge the political and economic status quo. 
 
Chapter 4 develops on the limitations of human rights approaches in the quest for 
reconciliation, by examining whether Kymlicka’s influential model of human rights based 
multiculturalism provides a sufficient framework for restoring the relationship between 
indigenous peoples and the state. In line with the decolonial approach outlined in Chapter 2, 
it critiques Kymlicka’s theory drawing from the work of indigenous activists and political 
philosophers, most of whom have engaged with multiculturalism as it arises in the Canadian 
context. It identifies three key ways in which human rights based multiculturalism falls short of 
enabling self-determination of indigenous peoples: it fails to adequately engage with 
indigenous worldviews, and thus overlooks the central importance of indigenous self-
determination; it reinforces colonial hierarchies of power that privilege the state as the ultimate 
legal authority; and it provides a  definition of citizenship that focuses on rights, rather than 
relationship and responsibility for each other and the natural world. 
 
Chapter 5 applies the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 to Article 32 of UNDRIP, in relation to 
FPIC. It argues that there are two very different interpretations of FPIC emerging. Indigenous 
rights advocates have defended a ‘general rule’ approach that affirms the fundamental place 
of indigenous self-determination, and requires consent to be obtained in the vast majority of 
extractive projects.  On the other hand, states have developed a ‘multiculturalist’ interpretation 
of FPIC as a measure that safeguards rights of indigenous peoples in the context of a 
democratic, multicultural but unified state. This multiculturalist interpretation considers that 
obtaining FPIC is an objective, but not a requirement. Utilising the analysis of the previous 
chapter on human rights based multiculturalism as well as the work of decolonial authors, 
Chapter 5 cautions that far from being a tool for reconciliation, there is potential for FPIC to 
create a new layer of conflict between states and indigenous peoples.  
 
Following this, Chapters 6 and 7 present two case studies on the implementation of FPIC in 
Peru (in Chapter 6) and Canada (in Chapter 7). These two chapters take the same format, 
first analysing the development of the legal framework on FPIC in each country and then 
presenting three illustrative examples of FPIC consultation processes, before analysing 
whether the theoretical constraints of multiculturalist approach to FPIC that were identified in 




Chapter 8 is the final substantive chapter of this thesis. It draws from the case studies, as well 
as wider literature on the practice of FPIC, to consider whether the use of mediation might 
overcome some of the limitations of the multiculturalist approach to FPIC noted in the previous 
Chapters. Drawing from theory on rights-based mediation, interests-based mediation and 
narrative mediation, it provides three different means of analysing power dynamics within a 
prior consultation process, and analyses how mediation techniques could help to expose and 
shift power imbalances to cultivate a more equal intercultural dialogue between indigenous 
peoples and states. It also draws attention to the limitations of western mediation models in 
this context, and highlights the importance of designing mediation processes in partnership 
with indigenous communities to give them equal control over the process.  
 
Finally, Chapter 9 provides the main conclusions and limitations of this thesis and suggests 








This chapter outlines the theoretical framework that underpins this thesis, and its 
methodological implications. Section 2 introduces the body of literature comprising 
‘postcolonial studies’, explaining its important exposure of the continued legacy of colonialism 
on the present-day world system, particularly in relation to the colonisation of the Middle East, 
South Asia and Africa. This critique has been applied to international law by those who employ 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), which has contributed to the study of 
indigenous peoples’ rights in international law. Section 3 suggests how the ‘decolonial’ or 
Modernity/Coloniality school1 - a specifically Latin American critique of the colonial legacy – 
could add to TWAIL’s analysis of international law, and to the study of indigenous peoples’ 
rights and FPIC in particular. The decolonial approach contains similar themes to postcolonial 
literature, particularly in terms of the dualism inherent in colonial culture and the need to 
identify that European culture and systems are not universal. However, decoloniality differs 
from postcolonial analyses in its emphasis on the importance of the early colonial period in 
Latin America to the creation of the modern world system and its engagement with indigenous 
and other marginalised epistemologies within Latin America.  Finally, Section 4 considers 
some methodological implications of the choice of decolonial literature as a theoretical 
framework.  
 




Postcolonialism is a diverse movement which came to prominence in the Western academy 
during the 1980s, drawing from the intellectual legacy of non-Europeans who were struggling 
against colonisation after the Second World War.2  This legacy includes influential intellectual-
activists such as Martinican Psychiatrist Frantz Fanon (who later lived in Algeria during the 
 
1 Different authors refer to ‘decolonial’ approaches and the ‘Modernity/Coloniality’ school to indicate a specific body 
of work based on the writing of Anibal Quijano and Walter Mignolo, which analyses the colonial legacy from a Latin 
American perspective. This thesis will mainly refer to the ‘decolonial approach’. 
2 Eve Darian-Smith, ‘Postcolonial Theories of Law’ in Max Travers and Reza Banakar (eds), An Introduction to Law 
and Social Theory (2nd edn, Hart 2012). 
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war of independence against the French),3 Trinidadian socialist historian C.L.R. James,4 
Martinican poet and politician Aimé Césaire5 and Afro-American sociologist and historian 
W.E.B. DuBois.6 Between them, they vehemently challenged colonialism in the Caribbean and 
Africa and racial oppression in the United States of America. Their writing also celebrated the 
power of oppressed peoples to resist such regimes. Postcolonial studies as an academic 
genre has been greatly influenced by the writing of three literary theorists:7 Palestinian-
American Edward Said,8 Indian Homi Bhabha9 and Gayatri Spivak, also from India.10  
 
Said’s work critiqued the field of Oriental Studies, interrogating the production of knowledge 
from the point of view of a constructed divide between the Occident (the Western World of 
Western Europe and the United States of America) and the Orient (the Middle and Far East). 
Said argued that Oriental Studies was founded on the distinction between the Orient as ‘other’, 
and the notion that Modernity was created by the West. Therefore, history had become the 
story of the Wests’ actions upon the passive ‘other’. Said draws from a variety of Western texts 
across many disciplines to demonstrate a discourse of ‘Orientalism’, which emerged at the 
end of the eighteenth century, constructed in the atmosphere of the Enlightenment. 
Knowledge was regarded as universal and categorised into disciplines whose conventions 
dictated how knowledge was recognised and classified. Despite the appearance of objectivity, 
Said demonstrated that scientific and other disciplines represented the Orient as being almost 
always negative, drawing from stereotypes with little evidential foundation. This underlying 
schema, being particularly insidious due to its propagation in government and mass media, 
acted to legitimise and perpetuate the domination of the Orient by the West.11 Said also 
explored the origins of imperialism in the Western psyche, arguing that Western culture has 
both reflected and reinforced imperialism in history and up to the present day. Said argued 
 
3 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Constance Farrington tr, New Ed, Penguin Classics 2001).; Frantz 
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New edition edition, Pluto Press 2008). 
4 CLR James and James Walvin, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution 
(New Ed edition, Penguin 2001). 
5 Aime Cesaire and Robin DG Kelley, Discourse on Colonialism (New Ed edition, Monthly Review Press 2000).  
Aime Cesaire, A Tempest: Based on Shakespeare’s the Tempest, (Wheeler Professor of Performance and Director 
of the Otto B Schoepfle Vocal Arts Center Richard Miller tr, 1 edition, Theatre Communications Group Inc,US 
2002).Aimé Césaire, James Arnold and Clayton Eshleman, The Original 1939 Notebook of a Return to the Native 
Land (Bilingual edition edition, Wesleyan University Press 2013). 
6 WEB Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New edition edition, Dover Publications Inc 2000). 
7 Robert JC Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (Routledge 1994)., 163; Peter Childs, 
An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory (Longman 1997)., viii; Alpana Roy, ‘Postcolonial Theory and Law: A Critical 
Introduction’ (2008) 29 Adelaide Law Review 315. 
8 Edward W Said, Culture And Imperialism (New Ed edition, Vintage 1994). Edward W Said, Orientalism ([New 
2003 ed], Penguin 2003).  
9  Homi K Bhabha, The Location of Culture (2 edition, Routledge 2004). 
10 Gayatri Spivak, The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayati Chakravorty Spivak (Donna Landry and Gerald 
MacLean eds, Routledge 1996). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History 
of the Vanishing Present (Harvard University Press 1999). 
11 Said, Orientalism (n 8). 
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that essentialist narratives about race and nationalism must be overcome in favour of a new 
recognition of intertwined histories and identities.12    
 
 Said’s influence is extremely significant. Childs and Williams comment that without Said, 
‘Colonial Discourse Analysis and Postcolonial Theory might not have cohered or constituted 
themselves as an area of theoretical enquiry in the way that they did.’13 As a result of Said’s 
theoretical influence, a key strategy of postcolonial literature is to expose and challenge the 
dualisms embedded in the European worldview which sustain neo-colonialist policies. 
Postcolonialism also seeks to challenge limiting and negative interpretations of the Third 
World, exposing dominating forms of power, and understanding how power can be enabled to 
resist Eurocentric hegemony.14 
 
Bhaba’s contribution focuses on the reconstruction of the concept of Modernity as a purely 
European construct. He points to the hybridity of the postcolonial condition. Bhabha argues 
that Fanon’s division of “Black Skins, White Masks” is in fact not clear cut: the process of 
colonisation results in hybridisation of colonised and coloniser culture, through cultural 
interchanges at the local level. The identities of the colonised and the colonisers are 
challenged and transformed by the process of colonisation. This reality belies the ideological 
notion of culture as separate or pure. The examination of these interactions between coloniser 
and colonised allows contradictions in the colonial narrative to emerge, which can be used to 
undermine its power.  
 
For example, the brutality of colonialism undermines the narrative of its ‘civilising mission’. 15 
Chakrabarty goes beyond Bhabha’s examination of hybridised identity to focus on the interplay 
between different knowledge systems. Chakrabarty advocates the ‘provincialisation’ of 
European knowledge and cultural narratives, recognising that they are not universally 
applicable.  He argues that European knowledge and narratives of history need to be 
‘provincialised’ with the recognition that they are inherently European, rather than global or 
universal. In addition, he posits that knowledge systems are not distinct entities, but can also 
be hybridised through interaction. Therefore, an examination of interplay between European 
and non-European knowledge systems is essential in order to discover alternatives to the 
dominant paradigm. In Provincialising Europe he writes ‘European thought is at once both 
indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think through the experiences of political 
 
12 Said, Culture And Imperialism (n 8). 
13 Childs (n 7). 
14 Dianne Otto, ‘Postcolonialism and Law?’ (2000) 15 Third World Legal Studies. 
15 Bhabha (n 9). 
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modernity in non-Western nations, and provincializing Europe becomes the task of exploring 
how this thought … may be renewed from and for the margins.’16 
 
The concept of the ‘subaltern’ has been introduced to postcolonial literature through the work 
of Spivak and the Subaltern Studies Group which includes the work of Chatterjee and Guja.17  
Subaltern Studies focusses not simply on the duality between colonised and coloniser, but 
also examines the hierarchies that are part of the colonised and colonising cultures. The 
narratives of colonisation and resistance are written by those with the power to speak, but this 
does not represent the totality of the colonised group. Subaltern Studies seeks to reveal the 
actions of those who may be ignored by intellectual postcolonial writing: for example, the 
grassroots peasant movements, or women whose voices are silenced by societal customs, 
laws, or lack of education. In concluding that the subaltern cannot speak for themselves, due 
to the overlapping hierarchies being imposed (for example, colonialism as well as patriarchy 
within the colonial and colonised community), Spivak argues that Subaltern Studies ought to 
draw attention to their exclusion from historical narrative, whilst resisting the temptation to 
speak on their behalf.18  
 
Spivak also recognises the pitfalls of essentialism (i.e. the danger of treating a specific group 
as homogenous and possessing the same characteristics and interests). She introduced the 
concept of ‘strategic essentialism’, to describe the use of group identity as a basis for a political 
struggle, whilst simultaneously rejecting the notion of homogeneity within the group.19 
Subaltern Studies therefore presents a challenge to postcolonial writers to avoid the trap of 
romanticising the subaltern or ignoring the diversity within the groups they seek to empower.  
 
Postcolonial literature has therefore drawn attention to the ongoing legacies of colonialism, 
and vehemently opposes the view that colonial policies ended with the decolonisation of 
colonial territories after World War Two. It has exposed the dualist notion of the West versus 
the Orient, revealing how imperialist tendencies are embedded and supported by European 
or North American culture. It also has drawn attention to the need for examination of how 
knowledge systems are recognised and placed in hierarchies of legitimacy, and of the need 
to challenge dominant narratives which claim universal relevance. Privileging the narratives of 
 
16 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (New edition with a 
New preface by the author edition, Princeton University Press 2007)., 16.  
17 Childs (n 7). 
18 Gayatri Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds), Colonial Discourse 
and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1994). 
19  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (Routledge 1998). 
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the oppressed can challenge the assumptions of the colonial narrative and reveal the agency 
of non-European peoples to resist colonialism and imperialism.  
 
2.2.2 TWAIL: Applying postcolonial thought to international law 
 
The above section reviewed the main themes of both postcolonial literature. This section 
explores how postcolonial approaches have been applied to International Law. It examines 
the role of law in establishing and perpetuating colonial hierarchies of inequality, for example 
through its underlying ‘civilising mission’ in the role of international institutions in the internal 
economic and social affairs of developing countries,20 the positioning of the State as the 
ultimate unit of social organisation to the detriment of other means, and the underlying 
assumptions of state sovereignty and formal equality separated from recognition of political 
realities.21   
 
The TWAIL movement arose in the late 1990s, from a series of meetings at Harvard Law 
School, which aimed to critique existing third world scholarship on international law, the 
universal claims of public international law and international economic law, and the relative 
weight given to international legal scholars from the ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds.22 TWAIL now is a 
diverse network of critical legal scholars who seek to examine how international law relates to 
questions of colonial history, identity, power and difference, as well as considering avenues 
for egalitarian changes to international law itself.23  TWAIL scholarship re-tells the history of 
international law, bringing the colonial encounter between Europeans and non-Europeans to 
the centre of its historical narrative.  It rejects the view that colonialism ended with the 
decolonisation period after World War Two, and seeks recognition within international law of 
colonialism’s continuing legacy. 24 It also aims to discover new forms of resistance to the 
generation of international law through the predominant knowledge and voices of the “Global 
North”, whether through the use of law by grassroots movements25 or through the voices of 
 
20 Antony Anghie, ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’ (2006) 27 Third World 
Quarterly 739. 
21 John D Haskell, ‘TRAIL-Ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to International Law’ 
(2014) 27 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 383.  
22 The initial conference was held in 1997, organised by a group of graduate students including Celestine Nyamu, 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Hani Sayed, Vasuki Nesiah, Elchi Nowrojee, Bhupinder Chimni and James Thuo Gathii, 
supported by Professor David Kennedy (Faculty Director of Harvard Law School) Anthony Angie (a Harvard Law 
School Graduate) and Makau Wa Mutua (former Director of the Human Rights Program at Harvard).  
23 James Thuo Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 26. 
24 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007). 
25 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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third world judges on International Tribunals.26  In doing so, TWAIL engages in a project of 
transforming international law, so that it represents the voices of all the world’s peoples.27 
 
There is a fine line to tread between recognising the use of international law to further the 
colonial legacy of Western imperialism, and affirming the proposition that international law as 
a framework which was devised solely by Europeans and exported to the periphery. Anghie 
demonstrates the impact of the colonial encounter on the development of International Law, 
which he views as originating in the need to mediate difference between European states and 
their colonies or non-European trading partners. Thus international law cannot be viewed as 
a purely European phenomenon, but one which has been exploited by European colonial 
states to support their political and economic aspirations.28 Anghie’s analysis continues the 
writing of third world scholars such as Weeramantry, who has examined the influence of 
Islamic legal systems on the development of legal doctrine in Europe in the 1400s.29  
 
In addition to affirming the contribution of non-European legal systems to early international 
law, TWAIL remains sceptical of many third world governments whose policies adopt 
oppressive legal frameworks and structures. TWAIL thus does not give support 
indiscriminately to any third world legal regime. TWAIL calls for ‘dialogic manoeuvres across 
cultures to establish, where necessary, the content of universally acceptable norms’, 
accepting the positive from both Eurocentric and other legal frameworks.30 As will be 
discussed in Section 2.3, it is particularly in this area that decolonial writing on transmodernity 
may be a useful addition to TWAIL’s theoretical approach.   
 
Critics of TWAIL have argued that it is doomed to failure by its own conflicting logic: how can 
TWAIL scholars utilise a system which is inherently colonial for emancipatory purposes? 
Fiddler has questioned whether the task of integrating third world voices into the construction 
of international law is possible, given the existence of an international system which is 
‘structurally and substantively more inhospitable to its message than the system faced by 
developing-country international lawyers in the period of decolonization.’31  Alvarez has also 
 
26  James Thuo Gathii, ‘Geographical Hegelianism in Territorial Disputes Involving Non-European Land Relations: 
An Analysis of the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 581.  
27 Makau Mutua and Antony Anghie, ‘What Is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) 31.  
28 Anghie (n 24).  
29 CG Weeramantry and Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan 
Ltd 1988).  
30 Mutua and Anghie (n 27). 
31 David P Fidler, ‘Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction 
of International Law’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 29.  
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questioned whether the deliberately diverse voices of TWAIL scholars have a clear enough 
message to enable change, and queries whether in fact they advocate disengagement with 
the international legal system entirely.32 Gathii suggests that this nihilistic point of view could 
derive from the fact that TWAIL is sometimes perceived as critique for its own sake. However, 
he argues, TWAIL scholarship undertakes critique to ‘build on and transform the egalitarian 
aspects of international law” rather than to merely ‘deride’.’33   
 
Indeed, the possibility of transforming international law is in fact a debate within TWAIL itself. 
Anthony Anghie states that ‘some scholars have eloquently argued that the Third World should 
dispense with international law altogether. But this not a feasible option, simply because that 
would leave open the field of international law to the imperial processes.’34 In other words, if 
TWAIL scholars accept that their mission is impossible, they admit defeat. Anthony Anghie 
argues further: 
 
The point is not to condemn the ideals of [international law] as being inherently imperial 
constructs, but rather to question how it is that these ideals have become used as a 
means of furthering imperialism and why it is that international law and institutions 
seem so often to fail to make these ideals a reality… and in doing so, empower us to 
make, rather than simply replicate, history.35  
 
However, in its attempts to reform international law, TWAIL stands accused of presenting 
solutions which are not radically different from Eurocentric reforms to international law. Haskell 
takes the work of leading TWAIL scholar, Chimni, and argues that current proposals for reform, 
even of scholars considered to be radical, are not noticeably different from reforms proposed 
by more conventional critics of International Law: 
 
In focusing on the 'timing' and 'extent' of trade liberalization, and calling for international 
institutional regulators to curb the excesses of financial speculation and promote 
abstract principles, such as 'accountability' and 'transparency', he not only seems 
indistinguishable from Eurocentric reform proposals, but perhaps more importantly, 
does not interact with the possibility that there is something more intrinsic to the ideas 
 
32  Jose E Alvarez, ‘My Summer Vacation (Part III): Revisiting TWAIL in Paris’ (Opinio Juris) 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/28/my-summer-vacation-part-iii-revisiting-twail-in-paris/> accessed 8 May 2014. 
33 Gathii (n 23)., 43. 
34 Anghie (n 20)., 752. 
35 Anghie (n 24)., 320. 
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and practices of the international economic regime itself that constructs the inequalities 
he sets out to confront.36 
 
A number of strategies have been presented in response to the challenge of transforming 
International Law. Haskell advises TWAIL scholars to find more radical solutions through 
challenging the goals and assumptions of the international legal system, rather than focussing 
solely on implementation.  He proposes that TWAIL scholars engage more deeply in 
Structuralist and Marxist critique, undertaking ‘structural jurisprudence’ which reveals the 
binary nature of international law’s vocabulary and analyses how capitalist production 
operates through the international legal system.37  
 
Another approach to the challenges of reform has been to conduct ethnographic research, 
linking local experience of international law to global law and institutions. Darian-Smith argues 
that TWAIL, through deeper analysis of intersectionality between different forms of 
discrimination and ethnographic research, can make an important contribution to the 
scholarship of international law, which remains  
 
stuck in a modernist worldview that ... prioritises a state’s legal interrelations with other 
states and fails to pay sufficient attention to the ever-expanding field of NGOs, 
volunteer organisations, religious and ethnic regional affiliations, and the mass 
movement of peoples in search of greater human security.38  
 
Eslava and Pahuja have also proposed an ethnographic approach, which explores the 
implementation of, and resistance to, international law within specific locations. These could 
be through regulatory implementation, and specific policy and practice at a State, regional or 
local level. This, they argue, would build a more nuanced understanding of how international 
law operates in a diverse manner dependent on local context, and could draw attention to and 
create links between many small acts of resistance.39 Similarly, Rajagopal has used an 
interdisciplinary approach to examine the emergence of transnational social movements, 
connecting individual sites of resistance and assessing implications of the emerging global 
movement for the international legal system, in particular human rights law and its 
institutions.40  
 
36 Haskell (n 21)., 405. 
37 ibid. 
38 Darian-Smith (n 2)., 263. 
39 Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law’ 
(2012) 45 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 195. 




Thus TWAIL has helped to raise the voice of the third world in international law, and it reveals 
the links between the current international legal system and institutions, and their colonial 
origins. It further reveals the Eurocentric nature of international law, whilst undermining the 
assumption that it has evolved purely from European thought. It calls for international legal 
scholars and practitioners, as well as grassroots activists, to create transnational coalitions 
which build on the egalitarian elements within international law whilst challenging the 
structures and use of international law for the furtherance of American/Western European 
ends. This includes critically examining the practice of third world governments who may be 
complicit in this project, and examining the manifestations of International Law in local 
contexts. However, critics argue that TWAIL has set itself an impossible task, and that it does 
not offer new solutions. The next section explores how TWAIL has contributed to the literature 
on indigenous peoples’ rights.  
 
2.2.3  Postcolonial analyses of indigenous peoples’ rights 
 
The vast majority of authors on indigenous peoples’ rights recognise the injustices wreaked 
on indigenous peoples through European colonialism. The preamble to UNDRIP itself recalls 
these injustices, and authors argue that indigenous peoples’ specific grievances demand a 
Declaration which is specific to indigenous peoples, as distinct from other minorities.  It is 
therefore not surprising that many authors on indigenous rights engage with postcolonial 
authors and approaches in their work.  For example, Gordon asserts that TWAIL is a useful 
framework for analysing the impact of international law on indigenous peoples’ rights, such as 
the International Labor Organization Treaty 169. He states that  
 
since the Third World and indigenous peoples share the characteristic of having been 
subjected to domination at the hands of a Eurocentric international legal system, the 
tools with which TWAIL has armed itself can be transferred to the realm of indigenous 
peoples in an attempt to explain the indigenous situation within the international legal 
system as well as identifying how the current system has failed and continues to fail 
these peoples.41 
 
Another example of postcolonial approach to indigenous rights scholarship is Indigenous 
Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration.42 This interdisciplinary work, drawing from legal, 
 
41 Seth Gordon, ‘Indigenous Rights in Modern International Law from a Critical Third World Perspective’ (2006) 31 
American Indian Law Review 401. 
42 Elvira Pulitano, Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration (Cambridge University Press 2012)., 6. 
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anthropological, literary and indigenous perspectives, asks whether UNDRIP is an effective 
tool for indigenous self-determination. The contributors argue that indigenous perspectives 
and stories must be taken into account in order to undo the Eurocentric origins of international 
law. UNDRIP is viewed as a point of departure from the trajectory of international law, towards 
a ‘humanized’ law, and points to the existence of ‘different types of laws in the world’.43 
Indigenous interpretations of terms such as statehood, understood as an autonomous and 
transculturated political structure rather than a separate State, can transform Eurocentric 
understandings of international law. It also highlights the reluctance of States and the UN to 
fully embrace and implement UNDRIP. Throughout the work, there is an emphasis on the 
need to resolve the conflict of values and meaning between indigenous and non-indigenous 
worldviews and legal approaches.  
 
Postcolonial writers also advocate the study of resistance movements and their effects, in 
relation to the indigenous movement. Transforming Law and Institution 44 is a socio-legal work 
exploring how the global indigenous movement operated within the UN system to bring about 
changes in discourse and international law relating to indigenous peoples rights, as well as 
the impact that that interaction had on the movement itself. Morgan cites many examples of 
how law and practice of international, regional and national regimes, as well as international 
organisations such as the UN and the World Bank, have been impacted by the indigenous 
rights movement, but cautions that law is insufficient to bring about lasting change. Social, 
economic, political and cultural factors are responsible for a widening ‘implementation gap’ 
between norms and reality on the ground. Influences such as the interests of States and 
transnational companies, discriminatory attitudes and structural racism, and an ‘administrative 
culture unaccustomed to multiculturalism’,45 lack of political will or mechanisms, bureaucracy 
and corruption are amongst the barriers to implementation. It requires the cooperation of the 
UN, States, indigenous peoples, and civil society to overcome these challenges.  
 
Discussion of indigenous peoples rights may directly speak to the fundamental uncertainty of 
the TWAIL movement discussed above, that international law may never be used for 
emancipatory purposes. Alexandra Xanthaki refers to the engagement of indigenous peoples 
in UN mechanisms, and notes: ‘Anghie questions whether the postcolonial world can “deploy 
for its own purposes the law which had enabled its suppression in the first place”. This is 
 
43 Ibid., 6. 
44 Rhiannon Morgan, Transforming Law and Institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights 
(Ashgate 2011). 
45 ibid., 159. 
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exactly what indigenous peoples are trying to do.’46 Whilst Xanthaki is sceptical of the 
possibility that international law could ever escape imperialist tendencies, she is optimistic 
about the impact of the indigenous rights movement, arguing that their claims for self-
determination, cultural rights and property rights are generally consistent with existing 
international law principles but are contributing to a dynamic shift of meaning. She considers 
that the indigenous debate has reopened discussions that international law had previously 
considered closed, such as human rights standards and their assumed meanings and use, 
whilst the engagement of indigenous peoples in UN institutions has strengthened the 
possibility of global cooperation. For this reason, the study of indigenous rights from a 
postcolonial perspective may benefit not only indigenous rights movement, but also 
postcolonial scholarship itself.   
 
2.3 The potential of the ‘decolonial’ approach  
 
As described above, TWAIL has made important contributions to the international legal debate 
which will shape the analysis in this thesis. TWAIL’s questioning of whether international law 
can be used to challenge its own imperial tendencies is particularly relevant for a thesis which 
explores indigenous peoples’ use of international law to regain control over their lives and 
territories after centuries of colonisation. Nevertheless, TWAIL has relied extensively upon 
postcolonial literature, but has not engaged significantly with an alternative viewpoint on 
colonialism put forward by decolonial thinkers from the Latin American Modernity/Coloniality 
school. This refers to a group of authors who root their analysis of present-day struggles for 
social justice in the experience of the colonisation of the Americas, which also offers valuable 
insights for this present research project, particularly given its focus on the implementation of 
FPIC in Peru and Canada.47  
 
In the context of a thesis on indigenous peoples’ rights, which is focused on countries in the 
Americas, it is important that the theoretical framework employed reflects both indigenous 
worldviews and the historical timeframe of colonisation in the countries in question. Decolonial 
writers date their lineage back to indigenous resistance of early colonisation, and have 
incorporated indigenous perspectives into their research.48  
 
 
46 Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land 
(Cambridge University Press 2010)., 2. Citing Anghie (n 24)., 8.   
47 Exceptions include Matthew Stone, Illan Rua Wall and Costas Douzinas (eds), New Critical Legal Thinking: Law 
and the Political (Birkbeck Law Press 2012).  
48 Catherine Walsh, ‘Afro and Indigenous Life-Visions in/and Politics. (De)colonial Perspectives in Bolivia and 




2.3.1 Building on TWAIL scholarship through the decolonial approach 
 
Decolonial authors have also engaged with matters of law, including the struggle of indigenous 
peoples at both the local and global levels. The most notable example is Portuguese 
Sociologist and Legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos, who cites both decolonial and 
postcolonial writers. His book (jointly with César A. Rodríguez-Garavito), Law and 
Globalization from Below,49 considers the role of law in the global justice movement, using a 
socio-legal, bottom-up approach.  In the introductory explanation of his theoretical position, 
Santos cites decolonial authors, particularly Mignolo, Quijano and Dussel, in his proposal of 
‘subaltern cosmopolitan legality’ defined a set of conditions which are essential if the law is to 
be used for emancipatory ends.50  
 
In Toward a New Legal Common Sense, Santos argues that modern law has become 
ineffectual in current challenges of social regulation and emancipation, but that there is an 
emerging movement of subaltern cosmopolitan legality which respects difference as well as 
equality, and results in bottom-up changes and use of the law for emancipatory goals. Santos 
also develops the possibility of an intercultural reconstruction of human rights in Another 
Knowledge is Possible,51 advocating a cross-cultural dialogue which results in a mestizo 
understanding of rights, rather than one that has evolved primarily out of capitalist/colonialist 
framework. Legal approaches based on Latin American decolonial philosophy have also been 
advocated by Leung52 Guardiola-Riveira53 and by Barretto in relation to human rights,54 and by 
 
49 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization from Below: 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
50 Boaventura de Sousa Santos lists eight proposals for subaltern cosmopolitan legality (SCL): (1) it is possible to 
use state law and individual rights for political struggle, but there are alternatives (2) Law should be used as a tool 
in political struggle, as part of a wider political mobilisation which may include illegal and non-legal acts (3) legal 
pluralism must be analysed and not assumed to be counter-hegemonic, as it may contribute to inequality of power 
relations (4) political objectives can be used to prioritise local, national or international legal action and to target 
links between global and local legalities (5) SCL is concerned with systemic change and social justice, not just 
individual justice (6) SCL views power relations as not being restricted to the State but including the market, and 
the community, and aims to empower the ‘subaltern market’ and ‘subaltern community’ (7) SCL uses the law’s 
aspirational qualities to argue for radical social transformation, whilst also arguing for more effective implementation 
of existing law. (8) SCL may also adopt ‘demo-liberal’ strategies which confirm the hegemony of the State, 
particularly where the objective is to achieve basic rights which will permit greater political mobilisation. Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense : Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (2nd ed., 
Cambridge University Press] 2002). 
51 Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed), Another Knowledge Is Possible; beyond Northern Epistemologies (Verso 
2008). 
52 Gilbert Leung, ‘Towards a Radical Cosmopolitanism’ in Matthew Stone, Illan Rua Wall and Costas Douzinas 
(eds), New Critical Legal Thinking: Law, Politics and the Political (Routledge 2012). 
53 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Law, Globalisation, and Second Coming’ (2013) 11 Human Architecture: Journal of the 
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54 José-Manuel Barreto, ‘Decolonial Strategies and Dialogue in the Human Rights Field: A Manifesto’ (2012) 3 
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Meyer in relation to international peace-making.55 Therefore this thesis will contribute towards 
a relatively new body of literature which seeks to apply decolonial Latin American writing to 
the problem of overcoming Eurocentric hegemony in International Law.  
 
Latin American Philosophy could assist in questioning the underlying assumptions and aims 
of the Law. Using the work of Dussel, as well as Simon Bolivar and other Latin American 
writers, Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, proposes a new approach which he terms ‘redemptive critical 
theory’.56 This critique argues that Latin American philosophy revolves around the creation of 
hope: alternative ways of configuring the world which draw from the principle of reciprocity 
(between people, current and future generations, or between people and planet) rather than 
concentrating on the production and distribution of financial capital, and with the faculty of 
judgement or reason. Guardiola-Rivera argues that Latin American philosophy highlights the 
need of capitalism to produce an ‘other’, and its tendency to evoke narratives of scarcity and 
competition, rather than plenty and reciprocity. Redemptive critical theory would therefore ask 
how hope can be rediscovered, reasserting Amerindian and Afro-descendent Latin-American 
ways of thinking which view time and space as priceless gifts of nature rather than 
commodities and emphasising reciprocity over capital exchange.  The route-map and 
methodology for redemptive critical theory is not clear, however it is an example of the radically 
different approach which could be taken as a result of engagement in Latin American 
philosophy.57  
 
Decolonial approaches may help to include the voices of Latin American and indigenous 
peoples in critiques of international law. As Caroline Walsh and Arturo Escobar58 have pointed 
out, there is a rich tradition of black and indigenous thought which has been ignored by 
postcolonial critique but which can contribute to creating alternatives to Modernity. Decolonial 
thought draws from such knowledges. Additionally, as discussed above, the main postcolonial 
authors – Spivak, Bhaba, Said and others – centre their analysis on the impact of British and 
French colonialism in the Middle East, Africa or Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
paying relatively little attention to the wealth of writing on colonisation from a Latin American 
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perspective.59 For example, Gathii states that ‘the colonial legacy of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries places a substantial constraint on the former colonies, to the benefit of 
former colonial powers.’60  Whilst decolonial scholars do not contest the truth of this statement, 
they argue that this historically limited view of colonialism obscures the impact of the previous 
three centuries of colonialism in the Americas. Latin America has its own experience and 
interpretation of colonialism which ought not to be omitted from holistic discussion of the global 
impact of colonialism.61  As Salvatore argues, ‘To start the criticism of Eurocentrism with 
Conrad and Kipling, or even with the cultural activities of the East India Company, seems to 
miss the origin of modernity by two or three centuries.’62 
 
Furthermore, through its emphasis on ‘border thinking’63 and ‘epistemic delinking’64(discussed 
later in this chapter), decolonial approaches might open up new and more radical proposals 
than those provided by TWAIL through its analyses which rely on Eurocentric theoretical 
frameworks, such as Marxism for example.  The Modernity/Coloniality school argue that the 
postcolonial literature is often theoretically based in the writings of European academics, such 
as Marx, Foucault, Horkheimer and others, and so postcolonial critique is  
 
largely anchored in Euro-American and continental perspectives, in ‘new’ readings of 
post-structuralism and post-modernism, and in a continued discarding or lack of 
attention to critical knowledge production of people of color, particularly intellectuals 
not from the ‘academy’ but associated with social movements and with a ‘collective’ 
rather than individual thinking.65  
 
Similarly, Ramon Grosfoguel argues that this ‘discarding’ of other knowledges limits the South 
Asian Subaltern Studies Group, which ‘by using a Western epistemology and privileging 
Gramsci and Foucault, constrained and limited the radicalism of their critique to 
Eurocentrism.’66 Grosfoguel calls for the decolonisation not only of Subaltern Studies but also 
 
59  Fernando Coronil, ‘Elephants in the Americas? Latin American Postcolonial Studies and Global Decolonization’ 
in Mabel Morana, Enrique Dussel and Carlos Jauregui (eds), Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the 
Postcolonial Debate (Duke University Press 2008).; Ricardo D Salvatore, ‘The Postcolonial in Latin America and 
the Concept of Coloniality: A Historian’s Point of View’ (2010) 8 A Contracorriente 332.  
60 Gathii (n 23)., 38.  
61 Morana, Coloniality at Large. 
62 Salvatore (n 59)., 336. 
63 Walter D Mignolo, ‘Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing: On (de)Coloniality, Border Thinking, and Epistemic 
Disobedience.’ (2013) 1 Confero 129. 
64 Walter D Mignolo, ‘Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of de-
Coloniality’ (2007) 21 Cultural Studies 449. 
65 Walsh, ‘“Other” Knowledges, “Other” Critiques’ (n 58). 
66 Ramón Grosfoguel, ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, 
Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality’ (2011) 1 TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural 
Production of the Luso-Hispanic World. 
63 
 
Postcolonial Studies. Whilst Haskell67 calls for radicalisation of TWAIL through greater 
engagement with Marxism and Structuralism (as discussed above), the decolonial approach 
seeks alternative paradigms which critique not just the relations between different parts within 
the prevailing system, but the very goals and assumptions that led to the system itself, from 
the perspective of those who are marginalised and oppressed.  This is what Mignolo means 
by ‘changing not only the content, but the terms of the conversation’.68 Supporters of decolonial 
thinking argue that epistemic delinking is essential to creating alternative models which 
challenge the fundamental assumptions of Modernity (i.e. are not based on economic growth 
and the accumulation of capital), bringing about transformation rather than limited reform of 
the existing system.69 This approach may be one response to the argument that TWAIL has 
failed to propose radical alternatives.  
 
2.3.2 Decolonial analyses of indigenous peoples’ rights 
 
The previous section showed how decolonial thought may add to existing postcolonial analysis 
of international law. The considerable literature on indigenous peoples rights has not often 
drawn from decolonial literature of the Modernity/Coloniality school,70  but this has begun to 
change.  This section presents some of the decolonial analysis of indigenous peoples’ rights 
that is most relevant to the focus of this thesis.  
 
One example is Helga Maria Lell’s article examining multiculturalism in Latin America, and the 
implications for national citizenship rights.71  Lell argues that prevalent understandings of law 
such as Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law72 assume a homogenous society in which each 
individual is equal under the law. In Latin America (and indeed elsewhere) this is not the case, 
and Lell argues that Kymlicka’s understanding of the State as being ‘pluri-national’ is more 
applicable due to its engagement with diverse cultures and immigrant communities, as 
 
67 Haskell (n 21). 
68 Mignolo, ‘Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of de-Coloniality’ (n 
64). 
69  E.g. See Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Notes on a Novella for the Future’ (n 56)., discussing Latin American philosophy’s 
potential for redemptive critical theory, and the “culture of life” versus the “culture of death” in Walsh, ‘Afro and 
Indigenous Life-Visions in/and Politics. (De)colonial Perspectives in Bolivia and Ecuador’ (n 48). See also Walter 
D Mignolo, ‘Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom’ (2009) 26 Theory, Culture & 
Society 159. 
70 In 2015 the author conducted a literature search of the HeinOnline database. It provided over 1100 references 
for articles containing ‘postcolonial/post-colonial’ and ‘indigenous rights’, but only 14 for ‘decolonial’ and ‘indigenous 
rights’. 
71 Helga Maria Lell, ‘Concept of Citizenship: Multicultural Challenges and Latin American Constitutional Democracy, 
The’ (2014) 2 Birkbeck Law Review 87. 




described in Multicultural Citizenship.73  Drawing from de Sousa Santos’ work, and citing 
Anibal Quijano, Lell demonstrates through the Mexican case of Joel Cruz Chavez y Otros74 
that although indigenous peoples are considered citizens, in practice they are excluded from 
participating in the citizenship right to vote. Lell concludes that legal systems must emphasise 
harmonisation between cultures, moving beyond tolerance to ‘the coexistence and dynamic 
dialogue between cultures that recognize each other's incompleteness’. She endorses 
Kymlicka’s theory, which is socio-political in nature, arguing that it should be inculcated into 
the law through consideration of cultural and linguistic values. Chapter 4 of this thesis explores 
this proposition further, drawing on indigenous political philosophy of indigenous authors in 
Canada.  
 
In addition to critiquing Kymlicka’s model of human rights based multiculturalism, the main 
focus of this thesis is on the operationalisation of Article 32 of UNDRIP, which relates to FPIC 
consultation in the context of extractive development on indigenous territories.  A body of work 
on prior consultation and FPIC is also developing from authors who take a critical, decolonial 
stance, mainly in the context of ethnographic study of consultations in Latin America. These 
scholars have highlighted that although prior consultations are theorised as providing neutral 
spaces for dialogue between equals, they are in practice top-down processes, controlled by 
the state.75 As a result, they draw attention to the impact of significant power asymmetries 
which reinforce the power of the state and constrain indigenous peoples’ claims to self-
determination within weak bureaucratic administrative procedures.76 According to these 
authors, FPIC is principally used as a mechanism to legitimise extractivist development 
policies and neutralise indigenous dissent,  at the expense of more meaningful collaborative 
reform of institutions and economic development policies.77 Consequently, several authors 
 
73 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press 1995). 
74 The State v Chavez and others (Trial to Protect the Political and Electoral Rights of Citizens) SUP-JDC-1 1/2007 
Mexican Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary. 
75 Esben Leifsen, Luis Sánchez-Vázquez and Maleny Gabriela Reyes, ‘Claiming Prior Consultation, Monitoring 
Environmental Impact: Counterwork by the Use of Formal Instruments of Participatory Governance in Ecuador’s 
Emerging Mining Sector’ (2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 1092. Jessie Shaw, ‘Indigenous Veto Power in Bolivia’ 
(2017) 29 Peace Review 231.; Marilyn Machado and others, ‘Weaving Hope in Ancestral Black Territories in 
Colombia: The Reach and Limitations of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation and Consent’ (2017) 38 Third 
World Quarterly 1075.; Gisela Zaremberg and Marcela Torres Wong, ‘Participation on the Edge: Prior Consultation 
and Extractivism in Latin America’ (2018) 10 Journal of Politics in Latin America 29. 
76  David Szablowski, ‘Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector? 
Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice’ (2010) 30 Canadian Journal of Development Studies 
/ Revue canadienne d’études du développement 111.; Roger Merino, ‘Re-Politicizing Participation or Reframing 
Environmental Governance? Beyond Indigenous’ Prior Consultation and Citizen Participation’ (2018) 111 World 
Development 75.; Roger Merino, ‘Reimagining the Nation-State: Indigenous Peoples and the Making of 
Plurinationalism in Latin America’ (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law 773.  
77 César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Ethnicity.Gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior 
Consultation in Social Minefields’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 263.; Rachel Sieder, 
‘“Emancipation” or “Regulation”? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Post-War Guatemala’ 
(2011) 40 Economy and Society 239.; María del Carmen Suescun Pozas, Nicole Marie Lindsay and María Isabel 
du Monceau, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Extractives Industries in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
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have questioned whether FPIC can lead to reductions in conflict, in the absence of institutional 
reform to improve participatory governance and the resolution of underlying historical 
grievances.78  
 
On the other hand, this same research has also highlighted the ways in which indigenous 
communities are utilising national and international law to mobilise resistance to unwanted 
extractive development, providing hope that international legal norms on FPIC may be 
effective at least to some extent as a strategy for contesting the oppression of indigenous 
peoples. They provide examples of indigenous communities leveraging even weak legal 
frameworks on FPIC to protect their rights79 and to politicise FPIC80 through court actions and 
through alliances with local, regional and national NGOs, as well as community referenda,81  
as well as by devising their own protocols for FPIC82 and contesting flawed consultation 
processes being imposed by states.83 This type of research is identifying the conditions that 
support successful bottom-up indigenous action, for example in identifying that indigenous 
communities which benefit from experience, support and strong political institutions are more 
likely to be successful in mitigating project impacts, and negotiating binding agreements to 
ensure that they have some share in the benefits.84 They also highlight the range of possible 
outcomes of resistance, for example in increasing social investment programs, precipitating 
the withdrawal of extraction companies, or introducing of new regulatory frameworks which, 
at least in part, reflect indigenous ambitions for FPIC.85  Walter and Urkidi have commented 
‘Perhaps, the key success of consultations has been the political learning processes that these 
have triggered – connecting social actors, scales, places, discourses and strategies – which 
 
Perspectives from the Ground’ (2015) 2 The Extractive Industries and Society 93.; Leah Temper, ‘Blocking 
Pipelines, Unsettling Environmental Justice: From Rights of Nature to Responsibility to Territory’ (2019) 24 Local 
Environment 94.  
78 George Stetson, ‘Oil Politics and Indigenous Resistance in the Peruvian Amazon: The Rhetoric of Modernity 
Against the Reality of Coloniality’ (2012) 21 Journal of Environment & Development 76. Almut Schilling-Vacaflor 
and Riccarda Flemmer, ‘Conflict Transformation through Prior Consultation? Lessons from Peru’ (2015) 47 Journal 
of Latin American Studies 811.; Merino, ‘Re-Politicizing Participation or Reframing Environmental Governance?’ (n 
76).  
79 Machado and others (n 75). 
80 Leifsen, Sánchez-Vázquez and Reyes (n 75).  
81 Brant McGee, ‘Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent to Development, The’ (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 570.;  John-Andrew McNeish, ‘Full 
Article: Extracting Justice? Colombia’s Commitment to Mining and Energy as a Foundation for Peace’ (2017) 21 
The International Journal of Human Rights 500. 
82 Cathal M Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2015)., 270-272. 
83 Viviane Weitzner, ‘“Nosotros Somos Estado”: Contested Legalities in Decision-Making about Extractives 
Affecting Ancestral Territories in Colombia’ (2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 1198. 
84 Machado and others (n 75).; Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Riccarda Flemmer, ‘Mobilising Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent (Fpic) from Below: A Typology of Indigenous Peoples’ Agency’ (2020) 27 International Journal 
on Minority and Group Rights 291. 
85 Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, ‘Prior Consultations in Plurinational Bolivia: Democracy, Rights and Real Life 
Experiences’ (2013) 8 Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 202.; Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 84).;  
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have allowed to reclaim and put in practice participation rights and to envision alternative forms 
of development.’86  
 
The exploration of FPIC from a decolonial perspective is therefore not only providing insights 
into the ways that the international legal framework is being implemented in ways that support 
the continuation of colonial legacies; it is also shedding light on how indigenous peoples are 
utilising international law in defence of their own rights and priorities for development.  This 
thesis builds on this emerging decolonial perspective on FPIC.  
 
2.4 Methodological implications 
 
Having argued for the adoption of a decolonial approach which builds on the TWAIL critique, 
this chapter now focuses on the methodological implications of this theoretical framework. 
  
2.4.1 Epistemic de-linking and border thinking 
 
As discussed above, proponents of decolonial approaches argue for analyses rooted in 
epistemologies which originate outside of Eurocentrism, in order to provide novel and radical 
solutions to the problems of Modernity.  It is therefore essential that a decolonial project 
engages with these ‘discarded’ knowledges in order to bring new insights to debates which 
have previously be couched in terms of Eurocentric theoretical frameworks.  Decoloniality 
advocates a practice of ‘epistemic delinking’, based on the work of Egyptian sociologist Amin 
and Anibal Quijano’s concept of ‘desprendimiento’, or ‘unlearning’. In brief, it is necessary to 
‘delink’ from European ways of thinking (for example relying solely on theoretical frameworks 
which have arisen from the Eurocentric academy) and think through the lived experience of 
being colonised and the epistemologies of colonised peoples.87 Because of the variety of 
experience and knowledge systems which exist, decoloniality does not advocate replacing 
hegemonic Eurocentrism with a decolonial hegemony:  instead, it aims towards a collective 
project of many epistemologies in dialogue. As a consequence, this thesis will engage with 
writing and viewpoints of various indigenous authors during the analysis, particularly those of 
indigenous feminists (discussed below).    
 
 
86 Mariana Walter and Leire Urkidi, ‘Community Mining Consultations in Latin America (2002–2012): The Contested 
Emergence of a Hybrid Institution for Participation’ (2017) 84 Geoforum 265.  




In conducting decolonial research, Mignolo advocates ‘border thinking’.88 He concludes that it 
is not possible to ‘sympathetically’ understand another ‘cosmo-vision’ (knowledge system) 
from one’s own, so the researcher must recognise the limits of one’s own ability to understand. 
However, through ‘border thinking’ – that is, the meeting of people and ideas from different 
places in time and space – new experiences and understandings of colonialism can be 
reached. Linda Martín Alcoff describes the purpose of ‘border thinking’ as follows: 
 
the point is not simply to reveal multiplicity, but to reveal the lines of tension and 
conflict, or the points of contradiction, between colonizing and colonized spaces. Thus, 
he [Mignolo] explained, “colonial semiosis required a pluritopic hermeneutics since in 
the conflict, in the cracks and fissure where the conflict originates, a description of one 
side of the epistemological divide won’t do.89 
 
Therefore, ‘border thinking’ is theorising from the conflict between Eurocentric and other 
knowledge systems. The border is a complex and diverse place, a site of profound tension 
which at first may appear divided and contradictory. However, following Anzaldúa, Mignolo 
suggests that such confrontational places can give rise to coherent, hybrid understandings 
and identities, and alternative possibilities for action.   
 
2.4.2 Critical approaches as a purposeful endeavour 
 
Authors who engage in such critical legal research do not view their discipline as having a 
specific methodology, but see it as a heterogeneous field with different approaches90 which 
may include looking at difference along many axes – such as race, class, gender, sex, 
ethnicity, economics or trade.91  The absence of a specific methodology has been viewed as 
an advantage: for example, Panu Minkinnen argues that strict methodological doctrine acts to 
produce legal conformity, rather than allowing new possibilities to emerge.92 The uniting 
principle in postcolonial legal studies is that the researchers have a shared concern with how 
law can be used to bring about social justice, by exposing and challenging the imperialist and 
Eurocentric/Anglo-American nature of modern international law. The 2007 TWAIL conference 
launched a vision statement which recognised the diversity of the movment but also its shared 
goals: 
 
88 Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking 
(Princeton University Press 2012).  
89 Linda Martín Alcoff, ‘Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality’ (2007) 7 CR: The New Centennial Review 79., 89.  
90 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Taylor and Francis 2013)., 120.  
91 Gathii (n 23). 




Members of this network may not agree on the content, direction and strategies of third 
world approaches to international law. Our network, however, is grounded in the united 
recognition that we need democratization of international legal scholarship in at least 
two senses: first, we need to contest international law’s privileging of European and 
North American voices by providing institutional and imaginative opportunities for 
participation from the third world; and second, we need to formulate a substantive 
critique of the politics and scholarship of mainstream international law to the extent 
that it has helped reproduce structures that marginalize and dominate third world 
peoples.93 
 
The explicit purpose of postcolonial research therefore positions the researcher not as an 
impartial observer who strives for neutrality (as in conventional European research 
paradigms), but as a political actor. 
 
Decolonial ‘methodology’ also suggests that the illusion of neutrality in European research is 
flawed.94 Mignolo argues that researchers in the European model construct a fallacious, 
imagined ‘zero-point’ from which to conduct research. This ‘zero-point’ assumes that it 
represents a universally agreed philosophy of research based on European science and 
reason. In fact, Mignolo argues, such a zero-point is not universal, but inherently located in 
Europe. Mignolo advocates that researchers reject the ideal of neutrality and be ever-mindful 
of the geographical, historical and social relations between researcher and researched: 
 
The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges? Why did eurocentred 
epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations and succeed 
in creating the idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also 
 
93 Vision Statement of the 2007 TWAIL Conference held at Albany Law School, New York, cited by Gathii (n 23). 
David Kennedy, ‘TWAIL Conference: Keynote Address - Albany, New York - April 2007, The’ (2007) 9 International 
Community Law Review 333.  
94 There are many who would agree with this proposition, including critical scholars from diverse schools (Marxism, 
Feminist Theory, Queer Theory, Critical Race Theory to name a few) who all approach their work with the specific 
objective of revealing inequality, rather than the neutral aim to reveal an objective truth. In the Social Sciences, the 
impossibility of a neutral researcher is also recognised. However, in Social Sciences, the researcher strives to be 
as neutral as possible, employing various techniques and methodologies to control for observer bias. For example, 
the Encyclopaedia of Evaluation considers bias to be ‘a negative condition that inhibits evaluators or evaluations 
from finding true, pure, and genuine knowledge. Bias is considered synonymous with subjective, unfair, partial, 
and prejudiced and is defined as errors based on beliefs or emotions that are wrong or irrelevant and that 
may adversely affect people and programs’ Additionally, the impact of the researcher on the subject is intended to 
be minimised. This is in stark contrast to critical approaches, including the decolonial approach, in which the 
researcher takes a political stance on the issue at hand. Additionally, decolonial authors stress the need for analysis 
to be carried out from the researcher’s locus of enunciation, rather than attempting to remove or ignore the effects 
of their locus on the research (‘Bias’, in Sandra Mathison, Encyclopedia of Evaluation (SAGE Publications, Inc 
2005) <http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/evaluation/n50.xml> accessed 7 April 2015., emphasis added.)  
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universal? This illusion is pervasive today in the social sciences, humanities, the 
natural sciences and the professional schools. Epistemic disobedience means to 
delink from the illusion of the zero point epistemology.95  
 
It is therefore vital to consider the researcher’s own ‘locus of enunciation’. In this case, the 
researcher is a non-indigenous, white woman who has been brought up and educated mainly 
in the United Kingdom (also spending three years in Nepal as a child, where her father worked 
on World Bank-funded development projects). As such, this research is carried out from the 
position of one who is conditioned by Eurocentric perspectives and academic traditions. The 
researcher is therefore not positioned on a ‘border’, from which decolonial research is often 
carried out. Despite this, in conducting this research it is recognised that the historical legacy 
of Eurocentric colonialism, both material and epistemic, has caused unspeakable harm, both 
in the ‘third world’ in the global South and also to immigrants, women, and other marginalised 
groups in the global North. This is not to say there is no merit at all in the European way of life 
– as discussed above, Enrique Dussel points out that the goal of Transmodernity is not to 
disdain all aspects of Modernity, but to collectively identify the positive elements, as well as 
those from other cultures.96    
 
Grosfoguel distinguishes the ‘epistemic location’ from the ‘social location’, arguing that just 
because a person originates from the South, does not mean that he has adopted Southern 
epistemology.97 For example, Dussel points to the role of local elites in administering and 
supporting colonial systems.98  In the same way, this research is an attempt to adopt a 
decolonial way of thinking, whilst recognising the limitations of the researcher’s own 
epistemological location. Caution must be taken to avoid the pitfalls of Eurocentrism – i.e. 
speaking on behalf of other peoples; viewing Modernity as something constructed solely by 
Europeans, rather than acknowledging the contribution of regions and events outside of 
Europe; failing to recognise the asymmetrical positions of cultures in dialogue; and failing to 
engage with and support non-Western understanding of the world. There is also a challenge 
to discuss the perspectives of ‘outsiders’ without appropriating them as one’s own, and of 
recognising that there is a limit to how much a person nearer the centre of the colonial order 
can contribute in the struggle for epistemic justice.  The researcher’s locus of enunciation also 
 
95  Mignolo, ‘Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom’ (n 69)., 160.  
96 Enrique D Dussel, ‘Transmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Philosophy of 
Liberation’ (2012) 1 TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 
<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6591j76r> accessed 19 February 2015. 
97 Grosfoguel (n 66).  
98 Dussel (n 96). This analysis is relevant to the activism of indigenous peoples at the international and national 
level, as the social and economic position of indigenous leaders may change due to their involvement in the United 
Nations system, or through training in the law, for example.  
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imposes limits on their ability to understand other perspectives – for example, Gordon Christie 
is ‘a cautious agnostic’ about the potential for non-indigenous scholars to participate in the 
development of Indigenous Legal Theory.  His view is that whilst there is doubt over whether 
a non-indigenous author could understand ‘what the world looks like, through the eyes (or 
rather the mind) of an Indigenous person’, the possibility is ‘left open’ and a ‘contestable 
point’.99 
 
There are examples of other white, Euro/American authors who engage in decolonial writing, 
as well as in other disciplines such as critical white studies. Catherine Walsh, an American 
now living and teaching in Ecuador, has taken the approach of relocating her ‘locus’:  
 
Although I work in the university, I seldom identify as an academic. I identify rather as 
a militant intellectual, an intellectual activist or activist intellectual, and always as a 
pedagogue. … Ecuador is now not only my home—I identify as an immigrant from the 
North to the South—but also my place of enunciation, thought, and praxis. It is here in 
the South, and most particularly through collaborative work with Afro-descendant and 
indigenous social movements and communities at their request, that I began more 
profoundly to comprehend the colonial and the decolonial.100 
 
 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, himself a Portuguese academic, has chosen a different route: 
to advocate from within the Eurocentric institutions and disciplines, calling for European 
academies to ‘recognize that the understanding of the world by far exceeds the Western 
understanding of the world. Is the university prepared to refound the idea of universalism on 
a new, intercultural basis?’101 This seems to be a more accessible position than attempting to 
alter one’s locus entirely, and one which is valuable. Walter Mignolo comments that  
 
Whether you are born and raised in London or Beijing, and whether you have been put 
in those places or move around the world, you cannot escape from ‘experiencing’ the 
world order you received when you were born and educated … You can try to 
assimilate to a dominant culture or to emulate ideas that emerged from bodies 
embodied in local histories (like Germany or France) and languages in which – 
 
99 Gordon Christie, ‘Indigenous Legal Theory: Some Initial Considerations’ in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai 
and Kent McNeil (eds), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart 2009).  
100  Catherine Walsh, ‘Pedagogical Notes from the Decolonial Cracks’ (2014) 11 e-misférica. 
101 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The University at a Crossroads’ (2012) 10 Human Architecture: Journal of the 
Sociology of Self-Knowledge 7. 
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unfortunately – your skin and brain were formed. Or you can accept – with pride – what 
you are, to embody the place you occupy in the colonial matrix of power.102  
 
In this sense, although a person’s locus of enunciation cannot change, one can accept their  
location and attempt to contribute to intercultural discussion from that perspective.  Thus this 
thesis attempts to engage with indigenous perspectives on human rights based 
multiculturalism and on FPIC in a decolonial manner. Perhaps this is the work that is required 
‘casa adentro’ for those of us who are located in a Eurocentric perspective: to relearn and 
critique our own knowledge and its place in relation to other knowledges. This self-reflexive 
practice would then allow us to contribute in the work ‘casa afuera’, which is ‘to help build a 
different vision and practice of humanity, life, and living’.103  
 
This approach seems to be one that decolonial authors would support.104  Ramón Grosfoguel 
describes Boaventura de Sousa Santos as  
 
the leading scholar of the Coimbra School of thought in Portugal that has replaced 
Paris as the centre of critical theory in Europe today… Santos himself is a perfect 
example of how being European does not automatically translate into being 
Eurocentric. Following the spirit of other European decolonial thinkers from de las 
Casas to Sartre, Santos is one of the most important decolonial thinkers today. Santos 
embodies a real possibility that gives us hope for the future of humanity: the possibility 
of decolonization for European man.105  
 
Therefore, in undertaking this research, the researcher is also endeavouring to speak from 
her own locus of enunciation, whilst endeavouring to decolonise Eurocentric ways of thinking. 
 
 
102 Madina V Tlostanova, Learning to Unlearn: Decolonial Reflections from Eurasia and the Americas (Ohio State 
University Press 2012)., 193.   
103 Walsh, ‘Afro and Indigenous Life-Visions in/and Politics. (De)colonial Perspectives in Bolivia and Ecuador’ (n 
48). 
104  In a related field, the call for the involvement of white people in critique of white supremacy has been made in 
critical white studies, for example by Derrick Bell and bell hooks, Richard Delgado and Tim Wise. Critical White 
Studies evolved from Critical Race Theory in the United States of America, and seeks to examine the socio-cultural 
construction of ‘whiteness’ and white identity, as well as the systemic privileging of whiteness. It is thought to derive 
from the D.E.B. Dubois’ essay, ‘The Souls of White Folk’, which charted the rise of white supremacy in ideology as 
well as political and social institutions, and revealed the flaws in white claims of supremacy over other races.  White 
authors have engaged reflexively with critical white studies, examining such areas as defensive psychological 
mechanisms in which white people can view themselves as ‘friends’ of black people, whilst remaining complicit in 
systemic injustice which privileges whiteness and characterises black people through negative stereotyping.  
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (eds), Critical White Studies: Looking behind the Mirror (Temple University 
Press 1997).; Tim Wise, White Like Me: Reflections on Race from a Privileged Son (Revised, Shoemaker & Hoard, 
Div of Avalon Publishing Group Inc 2011).  
105 Ramón Grosfoguel, ‘Preface’ (2006) 29 Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 141., 141. 
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2.4.3 The materiality of international law 
 
As discussed above, TWAIL scholars have advocated an approach which situates 
international law in the ‘material’ sphere, examining how it manifests itself at the local level, 
rather than viewing international law as an abstract normative framework which sits ‘above’ 
day-to-day experience. Eslava and Pahuja have argued for a turn towards legal ethnography, 
charting how international law is embodied in local contexts, such as  
 
administrative procedures, social spheres or simply innocuous technical or commercial 
things… international regulatory work done today by biometric scanners at 
international frontiers in the fight against terrorism and the control of illegal migration, 
the extensive implementation of ID cards and water-meters for the functioning, 
rationalisation and measurement of development projects, or the targeted use of 
mobile phone technology for the integration of small farmers into the global trading 
system.106  
 
The authors argue that through this mapping of international law on a material scale, it is 
possible to view the diverse ways in which ‘universal’ international law is enacted, and the 
scale and variety of existence to its intervention in domestic affairs.  
 
Decoloniality contributes towards this ‘materialisation’ of the study of international law, through 
its focus on the colonial experiences and epistemologies of subjugated peoples. In their 
introduction to Law and Globalization from Below, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. 
Rodríguez-Garavito extol the importance of a ‘bottom-up’ approach to international law and 
globalisation which centres on grassroots resistance. Importantly, they described the dialogue 
which led to their book as being based on the writing of the decolonial school: Dussel, Mignolo 
and Quijano. Consequently there is excellent precedent for engaging with decolonial writers 
in order to carry out postcolonial legal critique. The work of de Sousa Santos suggests that it 
will be important to engage with grassroots narratives which critique the mainstream position 
on UNDRIP and FPIC processes, which positions UNDRIP as a victory and FPIC as a 
safeguard of indigenous peoples’ rights.  
 
In view of the above, decolonial research requires the non-indigenous researcher to be ever 
mindful of their own locus of enunciation, whilst engaging with the ideas and epistemologies 
of indigenous peoples and those at grassroots level who have an alternative perspective on 
 
106 Eslava and Pahuja (n 39). 
73 
 
the everyday practice of indigenous peoples’ rights and FPIC in particular. It also requires 
consideration of the tension between epistemic delinking and conducting PhD research within 
the framework of a formalised university setting. As such, this project is as much about 





This chapter has shown that postcolonial approaches to International Law, such as TWAIL, 
provide a rich and appropriate theoretical framework from which to address the issue of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. However, critics of TWAIL suggest that thus far, its proposed 
solutions to the problems of Modernity do not go far enough towards a radical reimagining of 
the international legal system. Decolonial approaches based on the literature of the 
Modernity/Coloniality School are specifically rooted in a longer view of colonialism that dates 
back to the colonisation of the Americas. This chapter has suggested that they can add to 
postcolonial critiques by challenging both the underlying goals and assumptions of 
International Law, rather than simply challenging its practice and implementation. 
 
Both postcolonial and decolonial approaches have been used to analyse indigenous peoples 
rights, revealing the need to engage with indigenous worldviews and legal approaches to 
develop new understandings of legal concepts. They have also highlighted the success of the 
global indigenous movement to use international law as a strategic tool to achieve their 
objectives. However, recent decolonial analyses of FPIC have suggested that weak, top-down 
implementation of FPIC may not have the emancipatory effects that indigenous people had 
hoped, and highlights the role of bottom-up indigenous resistance movements is continuing to 
contest how FPIC should be carried out in practice. This thesis will build on these critiques to 
analyse how dominant assumptions that are rooted in Eurocentric liberal thought may be 
undermining the potential of FPIC to contribute to indigenous self-determination, and 
ultimately reconciliation between states and indigenous peoples.  
 
In taking a decolonial approach, certain methods are required. It is necessary, in particular, to 
engage with epistemologies and critiques from the periphery or exteriority of Eurocentric 
Modernity. This means taking seriously the opinions and critiques of indigenous grassroots 
movements, as well as their world views. Accordingly, the research carried out for this thesis, 
recognises the importance of engaging with indigenous critiques of multiculturalism and 
UNDRIP. Furthermore, this research, is informed by the need to recognise the epistemic 
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location and bias of the researcher, whilst also shunning the notion of a neutral researcher 
and engaging in a purposeful project of decolonising western research. 
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Chapter 3: The Limitations of UNDRIP as 




UNDRIP has been recognised as a reconciliatory instrument, that seeks to promote 
harmonious relationships between indigenous peoples and the state. This chapter examines 
whether UNDRIP’s content supports this claim, focusing in particular on the question of the 
right to self-determination.  
 
Section 2 provides an explanation of an important premise that underlies this thesis: that 
indigenous peoples and states are locked in an intractable conflict. Section 3 then examines 
claims that UNDRIP is a framework for reconciliation and examines key ideas about 
reconciliation from a Eurocentric and indigenous perspective, drawing from Peace and Conflict 
studies and the writings on indigenous political philosophy which have developed in Canada, 
which both emphasise the need for structural change to remove harmful colonial legacies. 
Section 4 explains the key role of indigenous self-determination in achieving reconciliation.  
 
International law has been identified as a tool that has been used by European powers to 
further colonial agendas. Section 5 of this chapter provides an explanation of how 
developments in international law since the earliest days of colonisation of the Americas until 
the establishment of the minority rights regime in the late Twentieth Century reveal the heart 
of the conflict between indigenous peoples and the state: the question of how indigenous self-
determination can coexist with states’ assertions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
unity. Section 6 then analyses how states and indigenous representatives tried to resolve this 
question during the negotiations of UNDRIP’s text, arguing that they settled on the paradigm 
of human rights. Whilst this decision eased the agreement of states to recognise indigenous 
self-determination, it had important limitations that have constrained the understanding of what 
indigenous self-determination can mean.  
 
The final section of this chapter addresses two key ways in which the human rights approach 
to self-determination is lacking – that of rebalancing political and economic power. It concludes 
that whilst UNDRIP is a significant step forward in improving the situation of indigenous 
peoples, the limited interpretation of the right to self-determination is problematic for its long-
term success as a framework for reconciliation. 
76 
 
3.2 Indigenous peoples and the state are locked in an intractable conflict 
 
This thesis starts from the viewpoint that indigenous peoples and the state are entrenched in 
a long-term, intractable conflict that commenced with the first colonisation of the Americas, 
and that is ongoing today. The term ‘intractable conflict’1 is a term used in the field of peace 
and conflict studies, first used to describe the conflicts that emerged after the end of the 
Second World War that involved socio-ethnic groups, rather than states, as the primary 
combatants. Such conflicts entail a destructive2 relationship between two distinct social 
groups, characterised by hostile interactions3 over a long period, even passing between 
generations.4 Such conflicts go through cycles of violence punctuated by intense crises (or 
‘episodes’) and periods of relative calm,5 but have no discernible end-point.6 There are usually 
factors which make the conflict groups interdependent or inextricably linked, be this for 
reasons of geography, financial interests or other factors.7 Intractable conflicts are also likely 
to involve third parties as supporters, observers, accomplices or peace-making facilitators, 
such as NGOs, businesses, militias, States or activist movements.8 
 
The root causes of intractable conflicts are often based ‘in [a] history of colonialism, 
ethnocentrism, racism, sexism or human rights abuses’.9 These abuses can lead to 
imbalances of power being formalised in the institutions and traditions of society10 denying 
their basic human needs for security, identity, respect, safety and control,11 and causing the 
 
1 Also described as ‘protracted social conflict’, or ‘deep-rooted conflict’. Oliver Ramsbotham, Contemporary Conflict 
Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (3rd ed, Polity 2011). 5 See also 
Edward E Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald McLaurin, ‘Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle 
East’ (1978) 8 Journal of Palestine Studies 41.; John Wear Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook 
(University Press of America 1987).; Edward A Azar, The Management of Protracted Conflict (Dartmouth 
Publishing Co Ltd 1990).; John Burton, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (Palgrave Macmillan 1993).; Louis 
Kriesberg, ‘Intractable Conflict’, The handbook of interethnic coexistence (Continuum 1998).; Peter T Coleman, 
‘Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a Metaframework-I.’ (2003) 9 Peace 
and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 1.; Louis Kriesberg, ‘Nature, Dynamics and Phases of Intractability’ in 
Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable 
Conflict (US Institute of Peace Press 2005).; Heidi Burgess and Guy M Burgess, What Are Intractable Conflicts? 
(2003) <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/meaning-intractability> accessed 5 June 2014.;  
2 John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention (Palgrave Macmillan 1990).: Resolution and Provention. 2. 
3 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (United States Institute of 
Peace Press 1997). 
4 Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis’ 
(2000) 21 Political Psychology 351. 354 
5 Morton Deutsch, Peter T Coleman and Eric C Marcus, The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice 
(John Wiley & Sons 2011).; Kriesberg, ‘Intractable Conflict’ (n 1). 
6 Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin (n 1). 50 
7 Morton Deutsch, Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective (Yale University Press 1985). 263 
8 Coleman (n 1); Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R Aall, Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation 
in a Complex World (US Institute of Peace Press 1999).  
9 Coleman (n 1). 
10  Johan Galtung and Tord Höivik, ‘Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization’ (1971) 8 Journal 
of Peace Research 73.; Edward E Azar, ‘Peace amidst Development: A Conceptual Agenda for Conflict and Peace 
Research’ (1979) 6 International Interactions 123.  
11 Burton, Conflict (n 1). 
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conflict to become entrenched in relationships, cultures and societal structures.12  Although it 
may be possible to settle particular episodes of conflict, new conflict episodes will occur unless 
there is structural change. Thus, intractable conflicts are not static but ‘processes’13 or 
‘systems in flux’, in which the actors, issues and intensity of conflict can change over time.14 
 
The relationship between indigenous peoples and the state has much in common with this 
definition of intractable conflict. Their conflict is multidimensional in nature, related to control 
of land and resources, but also including issues of identity, culture, power and status. Policies 
of colonialism and extractivist development, as well as Eurocentric hierarchies of forms of 
knowledge, race and gender, have dominated the interactions between these societies since 
first contact,15 with devastating impacts over generations. Furthermore, their physical location 
within state boundaries and their spiritual connection to their lands means that indigenous 
peoples and states remain interdependent and inextricably linked. Whilst the specific details 
of the conflict may evolve over time, the underlying question of how indigenous and non-
indigenous societies are to peacefully co-exist remains. As the next section outlines, UNDRIP 
is viewed as a means to bring about a more harmonious relationship.  
 
3.3 UNDRIP as an ‘instrument of reconciliation’ 
 
3.3.1 UNDRIP’s reconciliatory ambitions 
 
The Preamble of UNDRIP recognises the historic and colonial injustices that indigenous 
peoples have suffered,16 and sets out that:  
 
the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will enhance 
harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, 
based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination 
and good faith. 
 
 
12 Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus (n 5). 537; Lucas Mazur, ‘The Social Psychology of Intractable Conflicts’ (2014) 
20 Culture & Psychology 276. 277; Bar-Tal (n 4). 
13 Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin (n 1). 50. 
14 Coleman (n 1). 28.  For an influential systems approach, see also Lederach (n 3). 
15  Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007).; Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (eds), Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to 
Globalization (New Expanded Edition, University of California Press 2007). 
16  UNDRIP’s preamble states: ‘Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a 
result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing 
them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests’. 
UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007). 
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This view has been frequently reinforced through statements by UN officials, states and 
indigenous representatives. According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon: 
 
The Declaration is a visionary step towards addressing the human rights of 
indigenous peoples. It sets out a framework on which States can build or rebuild 
their relationships with indigenous peoples. The result of more than two decades 
of negotiations, it provides a momentous opportunity for States and indigenous 
peoples to strengthen their relationships, promote reconciliation and ensure that 
the past is not repeated.17 
 
James Anaya, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
seemed to share this view, asserting that UNDRIP has contributed to international law’s shift 
from being an oppressive instrument of colonialism to a framework which supports indigenous 
struggles for self-determination,18 and commenting that ‘the Declaration is a point of common 
understanding to address indigenous peoples concerns and develop measures of 
reconciliation’.19   The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) has 
also referred to UNDRIP as a ‘vehicle for reconciliation’.20 In addition to this, several states 
referred to the potential of UNDRIP to bring about reconciliation and greater harmony in their 
statements at the adoption of UNDRIP in the 66th General Assembly.21 Taking the example 
of Canada, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has called on all levels of Canadian 
Government to ‘to fully adopt and implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as the framework for reconciliation’ between the Canadian Government 
and Aboriginal Peoples, and the recent Bill C-1522 states that ‘the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides a framework for reconciliation, healing and 
peace’. Indigenous people have also viewed UNDRIP in this manner: Sheryl Lightfoot, an 
 
17 United Nations Secretary-General ‘Protect, promote endangered languages, Secretary-General urges in 
message for International Day of World’s Indigenous People’ (23 July 2008); 
<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11715.doc.htm> accessed 20 February 2015.  
18  S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press 2004). 
19  S James Anaya, ‘USA / Indigenous Peoples: “New Measures Needed for Reconciliation and to Address 
Historical Wrongs” – JAMES ANAYA’ <https://unsr.jamesanaya.org/?p=739> accessed 15 February 2021. 
20 UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Twelfth Session 15-19 July 2019 ‘Efforts to 
implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: recognition, reparation and 
reconciliation’ (2 September 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2019/3/Rev.1, para 7. 
21 See UNGA, Sixty-first Session 107th Plenary Meeting Thursday 13 September 2007, 10 am New York official 
records (13 September 2007) UN Doc A/61/PV.107 see Statement of the representative of Peru, Mr Chavez, 
introducing the draft resolution (at 10), statement of Leichtenstein (at 23), statement of Brazil (at 26); Suriname (at 
27). See also the statements of Canada (at 12), United States of America (at 15) and New Zealand (15), who 
considered at the time of its adoption that the Declaration had failed to achieve its purpose of providing a basis for 
harmonious relations between indigenous peoples and states. Also UNGA, Sixty-first Session 108th Plenary 
Meeting Thursday 13 September 2007, 3pm New York official records (13 September 2007) UN Doc A/61/PV.108, 
Statement of Guatamala (at 8).  
22 Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Second 
Session, Forty-third Parliament, 2020.  
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Anishinaabe indigenous academic and activist, has described UNDRIP as ‘an indispensable 
part of the national project of reconciliation’,23  and The Assembly of First Nations has said, 
‘when the Declaration is undermined, reconciliation is also under threat.’24  
Reconciliation is a complex concept with many definitions. The next two sections will consider 
how reconciliation is defined, in both Eurocentric and indigenous writing on the subject.  
 
3.3.2 Eurocentric perspectives on reconciliation 
 
Within the field of peace and conflict studies, reconciliation is often viewed as an ongoing 
process to heal conflict, rather than an end-point at which no conflict remains.  John Paul 
Lederach, a leading proponent of ‘conflict transformation’, defines reconciliation is as a 
‘dynamic, adaptive process aimed at building and healing’ during which a redefinition of 
relationships occurs.25 Intractable conflict is a part of the relationship between the disputants 
that may never be entirely resolved, so procedural solutions are required to transform the 
conflict from a destructive to constructive one reducing violence and increasing justice in both 
personal relations and societal institutions.26 This relational approach emphasises creation of 
dialogue mechanisms to allow the disputants to navigate the conflict through political means 
without resorting to violence, and over time to foster ‘right relationships’ based on the four 
principles of truth, justice, mercy and peace.27     
 
In addition to dialogue, reconciliation requires changes at the personal, relational, structural 
and cultural levels.28 However, this does not necessarily occur simultaneously, and a degree 
of reconciliation on a political level may be achievable even if it is still unthinkable at an 
interpersonal level. 2930 Taking a cautious view of what is achievable, Kriesberg provides a 
definition of reconciliation as ‘coexistence’: ‘the processes by which parties that have 
experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain 
or restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable’.31 However, Bloomberg 
 
23 Sheryl Lightfoot, ‘The Road to Reconciliation Starts with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
(The Conversation) <http://theconversation.com/the-road-to-reconciliation-starts-with-the-un-declaration-on-the-
rights-of-indigenous-peoples-122305> accessed 15 February 2021. 
24  ‘Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (Assembly of First Nations 
2017) <https://www.afn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/17-11-27-Implementing-the-UN-Declaration-EN.pdf> 
accessed 15 February 2021., 2. 
25  John Paul Lederach, ‘Civil Society and Reconciliation’ in Chester A Crocker (ed), Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict (United States Institute of Peace Press 2001)., 842.  
26   David Bloomfield, ‘On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation’ (Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management 2006) Report No 14.  
27  Lederach (n 3).,24-31. 
28  ibid., 23-27.  
29  Kriesberg, ‘Intractable Conflict’ (n 1). 
30 Chapman 2002 
31 Louis Kriesberg, ‘Changing Forms of Coexistence’ in Mohammed Abu-Nimer (ed), Reconciliation, Justice and 
Coexistence: Theory and Practice (Lexington Books 2001). 
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cautions that such coexistence may be unsustainable in the long-term; rather, ‘positive 
coexistence’32 or ‘political reconciliation’33 requires that there is also trust, equality, respect, 
acceptance of differences, mutual interests and a sense of partnership between the two sides. 
Bloomberg argues that creating democratic institutions through which issues can be jointly 
negotiated can help build confidence and trust, and help to develop these relational ties. This 
kind of political reconciliation, he notes, tends to be carried out in a top-down manner, as it 
involves structural change. Furthermore, a more holistic reconciliation - which includes the 
interpersonal and cultural levels, carried out at the grassroots and from the bottom-up - may 
come later still, once a positive working relationship between the two conflicting groups has 
enabled interpersonal relationships to develop across the divide.34  
 
Furthermore, dialogue mechanisms to resolve specific episodes of conflict must be 
accompanied by deeper institutional change, to tackle underlying inequalities and injustices 
that replicate conflict. Failing this, there will be only a ‘negative peace’, in which overt violence 
ceases but underlying ‘structural violence’ – harm caused by unjust institutions and societal 
structures and cultural norms – continues. In order to achieve ‘positive peace’, social systems 
must serve the whole population, without discrimination.35 John Burton, a major influence on 
the development of peace and conflict studies, has argued that the tendency of states to view 
their populations as a unified society, and to rely on coercive power or the narrative of ‘shared 
values’ was doomed to fail in the context of post-colonial, multicultural societies.36 In Burton’s 
view, conflict arises from the denial of three key needs by inflexible, inequitable and power-
based structures of society: psychological security – to have structure, predictability, stability, 
and freedom from fear and anxiety; identity – a sense of self in relation to the outside world; 
and to recognition - the experience of having one’s identity recognised and respected by 
others. 37  Burton advocated for ‘provention’, meaning the development of societal conditions 
and institutions that build cooperative relationships between different groups and in which 
policy decisions are taken through participatory problem-solving with the aim of fulfilling these 
three human needs. In this approach, reconciliation is said to require a positive recognition of 
 
32 Bloomfield (n 26)., 14. 
33 Erin McCandless, ‘The Case of Land in Zimbabwe: Causes of Conflict, Foundation for Sustained Peace’ in 
Mohammed Abu-Nimer (ed), Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice (Lexington Books 
2001). 
34 Bloomfield (n 26)., 27-28. 
35 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ (1969) 6 Journal of Peace Research 167. 
36 John Wear Burton, Deviance, Terrorism & War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political 
Problems (Martin Robertson 1979). 
37 Burton, Conflict (n 2).; John Wear Burton, Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and 
Their Prevention (Manchester University Press 1997).; See also Kevin Avruch and Christopher Mitchell, Conflict 
Resolution and Human Need: Linking Theory and Practice (Routledge 2013). 
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different identities and value systems, as well as deep shifts in power relations at both a 
personal and intergroup level.38   
 
3.3.3 Indigenous perspectives on reconciliation  
 
Eurocentric perspectives on reconciliation are by their nature limited and incomplete, and so 
this section will explore some indigenous perspectives on reconciliation. As Borrows and Tully 
have noted, these are very diverse,39 so this section touches on some of the key themes, 
many of which overlap with those discussed in the previous section.  
 
Indigenous people identify that the root of the conflict with the state lies in histories of 
colonisation and dispossession from lands, resources, and traditional ways of life. 
Consequently, the work of reconciliation is the reversal of these policies as they are enacted 
in the present day. 40   A key starting point is the recognition of indigenous peoples as peoples. 
EMRIP has drawn attention to the many possible forms of recognition that exist, from weak 
symbolic recognition such as apology for harm to stronger forms such as reparations, treaties, 
legal recognition of sui generis rights for indigenous peoples, or political recognition of 
indigenous governments.41 Coulthard, who (as discussed in Chapter 4) is sceptical of the 
impact of recognition, identifies that reconciliation also requires indigenous people to ‘re-
establish a positive “relationship to self”’ through a resurgence of indigenous culture and 
practices, instead of relying on external validation and acceptance.42  
 
The establishment of new social and political relationships is seen as critical to deconstructing 
colonial legacies43  and to take action towards restitution of indigenous peoples’ ‘political 
freedom, personal liberty, cultural identity, or human rights’44. According to Borrows and Tully, 
this involves rejecting the ‘power over’ model of relationship that has derived from ‘oppressive 
 
38 Burton, Conflict (n 2). 
39 John Borrows and James Tully, ‘Introduction’ in Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully (eds), Resurgence 
and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (University of Toronto Press 2018)., 4. It is 
noted that some indigenous people consider that reconciliation is tantamount to assimilation and should be resisted 
in favour of indigenous resurgence. For example, see Andrea Landry, ‘This Reconciliation Is for the Colonizer’ (The 
Wrong Kind of Green, 13 June 2017) <http://www.wrongkindofgreen.org/2017/12/01/this-reconciliation-is-for-the-
colonizer/> accessed 24 November 2020.  
40  ‘Manila Declaration of the International Conference on Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, Sustainable 
Development and Indigenous Peoples, 6-8 December 2000’ (Tebtebba Foundation 2000). 
41 UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Twelfth Session 15-19 July 2019 ‘Efforts to 
implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: recognition, reparation and 
reconciliation’ (2 September 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2019/3/Rev.1, paras 15-34, 47-48. 
42 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (University Of 
Minnesota Press 2014)., 108. 
43 ibid.; Dale R Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy (University of Toronto 
Press 2006). 
44 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (W W Norton & Company 
2000). , 318.  
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state and imperial ideas, practice and frameworks’45 and ‘engaging in dialogue and negotiation 
as equals … [giving rise to] partnerships based on mutual consent.’46 Furthermore 
reconciliation is viewed as a participatory process, which must include indigenous people and 
perspectives at all stages, and be undertaken in ways that reflect indigenous cultural and 
spiritual traditions, if outcomes are to be considered legitimate.47 Finally, reconciliation is 
described by indigenous authors in terms of restoring balance between people, community 
and the earth, based on principles such as responsibility, interconnectedness, and 
reciprocity.48 Thus reconciliation between indigenous peoples and the state cannot be 
divorced from the question of reforming economic models that are destructive, rather than 
sustainable,49  as well as to valuing indigenous knowledge and ways of living, rather than 
viewing them as inferior to ‘modern’ approaches.50 
 
3.4 The key role of self-determination in achieving reconciliation 
 
For indigenous authors, then, reconciliation requires a fundamental shift in power relations 
between indigenous peoples and the states, from systems of power that are rooted in colonial 
history, to new systems of power which emphasise participation, consent, and balance. For 
many indigenous people, the route to achieving this reconfiguration of power is through the 
recognition of indigenous self-determination.51  Claire Charters has expressed how self-
determination relates to ‘distributions of power and appropriate power-holders, and includes 
within it the right of peoples to choose how to express their own political aspirations, on the 
basis of equality, and to determine their collective destiny without outside interference.’52  
 
45 Borrows and Tully (n 39)., 8. 
46 ibid., 21. 
47 UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Twelfth Session 15-19 July 2019 ‘Efforts to 
implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: recognition, reparation and 
reconciliation’ (2 September 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2019/3/Rev.1, paras 72, 79. 
48 Carlo Osi, ‘Understanding Indigenous Dispute Resolution Processes and Western Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, Cultivating Culturally Appropriate Methods in Lieu of Litigation’ (2008) 10 Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 163.; Jeff Corntassel and Chaw-win-is T’lakwadzi, ‘Indigenous Storytelling, Truth-Telling, and 
Community Approaches to Reconciliation’ (2009) 35 English Studies in Canada 137.; John Borrows, ‘Earth-Bound: 
Indigenous Resurgence and Environmental Reconciliation’ in Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully (eds), 
Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (University of Toronto Press 
2018). 
49 Borrows (n 48). James Tully, ‘Reconciliation Here on Earth’ in Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully 
(eds), Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (University of Toronto 
Press 2018). 
50 Gina Starblanket and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, ‘Towards a Relational Paradigm - Four Points for 
Consideration: Knowledge, Gender, Land, and Modernity’ in Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully (eds), 
Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (University of Toronto Press 
2018). 
51 UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Twelfth Session 15-19 July 2019 ‘Efforts to 
implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: recognition, reparation and 
reconciliation’ (2 September 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2019/3/Rev.1 para 79. 
52  Claire Charters, ‘A Self-Determination Approach to Justifying Indigenous Peoples’ Participation in International 
Law and Policy Making’ (2010) 17 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 215. (emphasis added).  
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Anaya has clearly articulated the close relationship between indigenous self-determination 
and reconciliation, and how this is rooted in transformation of power relations: 
 
Properly understood, self-determination is an animating force for efforts toward 
reconciliation—or, perhaps more accurately, conciliation—with peoples that have 
suffered oppression at the hands of others. Self-determination requires confronting 
and reversing the legacies of empire, discrimination, and cultural suffocation. It does 
not do so to condone vengefulness or spite for past evils, or to foster divisiveness but 
rather to build a social and political order based on relations of mutual understanding 
and respect. That is what the right of self-determination of indigenous peoples, and all 
other peoples, is about.53 
 
Viewed in this way, the right to self-determination calls for states to take action to rectify the 
systemic structures and assumptions that perpetuate unjust power relations in their 
relationship with indigenous peoples.54  It must not be merely symbolic, but must be evidenced 
in material ways - for example through the return of enough indigenous lands to enable 
indigenous people to live in a self-sufficient manner, and in the adherence by the state to 
historical treaties with indigenous peoples. Gunn argues that as a route to reconciliation, self-
determination must be defined holistically, to also include indigenous peoples’ right to 
determine their economic, social and cultural development.55 Alfred argues that ‘without 
massive restitution, including land, financial transfer and other forms of assistance to 
compensate for past harms and continuing injustices committed against our peoples, 
reconciliation would permanently enshrine colonial injustices and is itself a further injustice’.56  
Without this kind of practical action, Alfred warns that reconciliation will be limited to a 
‘pacifying discourse’ which assuages settler guilt and obstructs the need for meaningful 
change.57 This assertion is supported by examinations of state-led Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions in Canada, Australia, Peru, and Guatemala which ‘differentiated the goal of 
reconciliation from an indigenous self-determination agenda.’58 The study found that this 
 
53 S James Anaya, Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination in the Post-Declaration Era’, Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2009)., 196.  
54 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach’ in Pekka Aikio and Martin 
Scheinin (eds), Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Abo Akademy University 
2000). 
55 Brenda L Gunn, ‘Moving beyond Rhetoric: Working toward Reconciliation through Self-Determination’ (2015) 38 
Dalhousie Law Journal 237. 
56  Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (University of Toronto Press 2005)., 152.   
57 Alfred, restitution is the real pathway to justice for indigenous peoples 182-184 
58 Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder, ‘Who’s Sorry Now? Government Apologies, Truth Commissions, and 




strategy failed to improve the relationship, because it did not hold states accountable for 
historical violations of rights.  
 
However, indigenous claims over land, financial and other forms of compensation, and 
political power present a challenge to the legitimacy of states’ political authority and to their 
control over economically valuable land and natural resources. As the next section shows, 
international law has played a key role in neutralising indigenous claims to land and 
resources, and legitimising the claims of the state.  
 
3.5 The role of international law in perpetuating the root cause of the conflict  
 
This section demonstrates how, since colonisation of the Americas, developments in 
international law have failed to recognise indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in 
order to support colonial policies of European nations, and in so doing have entrenched the 
tension at the heart of the conflict between indigenous peoples and states: how indigenous 
peoples’ assertion of self-determination can coexist with the concepts of state sovereignty, 
political unity and territorial integrity in international law.59  
 
3.5.1 Indigenous peoples in International Law during the colonial period 
 
In the early days of Spanish colonisation of the Americas, Naturalist theorists such as 
Francisco de Vitoria argued against the brutal feudalistic system of Encomienda that was 
imposed, recognising indigenous peoples as sovereign nations with the right to enter into 
treaties with other nations by virtue of their essential humanity and rationality.60 However, 
Vítoria justified colonisation on the basis of ‘just war’ theory, in which indigenous societies 
were deemed to be failing to adhere to international obligations imposed under Natural Law 
to allow foreigners to travel to their lands, trade and proselytize, or in order to impose 
benevolent government in the best interests of ‘backwards’ indigenous societies.61 In 1648 the 
Treaty of Westphalia led to the rise of the state as the sole subject of international law, and 
under the emerging Law of Nations, indigenous peoples had to meet higher definitions of 
 
59 For a fuller explanation of the treatment of indigenous peoples in international law, see Anaya, Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law (n 18).; Anghie (n 15).; Cathal M Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights 
and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 
2015)., 13-68.  
60 The Encomienda system permitted the Spanish Crown to grant indigenous land to colonisers and for the 
colonisers to demand labour and tributes (in the form of gold, animals, crops and other goods) from indigenous 
people.  See Timothy J Yeager, ‘Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown’s Choice of Labor Organization in 
Sixteenth-Century Spanish America’ (1995) 55 The Journal of Economic History 842.  
61 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (n 18). 15-26. 
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Statehood to be considered as subjects, based on Eurocentric criteria, in order to be 
considered as free and independent nations with a right to control their territories.62   
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Positivist writers renounced Natural Law 
and looked to the consent of States as its legitimate source.  The principle of State recognition, 
set out specific criteria for Statehood, including recognition by the ‘Family of Nations’ and the 
requirement that the society in question be ‘civilised’. Indigenous peoples by their nature were 
deemed unable to meet these criteria and, in any event, recognition of the sovereignty of 
indigenous peoples in colonised territories would have been against the interests of those who 
now controlled access to the elite club of recognised sovereign states.  Indigenous lands were 
deemed terra nullius (meaning, ‘land belonging to no-one’).  On this basis, the recognised 
states could claim sovereignty over indigenous territories on the basis of effective occupation.  
Former treaties with indigenous peoples were deemed outside the scope of international law, 
creating only ‘moral obligations’ which could lawfully be set aside.63  Instead, the doctrines of 
Trusteeship, and the Mandate system of the League of Nations established the practice of 
‘advanced nations’ governing territories that were ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand 
by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’.64  Indigenous territories 
were thus incorporated into larger administrative territories without recognition of their 
autonomy, and on the basis of their assumed backwardness. 65    
 
In 1923, Haudenosaunee Chief Deskaheh of the Six Nations of the Iroquois66 travelled to the 
newly-formed League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, to seek membership of the League 
 
62 ibid. James Anaya (no 10) 22. Largely, this resulted in a distinction by European theorists between indigenous 
peoples with institutions and cultures which were more akin to European ideas of civilisation (such as the Incas or 
Aztecs), and who settled in specific areas and cultivated land, rather than hunter-gathering across vast territories, 
for example in Vattel’s Law of Nations.  
63 ibid. 26-31.  
64 League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), Article 22. 
65 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (n 18). 31-14. Trusteeship, buoyed up by ‘scientific racism’, 
aimed to ‘civilise’ indigenous people out of their ‘backwards’ way of life. In tandem with numerous initiatives led by 
specific governments, particularly Britain, the United States and Canada, as well as the Church, International Law 
developed to reflect the Trusteeship doctrine, for example in the text of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin 
which addressed the purpose of colonization in Africa, which was stated as ‘instructing the natives and bringing 
home to them the blessings of civilization’. 
66 The Haudenosaunee Confederacy is a union of the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas 
and Tuscarora peoples, whose traditional territories lie in the regions of Lake Ontario, the River Hudson and Lake 
Champlain in what is now the border territories of Toronto, Canada and the State of New York, United States of 
America. After the American War of Independence, Confederacy families that had been allies of the British moved 
to the Grand River, in the Province of Canada. The British Crown granted the Confederacy a large tract of land 
known as the Grand River Tract to the east of Lake Ontario in the Haldimand Proclamation of 1784. After much of 
the land was lost to settlers, in 1842 a smaller parcel of land protected as the Six Nations Indian Reserve Number 
40 in 1842.  See ‘Six Nations of the Grand River’ (Ontario.ca, 5 June 2013) <https://www.ontario.ca/page/six-
nations-grand-river> accessed 15 August 2020.; ‘The League of Nations’ (Haudenosaunee Confederacy) 
<https://www.haudenosauneeconfederacy.com/the-league-of-nations/> accessed 11 August 2020.;  
‘Haudenosaunee’ (Native-land.ca, 3 March 2019) <https://native-land.ca/maps/territories/haudenosaunee/> 
accessed 15 August 2020.; ‘Deskaheh’ (The Canadian Encyclopaedia, 28 August 2015) 
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/levi-general> accessed 27 July 2020. 
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and to establish international recognition of the Six Nations’ status as ‘organised and self-
governing peoples’, with ‘independent rights of home-rule’,67 in the hope that it would put a 
stop to the Dominion of Canada’s increasing interference in the Six Nations’ internal affairs.68  
However, Chief Deskaheh did not find a warm reception; the League of Nations refused even 
to grant him an audience, viewing the dispute as a domestic matter not of international 
concern.69 The following year, in 1924, a Māori representative, Pita Moko, attempted to 
present a petition to the League of Nations on behalf of Māori spiritual leader Tahupōtiki 
Wiremu Rātana, calling for the return of lands confiscated by the British Crown and for the 
Crown to honour the Treaty of Waitangi. He, too, was denied. 70   
 
3.5.2. Indigenous peoples were sidelined during Decolonisation 
 
This paternalistic and erasing approach continued after the Second World War, when 
indigenous peoples’ rights were largely overlooked in the post-war process of decolonisation, 
which sought to establish self-government for colonial territories according to existing 
boundaries.71 72 The United Nations Charter, which stated that the purpose of the United 
 
67 Deskaheh, ‘The Redman’s Appeal for Justice’ (16 August 1923) 
<http://cendoc.docip.org/collect/deskaheh/index/assoc/HASH0102/5e23c4be.dir/R612-11-28075-30626-8.pdf> 
accessed 25 August 2020., para 20(1). See paras 3, 6 and 16. The letter argued that Great Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada - all members of the League of Nations - 
had already recognised the international status of the Six Nations by entering into treaties with them.  On this basis, 
Chief Deskaheh asserted that the Iroquois were ‘justly entitled to the same recognition by all other peoples.’ (para 
3).  
68 ibid., paras 1 and 2.  The urgency of Chief Deskaheh’s mission was a result of unwelcome interference within 
Haudenosaunee territories by the Dominion of Canada, preventing the ability of the Six Nations’ Hereditary Council 
from governing their peoples freely in the way that they saw fit.  The Dominion of Canada had imposed their own 
laws relating to property and the penal system on the Six Nations, had “misappropriate and wasted” funds that 
were held in trust, and were maintaining an armed force within Six Nations territory, all without the Six Nations’ 
consent (paras 10-15). This, Chief Deskaheh asserted, was contrary to treaty arrangements by which the Dutch 
and later the English had recognised the Six Nations as independent nations and allies (para 6), as well as 
contravening promises made by the British Crown to protect the Six Nations from ‘encroachments’ (para 4).  
69 ‘Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations Human Rights System Fact Sheet’ (Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 2013) No. 9, Rev.2 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5289d7ac4.html> 
accessed 19 February 2021.;  Grace Li Xiu Woo, ‘Canada’s Forgotten Founders: The Modern Significance of the 
Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Application for Membership in the League of Nations’ 2003 Law, Social Justice & Global 
Development Journal <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2003_1/woo/> accessed 27 July 2020.  
70 New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu Taonga, ‘Ratana, Tahupotiki Wiremu’ 
<https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3r4/ratana-tahupotiki-wiremu> accessed 27 July 2020.  
71 A system of trusteeship was established under the United Nations Charter Chapter XI to assist them to develop 
their own free political institutions in accordance with the political aspirations of the peoples.  (Ch XI Art 73). In 
1960, UNGA further supported the norm of granting independent statehood for colonies within their existing 
boundaries. The 1975 the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (Helsinki Declaration) applied 
self-determination not only to colonised territories but also to populations of existing state boundaries. Charter of 
the United Nations, (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter); 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA Res 1514 (XV) (14 
December 1960) (adopted by 89 votes to none; 9 abstentions).; Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE): Final Act of Helsinki (1 August 1975). 
72 The right of peoples and nations to self-determination, UNGA Res 637 (VII) A-C (16 Dec 1952). For a discussion 
of indigenous peoples and self-determination in international law during the post-war decolonisation period, see 
Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land 
(Cambridge University Press 2010).,131-135.; Doyle (n 59). 68-70;  
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Nations was, inter alia, ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’73 was generally interpreted to apply 
to entire peoples that were living in Non-Self Governing territories in the process of 
decolonisation.74  In 1960, the two international human rights Covenants recognised that ‘All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,’75 although 
‘peoples’ remained undefined.  
 
At the time, the Belgians put forward a proposal that compared the situation of indigenous 
peoples within existing state boundaries with that of Non-Self-Governing Territories, and that 
would have conferred on them a similar right to self-determination. However, instead States 
adopted the ‘Blue Water’ thesis, which emphasised the territorial integrity of existing states 
and territories, and treated indigenous peoples as part of the larger colonised populations.76 
This approach mirrored that of the recent ILO C107 - Indigenous and Tribal Populations 
Convention;77  this paternalistic treaty aimed to improve the living and working conditions of 
indigenous people through an approach which assumed the inevitable demise of indigenous 
ways of life and the eventual assimilation of indigenous people into national society.  
 
3.5.3 The status of indigenous peoples in the era of minority rights 
 
The right of self-determination was not intended to apply to sub-state minorities and instead 
the rights of people of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, and to 
practice their own religion and language in community with others was protected by Article 27 
of the ICCPR.78 Soon after, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination sought to protect minorities from racial discrimination.79 In the 1980s and 
1990s there emerged greater recognition of the different needs of sub-state social groups, and 
the ways in which these minorities were often discriminated against and marginalised from 
systems of democratic government. There was recognition that these minorities would want 
 
73 UN Charter (n 71) Art 1(2). 
74 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (n 71).  
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), Art 1; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 
16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), Art 1.   
76 Xanthaki (n 72). 133. 
77 International Labor Organization Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and 
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (adopted 26 June 1957, entered into force 2 
June 1959) (ILO C107).  
78 Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press 2002)., 126; Mauro 
Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions?’ (2011) 13 International 
Community Law Review 413.  
79 See, for example, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted by 
21 December 1963, entered into force 4 January 1969).  
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to preserve their own cultural identities, distinct from their national identity, whilst also having 
an equal opportunity to be involved in the life of the state.80  Controversial International 
instruments such as the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities81 and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities82 followed, alongside initiatives to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples, including ILO Convention 169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and the 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was first presented in 1993.83  
 
During this period, states continued to be reluctant to acknowledge indigenous peoples as 
‘peoples’ – preferring to refer to them as ‘populations’.84 Whilst the ILO C169 – Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples did use the term ‘peoples’, it also included a clear proviso that ‘The use of 
the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as 
regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.’85  The reason for this 
concern was that in an environment of rising socio-ethnic conflict, including conflict in Europe, 
states were wary of the potential for secessionist movements being a destablilising force.86 
Consequently, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 affirmed the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, but also specifically restricted actions that 
would harm the territorial integrity or political unity of states conducting themselves in 
accordance with these principles.87   
 
The right to self-determination for populations who were not under colonialism or foreign 
occupation became integrally linked with the concept of human rights and democratic 
governance.88 The concept of ‘internal self-determination’ developed, such that sub-national 
groups could ‘have the right to freely pursue their ‘political, economic, social and cultural 
 
80 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford University 
Press, USA 2009). 
81  Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UNGA 
Res 47/135 (18 Dec 1992) (adopted by consensus) (Declaration on Minorities). 
82 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (adopted on 10 November 1994, entered into 
force on 1 February 1998) 660 UNTS 195 (Framework Convention on Minorities).  
83 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the UNDRIP’s development and adoption. 
84 E.g. see UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations 
Final Report (last part) submitted by the Special Rapporteur Mr José Martínez Cobo’ (30 September 1983) UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8; and the establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations by the 
UN Economic and Social Council in 1982. Study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations, 
ECOSOC Res 1982/34 (7 May 1982).  
85 International Labor Organization Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) (ILO C169 – Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples), Art 1.3 (emphasis in original). 
86 The 1990s was marked by a number of violent intra-state conflicts involving ethnocultural groups. The collapse 
of the USSR in 1991 presented a significant threat to stability in Europe, and the 1990s saw the emergence of 
intra-state conflicts, for example in Bosnia (1992-1995); Somalia (1992-3) and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. See 
Ramsbotham (n 1). 
87 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (12 July 1993) 
A/CONF.157/23.  
88 Steven Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
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development within the framework of an existing State.’89 International frameworks such as 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities90 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities91 emphasised the importance of political rights and the opportunity for minorities to 
participate in the life of the state on an equal basis, whilst maintaining their own cultures, 
languages and traditions. Such an approach recognised that national populations were not 
homogenous units, and contributed to the development of the concept of ‘internal self-
determination’, in which the self-determination of sub-national groups was achieved through 
participation in democratic governance, in a way that did not undermine existing state political 
unity and territorial integrity.92   
 
This approach to minority rights stands in contrast to the notion of ‘external self-determination’, 
which permitted populations under colonisation or foreign occupation to form a new 
independent state.93 Scholars debated the potential for remedial secession, in which a minority 
group could secede from a state as a last resort in extreme cases of persistent and ongoing 
rights violations by the state and the absence of representation in state government. Anaya 
has suggested that such a right could apply to indigenous peoples in some circumstances.94 
However, as Barelli has observed, ‘there is no evidence of support for this under international 
law’.95 Furthermore, Xanthaki has argued that remedial secession depends on the subjective 
recognition of by states that rights violations are sufficient to merit it, and in practice this 
recognition is unlikely to be forthcoming for political reasons.96   
 
During this period, the status of indigenous peoples in international law was ambiguous. Many 
scholars agreed that due to their particular history and distinctiveness, indigenous peoples 
were not a typical example of a subnational minority so the existing minority rights framework 
was insufficient to respond to their particular situation.97 On the other hand, there was no clear-
 
89 E.g. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, para 126; CERD, General Recommendation XXI(48), 
The right to self-determination (8 March 1996) UN Doc CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3, paras 4 and 6. See also Antonio 
Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press 1995). 
90 Declaration on Minorities (n 81).  
91 Framework Convention on Minorities (n 82).  
92 CERD, General Recommendation XXI(48), The right to self-determination (8 March 1996) UN Doc 
CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3; Barelli (n 78). 
93 For example, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations recognised the 
duty of states to respect the equality and right to self-determination of peoples, and to ‘bring a speedy end to 
colonialism’. Furthermore, it recognised that ‘peoples under colonial or racist regimes or other forms of alien 
domination’ was a violation of the principle of self-determination and of human rights. Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, UNGA Res 26/25 (XXV) (24 October 1970) (adopted without a vote).  
94 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (n 18)., 83-84, 
95 Barelli (n 78)., 415.  
96 Xanthaki (n 72).,144-146.  
97 Trifunovska, ‘One Theme in Two Variations - Self Determination for Minorities And Indigenous Peoples’ (1997) 
5 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 175. 
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cut right to external self-determination, and whilst most indigenous peoples did not specifically 
seek independent statehood, states remained extremely wary that recognising the right to self-
determination for indigenous peoples could be used both by some indigenous peoples and 
other sub-national minorities as a basis for secessionist claims.98 Consequently, the 
discussions during the negotiation of UNDRIP attempted to establish the meaning of what the 
equal right to self-determination of all peoples means for indigenous peoples.  
 
3.6 The Right to Self-determination in UNDRIP: A ‘Fragile Architecture’?   
 
It has been said that UNDRIP ‘may represent one of the most significant stages in the 
development of the right to self-determination since decolonisation.'99 In 2007, UNDRIP 
recognised, for the first time, that indigenous societies are ‘peoples’ with a right to self-
determination. For indigenous representatives, achieving recognition of the right to self-
determination on an equal basis with other peoples was a central objective in its negotiation,100 
and indigenous delegates at the WGIP asserted that ‘the right of self-determination was the 
pillar on which all the other provisions of the draft declaration rested and the concept on which 
its integrity depended.’101  However, due to states’ concerns regarding the potential for 
encouraging secessionist movements, the inclusion of the right to self-determination in 
UNDRIP was extremely controversial, and a significant cause of delay in reaching its adoption.  
 
This section argues that the wording agreed on self-determination in UNDRIP has not resolved 
the fundamental tension between indigenous self-determination and state sovereignty, 
political unity and territorial integrity.  
 
3.6.1 The triumph of human rights over self-determination 
 
Karen Engle’s analysis of the negotiations of the draft UNDRIP demonstrates how the 
pragmatic and gradual adoption by the indigenous movement of the human rights paradigm 
undermined the essence of their claim for self-determination. She argues that the transnational 
indigenous movement of the 1970s and 1980s was ‘relatively united’ in demanding that the 
 
98 Barelli (n 78). 
99  Helen Quane, ‘New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory Rights?’ in Stephen Allen and Alexandra 
Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011). 
100  Barelli (n 78).,417; Anaya, Charters and Stavenhagen (n 53). 
101 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) Report of the Working Group on indigenous Populations on its eleventh session 
(23 August 1993) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, para 57.  
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indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination - including the right to secession - should be 
enshrined in UNDRIP.102 She writes that indigenous advocates were also  
 
wary of using international human rights mechanisms as a forum to advance their 
cause, due what they saw as the assimilationist tendencies of human rights, which 
allowed for neither strong forms of self-determination nor collective cultural rights.... 
human rights was often seen as inseparable from the civilizing mission of colonial days 
or the globalizing or liberalizing mission of neocolonialism.103  
 
Consequently, in its early days the indigenous movement tended to ‘eschew human rights’104 
and frame its demands in terms of ‘decolonization and self-determination’105. However, Engle 
relates that their stance weakened as the indigenous movement began to accept the right to 
culture as a basis for indigenous rights protections, rather than solely focusing on the right to 
self-determination.106 The indigenous movement found the international human rights bodies 
to be receptive to the protection of indigenous cultural rights, for example in the Human Rights 
Commission and CERD, the International Labor Organization, and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, and the IACtHR. At the same time, states and international 
human rights bodies resisted indigenous peoples’ claims to equal self-determination under 
Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR.107 In the end, the approach of advocating for cultural 
rights protections was less threatening to states, and consequently gained more traction. As 
Engle states, ‘the Declaration seals the deal: external forms of self-determination are off the 
table for indigenous peoples, and human rights will largely provide the model for economic 
and political justice for indigenous peoples.’108  
 
Engle’s position can be better understood through the evolution of Article 3 and related Articles 
during the drafting process. Indigenous representatives’ original concept of self-determination, 
as expressed in the WGIP’s 1993 draft, stated that: 
 
102 Karen Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context 
of Human Rights’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 141., 148. 
103  ibid., 151. 
104 Kelly Roy and Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘Indigenous Rights: The Literature Explosion’ (1987) 13 Transnational 
Perspectives 19., 21. 
105 ibid., 21; Douglas Sanders, ‘The Re-Emergence of Indigenous Questions in International Law’ (1983) 1983 
Canadian Human Rights Yearbook 3., 25.  
106 This was partly down to the expansion of human rights into a wide range of discourse in the post-Cold War era; 
as Engle puts it, human rights became the ‘lingua franca of both states and social movements’ to the extent that 
‘there are few legal and discursive spaces wholly outside the human rights framework’. Engle (n 102).,158. 
107 ibid., 152-160.  
108 ibid., 147. Engle argues that the danger is not in the lack of external self-determination per se, as this was not 
a main concern of the global indigenous movement by the end of the drafting process, and in any event the rules 
of international law will apply in limited circumstances to permit secession of indigenous peoples, as with other sub-




Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination, in accordance with 
international law, subject to the same criteria and limitations as apply to other peoples 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. By virtue of this, they have the 
right, inter alia, to negotiate and agree upon their role in the conduct of public affairs, 
their distinct responsibilities and the means by which they manage their own interests.  
An integral part of this is the right to autonomy and self-government.109 
 
Throughout the negotiations, this expansive view of self-determination was diluted until it 
reframed in the terms of established international law. States’ preoccupation with secession, 
although it was not a priority issue for indigenous peoples,110  became an entrenched 
distraction that prevented a more imaginative dialogue on how to radically reimagine the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and states.111 
 
Article 3 of the final text states: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.  
 
And Article 4 states: 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
 
 
109 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples Revised working paper 
submitted by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, pursuant to Sub-Commission resolution 1992/33 
and Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/31’ (8 June 1993) UN Doc  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26, Art 3.   
110 States’ need for overall control of legal, territorial and political matters was evident from the observations 
registered during the eleventh session of the WGIP. Canada expressed the need for establishing harmonious 
negotiation processes between states and indigenous governments but expressed the view that indigenous 
peoples should not have the ability to unilaterally determine their status within the existing state, and enact laws 
without reference to the application of state law, a perspective echoed by New Zealand. At this stage, Australia 
and Chile supported a change in the draft to specifically confirm the territorial integrity of states, placing indigenous 
self-determination firmly within the bounds of the state. See UNHCR (Sub-Commission), Report of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations on its eleventh session’ (23 August 1993) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, paras 
50, 52 and 53; UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its eleventh 
session Addendum Comments by the Government of Canada’ (27 August 1993) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29/Add.1.  
111 For example, in 1993 Erica-Irene Daes, Founding Chairperson & Special Rapporteur, WCIP provided an 
explanatory note to states framing Article 3 in terms of ‘internal self-determination’. See UNCHR (Sub-
Commission), ‘Explanatory note concerning the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples’ (19 July 1993) 
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1. Engle notes that this approach was not universally agreed by indigenous 
delegates at the time and that the note and the proposed alternative wording was not included in the WCIP draft.   
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Charmaine White Face, Zumila Wobaga, who was involved in a hunger strike during 
negotiations at the WGDD, has called Article 4 ‘very limiting and dangerous to the self-
determination of Indigenous Nations’.112 In her view, the reference to ‘matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs’ in this Article, without defining what these matters are, gives states 
the opportunity to define this narrowly, thus limiting its scope.  Article 31 of the 1994 draft 
declaration adopted by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, on which Article 4 is based, not only provided a wide-ranging list of matters over 
which the clause applied, but also made clear that indigenous autonomy represented ‘a 
specific form’ of exercising the right to self-determination.113 These words are omitted in the 
final text, creating ambiguity as to whether autonomy is intended to be the sole means of 
expressing indigenous self-determination. 114  
 
The right to self-determination was finally agreed by states subject to the inclusion of Article 
46.1, following intensive negotiations in the run up to the 61st General Assembly. Article 46.1 
reads: 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States.115 
 
A further amendment was made in the final negotiations to remove a statement from the 
preamble which asserted ‘indigenous peoples have the right freely to determine their 
relationships with states, in a spirit of coexistence, mutual benefit and full respect.’ Together, 
these changes arguably undermine the original intention of the indigenous drafters to reframe 
 
112 Charmaine White Face, Zumila Wobaga, An Analysis of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(Living Justice Press 2013)., commentary on Article 4.  
113 Article 31 of the draft declaration adopted by the Sub-Commission stated:  
 
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture, 
religion, education, information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, 
land and resources management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means 
for financing these autonomous functions. 
 
See Annex to UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res 1994/45 (26 
August 1994) in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session Geneva 1-26 August 1994’ (28 October 1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1995/2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56. 
114 Barelli (n 78).  Barelli has also noted that the reordering of the text so that Article 4 on autonomy reads together 
with Article 3 on self-determination could imply that the right to self-determination is intended to be limited to 
autonomy. However, he also makes a case against this interpretation.  
115 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 46(1). 
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their relationship with states as one of negotiation between equals, and instead position them 
firmly as sub-state minorities within the existing state-centric framework of international human 
rights. This is reinforced by Articles 46.2 and 46.3, which require UNDRIP to be interpreted in 
accordance with principles of democracy, respect for human rights, equality and non-
discrimination.  Engle argues that self-determination became roughly equated with the right to 
autonomy, and was granted on the condition that indigenous peoples do not challenge the 
political unity and territorial integrity of the state and fall in line with existing international legal 
norms.116 White Face has gone further, arguing that the prioritisation of states’ territorial 
integrity and political unity undermines indigenous treaty rights and the norm of democratic 
government is a violation of indigenous peoples’ right to choose how they self-govern. She 
sums up Article 46 as ‘very offensive to all indigenous Peoples of the world who have suffered 
the longest from the lack of Human Rights.’117  
 
3.6.2 The ‘dual aspect’118 of the UNDRIP right to self-determination and its limitations 
 
The success of the UNDRIP is not in gaining recognition of the right to external self-
determination for indigenous peoples.119 However, according to Anaya, interpreting 
independent statehood as the ultimate expression of self-determination is to be limited by ‘a 
narrow state-centred vision of humanity and the world, that is, a vision of the world that 
considers the modern state—that institution of Western theoretical origin—as the most 
important and fundamental unit of human organization.’120 For Anaya, UNDRIP reflects a new 
development in political theory that is based on indigenous ideals, which goes beyond the 
state/individual dichotomy to reflect the complexity of human identity, political orders and 
social allegiances. Self-determination, in this context, is for indigenous peoples ‘to be full and 
equal participants at all levels in the construction and functioning of the governing institutions 
under which they live’121 and to ‘control their own destinies under conditions of equality.’122  
  
Anaya reflects this view when he describes self-determination in terms of its ‘substantive’ and 
‘remedial’ aspects. ‘Substantive’ self-determination is both constitutive and ongoing. First, 
governing orders must be constituted in such a way that they represent the will of the people 
 
116 Engle (n 102)., 161. 
117 White Face, Zumila Wobaga (n 112)., commentary on Article 46.  
118 Anaya, Charters and Stavenhagen (n 53)., 193. 
119 Mauro Barelli, Seeking Justice in International Law: The Significance and Implications of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Routledge 2016).,  21-27. However, as Barelli has argued, it does not detract 
from any right they may have elsewhere in international law, and in any case the majority of indigenous peoples 
do not aspire to form new states, but to redefine their relationship with the state within which they now live 
120  Anaya, Charters and Stavenhagen (n 53).,186.  
121  ibid.,188.  
122  ibid.,190.  
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they serve, for example being formed and altered through processes which are participatory 
and based on consent. At the same time, the ongoing aspect requires that these governing 
orders permit people and collectives to have meaningful control and choice over their affairs, 
on a day-to-day basis.123 In Anaya’s view, UNDRIP arises from the continued violation of this 
principle of substantive determination, in relation to indigenous peoples. He argues that 
UNDRIP engages the ‘remedial aspect’ of self-determination, providing ‘a self-determination 
remedial regime’124 which details specific rights to restore indigenous peoples’ substantive 
self-determination on a basis of equality with all other peoples in a manner that is adapted to 
their particular histories and circumstances. In this way, he likens it to the process of post-war 
decolonisation – a specific response to a violation, that is appropriate to the individual 
circumstances and need.125  
 
The model of self-determination in UNDRIP is two-pronged: it seeks to protect indigenous 
peoples’ autonomy over their internal affairs whilst also enabling them to participate effectively 
in the decision-making processes of the state.126  This dual model is summed up in Article 5 
of UNDRIP, which states:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, 
legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate 
fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
 
In relation to autonomy, many of UNDRIP’s provisions flesh out the ways in which indigenous 
peoples can maintain their own political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions. An 
important element of this is the provisions on the right of indigenous peoples to own, use, 
develop and control their lands, territories and resources, which are an essential for 
indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional ways of life.127  UNDRIP also protects 
indigenous peoples’ right to control their knowledge, intellectual property and cultural 
heritage,128 and their educational systems.129  However, commentators such as White Face 
highlight how the text of UNDRIP demonstrate states’ resistance to a high degree of 
indigenous autonomy. This can be seen in the discussion on Article 4 above, as well as in 
 
123  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (n 18)., 97-129. 
124 Anaya, Charters and Stavenhagen (n 53)., 190. 
125 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (n 18)., 196.   
126 Anaya, Charters and Stavenhagen (n 53). 193.   
127 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Study on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous 
peoples by Erica-Irene Daes’ (28 July 1993) UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28, para 24; Case of the Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua,  Judgment of 31 August 2001 (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights  Series C  No 79 (31 August 2001), para 149; ‘The Hague Conference (2010) 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples Interim Report’ (International Law Association 2010). 
128 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 31. 
129 Ibid., Art 14. 
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Article 23 which protects the right of indigenous peoples to determine and develop priorities 
and strategies for exercising their development. White Face argues that the original text of 
Article 23 protected indigenous peoples’ ‘right to determine and develop all’ health, housing, 
economic and social programmes that relate to them, whereas the final text includes an 
amendment which ensures only a right to be ‘actively involved’ in developing them. She argues 
that this neuters the provision, by allowing the state to take decisions on matters of indigenous 
responsibility, in accordance with to the state’s own values and norms. Furthermore, she 
argues that ‘the deletion of the word all in the GA version underscored the agenda of States 
to maintain control over Indigenous Peoples in key areas of everyday life and to restrict our 
self-determining authority.’130  
 
Similar critiques have also shown how self-determination is constrained in UNDRIP’s 
participatory rights regime. The importance of participation in decision-making to the operation 
of self-determination has been frequently affirmed.131  UNDRIP includes a raft of participatory 
rights, that go far further than those protected in the Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. These include the right of 
indigenous peoples to participate in decisions that would affect their rights through their 
representative institutions;132 to participate in the establishment of processes to recognise and 
adjudicate their rights to land, territories and resources; and in state-led measures to combat 
prejudice or child exploitation.133 Additionally, states must obtain FPIC before relocating 
indigenous peoples or storing hazardous waste on their lands, and must ‘consult in order to 
obtain’ FPIC before adopting administrative and legislative measures that would affect 
them,134 and before approving projects on indigenous territories.135   
 
Scheinin and Åhren have noted the particular importance of FPIC to the realisation of 
indigenous self-determination, noting that it goes beyond mere participation to include the 
power to make decisions. Consequently, they argue, FPIC ‘requires transfer of jurisdiction 
from state to political bodies to indigenous peoples’ representative institutions’.136 This 
understanding of participatory rights in UNDRIP would certainly greatly transform the place of 
 
130 White Face, Zumila Wobaga (n 112)., commentary on Article 23. 
131 For example, UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Third session 12-16 July 2010, 
‘Progress Report on the Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making, Report of 
the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (17 May 2010), UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2, para 
5.  
132 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 18 
133 Ibid., Arts 27, 30, 15 and 17  
134 Ibid., Art 19 
135 Ibid., Art 32. See Chapter 5 for a more in-depth discussion of Article 32. 
136 Martin Scheinin and Mattias Åhrén, ‘Relationship to Human Rights, and Related International Instruments’ in 
Jesse Hohmann and Marc Weller (eds), The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2018)., 67.   
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indigenous peoples vis à vis the state.  However, as is explored in depth in Chapter 5, due to 
states’ concerns the wording in Article 32 relating to FPIC was compromised, so that consent 
must be genuinely sought, but is not required for the state to proceed with measures that 
indigenous peoples do not support.  The same was also true of Article 19, which at first states 
to obtain consent from indigenous peoples before adopting administrative and legislative 
measures that affect indigenous peoples, and to ensure that indigenous peoples could 
participate fully in these decisions ‘through procedures determined by them’.137 In contrast, 
the final text requires consultation through indigenous peoples’ representative institutions, 
which leaves the question of who designs the consultation process ambiguous (or impliedly, 
in the hands of the state). As will be discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the design of 
consultation mechanisms can have considerable impacts on the ability of indigenous peoples 
to exercise self-determination.  
 
Thus, in relation to the two main modes of self-determination – autonomy and participation – 
UNDRIP’s text fell short of guaranteeing the freedoms that indigenous representatives had 
originally claimed.  
 
3.7 Moving beyond the ‘dual aspect’ approach 
 
In the years since UNDRIP’s adoption, indigenous people and their supporters have sought 
to interpret its provisions as widely as possible within a state-centric framework of human 
rights.138 This section examines further the potential of UNDRIP’s recognition of right to self-
determination (understood in the ‘dual aspect’ model described above) to fundamentally 
transform political and economic power relations between indigenous peoples and the state, 
in ways that are supportive of indigenous author’s understandings of what is necessary for 
reconciliation to occur.  
 
3.7.1 A new understanding of political power 
 
 
137 Annex to UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res 1994/45 (26 
August 1994) in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session Geneva 1-26 August 1994’ (28 October 1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1995/2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56., Art 20.  
138 For example, S James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers 2009).; 
Dorothée Cambou, ‘The UNDRIP and the Legal Significance of the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination: A Human Rights Approach with a Multidimensional Perspective’ (2019) 23 The International Journal 
of Human Rights 34. 
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This section examines the difference between Eurocentric and indigenous conceptualisations 
of power, and evaluates the extent to which UNDRIP is able to transform power relations 
between indigenous peoples and the state.  
 
As Engle and others have noted,139 there were differing views within the indigenous movement 
as to the suitability of the human rights framework for pursuing self-determination (and thus a 
new power dynamic between indigenous peoples and the state). Decolonial authors such as 
Santos have also commented on the limitations of human rights in emancipating oppressed 
groups. Santos notes that human rights have developed out of a capitalist/colonialist 
framework, and are rooted in western ideas, and liberal human rights institutions. 140 
Consequently, human rights – and international law more generally -encapsulates a top-down 
notion of power, in which states have been viewed as the primary subjects of international law 
and its main actors.141   
 
Additionally, there is concern that a human rights framing of self-determination does not 
challenge states to re-examine their power relationship with indigenous peoples.  For example, 
Xanthaki has addressed how adoption of a human rights frame may lead to self-determination 
being conceived as an ‘umbrella right’,142 such that it becomes indistinguishable from the right, 
protected in Article 1 of the International Covenants on Human Rights, of a people ‘to pursue 
their social, economic and cultural development’. As a result, she argues that approaches 
which conflate the right to self-determination with a broad spectrum of other rights run the risk 
of losing its core essence: political power.143  Such a neutered understanding of self-
determination could be used by states to gloss over politically sensitive claims for self-
determination and characterise them in social or economic terms which pose less of a threat 
to the status quo.144 Such an apparently innocuous definition of self-determination reinforces 
unequal relations of power, rather than prompting states to address them.   
 
139 Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke University Press 
2010).; Andrew Erueti, ‘The Politics of International Indigenous Rights’ (2017) 67 University of Toronto Law Journal 
569.; Dwight Newman, ‘Interpreting Fpic in Undrip’ (2020) 27 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
233.   
140 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization from Below: 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press 2005).; Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed), Another 
Knowledge Is Possible; beyond Northern Epistemologies (Verso 2008).  
141 Solomon Salako, ‘The Individual in International Law: “Object” versus ‘Subject’ (2019) 8 International Law 
Research 132. 
142 Xanthaki (n 72)., 153 citing Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: 
Definitions of Terms as a Matter of International Law’ in Nazila Ghanea and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Minorities, 
Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry (Brill Nijhoff 2004) 
<https://brill.com/view/title/11165> accessed 17 February 2021. 
143 Xanthaki (n 72). 157-159. See also Charters (n 52). 
144 To combat this possibility, Xanthaki argues that conceiving of self-determination as a principle of international 
law (in addition to its status as a more narrowly-defined right) means that it becomes a ‘standard to be observed in 
the name of justice and fairness’ alongside other principles such as equality, respect for life, territorial integrity and 




Indeed, the unequal relations between states and indigenous peoples was evident in the 
decision to strategically adopt a human rights framework to enunciate indigenous claims 
during UNDRIP’s drafting period. In order to make progress towards agreement, indigenous 
representatives had to negotiate their rights with reference to previously established norms of 
international law, convincing states that indigenous demands were consistent with an 
established legal framework that, until that point, had made a habit of excluding indigenous 
peoples.145  As Peters argues, ‘in terms of norm dynamics, the existing framework of norms 
was so strongly institutionalized that the new norms of rights for indigenous peoples could only 
be acceptable to the critical mass of states when they were made to fit into existing 
international law’. The requirement to negotiate from within the terms of international law came 
at a cost to the cohesion of the indigenous movement, which at times became severely 
fractured as indigenous representatives struggled to make progress whilst remaining true to 
their indigenous values and identities.146  Peters also notes how the final text denies 
indigenous peoples agency, commenting that throughout UNDRIP, indigenous peoples are 
conceived not as agents in their own right but as passive subjects of the state147  -  a 
positioning which is consistent with the view that states are the main subjects of international 
law, but which is far from transformative in terms of power relations, and could even be seen 
to be disempowering from an indigenous perspective.  
 
This recourse to established norms of international law precluded a wider discussion on the 
nature of power and how it relates to the relationship between states and indigenous peoples. 
Indigenous conceptualisations of power often differ dramatically from those of Eurocentric 
philosophy. Alfred describes ‘western’ idea of power as ‘adversarial’ and ‘coercive’.148 This 
chimes with analyses of power by some non-indigenous authors, such as Foucault’s writing 
on sovereign power and the disciplinary state. Building on Foucault, Santos has defined power 
as an ‘unequal exchange’,149 reinforced by three forms of domination: capitalism, patriarchy 
 
an approach by-passes the counter-productive focus on secession and enables the emergence of a broad range 
of institutional arrangements that support indigenous peoples to experience political autonomy and gain control of 
their futures. Xanthaki (n 72)., 155. 
145 See Chapter 1. 
146 Andrea Carmen, ‘International Treaty Council Report from the Battle Field - the Struggle for the Declaration’ in 
Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009). 
147 Frederike Peters, ‘Subaltern Voices in International Law. Role and Contribution of Indigenous Representatives 
in the Creation of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (Master thesis International 
Relations (MA), Universiteit Leiden 2017) <https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/52445> 
accessed 17 February 2021.  
148 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (1st edn, David Bunnett Books 1999)., 
59.  
149 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense : Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 
(2nd ed., Cambridge University Press] 2002)., 451.  See 420-495 for Santos’ discussion of the six forms of power.  
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and colonialism. These forms of power both influence and are sustained in the way that society 
is constructed in the household; workplace; markets; in the community through the creation of 
the ‘other’; in political spaces and institutions; and in the ‘worldplace’, in which economic value 
moves from peripheral places in the global south to the ‘core’ in the global north.  Santos 
argues that these unequal exchanges are reinforced by six ‘legal orders’, that govern the 
actions of individuals within each of these six spheres of life. In common with Alfred, Santos 
considers that law takes effect through an argumentative discourse, and the ‘threat of force’.150  
 
In relation to the key principle of state sovereignty in political theory, Wheatley has noted that 
the positivist law of nations considers a capacity for coercive force to be integral to the 
definition of a sovereign state: ‘Sovereign political communities were distinguished from non-
sovereign political communities by the existence of institutions of government and coercive 
systems for the enforcement of law norms.’151 Furthermore, Wheatley suggests that the 
influential Eurocentric understandings of sovereign power that were put forward by key 
theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Vattel were conceptualised in direct opposition to 
indigenous traditional livelihoods and governance systems.152 To these theorists, indigenous 
land tenure systems and governance practices represented a ‘dystopian “state of nature”’ in 
which land was left unused and indigenous people were thought to live in a backwards and 
uncivilised manner.153 Sovereign authority was understood to be exercised in relation to 
discrete populations settled on defined parcels of land, and systems of government, laws and 
the coercive means to enforce them were considered to be necessary for people living within 
these ‘civilised’ societies to achieve ‘the good life’ - as defined by economic development, 
private property and agricultural productivity in accordance with European-style land use 
systems.154   
 
 
150 ibid. Santos defines ‘law’ broadly, as ‘a body of regularized procedures and normative standards, considered 
justiciable in any given group, which contributes to the creation and prevention of disputes, and to their settlement 
through an argumentative discourse, coupled with the threat of force’ (at 457).  
151 Steven Wheatley, ‘Conceptualizing the Authority of the Sovereign State over Indigenous Peoples’ (2014) 27 
Leiden Journal of International Law 371., 381. 
152 ibid. 
153 ibid. 
154 Echoes of such arguments can still be witnessed in relation to indigenous-state conflict today: for example, in 
Chapter 6 it is seen in the characterisation of indigenous peoples as ‘dogs in the manger’ who refuse to put their 
land to good use; in the case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay, the Agrarian Statute of 
Paraguay limited the expropriation of indigenous land to those instances in which the land is not ‘rationally 
productive’ (at 265)- i.e. in use for commercial, agricultural purposes. The Court found that this was in breach of 
the indigenous community’s right to property, commenting that he Court comment that failing to recognise a variety 
of cultural conceptions of property ownership ‘would make the protection granted by Article 21 of the Convention 
meaningless for millions of individuals’.  Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay Judgement of August 
24 2010 (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 214 (24 August 2010), 
paras 87, 149.  
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In contrast, indigenous political philosophy tends to interpret power in a bottom-up or 
horizontal fashion, rather than as a force that operates from the top down.155 Alfred explains 
that in indigenous cultures, ‘access to power is gained through balancing the diverse aspects 
of our being, harmonization with the natural forces that exist outside us, respect for the integrity 
of others and the diverse forms of power, and knowledge of ritual.’156  Central to the indigenous 
understanding of power is the human relationship with nature: ‘In indigenous philosophies, 
power flows from respect for nature and the natural order. In the dominant western philosophy, 
power derives from coercion and artifice – in effect, alienation from nature.’157 Whilst 
indigenous societies are not immune to operating under exploitative forms of power, Alfred’s 
concept of power as balance and harmony offers an alternative vision of how power could 
operate between the state and indigenous peoples.  
 
Many indigenous authors have expressed that they do not want a degree of power delegated 
from a state who asserts its power over them; instead they are seeking a relationship in which 
power is expressed as a horizontal relationship of mutual respect.  Alfred has advocated for a 
nation-to-nation approach, which he views as a ‘traditional objective. In contrast, attempting 
‘to achieve partial recognition of a right of self-government within the legal and structural 
confines of the state’ he considers to be an assimilationist goal.’158 Vine Deloria has argued 
that the approach of self-government and delegated autonomy is inadequate, because it does 
not accommodate spiritual needs and originates ‘in the minds of non-Indians who have 
reduced the traditional ways to dust, or believe they have, and now wish to give, as a gift, a 
limited measure of local control and responsibility’.159  
 
This chapter argues that UNDRIP represents exactly this arrangement – the delegation by 
states of limited control and responsibility to indigenous peoples. In contrast, the Iroquoian 
Guswentha, or Two-Row Wampum, is one model for the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and states that has been cited by indigenous authors as an example of how power 
 
155 In a discussion with Atsenhaienton, a Kanien’kehaka whose people was one of the founding members of the 
Iroquois Confederacy, Alfred examines the concept of sovereignty in European and indigenous culture.  
Atsenhaienton views sovereignty as a European construct, that relates to the Crown’s (or state’s) authority over its 
land and people. In contrast, in indigenous systems ‘the people are sovereign’ (at 109). Alfred, Peace, Power, 
Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (n 148). 108-113. In the Iroquois Confederacy, Turner relates that the 
Chiefs of the Grand Council would not negotiate decisions with their counterparts without first gaining the approval 
of their communities. This speaks to contrasting understandings of who are the ultimate bearers of power within 
indigenous and non-indigenous societies. Turner (n 43). 49. 
156 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (n 148)., 52. 
157 ibid., 60. 
158 ibid., 99 
159  Vine Deloria Jr and Clifford M Lytle, The Nations within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty 
(Reissue edition, University of Texas Press 1998)., 15, cited in Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An 
Indigenous Manifesto (n 148)., 54. 
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relations between states and indigenous peoples should operate. The Two-Row Wampum 
has been described by Grand Chief Michael Mitchell of Akwesasne as follows: 
 
 When the Haudenosee first came into contact with the European nations, treaties of 
peace and friendship were made. Each was symbolized by the Gus-Wen-Teh or Two 
Row Wampum. There is a bed of white wampum which symbolizes the purity of the 
agreement. There are two rows of purple, and those rows have the spirit of your 
ancestors and mine. There are three beads of wampum separating the two rows and 
they symbolize peace, friendship and respect. 
 
These two rows symbolize two paths or vessels, traveling down the same rivers 
together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their 
customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in 
our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other’s vessel. The principles of the Two 
Row Wampum became the basis for all treaties and agreements that were made with 
the Europeans and later the Americans.160 
 
Turner gives insight into the principles on which the Iroquois Federacy was based, including 
the value of recognising ‘the moral autonomy of the other’161. Thus the two boats symbolise a 
model of the ‘coexistence of power’ based on commonly-held principle that the two peoples 
are interdependent, sharing the same ‘river of time’162 whilst remaining ‘distinct political 
entities’ and ‘independent nations’163 in whose affairs the other must not interfere. This same 
spirit is summed up by Ladner when she says ‘Both indigenous nations and the settler state 
will need to come to terms with what it means to have multiple nations occupying the same 
space. We will need to find a way to live together in a mutually respectful, mutually agreeable 
and mutually beneficial way on indigenous lands.’164 
 
Along similar lines, political theorists such as James Tully and Richard Stacey have advocated 
for alternative models of relationship outside the human rights paradigm that could better 
accommodate indigenous understandings of power. For example, ‘intercultural 
constitutionalism’, based on shared principles of mutual recognition as independent nations, 
 
160  Michael Mitchell, ‘An Unbroken Assertion of Sovereignty’ in Boyce Richardson and Assembly of First Nations 
(eds), Drum beat: anger and renewal in Indian country (Summerhill Press 1989)., 109-110 cited in Turner (n 43)., 
48.  
161 Turner (n 43)., 53. 
162 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (n 148)., 52. 
163 ibid., 54 (emphasis in original). 
164 Kiera Ladner, ‘Learning from the Earth, Learnining from Each Other: Ethnoecology, Responsibility and 
Reciprocity’ in Michael Asch, John Borrows and James Tully (eds), Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-
Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (University of Toronto Press 2018)., 261. 
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consent and the continuity of their respective distinct political and cultural identities;165 or 
through developing the model of Canadian federalism as the basis for indigenous self-
government.166 These approaches differ from a human rights approach that is evident in 
UNDRIP because they emphasise the separateness of indigenous peoples, and their 
existence as nations who have the right to decide which of their powers and responsibilities 
they will grant to outside entities, such as the state. In contrast, as discussed above in section 
2.4.1, in the human rights approach the state decides which of its own powers and 
responsibilities it will delegate to indigenous peoples. In a nation-to-nation approach there is 
a negotiation between equals; in the human rights approach, there is a limited degree of 
control given down as a ‘gift’.167 This is a crucial difference.  
 
Several of UNDRIP’s provisions reflect the unwillingness of states to countenance a ‘nation-
to-nation’ or ‘citizens plural’ approach. The draft declaration originally contained a provision 
enabling indigenous peoples to collectively determine their own citizenship in addition to being 
citizens of the state.168  However, by the end of the WGDD, this provision had been removed 
and replaced with the ‘right to determine own identity or membership’169 – which fails to 
distinguish indigenous citizenship from membership of any other group or organisation.170 
Throughout negotiations, states also watered down provisions on recognising treaties, 
agreements and constructive arrangements between indigenous peoples and states in a way 
that reinforced states’ dominance over indigenous peoples and undermined indigenous efforts 
to put their relationship with states on a nation-to-nation footing.171 Furthermore, states 
 
165 For example, see James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge 
University Press 1995).  
166  Richard Stacey, ‘The Dilemma of Indigenous Self-Government in Canada: Indigenous Rights and Canadian 
Federalism’ (2018) 46 Federal Law Review 669. 
167 Jr and Lytle (n 159).; Richard Day, ‘Who Is This We That Gives the Gift? Native American Political Theory and 
The Western Tradition’ (2001) 2 Critical Horizons 173.Vine Deloria, and also Richard Day.  
168 See Annex to UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res 1994/45 
(26 August 1994) in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session Geneva 1-26 August 1994’ (28 October 1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1995/2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56., Art 32, which states:  
Indigenous peoples have the collective right to determine their own citizenship in accordance with their 
customs and traditions. Indigenous citizenship does not impair the right of indigenous individuals to 
obtain citizenship of the States in which they live. 
169 UNCHR ‘Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its eleventh session’ (22 March 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/79, Art 32; UNDRIP, 
UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 33. 
170 White Face, Zumila Wobaga (n 112)., commentary on Article 33. White Face calls Article 33 ‘one of the most 
dangerous Articles in this Declaration’.  
171 The draft of the Declaration produced by Daes at the end of the WGIP called for states to recognise that ‘treaties, 
agreements and other arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are properly matters of international 
concern and responsibility,’ (13th preambular paragraph) and such agreements should be recognised, observed 
and enforced by states ‘according to their original spirit and intent’ (Art 36). Furthermore, any disputes should be 
settled by ‘competent international bodies.’ (Art 36). Annex to UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, Res 1994/45 (26 August 1994) in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session Geneva 1-26 
August 1994’ (28 October 1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56. 
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removed provisions in the WCIP draft that called for the full recognition of indigenous legal 
systems.172 All these amendments work against the potential for UNDRIP to significantly 
challenge existing power relations, and constrain the scope of indigenous self-determination.  
 
Champagne has criticised UNDRIP on these terms. In his view, far from being a foundation 
for a new relationship between indigenous peoples and the state - UNDRIP is a sophisticated 
form of integration, designed to be consistent with states’ established method of dealing with 
minority groups or ethnic minorities. As such, it leaves the primacy of state governments 
unchallenged and indigenous peoples at the mercy of state discretion, particularly when it 
comes to important issues of land ownership and control of resources.173 In his view, UNDRIP 
emphasises ‘democratic multiculturalism’ over an alternative model of ‘citizens plural’, which 
‘recognizes the extralegal character of indigenous peoples' participation in the nation-state’. 
The ‘citizens plural’ approach, he argues, would have better reflected the wish of indigenous 
peoples to join in national government and culture as well as maintaining their separate 
government and culture as indigenous peoples. However, as Starblanket and Stark have 
acknowledged, ‘Too often, conventional Western knowledge is willing to turn to the relational 
only insofar as this attention to relationships doesn’t threaten the stability of the state’.174    
 
Indigenous models of power and the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state 
suggest that the treatment of indigenous peoples as a special kind of minority within the state 
may be a flawed approach, that limits the definition of the right to self-determination to the 
content of Articles 4 and 5 of UNDRIP, precluding other possibilities for its expression. Chapter 
4 of this thesis further explores the limits of the human rights framework for reconciliation, 
through a critical examination of Kymlicka’s model of minority rights, human rights based 
multiculturalism, from the perspective of indigenous political philosophy. The next section of 
this chapter highlights a second important way in which human rights-based perspectives on 
the right to self-determination may be lacking.  
 
 
The final text of the Declaration falls short of this unambiguous recognition, stating that these agreements are 
matters of international concern ‘in some cases’ (at Article 37.1). Although the Declaration is careful not to imply 
that it diminishes or eliminates indigenous rights that have been established through treaties, agreements and 
constructive arrangements (Art 37.2) and considers that these ‘and the relationship they represent, are the basis 
for a strengthened partnership’ (14th preambular paragraph) there is no provision for disputes to be referred to 
international bodies - suggesting that states prefer to handle such disputes as internal matters, consistent with the 
original approach of the League of Nations (discussed in Chapter 3). UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 
2007).  
172 Ref compare WGIP with Dec.  
173  Duane Champagne, ‘UNDRIP (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples): Human, Civil, 
and Indigenous Rights’ (2013) 28 Wicazo Sa Review 9., 20. 
174 Starblanket and Stark (n 50)., 180.  
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3.7.2 A new understanding of economic power  
 
In addition to concerns over the ability of the human rights paradigm to transform political 
power relations, there is a significant danger that the question of economic power glossed 
over in the human rights approach to self-determination. Section 2.2.3 noted that for 
indigenous writers, reconciliation encompasses addressing economic models that create 
imbalance between people and the earth. Mander and Tauli-Corpuz have argued that 
indigenous peoples and states are locked in ‘paradigm wars’; a conflict of worldviews which 
impacts on each sides’ understanding of land, property, and humanity’s place within the 
natural world, and gives rise to radically different visions of what ‘development’ look like.175 
The ideological nature of the claims of the global indigenous movement, and its opposition to 
the neoliberal model of development, is a point which is also made by decolonial scholars 
such as de Santos, Rodriquez-Garavito and Arenas.176 Santos argues that the indigenous 
movement’s ‘reading of our time is paradigmatic in nature, its logic is anti-capitalist, its politics 
is based on self-determination and autonomy, its ideology is emancipation from hegemonic 
‘development models’’.177 
 
Consequently, a related conceptualisation of self-determination as ‘resurgence’ focuses less 
on indigenous peoples’ political relationship to state structures and more on reviving their 
traditional relationship with the land. This approach advocates the revival of all areas of 
indigenous life in a way that draws from traditional wisdom as it relates to the present. An 
important aspect of this ideal is the revival of indigenous land management practices, and 
creating independent means of sustainable self-sufficient economies based on indigenous 
values such as reciprocity.178 Indeed, Corntassel has also warned that state-centric rights-
based approaches may change the nature of indigenous institutions, resulting in indigenous 
peoples ‘mimicking state functions rather than honoring their own sustainable, spiritual 
 
175  Mander and Tauli-Corpuz (n 15).  
176  For example, Rodriquez-Garavito and Arenas comment that the global indigenous movement ‘is explicitly 
rooted in a reaction against the expansion of the frontiers of predatory forms of global capitalism into new territories 
(e.g. the Amazon) and economic activities (e.g. the commercial exploitation of traditional knowledge and 
biodiversity). This expansion, in turn, is linked to the pressures to step up the exploitation of natural resources 
associated with the increasing consumption of the North and economic dependence of the South.’  César 
Rodríguez-Garavito and Luis Carlos Arenas, ‘Indigenous Rights, Transnational Activism, and Legal Mobilization: 
The Struggle of the U’wa People in Colombia’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito 
(eds), Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press 2005)., 
242. 
177 Santos (n 149)., 239. 
178 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (n 148)., 118-119.; Jeff Corntassel, ‘Re-
Envisioning Resurgence: Indigenous Pathways to Decolonization and Sustainable Self-Determination’ (2012) 1 
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 86.; Borrows and Tully (n 39). 
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relationships with their homelands’.179  In his view, ‘the pursuit of self-determination should be 
reconceived as a responsibility based movement centered on a sustainable self-determination 
process, not as a narrowly constructed, state-driven rights discourse.’ 180 However, in practice 
this can be a significant challenge because, as Alfred notes, ‘the structure of mainstream 
society is such that people who adhere to traditional values are not likely to have access to 
the resources and cooperation needed to achieve self-sufficiency.’181  
 
To realise indigenous self-determination defined in this way requires that indigenous peoples 
wield only political power but also economic power. This would require systemic changes to 
economic models and the way that resources are distributed.182 For example, in the context 
of resource extraction activities, a view of self-determination that connects the economic with 
the political would not only require consent, but might also require that resource extraction 
activities are carried out at the request of indigenous communities, in way that reflects 
indigenous values. Furthermore, it would require indigenous communities to be recognised as 
resource owners and project partners with substantial control over the project, rather than 
viewing them as beneficiaries or stakeholders who are to be consulted.183  
 
Whilst these ‘resurgence’ approaches to indigenous self-determination do not focus on 
secession, they are nevertheless often perceived as a threat to the authority of the state and 
its control over land and resources.184  Thus many of its proponents emphasise unilateral 
action rather than negotiation with the state, whilst pointing to the way that indigenous people 
are vilified and even criminalised for participating in cultural practices on traditional land which 
is often considered private property or publicly-owned parks. In one example, Corntassel and 
Bryce describe the work of Lekwungen communities in what is known as British Columbia in 
Canada, to revive their traditional kwetlal food system. Frequently encountering opposition 
from non-indigenous citizens, Bryce initiated projects that involved the non-indigenous 
community, to educate them about the history of the land and their responsibilities towards its 
food system. This is one example of how indigenous ‘communities must assert sustainable 
self-determination rather than negotiate for it.’185 
 
179  Jeff Corntassel and Cheryl Bryce, ‘Practicing Sustainable Self-Determination: Indigenous Approaches to 
Cultural Restoration and Revitalization’ (2012) 18 The Brown Journal of World Affairs 151., 153. 
180 ibid.,160. See also Gerald Taiaiake Alfred, ‘Colonialism and State Dependency’ (2009) 5 International Journal 
of Indigenous Health 42.; Corntassel (n 178).  
181 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (n 148)., 118. 
182 Coulthard (n 42)., 108-9.  
183 ibid., 108-9. 
184 Corntassel and Bryce (n 179). 
185 Jeff Corntassel, ‘Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights 




Article 3 of UNDRIP states that by virtue of the right to self-determination, indigenous peoples 
can ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’,186 and further protects 
their right to maintain their own economic systems and institutions, to be secure in their 
subsistence, and engage in traditional and other economic activities.187 However, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, states retain their permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
including sub-soil resources, which significantly alters the economic balance of power in their 
favour. As discussed above in relation to Article 4, indigenous peoples have the right to 
‘autonomy’ in their local affairs, but specific reference to autonomy over ‘economic activities, 
land and resources management’ was removed during negotiations. Furthermore, as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, according to a human rights approach based on 
multiculturalism, the state retains sole authority to take decisions relating to development 
projects on indigenous lands, weighing up indigenous rights and interests against the rights 
and interests of the population of the state as a whole. This framework ensures that indigenous 
peoples do not have full control over their own lands and resources, and enforces the 
prevailing economic power disparity between states and indigenous peoples.  
 
3.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has argued that since the earliest colonisation of the Americas, indigenous 
peoples and the states have been locked into an intractable conflict, between indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination on the one hand, and states’ sovereignty, political unity and 
territorial integrity on the other.  Developments in international law over this period have 
entrenched this conflict and failed to recognise indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. 
UNDRIP was an attempt to redress this long-standing injustice, and to finally resolve an issue 
that stands at the heart of the ongoing conflict.  
 
The discussion on reconciliation in Section 2.2 suggests that addressing the root of conflict is 
key to reconciliation, and that deep systemic change is necessary to transform unjust power 
relations in social structures, cultural norms, and political institutions. As a single instrument, 
UNDRIP is obviously limited in its capacity to achieve this. It did succeed in opening up a 
debate on how international law should treat indigenous peoples more equally, and provides 
a framework that, if implemented, would surely improve the situation of indigenous peoples. 
 
186 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 3. 
187 Ibid., Arts 5 and 20. 
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In fact, UNDRIP is remarkable for its explicit recognition of the right to self-determination of a 
non-state people – a recognition that, indigenous people argue, is key to reconciliation.  
 
However, this chapter has argued that UNDRIP has not succeeded in resolving the root cause 
of the conflict, because it has reinterpreted indigenous claims for self-determination through a 
lens of human rights. States’ preoccupation with the external/internal self-determination 
dichotomy has resulted in a framework, based on human rights, that views indigenous peoples 
similarly to sub-national minorities and equates the right to self-determination with the right to 
democratic governance and participation alongside limited rights to autonomy. 
  
Human rights are of course a basic entitlement and are of particular importance in view of the 
violations of rights that indigenous peoples continue to suffer. Furthermore, the strategy of 
adopting the language of human rights enabled indigenous peoples to secure recognition of 
the right to self-determination, which may not have been possible otherwise. However, the 
heavy reliance on a human rights framing has precluded a more expansive examination of 
alternative models of relationship. Consequently, rather than providing a model of equal 
relations that is truly transformative, UNDRIP’s ‘dual aspect’ model of self-determination 
remains aligned with a colonial model of hierarchical power between the state and indigenous 
peoples and does not sufficiently challenge the way that political and economic power is still 
distributed between them. As a result, in the terms of peace and conflict studies, UNDRIP may 
be able to support ‘coexistence’ and reduce the prevalence of outright conflict, it is unlikely to 
support deeper forms of reconciliation, and positive peace. 
 
This conclusion is perhaps not surprising, given that UNDRIP is stated to constitute ‘minimum 
standards for the survival, dignity and well-being’ of indigenous peoples.188 Consequently 
there is an implied expectation that states should go further than its provisions to fully address 
the conflict with indigenous peoples. The danger of continuing to prioritise human rights as the 
dominant lens through which to view UNDRIP is that it will fail to deliver the transformative 
results that indigenous peoples are seeking, and subsequently lead to disillusionment. As 
Scheinin and Åhrén have forcefully observed, over a decade after UNDRIP was adopted, 
states have largely conflated self-determination with consultation, and ‘are currently doing next 
to nothing to realize one of the greatest promises of the Declaration’. 189 This chapter has 
highlighted some of the alternative ways in which political reconciliation between indigenous 
peoples and states could be designed, outside of the model of human rights.   The next chapter 
 
188 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 43. 
189 Scheinin and Åhrén (n 136)., 74. 
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continues the examination of the dangers of treating indigenous peoples as minorities within 
a state, by critically evaluating Kymlicka’s model of human rights-based multiculturalism from 




Chapter 4: A Critical Analysis of Human Rights 





This chapter analyses Kymlicka’s model of human rights based multiculturalism as a model 
for reconciliation between indigenous peoples and the state. This model has been chosen 
because it specifically addresses how liberal political theory could be developed to 
accommodate the claims of indigenous peoples to self-government and recognition of their 
collective rights: something that, at the time UNDRIP was being adopted, was a fiercely 
contested idea. Kymlicka’s monograph, Multicultural Citizenship was originally published in 
1995, shortly after the formation of the WGDD. It sought to provide a coherent liberal rationale 
for the developing international framework of minority rights, including the draft declaration.1 
Drawing from key liberal principles such as individual autonomy, Kymlicka sought to explain 
how recognition of collective or ‘group-differentiated’ rights was logically consistent with - and 
essential for – ensuring the rights and freedom of the individual.  
 
Kymlicka’s work was highly influential on Eurocentric understandings of minority rights 
(including those of indigenous peoples) in academic political philosophy, as well as the 
practice of states and international organisations.2 Anaya has commented that the model of 
indigenous rights developed through the UNDRIP was generally consistent with Kymlicka’s 
 
1 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press 1995).  
2 Kymlicka’s model of multiculturalism has been noted by various authors as being influential in the development 
of liberal understandings of multiculturalism and how states can navigate cultural difference. For example, Brock 
writes that Kymlicka’s account of how cultural claims should be mediated is ‘probably the most developed and 
dominant one around’. Similarly, Newman has commented that Kymlicka  ‘created an entire school of thought in 
liberal multiculturalism and its variants’. Jewkes and Grégoire describe Kymlicka as ‘one of the most influential 
political philosophers of our time.’ Kymlicka himself observes, ‘Having defended this ideal of liberal multiculturalism 
in my own work - particularly my 1995 book Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights - I have 
been struck by the way it has come to inform the work of many international organizations’.  See Gillian Brock, 
‘Can Kymlicka Help Us Mediate Cultural Claims?’ (2005) 12 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
269., 269; Dwight G Newman, ‘You Still Know Nothin’ ’Bout Me: Toward Cross-Cultural Theorizing of Aboriginal 
Rights’ (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 725. 743; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New 
International Politics of Diversity (Oxford University Press, USA 2009)., 7.; Will Kymlicka, Michael Jewkes and 
Jean-François Grégoire, ‘Models of Citizenship, Inclusion and Empowerment: National Minorities, Immigrants and 
Animals? An Interview with Will Kymlicka (WK)’ (2016) 44 Political Theory 394. 
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model,3 and Kymlicka himself has noted that the adoption of UNDRIP is evidence of states’ 
continued support for multicultural citizenship.4 As was discussed in Chapter 3, the collective 
right to self-determination in UNDRIP is interpreted through the lens of human rights and 
expressed through the ‘dual aspects’ of participation in state decision-making on the one hand, 
and autonomy in local affairs on the other. In a similar way, human rights based 
multiculturalism entails protection of individual and collective rights, and proposes both limited 
self-government for indigenous peoples as well as enhanced rights of participation in state 
decision-making. Consequently, this thesis considers Kymlicka’s model of human rights based 
multiculturalism to be a useful model for exploration of the assumptions and philosophical 
lacunae that underpin the ‘dual aspect’ model of internal self-determination5 advanced by 
UNDRIP. 
 
In keeping with decolonial practice discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter will critique human 
rights based multiculturalism from the perspective of the marginalised group - in this case, 
indigenous peoples. It therefore draws from critiques by indigenous critics of liberal 
multicultural models, and their analysis brings some altogether different insights from those 
offered by liberal commentators, and opens up alternatives. In particular, it draws heavily from 
the work of indigenous authors in the Canadian context, who have engaged directly with 
questions of reconciliation and liberal multiculturalism.  Whilst this chapter concentrates on 
the limitations of Kymlicka’s theory, it is important to point out that its support of indigenous 
self-government is recognised by some indigenous writers as an important step forward. For 
example, Turner comments that Kymlicka’s work is ‘arguably … the most generous 
accommodation of Aboriginal rights in contemporary liberalism’,6 and Holder and Corntassel 
consider it - at least in part - to be ‘a promising avenue of development.’7 Of course, it must 
also be noted that indigenous perspectives are diverse, and should not be represented as 
homogenous. The critics cited in this chapter hold varying degrees of optimism or pessimism 




3 S James Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural State’ 
(2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 13., 15.  
4 Will Kymlicka, ‘The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse 
Societies’ (2018) 68 International Social Science Journal 133.,139.  
5 See Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2.  
6 Dale R Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy (University of Toronto Press 
2006). 59. 
7 Cindy L Holder and Jeff J Corntassel, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Multicultural Citizenship: Bridging Collective and 
Individual Rights’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 126. 150. 
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Section 2 of this chapter introduces human rights based multiculturalism: its origins, its main 
characteristics, and critiques that have been levied at it from within the liberal tradition. Section 
3 highlights the need for models of multiculturalism that centre epistemic justice, and are 
developed in dialogue between cultures. On the contrary, human rights based multiculturalism 
draws only from Eurocentric liberal theories, which make universalist claims and do not 
adequately engage with indigenous historical narratives. Section 4 unpacks the significant 
consequences of the epistemic limitations of human rights based multiculturalism on its 
suitability for addressing the political balance of power between indigenous peoples and the 
state. By assuming the role of states as the main unit of social organisation, human rights 
based multiculturalism misrepresents the core claim of indigenous peoples to self-
determination. Furthermore, drawing from the ‘dual aspect’ model of self-determination 
discussed in Chapter 3, it shows how human rights based multiculturalism constrains both the 
self-government/autonomy aspect, as well as their ability to participate effectively in decision-
making. Finally, Section 5 of this chapter examines the limitations of human rights based 
multiculturalism to challenge economic power imbalances, and provides some insight into how 
indigenous political philosophy moves beyond human rights based multiculturalism to 
transform indigenous-state relations based on a concept of ‘citizenship with the land’.  
 
4.2  Human Rights Based Multiculturalism 
 
This section will set out the main principles of human rights based multiculturalism as 
expressed by Kymlicka in Multicultural Citizenship. 
 
4.2.1 Kymlicka’s purpose in developing a model of human rights based multiculturalism 
 
Kymlicka observed that International Organisations such as the United Nations and the World 
Bank adopted liberal multiculturalist policies during the late 1980s and 1990s despite a lack of 
firm evidence that it plays an effective role in the reduction of ethnic conflict. This commitment 
to liberal multiculturalism, he argued, was evidenced in best practice guidance, legal norms 
(which sought to impose liberal multiculturalism to overcome the reluctance of some States to 
adopt best practice), and interventions in specific conflicts.8  However, although South America 
adopted a form of multicultural constitutionalism9 following the end of the dictatorship period, 
 
8 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys (n 2). 247-293. Kymlicka was a significant contributor and the peer reviewer for 
the Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World (United Nations Development 
Program 2004)., which champions multiculturalism as a crucial component of successful development.  
9 Helga Maria Lell, ‘Concept of Citizenship: Multicultural Challenges and Latin American Constitutional Democracy, 
The’ (2014) 2 Birkbeck Law Review 87. 
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Kymlicka notes that Latin America’s adoption of multiculturalism was the exception. He notes 
that it was not enthusiastically embraced by African or Asian states, due to several factors that 
include distrust of universalist European ideals and international organisations more 
generally.10  
 
Furthermore, Kymlicka argued the minority rights instruments adopted in the 1990s were 
‘adopted hastily’ and ‘quite vague’, seemingly ‘motivated more by the need to appease 
belligerent minorities than by any clear sense of what justice requires. Both the underlying 
justification for these rights, and their limits, remain[ed] unclear.’11 He raised concerns that 
human rights, although essential, are insufficient by themselves to secure the rights of minority 
groups within a State because they do not address key practical questions which arise in a 
State with minority communities. For example, the individual human rights framework does 
not address issues such as which languages should be recognised in State institutions and 
schools, whether indigenous lands should be under State or indigenous control, or the extent 
to which minorities should be expected to integrate into the wider national society. If such 
policy decisions are made through a democratic government, it is likely that minority concerns 
will be side-lined or subsumed by the interests of the national majority because decision-
making will usually be dominated by the views of the majority. Kymlicka argued that this would 
lead to injustice and the exacerbation of ethnocultural conflict.12  
 
In view of this belief, Kymlicka intended his work to show how the liberal tradition was a diverse 
field that was capable of recognising the importance of culture and community, and to 
overcome the resistance to minority rights (and collective rights in particular) that was 
prevalent at the time, a resistance that, in his view, ‘was more a function of Cold War 
ideological battles than of careful philosophical analysis.’13 In doing so, he hoped to explain 
the normative logic of ‘relatively successful, peaceful, democratic multinational federations in 
the West,’, to help post-colonial and post-communist countries manage the political claims of 
sub-national groups and prevent conflict.14  Whilst the following critique of Kymlicka’s model 
focuses on its limitations, it is important to acknowledge the extent of his contribution in 
demonstrating that collective rights are not incompatible with the liberal tradition.  
 
 
10 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys (n 2). 248-252. 
11 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press) <https://0-
oxford-universitypressscholarship-com.wam.city.ac.uk/view/10.1093/0198290918.001.0001/acprof-
9780198290919> accessed 14 November 2020. 5-6.  
12  ibid. 4-5.  
13 Kymlicka, Jewkes and Grégoire (n 2)., 397.  
14 ibid., 402. 
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4.2.2 An overview of human rights based multiculturalism 
 
Kymlicka’s model of ‘human rights based multiculturalism’ distinguishes two different types of 
minority within a State, and three kinds of ‘differentiated citizenship rights’ which different types 
of minority may claim.  ‘National minorities’ are defined as groups which are linguistically and 
culturally different from the majority State culture and (crucially to Kymlicka’s framework) which 
possess their own societal institutions encompassing both private and political life.  These, he 
suggested, tend to occur within ‘multination States’ in which previously autonomous and 
territorially concentrated cultures find themselves being incorporated into a larger State. 
Indigenous peoples would normally fall into this category. On the other hand, there are ‘ethnic 
groups’ which are immigrant groups with cultures distinct from the national majority, but which 
do not have their own established institutions.15   
 
Kymlicka argues that these two types of minority are likely to claim different ‘group-
differentiated rights’ to protect their cultures. Thus national minorities, such as indigenous 
peoples, tend to seek self-government rights in which State power is delegated to the national 
minority. Ethnic groups, on the other hand, seek ‘polyethnic rights’ which enable them to 
preserve their cultural practices in the context of the wider State apparatus. This may include 
financial support or legal protection. Finally, both ethnic groups and national minorities may 
require special representation rights, which are guaranteed seats for minority groups within 
the institutions of the State.16  
 
The rationale for this model is explicitly rooted in Eurocentric liberal ideals, intended to 
demonstrate ‘how minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy, and 
social justice.’17 Consequently, Kymlicka’s model seeks to balance the interests of individuals 
within a minority group with the rights of the group itself to exist and practice its own culture. 
Kymlicka argues that ‘internal restrictions’ - in which individual autonomy is curtailed by 
minority groups - can generally not be tolerated in liberal societies, with limited exceptions in 
the case of national minorities. On the other hand, ‘external protections’ for minorities may be 
permitted to limit the impact of State policy and action on their cultures and ways of life, and 
put different groups within a state on a ‘more equal footing’.18  
 
Kymlicka justifies the addition of group-differentiated rights to the existing framework of 
 
15 ibid.10-33 
16 ibid. 131-151. 
17 ibid. 6. 
18 ibid. 36. See also ibid. 34-48 for Kymlicka’s discussion of internal restrictions and external protections. 
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individual rights on the basis of equality with historical circumstances and the benefit of cultural 
diversity to wider society also providing justification in some instances. In relation to equality, 
he argues that the policy of ‘benign neglect’, which assumes that individual rights are all that 
is necessary to protect ethnocultural minorities, ignores the structural disadvantage that these 
minorities face. For example, the State makes decisions about the official languages of 
institutions which will put linguistic minorities at a disadvantage. Group-differentiated rights are 
essential to redress these imbalances.19 
   
In developing the equality justification, Kymlicka leans on the work of liberal philosophers 
Rawls, Dworkin and Stuart Mill, to propose a liberal notion of freedom: the freedom of each 
individual to choose their own idea of what ‘a good life’ entails, along with the freedom to revise 
their beliefs and change their plan of life accordingly. Such a ‘good life’ cannot be imposed by 
external forces but must be consistent with the individual’s own evolving internal belief system. 
According to Kymlicka, this gives rise to two pre-conditions for leading the ‘good life’: the 
‘resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, 
without fear of discrimination or punishment’ and the freedom to question those beliefs, ‘to 
examine them in the light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can 
provide.’20 Thus liberal societies value individual privacy, education, as well as freedom of 
expression and association in order to support these preconditions for the good life.21 
 
Kymlicka places great emphasis on the role of an individuals’ own culture as a necessary 
condition for the fulfilment of the ‘good life’. Culture, according to Kymlicka, provides the 
cultural narratives which individuals use to discover different options for the good life, and 
assess their value and meaning. Therefore, culture is a necessary resource for ensuring 
individual freedom in the liberal tradition. Furthermore, any culture will not do - it is access to 
one’s own culture which is required for individual freedom. Kymlicka argues that people have 
bonds with their culture that are too strong to reasonably expect them to give up. Reasons for 
this may be that, as Rawls suggests, culture provides the language with which we understand 
ourselves. In general people do not choose to make dramatic breaks with their own culture in 
preference for another, so it is not reasonable to require them to do so. Kymlicka also suggests 
that our culture has important influences on our sense of identity and self-esteem, and that 
denigration of our cultural group by others can result in the dignity and self-respect of its 
members being threatened.22 In light of the above, Kymlicka argues that  
 
19 ibid. pp 108-115. 
20 ibid. p81 
21 ibid. 75-106. 




The freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the freedom to go 
beyond one’s language and history, but rather the freedom to move around within 
one’s societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which 
features of a culture are most worth developing, and which are without value.23 
 
Having established that all individuals require membership of a societal culture as a primary 
good on which individual freedom depends, Kymlicka’s justifies the creation of minority rights 
based on the liberal egalitarian theories of Rawls and Dworkin, that inequalities which are 
unchosen, and occur arbitrarily, should be addressed.24 Thus the structural disadvantages that 
minorities face within national society should be mitigated by a framework of group-
differentiated rights, intended to overcome these disadvantages and ensure continued access 
to their culture as a resource for individual freedom.  
 
In addition to this equality argument, Kymlicka proposes that there is sometimes an historical 
justification for group-differentiated rights, particularly where national minorities have been 
subsumed into a larger State against their will. There may have been treaties (for example 
between indigenous peoples and colonisers) which the State has not honoured, or the land 
may have been taken by force. In this situation, there is an historical grievance which may be 
redressed in part through group-differentiated rights. However, this historical argument works 
together with the equality argument. Finally, Kymlicka makes the case that group-
differentiated rights are justified if one recognises the benefit to wider society of diversity (in 
terms of creating more diverse options and therefore greater freedom). However, he noted 
there are those who do not recognise these advantages and so cultural arguments, based on 
self-interest rather than rights per se, are not persuasive on their own.25 
 
4.2.3 Critiques of human rights based multiculturalism from a liberal perspective 
 
Kymlicka has been criticised on numerous grounds from within the liberal tradition. Chandran 
Kukathas has criticised Kymlicka’s assertion that access to one’s own culture will automatically 
provide options from which to choose, because illiberal cultures may reduce a person’s options 
by requiring strict adherence to cultural norms. Thus Kukathas argues that Kymlicka’s 
 
23 ibid. 90-91. 
24 ibid. 109. Kymlicka writes ‘They are clearly justified, I believe, within a liberal egalitarian theory, such as Rawls's 
and Dworkin's, which emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities. Indeed inequalities in cultural 
membership are just the sort which Rawls says we should be concerned about, since their effects are “profound 
and pervasive and present from birth”’. (citing John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971). 
and Ronald Dworkin, ‘What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’ (1981) 10 Philosophy & Public Affairs 283.) 
25 ibid. 107-130. 
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justification for providing group-specific rights in order to support liberal freedom fails on this 
basis.26 Brian Barry refutes Kymlicka’s assertion that the survival of cultures is a legitimate 
end which ought to be supported by States27 and cautions that bestowing ‘national minorities’ 
with self-government rights and special representation in national legislature conflates cultural 
distinction with nationhood and unfairly creates two unequal classes of citizen.28 Iris Marion 
Young argues that the categories of ‘national minority’ and ‘ethnic groups’ are too rigidly 
defined, and that in overlooking bicultural identities, Kymlicka excludes groups such as 
African-Americans. Thus the model ought to be softened to provide a continuum of ways of 
being and interacting with the majority, beyond the two options of integration or segregation.29  
Waldron argues for ‘cosmopolitanism’, stating that individuals are influenced by elements of 
many cultures and sometimes even move between them - undermining Kymlicka’s assertion 
of one’s own cultures as a primary need. Waldron writes that to insist that individuals live solely 
within the culture of their birth is in fact illiberal, because it limits rather than expands their 
choices.30 Bhikhu Parekh also disputes Kymlicka’s argument that immigrants, by choosing to 
relocate, have voluntarily given up the right to their culture – lack of access to their own culture 
is a ‘chosen inequality’. Parekh counters that if, as Kymlicka argues, culture is a primary good, 
then it is hard to see how individuals can be expected to waive their right to such a fundamental 
need.31   
 
A comprehensive discussion of liberal debates on Multicultural Citizenship is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.32 Far more relevant, is the question of whether it presents a model that 
indigenous peoples can support, as a roadmap for re-setting their relationship with the state.  
 
26 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’ in Will Kymlicka (ed), The Rights of Minority Cultures 
(Oxford University Press 1995). 
27 Instead, Barry argues that the survival of cultures, when divorced from the interests of individuals, has no value 
in and of itself. Such an approach would result in reifying and preserving cultures rather than permitting their 
evolution and demise, should they cease to serve a useful purpose for their members. 
28 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Polity 2001) cited in Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)..See also ‘Barry and the Dangers of Liberalism’ in Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking 
Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2nd ed, Palgrave Macmillan 2006). 
Reconsidered ed. Paul Kelly (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 137. 
29 Iris Marion Young, ‘A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka’s Ethnic-Nation Dichotomy’ (1997) 4 
Constellations 48. 
30 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’ (1991) 25 University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform 751. In response, Kymlicka argues that Waldron’s examples of moving between cultures are in fact 
simply examples of how many cultural influences can form part of a single diverse societal culture like that of the 
United States. Additionally, the fact that some rare people do choose to move between cultures does not undermine 
the proposition that people are reasonably entitled to access their own culture. See Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship (n 4). p86. 
31 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2nd ed, Palgrave Macmillan 
2006)., 100. 
32 For an overview of liberal multiculturalism and some of its common critiques, see Kukathas (n 26).; Dominic 
McGoldrick, ‘Multiculturalism and Its Discontents’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 27.; Kymlicka, ‘The Rise 
and Fall of Multiculturalism?’ (n 4).; Sarah Song, ‘Multiculturalism’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 2020) 




4.3 Epistemic justice 
 
4.3.1 Rejecting universalism and recognising the locus of enunciation of liberal theories 
 
Whilst the above commentators’ critiques stem from an examination of the correctness or 
coherence of Kymlicka’s rationale, when human rights based multiculturalism is analysed 
through the lens of decolonial thought discussed in Chapter 2, a far more significant problem 
is its universalist tendencies and its very nature as a liberal model rooted in Eurocentric ideals.  
Parekh has noted that whilst liberalism reinforces important values, such as ‘as human dignity, 
autonomy, liberty, critical thought and equality’,33 liberal political philosophy does not have the 
monopoly on their definition. Furthermore, liberalism tends to underplay other important 
values, such as ‘human solidarity, equal life chances, selflessness, self-effacing humility, 
contentment and a measure of scepticism about the pleasures and achievements of human 
life.’34 Parekh demonstrates how a liberal model is incompatible with other worldviews, and 
asserts normative standards which require justification and which ultimately weaken the 
model’s applicability and moral standing.35  In fact, for Parekh, although Kymlicka’s work is 
valuable because it ‘explores and deepens the theoretical resources of liberalism and has a 
persuasive power over liberals’,36 any one-sided view of multiculturalism will be self-evidently 
incomplete, and as a result it is unlikely to be a model with persuasive power across diverse 
cultures:37  
 
Since every political doctrine has a limited grasp of the immense complexity of human 
existence and the problems involved in holding societies together and creating 
sensitive, sane and self-critical individuals, none of them including liberalism can be 
the sole basis of the good society… Moreover, since multicultural societies represent 
an interplay of different cultures, they cannot be theorized or managed from within any 
one of them. They require a multicultural perspective.38 
 
33 ibid., 338-339. 
34 ibid., 338-339. 
35 ibid., 105-6.  
36 Parekh (n 31)., 12. 
37 ibid.,107. 
38 ibid., 339. For example, Parekh argues that Kymlicka’s focus on autonomy means that his theory is not as tolerant 
of some cultures which value, for example, well-being above autonomy of its members: some cultures have ends 
which are more acceptable than others in Kymlicka’s model. Kymlicka’s liberal assertion that a ‘good life’ must be 
lived from within requires that the self is separated from others, ‘and that in turn rests on a wider theory of 
individuation and the concomitant view of moral agency. Many cultures do not draw such a distinction’ (at 339). 
Parekh even points out that individualism is to a great extent based in Protestantism and is not representative even 




Similarly, Day has criticised Kymlicka, as well as other liberal theorists of multiculturalism, for 
failing to engage with the work of indigenous political theorists,39 whilst arguing that Kymlicka 
writes his theory from the supposedly neutral point of view of the system of states itself. 
Consequently, human rights based multiculturalism is concerned with preserving the stability 
of the state in the face of minority nationalism, and requires all identities to accept the state 
model as the only currently available option. Thus liberal theorists offer a universalist approach 
in which they grant, from their privileged position, rights to others based on a limited 
understanding of those others’ needs.  According to Day, liberal theorists must ask themselves  
 
How is it that ‘we’ – whoever ‘we’ are – can be so sure of what ‘they’ – whoever ‘they’ 
are – really want? And how is it that ‘we’ came to be in a position of granting or denying 
recognition to ‘them’ in the first place? Who is this ‘we’ who gives the gift of liberal 
multiculturalism?40 
 
Consequently, Day suggests that unless liberal theorists can recognise the deficiencies of 
their limited locus of enunciation, the resulting multicultural paradigm ‘may, in its current form, 
serve primarily to assuage the anxieties of semi-peripheral capitalist nation-states rather than 
to advance the goals of indigenous peoples’.41 This is a view echoed in Glen Sean Coulthard’s 
book, Red Skin White Masks,42 which examines the liberal conceptualisation of indigenous 
rights and finds it lacking on several points.  Coulthard argues that it is doubtful whether a 
model purely justified by liberal principles, without a similar foundation in indigenous principles, 
can ever adequately provide a framework to mediate the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and the State.  
 
The one-sided nature of human rights based multiculturalism is a weakness which Kymlicka 
himself acknowledges, as he reminds us that the primary goal of Multicultural Citizenship is to 
 
39 Richard Day, ‘Who Is This We That Gives the Gift? Native American Political Theory and The Western Tradition’ 
(2001) 2 Critical Horizons 173., 177. Indigenous political theorists include, for example, Taiaiake Alfred (for 
example, Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness - An Indigenous Manifesto (1st edn, David Bunnett Books 
1999).) Vine Deloria (for an overview of his influential life and work, see Holly Boomer, ‘Writing Red: A Tribute to 
Vine Deloria Jr (1933-2005)’ (2006) 26 Great Plains Quarterly 113.; Tink Tinker, ‘Walking in the Shadow of 
Greatness: Vine Deloria Jr. in Retrospect’ (2006) 21 Wicazo Sa Review 167.), Lee Maracle (for example, Lee 
Maracle, I Am Woman: A Native Perspective on Sociology and Feminism (Press Gang Publishers, an imprint of 
Raincoast Books 1996). Lee Maracle, My Conversations with Canadians (Book*hug Press 2017)., Georges E Sioui 
(for example, Georges Sioui, Eatenonha: Native Roots of Modern Democracy (McGill-Queen’s University Press 
2019)., Patricia Monture-Angus (for example Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk Woman 
Speaks (Fernwood Publishing Co Ltd 1995). 
40 Day (n 39). 
41 Richard JF Day, Gramsci Is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements (Pluto Press; Between 
the Lines 2005). 
42 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (University Of 
Minnesota Press 2014). 
120 
 
clarify the liberal rationale, as a first step towards inter-cultural dialogue.43 Furthermore, in 
2014 Kymlicka expressed a new-found scepticism about the universal applicability of human 
rights based multiculturalism, particularly in Africa, the Middle East or Asia due to their different 
circumstances, and recognises the need for ‘historical contextualism’, and attending more 
closely to the specific local circumstances rather than taking a universalist approach.44 As the 
following sections will show, indigenous authors’ analyses reveal the shortcomings of human 
rights based multiculturalism in the context of the relationship between indigenous peoples 
and the state, and call for an approach that takes greater account of their particular history of 
conflict.  
 
4.3.2 The importance of historical contextualism  
 
One important reason for liberal theorists of multiculturalism to engage with indigenous 
perspectives, is to ensure that the models of multiculturalism put forward are based on an 
understanding of history and the present-day context that is as complete and as nuanced as 
possible. Indeed, Dale Turner notes that it is a ‘frustrating problem’ for indigenous peoples 
that their own interpretations of history are not viewed as being valid from a Western 
perspective.45  An example of this lack of engagement in Multicultural Citizenship is found in 
Kymlicka’s justification of why individuals must have access to their own cultures as a 
necessary resource for individual freedom: 
 
Of course, people do genuinely move between cultures. But this is rarer, and more 
difficult. In some cases, where the differences in social organization and technological 
development are vast, successful integration may be almost impossible for some 
members of the minority. (This seems to be true of the initial period of contact between 
European cultures and indigenous peoples in some parts of the world).46 
 
Although Kymlicka acknowledges the injustices that many indigenous peoples have suffered 
elsewhere in his book, this statement conflicts sharply with the narratives of indigenous 
peoples regarding their experience of early colonisation by Europeans. Indigenous nations 
often had no desire to integrate, and suffered extreme violence and exploitation at the hands 
of European invaders.47 Kymlicka’s words could be interpreted as suggesting that indigenous 
 
43 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 4)., pp 170-171. 
44 Kymlicka, Jewkes and Grégoire (n 2)., 395. 
45 Turner (n 6)., 67. 
46 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 85. 
47 The two opposing narratives regarding early colonisation of the Americas can, for example, be seen in the 
contentious debate over replacing ‘Colombus Day’ with ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Day’ in the United States of America 
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peoples did not integrate due to their own relative ‘backwardness’ compared with European 
colonisers, and it obscures a colonial history of violence and injustice. Referring to indigenous 
nations as ‘the minority’ during the initial period of contact also misrepresents the fact that 
European colonisers came to complex, established indigenous societies as outsiders, not as 
the ‘majority’ culture.  
 
Kymlicka’s lack of engagement with indigenous viewpoints also results in the demotion of 
historic injustice to a secondary issue, and privileges distributive justice above compensatory 
justice as a rationale for group-specific rights. According to Turner, Kymlicka’s equality 
argument does concede that indigenous peoples were ‘initial legitimate entities that formed 
the multinational state of Canada’48 which subsequently ceded powers and were ‘incorporated’ 
into the new State, in situations that were sometimes unjust. However, the injustice that 
occurred at the time of ‘incorporation’ is not considered by Kymlicka to be a relevant factor to 
his equality argument which forms the primary rationale for group-specific rights; instead, the 
ultimate justification is the importance of equality of the national minorities in the State of 
Canada as it exists today. Although Kymlicka does also present a rationale based on historical 
justice, this is a secondary, supporting argument in which claims for specific rights based on 
historical wrongs are entertained only to the extent that they are necessary to protect cultural 
existence, and only to the extent that they do not disrupt a balance of equity with other national 
minorities.49  
 
Whilst welcoming Kymlicka’s theory as a step forward in defending aboriginal self-
government, Turner argues that by excluding indigenous philosophy and voices from liberal 
theorising on rights, Kymlicka has relegated historical concerns to the periphery. In his words: 
   
The relevant issue for Aboriginal peoples is not whether we ought to rectify past 
injustices in order to balance the scales of a liberal distributive justice system, but 
rather how governments can come to recognize the legitimacy of Aboriginal forms of 
 
and other countries in the region. On the one hand, Columbus Day is viewed as a source of national pride in 
celebrating the pioneering spirit of Christopher Columbus who ‘discovered’ the New World and brought European 
civilisation to the Americas. On the other hand, proponents of Indigenous Peoples’ Day recognise it as a celebration 
of indigenous resistance to genocide and the attempted eradication of their civilisations by barbaric invaders. See 
Sam Hitchmough, ‘“It’s Not Your Country Any More”. Contested National Narratives and the Columbus Day Parade 
Protests in Denver’ (2013) 32 European Journal of American Culture 263.; ‘Columbus Day Being Replaced With 
“Indigenous Peoples Day”’ (2015) 31 New American 6.; Jorge Baracutei Estevez, ‘“Columbus Day Is the 
Celebration of Genocide”’ Down to Earth (13 August 2018) 
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HTDWTE0020180831ee8d0005l&cat=a&ep=ASE> 
accessed 4 October 2020. 
48  Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 10-13. Kymlicka recognises that this incorporation could be forcible or 
by consent.  
49 Turner (n 6)., 63-66. 
122 
 
sovereignty in order to renew the political relationship on more just foundations.50  
 
Consequently, Turner argues that Kymlicka’s model overlooks the key claim of indigenous 
peoples - their self-determination as independent nations - and so proposes only a weak form 
of Aboriginal sovereignty which is curtailed to the extent it impinges on that of the state. The 
next section explores in more detail how human rights based multiculturalism may act to 
reinforce, rather than overcome, imbalances of political power that have their roots in colonial 
history.  
 
4.4 Political Power 
 
4.4.1 The problematic assumption of state authority over indigenous peoples  
 
As noted by Day,51 human rights based multiculturalism is proposed from the point of view of 
states. It takes as its starting point the nation state as the main unit of social organisation in 
the world. This is not due to any ideological preference on Kymlicka’s part,52 but due to a more 
pragmatic assessment that the world today is organised into states, and is likely to remain so. 
Kymlicka argues that indigenous peoples – whether voluntarily or not – have now been 
‘incorporated’ into the state, and so the question is now how to ensure equality for indigenous 
peoples in their present context.53 Turner argues that in taking this approach, Kymlicka 
‘sidesteps the issue of Aboriginal incorporation’.54 
 
The underlying assumption of the legitimacy (or at least, the inevitability) of state authority 
over indigenous peoples poses a significant problem for many indigenous writers, who do not 
concede the overarching sovereignty of the State over indigenous peoples.55 As discussed in 
Chapter 3, many indigenous authors call for the recognition of their status as equal peoples in 
a horizontal relationship of power vis-à-vis the state. However, Kymlicka’s human rights based 
multiculturalism subsumes indigenous peoples as one of many minorities under the nation 
state. Macklem explains the problem with this approach:  
 
 
50 ibid., 69. 
51 See Section 4.2.1. 
52 Kymlicka, Jewkes and Grégoire (n 2).; See also comments in Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, ‘Reply: Animal 
Citizenship, Liberal Theory and the Historical Moment | Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue 
Canadienne de Philosophie | Cambridge Core’ (2013) 52 Canadian Philosophical Review 769. 
53 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 10-13.  
54 Turner (n 6)., 65. 
55 Alfred (n 39).; Duane Champagne, ‘UNDRIP (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples): 
Human, Civil, and Indigenous Rights’ (2013) 28 Wicazo Sa Review 9.; Coulthard (n 42).  
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Kymlicka’s characterization of the problem indelibly marks his conclusion. By viewing 
the moral or political issue implicated by indigenous difference as one that requires 
justification of unequal distribution of political rights and responsibilities within a 
particular nation-state, Kymlicka includes indigenous people in the very political 
structure from which they seek a measure of autonomy.56  
 
The theoretical incorporation of indigenous peoples under the authority of the state has 
implications for the extent of indigenous self-determination. In a human-rights based model of 
multiculturalism, the state has a responsibility to balance the rights and interests of its citizens, 
and wields considerable power to determine these decisions in the way that it sees fit. 
However, indigenous writers have observed that such an approach requires indigenous 
peoples to submit to colonial law and institutions that they may not recognise as having 
legitimate authority over them.57 On the other hand, a treaty-based relationship of equals 
would require such decisions to be made through mutual consent.58 According to Corntassel, 
approaches based on recognising individual rights are insufficient to restore this dynamic, 
because ‘Indigeneity is legitimized and negotiated only as a set of state-derived individual 
rights aggregated into a community social context - a very different concept than that of 
collective rights pre-existing and independent of the state.’59 
 
Two decades after the release of Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka himself recognised the 
need to re-articulate human rights based multiculturalism in a way that engages more directly 
with post-colonial theory, in order to overcome the tendency towards imperialism that is 
embedded in liberal thought. He commented: 
 
In my mind, I have always operated on the premise that a multicultural liberalism must 
be a postcolonial liberalism: liberalism needs to renounce imperial fantasies at the 
same time as it renounces fantasies of homogenous and unitary nationhood. … 
[Multicultural Citizenship] can contribute to a post-colonial project, but that would need 
to be disentangled and expressed in a way that I didn’t do.60  
 
 
56 Patrick Macklem, ‘Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples’ (1993) 45 Stanford Law 
Review 1311., 1354. 
57 Coulthard (n 42). 
58 Brenda L Gunn, ‘Moving beyond Rhetoric: Working toward Reconciliation through Self-Determination’ (2015) 38 
Dalhousie Law Journal 237. 
59 Jeff Corntassel, ‘Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights 
Discourse’ (2008) 33 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 105. 115. 
60 Kymlicka, Jewkes and Grégoire (n 2)., 397.  
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However, as the next two sub-sections show, this omission has important potential impacts 
on the ability of indigenous peoples to exercise fully their right to self-determination.  
 
4.4.2 A decolonial critique of the ‘politics of recognition’  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, western scholars of peace and reconciliation studies have pointed 
to external recognition and respect for one’s identity as a key human need, and as an important 
step in the reconciliation process. Kymlicka’s model does indeed recognise the distinctiveness 
and value of indigenous identity, as well as the importance of the recognition of one’s culture 
for individual self-esteem. This is a key justification for human rights based multiculturalism’s 
purpose of ensuring that people can continue to identify with their culture on an equal and 
non-discriminatory basis. However, Coulthard has offered a different view of the importance 
of recognition. He argues that the crucial factor for self-esteem is not the recognition of one’s 
culture by others, but an individual’s ability to live out one’s cultural identity and to feel pride 
and respect for one’s own culture. More recently, Kymlicka himself has indicated his new 
understanding that the importance of external recognition of identity to minority groups can 
fluctuate over time, and that the more pressing factor in creating resilient multicultural societies 
is whether or not different groups can ‘act effectively upon their national identity’.61  
 
Coulthard argues that liberal models which are based on the state delegating limited powers 
of self-government to indigenous peoples have the potential to undermine indigenous 
communities’ self-identity and limit the range of options by which the state permits them to put 
self-determination in practice.  In the context of indigenous peoples’ struggles, Coulthard62 
follows Day63 in defining ‘politics of recognition’ as the many attempts to reconcile indigenous 
claims of nationhood with settler-state sovereignty, through models of liberal pluralism which 
recognise indigenous peoples by attempting to create new legal and political relations with the 
State.64 As such, Coulthard and Day define recognition-based models according to their 
underlying liberal logic, as well as according to their proposed solutions. Kymlicka’s theory fits 
Coulthard’s definition in the sense that it advocates a new relationship with the State, based 
 
61 ibid., 400. 
62 Glen Sean Coulthard is a member of the Dene Nation and assistant professor in the First Nations Studies 
Program and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. His monograph, Red Skin, 
White Masks, is an in-depth critique of the paradigm of recognition from a Fanonian and Marxist perspectives in 
dialogue with indigenous political theory, arguing that it is an ineffective framework for achieving decolonisation of 
indigenous peoples.  
63 Day (n 39). 
64 Coulthard argues that the paradigm of ‘the politics of recognition’ has become prevalent in international 
indigenous rights struggles, with common traits being the delegation of power, capital and land to indigenous 
communities via land claim settlements, economic development programs, and self-government agreements. 
Additionally he notes that the politics of recognition are also being applied in other claims for rights by groups 
including women, ethnic and religious minorities, and LGBTQIA communities.   
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on liberalism, which includes delegation of self-government rights (including land) by the State 
to indigenous peoples. 
 
Coulthard shows a flaw in the logic that liberal theorist of multiculturalism Charles Taylor65 
uses to justify self-government rights for indigenous peoples. Taylor draws from Hegels’ 
master/slave dialectic to suggest that ‘recognition’ by the State or mainstream society is 
needed for indigenous peoples to realise self-determination. Taylor argues that identity 
provides a background from which individuals can make their own life choices. Our identity, in 
turn, is constituted dialogically in the context of our cultural community. In order to maintain a 
positive self-identity and self-esteem, individuals require the positive recognition of their self-
identity by other people in their community. Furthermore, this recognition must be mutual to 
take effect. Drawing on the work of Frantz Fanon,66 Taylor argues that failure to gain this 
recognition is injurious to the sense of self and harms the individual, through the internalisation 
of a negative self-image by the colonised people.67 On this basis, Taylor argues that 
recognition is a ‘vital human need’, and so it is essential to ensure the survival of strong cultural 
communities within which and between which this recognition can occur. Without these 
communities, individuals will not have the resources they need to determine their own destiny. 
 
However, Coulthard points out that Fanon drew a distinction between Hegel’s hypothetical 
scenario and the reality of colonialism, which Taylor overlooks. Fanon argued that unlike 
 
65 Taylor is a key theorist of the recognition paradigm. Like Kymlicka, Taylor seeks to provide a liberal justification 
of group-specific rights. Taylor emphasises the importance of identity, arguing that as identity provides a 
background from which individuals can make their own life choices. Our identity, in turn, is constituted dialogically 
in the context of our cultural community. Ensuring the survival of strong cultural communities is therefore essential 
to providing the resources individuals need to determine their own destiny. Although they propose similar solutions, 
Kymlicka and Taylor’s justifications of group-differentiated rights differ in their focus on the role of culture in 
promoting individual freedom. Taylor’s analysis focusses on the psychological aspects of cultural communities in 
providing recognition to promote positive self-identity and self-esteem. In contrast, Kymlicka’s analysis draws 
mainly on the role of culture in providing the options for individual beliefs and definitions of ‘the good life’. 
Nevertheless, as part of his defence of culture as essential to personal autonomy and the liberal tradition, Kymlicka 
cites Taylor (1992a) to acknowledge the negative impact on individual self-esteem and dignity if the individual’s 
culture is not respected. (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 89). For a key exposition of Taylor’s work, see 
Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Amy Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition (Princeton University Press 1992).  
66 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Constance Farrington tr, New Ed, Penguin Classics 2001). Fanon’s 
extended Hegel’s master/slave dialectic to argue that colonial relations are perpetuated not only by physical force 
but also by the internalisation of a negative self-image on the part of the colonised. Settler societies did not 
recognise colonised peoples as equals but as inferior, even sub-human beings, and colonised people’s self-image 
was destroyed through repeated misrecognition of their humanity by the colonisers. This has dire and lasting 
consequences for the mental health and physical wellbeing of colonised communities. Over time, these negative 
self-images as well as the structural features of colonialism begin to be normalised, contributing to the long-term 
stability of the colonial system. 
67 Taylor writes: ‘our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, 
and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them 
mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non recognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced 
mode of being.…Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.’ Taylor (n 65)., 25-
26; emphasis in original.  
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Hegel’s slave, colonised societies don’t have to struggle for independence, limited forms of 
which are negotiated or granted by the State.68 According to Fanon, struggle is essential for 
the removal of the subjective (psychological) elements of colonisation – the negative self-
image which colonised peoples adopt as a result of their experiences of colonisation and the 
derogatory narratives of the setter regarding colonial peoples. Additionally, without a struggle 
which results in a break from colonial structures, Coulthard argues that the resulting ‘solution’ 
will be based on the values of the coloniser. These external values are then adopted by the 
colonised as their own, and limit the type of freedom they are able to claim. For Fanon, this 
falls short of true self-determination because the colonised do not set the terms by which they 
are recognised. For example, Coulthard cites an example in which attempts to gain 
independence through capitalist projects has led to an indigenous bourgeoisie more interested 
in profit than indigenous values.69  
 
This throws doubt on the usefulness of recognition-based models for reconciliation in the 
indigenous context. Fanon did not consider the colonial situation to provide any such mutual 
recognition, and Coulthard argues that the settler state does not desire or need mutual 
recognition from the colonised, instead seeking ‘land, labor and resources’.70 Consequently, 
Coulthard points out that in the case of States and marginalised groups, there is likely to either 
be explicit non-recognition of equal status, or a recognition whose terms do not challenge the 
prevailing power imbalance between the State and the marginalised group. Coulthard urges 
caution against liberal multiculturalism, saying: 
 
instead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the ideal of 
reciprocity or mutual recognition, the politics of recognition in its contemporary liberal 
form promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal 
state power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition have historically sought 
to transcend.71  
 
Despite a transition from State policies of assimilation to ones of recognition and 
accommodation, ‘the State has remained colonial to its foundation.’72  
 
 
68 Fanon has controversially accepted a role for violence in counter-colonial struggles. Fanon (n 66)., 27-84; see 
also Lewis R Gordon, Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun and Drucilla Cornell, What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction 
to His Life and Thought (Illustrated edition, Fordham University Press 2015)., 114-123.   
69 Coulthard (n 42)., 42. 
70 ibid.,13.  
71 ibid., 3. 
72 ibid., 6. 
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A similar critique could be applied to Kymlicka’s model. Due to its exclusion of indigenous 
theoretical perspectives, Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights is, by definition, a theory 
which is based on the values of the coloniser, and which entails the granting of rights by the 
State and participation of minority groups in State decision-making apparatus (according to 
the rules of such institutions, which are likely to be established by the State). This does not 
represent ‘struggle’ as Fanon would have it, and the terms of any negotiation are likely to be 
dominated by the needs and values of the State, rather than those of indigenous peoples. 
According to Coulthard, the failure to include indigenous values in liberal theories such as 
Kymlicka’s has significant negative and assimilative effects on the self-identity of indigenous 
peoples and limits the possible options which can be imagined or entertained in a system 
dominated by liberal values.73  The next section will examine further how this may take effect 
in the context of indigenous peoples right to self-determination, through the dual aspects of 
autonomy and effective participation, that were discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
4.4.3 Constraints on the ‘dual aspects’ of self-determination: self-government and effective 
participation 
 
Kymlicka advocates for indigenous land rights and self-government as forms of ‘external 
protection’ to help in ‘alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to majority decisions’ and 
to ‘ensure that members of the minority have the same opportunity to live and work in their 
own culture as members of the majority.’74 In the context of indigenous peoples, collective 
ownership of land is crucial to support the holistic health of the community and its members.75  
However, Nadasdy argues that strategies being used in the name of indigenous self-
government and rights to land, such as Canada’s land claim and self-government agreements, 
reinforce the colonial notion of ‘territorially organized polities’ and are mechanisms that 
perpetuate colonial practices and ‘extend the territorializing process that is currently 
transforming indigenous societies across the north [of Canada] and rendering many of their 
core beliefs, practices and values nonsensical.’76 Analysing Kymlicka’s later work, Zoopolis,  
Nadasdy contests Kymlicka’s assertion of a ‘basic fact that human society is organized into 
distinct, territorially bounded, self-governing communities’.77 On the contrary, Nadasdy notes 
that ‘there are, in fact, many forms of non-territorial organization … this is not to say that 
 
73 ibid. 
74 A fact that Kymlicka himself points out. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 109. 
75 UNHRC Forty-fifth Session 14 September – 2 October 2020 ‘Right to Land under the United Nation Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: a human rights focus Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (15 July 2020) UN Doc A/HRC/45/38. 
76 Paul Nadasdy, ‘First Nations, Citizenship and Animals, or Why Northern Indigenous People Might Not Want to 
Live in Zoopolis’ (2016) 49 Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 1., 11.  
77 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford University Press 2013). 
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territorial strategies are never used in such societies, but only that territoriality is not their 
organizing principle, as it is in the territorial state’. Nadasdy argues that liberal theories take 
for granted the universalist nature of the territorial state, and in so doing, ignore the real-life 
existence of alternative modes social organisation.78 Worse than that, by operationalising self-
government and autonomy in a way that reinforces the liberal assumption of societies 
organised into political and territorial units, liberal multiculturalism erodes and is ‘doing 
violence’79 to traditional indigenous ways of life rather than seeking alternative models that 
might better reflect indigenous values.  
 
Another potential constraint on self-government that arises from human rights based 
multiculturalism is Kymlicka’s proposal of ‘internal restrictions’80 which contemplate state 
interference in indigenous affairs should it consider that the individual rights of members of an 
indigenous people were being unduly restricted. Kymlicka acknowledges this is a difficult 
balance to strike, and that liberalism must give considerable thought to when it is appropriate 
to use coercive and non-coercive means to protect the individual rights and personal 
autonomy of individual minority group members.81 In practice, this could lead to considerable 
interference in indigenous affairs, and to the perception of collective rights as less important 
than individual ones.  
 
On the other hand, human rights based multiculturalism may act to restrict the range of 
possibilities for indigenous self-determination to only those that are deemed to fall within the 
scope of ‘authentic’ indigenous culture. Because the objective of Kymlicka’s model is to ensure 
the right to culture, and not self-determination, if an indigenous group were to decide to pursue 
a strategy for development that is not viewed as authentic to their indigenous culture (from the 
point of view of the non-indigenous majority), then it may prejudice legal protection of their 
group-specific rights. This has been observed by Povinelli in Australia, who argues that liberal 
multiculturalism places demands on indigenous peoples to redefine their identities and 
traditions in a way that is comprehensible to those with liberal perspectives.82 A similar 
phenomenon was evident in the Canadian Van der Peet case, in which Canada’s Supreme 
Court held that fishing for commercial purposes was not a traditional aboriginal practice and 
 
78 Nadasdy refers, for example, to indigenous peoples in northern Canada.  
79 Nadasdy (n 76). 
80 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 37. See also Chandran Kukathas, ‘Survey Article: Multiculturalism as 
Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’ (1997) 5 Journal of Political Philosophy 406.  
81 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 4)., 173-192. 
82 Elizabeth A Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian 
Multiculturalism (Illustrated edition, Duke University Press Books 2002). 
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was therefore not protected as an aboriginal right under Canadian law.83  
 
The second aspect of self-determination, described in Chapter 3, is the requirement for 
indigenous peoples to be able to effectively participate in decision-making that affects their 
rights. Kymlicka also advocates special representation rights that would require states to 
consult or even gain the consent of a self-governing national minority before taking decisions 
that would constrain their self-government rights, and permanent representation of national 
minorities on the bodies that take such decisions.84 Furthermore, he recognises the possibility 
for national minorities to veto  - or withhold consent to - specific policies that would infringe 
their rights, such as the approval of extractive projects on indigenous territories.85  In theory, 
these proposals should afford indigenous people a degree of control over their futures and 
enable them to determine their own priorities for development.  
 
However, indigenous authors have highlighted the limitations of human rights based 
multiculturalism in enabling a meaningful dialogue of equals in the context of state-indigenous 
consultation mechanisms. Indigenous writers have shown how liberal models of 
multiculturalism require indigenous peoples to enunciate their claims for justice in liberal terms 
- as opposed to referencing indigenous laws and principles. Turner has called this limitation 
‘Kymlicka’s Constraint’,86 pointing out that this leads to an ‘asymmetry’ in which ‘indigenous 
peoples must use the normative language of the dominant culture to ultimately defend world 
views that are embedded in completely different normative frameworks. The dominant culture 
does not face this hurdle.’87 
 
83 R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507. See Chapter 7, 211-212, and Russel Lawrence Barsh and James 
Youngblood Henderson, ‘The Supreme Court’s Van Der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand’ (1997) 
42 McGill Law Journal. 
84 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 4)., 32-33. Kymlicka writes:  
However, the issue of special representation rights for groups is complicated, because special 
representation is sometimes defended, not on grounds of oppression, but as a corollary of self‐
government. A minority's right to self‐government would be severely weakened if some external body 
could unilaterally revise or revoke its powers, without consulting the minority or securing its consent. 
Hence it would seem to be a corollary of self‐government that the national minority be guaranteed 
representation on any body which can interpret or modify its powers of self‐government (e.g. the Supreme 
Court). Since the claims of self‐government are seen as inherent and permanent, so too are the 
guarantees of representation which flow from it (unlike guarantees grounded on oppression). 
85 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1). 109,110,126. Where it can help protect a minority from unjust 
policies/decisions that favour the majority. Specific examples include decisions on language and culture. 
86 Turner (n 6)., 58. Turner cites Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Claredon 1989). in which he 
admits that indigenous people will need to bear the burden of justifying their claims for self-determination and other 
rights in accordance with liberal logic. At 73, Turner writes: ‘The kinds of explanations that are embedded in 
Aboriginal philosophies are not viewed as legitimate ‘claims of reason’ in contemporary legal and political 
discourses. … As long as Kymlicka’s constraint requires indigenous peoples to explain themselves within the 
discourses of the dominant culture, there will be a need for specially educated indigenous people to generate the 
required explanations. It must be remembered that the need to explain ourselves to the dominant culture arises 
primarily for political reasons and only secondarily from a desire to attain some kind of rich cross-cultural 
understanding of indigenous philosophies’. 




As a result of this privileging of liberal discourse, Coulthard, Turner and Alfred have all noted 
that the legal and political institutions within which recognition claims are conducted are not 
neutral sites but are instead charged with colonial relations of power.88  These operate to 
reinforce the values of the State and exclude alternative world views from the discursive sites 
which shape the content of their rights.89 Alfred argues that interaction with these institutions 
can alter the perceptions of indigenous claimants, who come to understand their rights more 
in terms of the State’s legal definition pertaining to such rights, rather than through their own 
cultures and traditions.90 Turner remains optimistic that indigenous ‘word warriors’ can work to 
overturn the imbalance of power through dialogic engagement in both indigenous and 
Eurocentric legal and political discourse.91 However, many other indigenous thought leaders 
remain skeptical, warning of the ‘illusion of inclusion’92 and calling instead for ‘local, 
indigenous-centered, responsibility-based movements’93 that rejuvenate indigenous 
institutions and resist the continued colonisation of indigenous lands and ways of life.  
 
An example of the practical result of the imbalances of power in participation mechanisms is 
given by Kaplan-Myrth, in an examination of a program to improve public health in indigenous 
communities. She draws the distinction between ‘practical reconciliation’, in which the state 
and indigenous peoples work in partnership to meet specific public health goals in a way that 
affirms underlying liberal values, and ‘impractical reconciliation’, in which there is ‘an 
opportunity to reinterpret Australia's colonial history and to recognise Aboriginal people's rights 
as Indigenous Australians.’94  Kaplan-Myrth reported that non-indigenous public health policy 
makers supported liberal ideas of ‘community empowerment’ as a means to achieve a public 
health objective. On the other hand, for the aboriginal activists, recognition of their self-
determination was a primary concern in devising healthcare provision for aboriginal peoples 
in Australia. Aboriginal representatives called for a rebalance of power in the structures of 
collaboration and partnership in aboriginal healthcare programmes, ensuring that institutional 
structures build aboriginal capacity to design and implement healthcare provision suitable for 
their specific needs in partnership with the state. Aboriginal participants called for these 
partnerships to be built on consent: as one commentator from the National Aboriginal 
 
88 Alfred (n 39).; Turner (n 6).; Coulthard (n 42). 
89 Turner (n 6).  
90 Alfred (n 39). 
91 Turner (n 6)., 69.  
92 Alfred (n 39).; Corntassel (n 59). 109.; Coulthard (n 42).; Andrea Landry, ‘This Reconciliation Is for the Colonizer’ 
(The Wrong Kind of Green, 13 June 2017) <http://www.wrongkindofgreen.org/2017/12/01/this-reconciliation-is-for-
the-colonizer/> accessed 24 November 2020. 
93 Corntassel (n 59)., 122. 
94 Nili Kaplan-Myrth, ‘Sorry Mates: Reconciliation and Self-Determination in Australian Aboriginal Health’ (2005) 6 
Human Rights Review 69. 
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Community-Controlled Health Organization put it: ‘the day we say "No" to something and it 
doesn't happen, we'll begin to believe that there's a partnership in place.’95 
 
The perspectives of indigenous critics indicate that Kymlicka’s theory does not go far enough 
to address epistemic injustice and maintains colonial hierarchies of political power. In turn, this 
constrains the range of options that are available for indigenous self-determination to be put 
into practice through state-led mechanisms for self-government and effective participation. 
The next section explores how human rights based multiculturalism is also limited in its 
capacity to transform imbalances of economic power, a limitation which also constrains 
indigenous peoples’ ability to ‘act out of their own identity’ in a way that is consistent with 
indigenous values.  
 
4.5 Economic power 
 
4.5.1 The need for a more holistic approach 
 
As discussed above, Kymlicka advocates for indigenous land rights and territorial autonomy 
as a form of ‘external protection’ to help in ‘alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to 
majority decisions’ and to ‘ensure that members of the minority have the same opportunity to 
live and work in their own culture as members of the majority.’96 In the context of indigenous 
peoples, collective ownership of land is crucial to support the holistic health of the community 
and its members.97 In addition, Kymlicka advocates special representation rights that would 
require states to consult or even gain the consent of a self-governing national minority before 
taking decisions that would constrain their self-government rights, and permanent 
representation of national minorities on the bodies that take such decisions.98 In this respect, 
Kymlicka recognises the possibility for national minorities to veto specific policies that would 
 
95 ibid. 80. 
96 A fact that Kymlicka himself points out. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 109. 
97 UNHRC Forty-fifth Session 14 September – 2 October 2020 ‘Right to Land under the United Nation Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: a human rights focus Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (15 July 2020) UN Doc A/HRC/45/38. See Chapter 3 and 5 for discussion of this issue.  
98 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 4)., 32-33. Kymlicka writes:  
However, the issue of special representation rights for groups is complicated, because special 
representation is sometimes defended, not on grounds of oppression, but as a corollary of self‐
government. A minority's right to self‐government would be severely weakened if some external body 
could unilaterally revise or revoke its powers, without consulting the minority or securing its consent. 
Hence it would seem to be a corollary of self‐government that the national minority be guaranteed 
representation on any body which can interpret or modify its powers of self‐government (e.g. the Supreme 
Court). Since the claims of self‐government are seen as inherent and permanent, so too are the 
guarantees of representation which flow from it (unlike guarantees grounded on oppression). 
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infringe their rights, such as the approval of extractive projects on indigenous territories.99  In 
theory, these proposals should afford indigenous people a degree of control over their 
livelihoods and subsistence, and enable them to determine their own priorities for 
development.  
 
However, scholars of multiculturalism - including Kymlicka himself - have  observed that the 
ideas of equality between groups and freedom within groups, as espoused by the minority 
rights regime, have not led to economic equality for indigenous peoples,100 and Kymlicka has 
observed that in practice, different forms of multiculturalism cut across issues of identity, 
economic resources and political inclusion.101 Nancy Fraser has identified that strategies which 
focus on recognition of identity and cultural membership are often seen as distinct and even 
polarised from claims for redistribution of resources. Thus in the context of western societies, 
‘class politics’ becomes oppositional to ‘identity politics’ and the economic sphere becomes 
detached from the cultural.102 Bhikhu Parekh has argued that cultural recognition and equality 
is impossible in multicultural societies without a simultaneous transformation of economic and 
political power.103 
 
Indigenous authors have also called for a more holistic approach to indigenous rights, and for 
greater emphasis on transforming existing modes of capitalist economics that drive the need 
for states to continue to extract resources from indigenous territories.  Holder and Corntassel 
argue that Kymlicka’s characterisation of culture as primarily a psychological need ignores the 
very real material benefits of cultural membership for indigenous people and sets up a false 
dichotomy between the psychological and cultural aspects of indigenous rights on the one 
hand, and more tangible economic and political concerns on the other. Consequently, in 
separating cultural/psychological and material concerns, liberal theories of multiculturalism are 
‘not merely ‘partial’ in their representation; they are misleading’ because they fundamentally 
 
99 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1). 109,110,126. Where it can help protect a minority from unjust 
policies/decisions that favour the majority. Specific examples include decisions on language and culture. 
100 ibid., 148.  
101 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys (n 2). 
102  Nancy Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age, I/212, July–
August 1995’ 1 New Left Review 68. 
103 Parekh (n 31). 343. Parekh writes: ‘Misrecognition, therefore, can only be countered by both undertaking a 
rigorous critique of the dominant culture and radically restructuring the prevailing inequalities of economic and 
political power. Since the dominant group welcomes neither the radical critique nor the corresponding political 
praxis, the struggle for recognition involves cultural and political contestation and sometimes even violence, as 
Hegel (1960) highlighted in his analysis of the dialectic of recognition and which Taylor’s (1994) sanitized version 
of it ignores. As we have seen, the politics of culture is integrally tied up with the politics of power because culture 
is itself institutionalized power and deeply imbricated with other systems of power. Cultural self-esteem cannot be 
developed and sustained in a vacuum and requires appropriate changes in all the major areas of life. No 
multicultural society can be stable and vibrant unless it ensures that its constituent communities received both just 
recognition and a just share of economic and political power. It requires a robust form of social economic and 
political democracy to underpin its commitment to multiculturalism.’ 
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misrepresent the central claims of the indigenous movement.104 As a result, Holder and 
Corntassel warn that these misleading frameworks pose a risk to the indigenous movement’s 
ultimate success. 
 
4.5.2 The need for economic as well as cultural diversity 
 
Richard Day has also argued that the false distinction between cultural and economic matters 
has influenced the limited models of self-government that have been tried, so that they are 
incapable of reducing the conflict between the state and indigenous peoples. He argues that 
liberal multiculturalism is willing to permit cultural diversity and the ‘possibility of multiple 
national identifications’ but it is less willing to countenance political and economic diversity, 
always assuming that ‘any subaltern group that is granted ‘national’ status will thereby acquire 
subordinate articulation with a capitalist state.’105 Day cites examples from Canada, the USA 
and Australia in which the existing state has retained a ‘trump card’ allowing it to control the 
parameters of indigenous autonomy to protect state economic interests (such as access to 
minerals and other sub-soil resources). 106 In order for multiculturalism to work, Day calls for a 
wider acceptance of the diverse economic models that exist: 
 
It will become increasingly necessary for state peoples to accept diversity not only at 
the level of cultural symbols, but at all levels of social, political and economic 
organisation. This means that future intercultural discussions will have to leave behind 
state-based liberal-capitalist federalism, and focus on the development of more 
 
104 Holder and Corntassel (n 7)., 139. As has been noted earlier in this chapter, Kymlicka bases his main argument 
for group-differentiated rights on the importance of one’s own culture for the enjoyment of individual freedom. 
However, Holder and Cornassel note that it is often the oppressors who insist on defining a group and treating 
them in a particular manner – and that the need for specific group protections stems from this external 
categorisation rather than the ethical implications of the self-identification of group members. This is not 
acknowledged in Kymlicka’s analysis. A rationale based on the psychological value of groups also employs a 
universalist explanation of the value of culture, resulting in false assumptions. For example, such theories assume 
that all group members share the same interest in the continuance of the group, and that the conditions necessary 
for group continuance and the features of group membership are consistent across all groups. Therefore such 
theories do not take into account the complex differences between the experiences of the various groups in society. 
These assumptions may also risk the success of the indigenous rights movement, for example if the majority group 
uses the emphasis on the psychological attachment to groups to justify the erosion of minority rights, in the interests 
of state-building or creating a strong national identity.  Additionally, indigenous political demands are more likely to 
be evaluated with reference to universal needs which we all share, rather than on the specific history of injustices 
suffered. By removing the focus from tangible inequalities and oppression, the liberal insistence on the 
psychological importance of group membership ‘thus erodes the intuitive moral difference between claims of the 
powerful and claims of the powerless’ (at 137). Finally, in theories such as Kymlicka’s, collectivities are conceived 
as monolithic, homogenous, and clearly defined whereas in practice, this is far from the case. The understanding 
of cultures as being homogenous ‘introduces an element of naturalism to the discussion of group politics, with a 
corresponding limitation on the degree of moral and political responsibility which we expect people to take for the 
shape of the society they build.’ (at 138).  
105 Day (n 39)., 182.  Day argues that Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism assumes that all groups are willing to 
accept ‘a model of multinational federalism that preserves the current allocation of territories to identities, 




heteronomous systems. A difficult choice faces liberal multiculturalism: in order to 
become what it says it wants to be, it will have to sacrifice much of what it has always 
been.107 
 
Kymlicka’s model does not go far enough to address the inequality that is generated through 
the systemic privileging of one economic development strategy over another.  By its own 
liberal logic, if the primary justification of group-specific rights is to rectify ‘unchosen inequality’, 
then one could argue that economic systems which systematically endanger a specific culture 
or way of life should be subject to restrictions or should require such minority groups to have 
special representation rights in economic decision-making at a national or international level. 
Kymlicka acknowledges the need to balance conflicting rights when it comes to the attempts 
of groups to restrict the rights of individual members, and recognises the need to balance the 
cultural rights of national minorities with the rights of the cultural majority. However, it is 
extremely doubtful that Kymlicka intended that the special representation rights that he 
proposed would extend to a discussion of how the materialistic entitlement of some societies 
might be limited, should their own vision of the ‘good life’ consistently undermine the ability of 
other societies to live in a way which is consistent with their own worldviews.  
 
This suggestion is supported by Kymlicka’s comment that self-government might coincide with 
reduced representation of national minorities on some federal bodies – an arrangement that 
would actually lessen indigenous peoples’ ability to influence the economic development 
policies of the state once they had obtained rights to self-government.108 Far from being 
partners in the country’s economic trajectory, human rights based multiculturalism affords 
indigenous peoples group-specific rights in order to mitigate the negative consequences of an 
economic policy over which they have no control at all. On the basis of this analysis, it is far 
from clear that Kymlicka’s ‘external protections’, including self-government rights and special 
representation rights, will be sufficient to protect indigenous cultures from the imperative of 
states’ continued economic development,109 which often stands in direct contrast to indigenous 
peoples’ own views on how to live in relation to the land. The next section examines how an 
enlarged definition of citizenship could provide a way to open up dialogue on the economic 
power imbalance that remains unchallenged by human rights based multiculturalism.  
 
 
107 ibid.,195.  
108 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 11). Kymlicka writes: ‘To over‐simplify, then, self‐government for a national 
minority seems to entail guaranteed representation on intergovernmental bodies, which negotiate, interpret, and 
modify the division of powers, but reduced representation on federal bodies which legislate in areas of purely 
federal jurisdiction from which they are exempted.’ (at 202).  
109 Kymlicka himself acknowledged states’ reluctance to grant land rights to national minorities, given their concerns 
about political stability and access to resources. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 1)., 123. 
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4.5.3 From ‘multicultural citizenship’ to ‘citizenship with the land’  
 
Indigenous peoples’ relationship with their land and resources is difficult for those of a western 
mindset to conceive. For indigenous communities, there is a spiritual and ancestral connection 
with territory that is central to their culture and way of life, far exceeding purely economic 
interests.110  In the indigenous worldview, people and communities are seen as being deeply 
interconnected and even related to the natural world around them. This sense of relationship 
to the land brings with it a duty of responsibility, to the environment as well as past and future 
generations. This quote from John Borrows gives an insight into this way of viewing the world, 
and the impact of European colonisation on indigenous peoples’ ability to live in accordance 
with their own ‘good life’ ideals: 
 
My grandfather was born in 1901 on the western shores of Georgian Bay, at the Cape 
Croker Indian reservation. Generations before him were born on the same soil. Our 
births, lives, and deaths on this site have brought us into citizenship with the land. We 
participate in its renewal, have responsibility for its continuation, and grieve for its 
losses. As citizens with this land, we also feel the presence of our ancestors, and strive 
with them to have the relationships of our polity respected. Our loyalties, allegiance, 
and affection is related to the land. The water, wind, sun, and stars are part of this 
federation. The fish, birds, plants, and animals also share this union. Our teachings 
and stories form the constitution of this relationship, and direct and nourish the 
obligations this citizenship requires. The Chippewas of the Nawash have struggled to 
sustain this citizenship in the face of the diversity and pluralism that has become part 
of the land. This has not been an easy task. Our codes have been disinterred, 
disregarded, and repressed. What is required to re‐inscribe these laws, and once again 
invoke a citizenship with the land?111  
 
The concept of ‘citizenship with the land’ reveals important differences between many 
indigenous understandings of what ‘citizenship’ should entail, and that proposed by human 
rights based multiculturalism. Multicultural citizenship, surprisingly, does not go into great 
detail on the definition of citizenship; Kymlicka notes that the liberal tradition frequently fails to 
distinguish between equality of persons and equality of citizens. Throughout, Multicultural 
Citizenship suggests that the duty of a liberal society towards those whom it regards as its 
 
110 Janeth Warden-Fernandez, ‘Indigenous Communities and Mineral Development’ (International Institute for 
Environment and Development 2001) 59. 
111 John Borrows, ‘“Landed” Citizenship: Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participation’, Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press 2000).  
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people is to protect the rights of all individuals equally and to protect minority cultures in order 
to provide individuals with an appropriate ‘context of choice’ from which to exercise their 
personal freedom. Furthermore, liberal political philosophy implicitly assumes that citizenship 
is reserved for humans only, and the natural world, including plants, animals and minerals, is 
treated as a resource or property for disposal as citizens deem fit in the pursuit of a ‘good 
life’.112  
 
In contrast, indigenous perspectives on ‘citizenship’ leads to a different conceptualisation of 
what it means to be a citizen, bringing a sense of shared responsibility for the welfare of a 
natural environment on which both indigenous and non-indigenous communities are reliant. 
Nadasdy, referring to the worldview of Dene indigenous people in the Yukon, comments that: 
 
First Nations peoples have long regarded themselves as the least powerful of all the 
various kinds of persons inhabiting the landscape. Although they recognize the mutual 
interdependence of humans and animals, they view the relationship as unequal. After 
all, human people depend for their very survival on the goodwill of their animal 
benefactors’.113  
 
This contrasts dramatically with the Eurocentric tendency to view humans as the most 
powerful of the species, dominant over nature. Due to this marked difference in worldview, 
and its impacts on the ability of indigenous peoples to live their own version of the ‘good life’, 
models of multiculturalism are needed that include a holistic view of inequality which includes 
tangible and systemic dimensions - and a key element of this, for many indigenous people, is 
a critique of global capitalism itself.114  Coulthard has highlighted the failure of liberal 
multicultural theories to tackle inequality’s ‘generative structures, in this case a capitalist 
economy constituted by racial and gender hierarchies and the colonial state’ and comments 
that ‘an approach that is explicitly oriented around dialogue and listening ought to be more 
sensitive to the claims and challenges emanating from these dissenting Indigenous voices.’115 
However, human rights based multiculturalism does not attend to these wider systemic 
 
112 Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson, ‘Locating Animals in Political Philosophy’ (2016) 11 Philosophy Compass 
692. 
113 Nadasdy (n 76)., 7 
114 Coulthard cites Mohawk political scientist Taiaiake Alfred as one of many indigenous voices who have explicitly 
challenged capitalist values as being a driving force of coloniality in all its forms. For example, Alfred (n 39). See 
also Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (eds), Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to 
Globalization (New Expanded Edition, University of California Press 2007). The Manila Declaration also raises the 
devastating impact of globalisation on indigenous lands and peoples, and commends indigenous peoples to 
‘strategize concrete ways to appropriately respond to the forces and processes of globalization’. ‘Manila Declaration 
of the International Conference on Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, Sustainable Development and Indigenous 
Peoples, 6-8 December 2000’ (Tebtebba Foundation 2000)., Art 3.1. 
115 Coulthard (n 42)., 36.  
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questions, instead assuming that indigenous culture will to a significant degree remain 
confined to the domain of indigenous society and territories, and overall state policy be subject 
to adjustment in places where it directly affects minority rights, rather than needing to be 
radically redefined.  
 
Contrary to this assumption, some indigenous scholars such as John Borrows do aspire to 
influence wider state affairs at a systemic level, advocating not only for indigenous control of 
their own communities, but also for indigenous people to have significant influence in the wider 
decision-making of state institutions and society. Through greater involvement of indigenous 
people in all aspects of government, Borrows advocates for ‘aboriginal control of Canadian 
affairs’ to influence the state’s relationship with the land. Rather than being assimilated into 
the conventional approach of the state, Borrows writes that as a strategy, aboriginal control of 
Canadian affairs entails significant political control for aboriginal peoples, and the potential to 
‘change contemporary notions of Canadian citizenship’.116 In his view, 
 
Citizenship under Aboriginal influence may generate a greater attentiveness to land 
uses and cultural practices that are preferred by many Aboriginal peoples. Canadian 
notions of citizenship might not only develop to include greater scope for people's 
involvement in sustenance activities, but these ideas of citizenship might also further 
reduce the tolerance for land uses which extirpate these pursuits.117 
 
This level of participation and control of state affairs by what Kymlicka would term a ‘national 
minority’, is far beyond the realms of what is contemplated in Multicultural Citizenship. Instead, 
it constitutes a reframing of citizenship not as a list of entitlements and conflicts of rights to be 
navigated, but as conferring a solemn responsibility to the natural world and to sustainable 
development in the land on which an individual resides.118  
 
Although it may appear far-fetched, this emphasis on a shared responsibility to the land opens 
the door to new approaches to reconciliation which build on indigenous legal systems and 
worldviews to bestow rights directly on the environment, moving the focus away from 
Eurocentric conceptions of ‘ownership’ to indigenous principles of responsibility, duty and 
relationship. For example,  Nyquist has proposed that viewing the land as a ‘common good’, 
which both indigenous peoples and the state must protect, provides a basis (alongside 
 
116 Borrows (n 111). 
117 ibid., 332 




indigenous self-determination) for building partnerships between indigenous peoples and the 
state.119 An even more transformative approach is demonstrated in the Te Awa Tupua 
(Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 of New Zealand, which bestowed the 
Whanganui River with legal personality,  and recognises a Māori worldview which sees the 
River as a living, indivisible being, and Te Pou Tupua as a human representative of the River 
as a living ancestor.  Subsequently, management of the river is a mutual responsibility 
between the Maori and the Crown. Although it has been argued that the Act could go further 
towards recognising indigenous worldviews and self-determination, it is an attempt to base 
settlements on indigenous legal traditions and epistemology, and to bring about reconciliation 
through the reconceptualisation of our mutual relationship with the land.120  
 
In his book, Merging Fires, Rick Wallace describes a reconciliation process between the Grand 
Council of Treaty No 3121 and the City of Kenora in Western Ontario, Canada,122 which sits 
within Treaty No 3 territory.123 In this process, an area of land was designated to be jointly 
managed by both governments. Summing up the Kenora reconciliation project, Rick Wallace 
writes:  
 
Underlying this process is a radical re-harmonization - environmentally, spiritually, 
politically and economically - occurring in a local space that confronts the impacts of 
globalization on its resource-based economy. Environmentally, it is based on a 
recognition that resources need to be locally controlled and sustainably used for the 
benefit of the region. Spiritually, it is a re-casting of the land as spirit, as itself animated 
and alive, of having a will and as a partner in a relationship of respect and reciprocity. 
Politically, it is an evolving process between communities at the grassroots/local level 
to reclaim governance and development.124 
 
 
119 Steven Nyquist, ‘Self-Determination and Reconciliation: A Cooperative Model for Negotiating Treaty Rights in 
Minnesota’ (1991) 9 Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice 533.This approach also has the benefit of 
potentially prohibiting state interventions which are detrimental to the land and indigenous ways of life. This by no 
means suggests that there will not be conflict between the state and indigenous peoples even if projects are for 
environmental protection - projects aimed at conservation, e.g. national parks or carbon storage, are also the 
subject of conflict between IPs and the state. Furthermore, such an approach may not be agreed by all, as it may 
be seen to undermine indigenous sovereignty and self-determination. 
120 Jacinta Ruru, ‘Listening to Papatūānuku: A Call to Reform Water Law’ (2018) 48 Journal of the Royal Society 
of New Zealand 215.; Dennis Dennis-McCarthy, ‘Incorporating Indigenous Worldviews on the Environment into 
Non-Indigenous Legal Systems: Has the Te Awa Tupua Act Led to Reconciliation and Self-Determination?’ (2019) 
27 Māori Law Review.  
121 Representing 25,000 Anishinaabe people living in 55,000 square miles of territory in north-western Ontario and 
Manitoba. Rick Wallace, Merging Fires: Grassroots Peacebuilding Between  Indigenous and Non-Indigenous 
Peoples (Fernwood Publishing 2013)., 137. 
122 A city of around 17,000, 85% of whom are Euro-Canadian and 15% Anishinaabe. ibid., 137. 
123 ibid., 137-165. 
124 ibid., 161. 
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His words provide an insight into the extent of the transformation in the institutions and mindset 
of liberal multicultural states that will be necessary if they wish to fully reconcile with indigenous 
peoples.  
 
Unfortunately, the ability of liberal multiculturalism to rise to this challenge is questioned by 
Duane Champagne, who warns that although the impacts of the global market system will 
lead to indigenous people wanting to engage more fully in ‘national and international markets 
and political systems’,125 they want to do so ‘informed by their own histories, cultures, and 
interests.’126 However, due to the liberal separation of politics and culture, ‘Multicultural states 
will want indigenous peoples to remove themselves from the holistic relations among culture, 
politics, community, and economy that often prevail in indigenous nations.’127 Consequently, 
Champagne concludes that ‘multicultural nation-states, just like their mono-cultural 
predecessors, will be institutionally incapable of addressing the values, interests, and social 




Kymlicka’s model of human rights based multiculturalism sought to bring clarity and a sense 
of underlying cohesion to the way that influential liberal states and international organisations 
have managed the demands of minorities within the context of the nation state. But can it 
successfully provide a basis for reconciliation? Some indigenous authors, such as Turner, 
Holder and Corntassel, suggest that it is possible to enlarge Kymlicka’s theory to embrace 
indigenous ideas about sovereignty, the interlinkages between cultural and economic rights, 
and the multiple ways in which individuals relate to their communities and lands. On the other 
hand, those such as Day, Coulthard and Champagne cast doubt on whether liberal theories 
will ever be able to overcome colonial structures of power. However, both groups agree that 
on its own, the human rights based model of multiculturalism is not sufficient to fully meet 
indigenous rights claims.   
 
This chapter has suggested that human rights based culturalism, whilst being a significant 
advancement in the liberal understanding of how the state might relate to indigenous peoples, 
is ultimately limited as a model for reconciliation. By its nature, it is a one-sided model that 
does not engage deeply with indigenous historical narratives and political philosophy, and 
 
125 Champagne (n 55)., 18. 
126 ibid., 18. 
127 ibid., 19.  
128 ibid., 19.  
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consequently it conceptualises indigenous peoples as a sub-national group under the 
authority of the state, fundamentally missing the claim of self-determination at the heart of 
indigenous struggles. The result is that this model is one that will uphold the right of indigenous 
peoples to their distinct culture provided that it does not significantly challenge the existing 
power hierarchy or economic interests of the state. Furthermore, it requires that indigenous 
peoples submit to liberal limitations on the recognition of their collective rights and negotiate 
their position with reference to the liberal terminology, and does not go far enough to tackle 
the root causes of material inequalities that are inextricably linked with enjoyment of 
indigenous peoples’ cultural rights.  
 
An underlying assumption of human rights based multiculturalism is that provided indigenous 
peoples are afforded autonomy within their own society, they will have less cause to seek 
special influences over other areas of state decision-making. However, as discussed in the 
last section of this chapter, some indigenous people do seek to influence state decision-
making at a broad level, for example in relation to sustainable economic policies or how 
citizenship is defined. Given the controversies surrounding liberal multiculturalism, it is likely 
that the mere suggestion of a national minority holding sway over national economic policy 
would result in a significant backlash unless a shared understanding of history and a sense of 
partnership is also developed between indigenous and non-indigenous people. However, 
indigenous perspectives have much to offer in deepening the liberal concept of what it means 
to be a citizen in society. They highlight the importance of the land on which the citizenry live, 
as a living and dynamic player in its own right, as opposed to a resource to be divided and 
exploited. An indigenous conceptualisation of citizenship contributes greater emphasis on the 
responsibilities of citizens to protect the natural environment for the benefit of all those living 
in a multicultural state - whether now, or in the future. Greater engagement with this principle 
could open up possibilities for new legal approaches and avenues for reconciliation, based on 
the recognition of mutual dependence on the land and the shared duty to protect it. 
 
These critiques of human rights based multiculturalism bear great similarity to the critiques of 
UNDRIP in the previous chapter, arguing that neither goes far enough to resolve the root of 
the intractable conflict, and requiring new ways of thinking that transform both political and 
economic power structures. The analysis of human rights based multiculturalism has also 
highlighted the importance of rebalancing the imbalance of epistemic power, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, arguing that it is essential for both the legitimacy of multicultural models as well as 
supporting the identity and self-esteem of indigenous peoples and their ability to negotiate on 




Despite its shortcomings, human rights based multiculturalism remains a prevalent and 
influential strategy adopted by liberal states and institutions. The next chapter details how the 
limitations of human rights based multiculturalism are evident in the negotiation and 
interpretation of Article 32 of UNDRIP, which pertains to an important special representation 




Chapter 5: The multiculturalist model of FPIC and 




This thesis focuses on the principle of free prior and informed consent (FPIC) in the context of 
mining projects on indigenous territories, with a view to assessing the potential of FPIC as a 
tool of reconciliation between indigenous peoples and states. As was discussed in Chapter 3, 
indigenous self-determination and revitalisation of indigenous relationships to land are crucial 
for reconciliation to occur. However, extractive projects have significant harmful impacts on 
indigenous land and resources, and are a frequent cause of conflict between indigenous 
peoples and states who both claim rights over the land.  
 
This chapter examines the negotiation of the text of Article 32 and its subsequent 
interpretation, to provide insights into its potential as a tool of reconciliation between 
indigenous peoples and states in the context of extractive projects. Given the frequency of 
conflict over extractives activity, Article 32 is arguably one of UNDRIP’s most important 
provisions, because it requires states to consult with indigenous peoples in order to obtain 
their FPIC before approving projects that would affect indigenous lands, territories or 
resources. Due to the fact that FPIC is operationalised through a consultation process, it 
potentially provides a mechanism for the kinds of constructive, cooperative dialogue proposed 
by Peace and Conflict scholars (discussed in Chapter 3) to build positive relationships, and 
therefore may contribute to reconciliation.  
 
On the other hand, there is also potential for flawed FPIC consultations to exacerbate existing 
conflict. Article 32 was extremely controversial during the drafting process of UNDRIP, 
because states were concerned that a duty to obtain indigenous consent could enable 
indigenous peoples to veto projects that were key to the economic development of the nation, 
and bestow greater rights on indigenous people compared with other citizens. Due to these 
concerns, the wording originally proposed by indigenous representatives was watered down, 
so that as it stands, there is considerable variation in opinion as to its meaning, and its 
implications for state practice. The inability of indigenous representatives to achieve 
unambiguous wording on consent in UNDRIP’s final text is symptomatic of FPIC’s location at 
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the intersection between state sovereignty and indigenous self-determination. As such, Article 
32 encapsulates the root of the intractable conflict between indigenous peoples and states 
that was discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of the main provisions of UNDRIP that 
relate to land rights, examining the extent to which the state was willing to give up its control 
of resources on indigenous territories. Then in Section 2, the text of Article 32 is analysed to 
demonstrate how the text changed over the drafting period, and the reasons for states’ 
concerns. Section 3 explains two very different emerging interpretations of FPIC – one based 
on the right to self-determination, and the other drawing from a multiculturalist approach that 
emphasises democratic participation and equality which, it is argued, is likely to dominate 
implementation of FPIC in practice. Section 4 analyses this multiculturalist approach drawing 
on the work of decolonial authors and the critiques of human rights based multiculturalism 
developed in Chapter 4, concluding that far from improving relations between the state and 
indigenous peoples, FPIC has potential to become a site for additional conflict.  
 
5.2 The struggle for control of territory and resources 
 
Traditional lands and territories, and the natural resources found within them, play a vital role 
in indigenous spiritual, cultural and economic life, and their very survival as distinct peoples. 
Consequently, indigenous rights to land are a necessity for the enjoyment of indigenous self-
determination.1 Furthermore, indigenous self-determination also requires that indigenous 
peoples may use and freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources as they see fit.2 
However, states are also extremely concerned with the maintenance of territorial unity and the 
ability to use natural resources in the national interest. Consequently, the negotiation of 
UNDRIP required extensive discussion on how indigenous peoples and states would navigate 
their overlapping claims to indigenous lands, territories and resources. The discussions reveal 
how states asserted their overall control of land, rather than seeking to reframe the relationship 
in the way envisaged by indigenous critics of liberal multiculturalism in the previous Chapter. 
 
 
1  UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Study on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples 
by Erica-Irene Daes’ (28 July 1993) UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28, para 24; Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v Nicaragua,  Judgment of 31 August 2001 (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights  Series C  No 79 (31 August 2001), para 149; ‘The Hague Conference (2010) Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Interim Report’ (International Law Association 2010). 
2 Dorothée Cambou, ‘The UNDRIP and the Legal Significance of the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination: A Human Rights Approach with a Multidimensional Perspective’ (2019) 23 The International Journal 
of Human Rights 34. 
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Traditionally, the rights to control land and natural resources has been interpreted under 
international law as an aspect of the principles of territorial integrity of states and of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR).3 Huff suggests the issue of natural resource 
ownership was at the heart of state opposition to the recognition of self-determination in 
UNDRIP, as opposed to concerns regarding territorial integrity. He asserts that the objections 
of States concerning the risk of political disunity and secession were exaggerated to mask 
deeper concern that indigenous self-determination ‘could lead to a loss of control over the 
valuable natural resources which remain on indigenous traditional lands.’4 The former Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Erica-Irene Daes, conducted a ‘Study on 
indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ during the drafting of 
UNDRIP, to look into this controversial area of tension between indigenous peoples and 
States.   
 
Daes’ study consulted governments, NGOs and indigenous representatives and sought to find 
a middle ground. Daes underlined the importance of natural resources to indigenous self-
determination, saying: ‘the right of permanent self-determination over natural resources was 
recognized because it was understood early on that without it, the right of self-determination 
would be meaningless.’5 Her report argued for an interpretation of indigenous ownership of 
natural resources in which the PSNR principle applies to indigenous peoples, to a limited 
degree;  Daes explains: PSNR for indigenous peoples ‘does not mean the supreme authority 
of an independent State’, and ‘use of the term in relation to indigenous peoples does not place 
them on the same level as States or place them in conflict with State sovereignty’.6  Instead, 
indigenous peoples are permitted ‘governmental control and authority over the resources in 
the exercise of self-determination’7 and States have a corresponding duty to ensure this 
collective right is respected.8  
 
Relying on this argument, indigenous representatives succeeded in securing extensive 
protections of indigenous land rights. Article 26 of UNDRIP protects indigenous peoples’ rights 
to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise used 
or acquired, and protects their  right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
 
3  Ricardo Pereira and Orla Gough, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the 21st Century: Natural 
Resource Governance and the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law’ (2013) 
14 Melbourne Journal of International Law 451. 
4 Andrew Huff, ‘Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Determination Papers Presented: 2004 ILSA Fall 
Conference, Oct. 21-23, 2004 - University of Colorado School of Law: Panel:  Indigenous Rights, Local Resources 
and International Law’ (2005) 16 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 295.  
5 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Final Report 
of the Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene A. Daes (13 July 2004) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30. 
6 Ibid., para 18. 
7 Ibid., para 18. 
8 Ibid, para 40. 
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resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation 
or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired, including through legal 
recognition and protection of indigenous lands, territories and resources. However, this the 
rights to ownership, possession, development and control are only protected in relation to 
lands that indigenous peoples currently inhabit. Rights to lands that have been lost to them 
are protected in vague terms, and there is considerable difficulty for indigenous peoples in 
proving their historical connection with lands that have been lost.9  
 
To manage disputes over land, under Article 27 States are required to set up ‘a fair, 
independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous 
peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the 
rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources’.10 Where this 
land has been ‘confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and 
informed consent’, Article 28 of UNDRIP provides for redress by restitution or, when this is not 
possible, just, fair and equitable compensation in the form of lands, territories and resources 
equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate 
redress.  
 
Furthermore, UNDRIP recognises indigenous peoples’ ‘right to maintain and develop their 
political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their 
own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and 
other economic activities.’11 Article 29 provides for the right of indigenous peoples to ‘the 
conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or 
territories and resources’, as well as imposing a requirement for states to give assistance in 
this regard.12 The recognition that indigenous models of subsistence and development are 
distinct from those of states and need protection is significant. However, this recognition was 
limited by states’ refusal to explicitly recognise both the cultural and material impact of 
indigenous peoples’ relationship with the land. The negotiations of the WGDD led to a deletion 
to part of Article 25 of the WGIP’s 1994 draft text, with the result that in the final text Article 25 
acknowledges indigenous peoples’ distinctive spiritual relationship with lands, but not their 
material relationship.13  
 
9 Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments 
Feature: Reflections on a Decade of International Law’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 27.; 
Charmaine White Face, Zumila Wobaga, An Analysis of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Living 
Justice Press 2013)., commentary on Article 26.  
10 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 27. 
11 Ibid., Art 20.1. See also Art 20.2 which provides for just and fair redress for indigenous peoples deprived of their 
means of subsistence and development. 
12  Ibid., Art 29. Article 29 also prevents storage of hazardous waste on indigenous land without their FPIC. 




In addition, UNDRIP’s recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and 
resources does so in a manner that reinforces the overriding authority of state legal systems 
in controlling the process of recognising, protecting and adjudicating indigenous land claims. 
The WGIP had included wording in Article 26 affirming indigenous peoples’ ‘right to the full 
recognition of their laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the 
development and management of resources’.14 Instead, the draft that was submitted by the 
WGDD to the HRC included more vague provisions calling for ‘due respect to the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems’15 in the way that states recognise and protect indigenous 
land, and ‘due recognition of indigenous laws’16 in adjudication procedures that relate to this 
duty. Consequently, state legal systems remain the highest authority and may determine what 
the duty to give ‘due regard’ to indigenous legal systems should entail. This reluctance to 
entirely embrace indigenous legal systems is also evident in the watering down of the final 
Article 34 of UNDRIP, in which states recognised indigenous legal systems and customs 
‘where they exist’.17 The addition of these three words places on indigenous peoples the 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material 
relationship with the lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources which they have 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations 
in this regard.  (Emphasis added.) 
Annex to UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res 1994/45 (26 
August 1994) in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session Geneva 1-26 August 1994’ (28 October 1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1995/2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56. 
14 Annex to UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res 1994/45 (26 
August 1994) in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session Geneva 1-26 August 1994’ (28 October 1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1995/2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56., Art 26 stated:  
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands and territories, including the 
total environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. This includes the right to the full 
recognition of their laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the 
development and management of resources, and the right to effective measures by States to prevent any 
interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these rights. (Emphasis added).  
15 UNCHR ‘Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its eleventh session’ (22 March 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/79.  
States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such 
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems 
of the indigenous peoples concerned. (Emphasis added).  
16  Ibid., Art 26.  
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, 
independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ 
laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of 
indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate 
in this process. (Emphasis added). 
 
17 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007)., Art 34.  
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their 
distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, 




burden of demonstrating the very existence of their juridical systems, in order to have them 
recognised as such and taken into account by the dominant legal system of the state.  
 
Thus, whilst representing a significant step forwards, the provisions of rights to lands, 
territories and resources again demonstrate the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the 
framework of the state, rather than a reimagining of the relationship premised on mutual 
recognition as equals. Despite providing what many described as progressive protection for 
indigenous rights over their land and natural resources,18 UNDRIP does so within a framework 
which reinforces the territorial integrity, PSNR and legal authority of states.  Schrijver notes 
that none of its provisions ‘vests indigenous peoples expressis verbis with permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources or entails exclusive rights for indigenous 
peoples over the natural resources within their territories.’19 As a result, UNDRIP continues 
the historical conflict in which states and indigenous peoples both lay claim to the land and 
natural resources within traditional indigenous territories.  
 
5.3 FPIC in UNDRIP: An Ambiguous Solution to the Sovereignty/Self-Determination 
Conflict 
 
5.3.1 The compromise in Article 32 
 
Mindful of this continuing issue,20 the concept of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) was 
included in the Draft Declaration by the WGIP, as a key strategy for resolving the overlapping 
claims to land and natural resources discussed in the previous section.  As Doyle comments, 
‘The consent requirement provides the middle ground in which the apparently irreconcilable 
claims of indigenous peoples to an inherent right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources can be reconciled with states’ claims to sovereignty over these same resources.’21 
 
18 Jo M Pasqualucci, ‘International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 27 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 51.; Cathal M Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and 
Resources: The Transformative Role of Free Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 
2015).; Mauro Barelli, Seeking Justice in International Law: The Significance and Implications of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Routledge 2016). 
19 Nicolaas Schrijver, ‘Self-Determination of Peoples and Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources’ in 
United Nations (ed), Realizing the Right to Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (United Nations 2013)., 99. 
20 In 2003, Stavenhagen noted the significant negative impacts that large-scale projects were having on indigenous 
rights, and noted that ‘the right to free, informed and prior consent by indigenous peoples continues to be of crucial 
concern, inasmuch as too many major decisions concerning large-scale development projects in indigenous 
territories do not comply with this stipulation [of consultation and participation in decision-making], clearly set out 
in paragraph 6 of ILO C169.’ (at para 13). UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolpho Stavenhagen’ (21 January 2003) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2003/90, paras 6-29. 
21 Doyle (n 18)., 147.  
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UNDRIP is not the first international instrument to introduce the requirement for states to 
consult indigenous peoples, or indeed to gain their consent, but it does arguably represent the 
most extensive expression of these principles to date. ILO C107 and ILO C169 established 
consultation as a means of negotiating conflicts between state objectives and indigenous 
people’s human rights, requiring that states do not remove indigenous peoples from their land 
without their consent.22 ILO C169 in particular established the importance of indigenous 
peoples participating in decision-making on issues that affect their rights.23  
 
Indigenous representatives in the WGIP and WGDD succeeded in extending the principle of 
consent beyond its limited application in the ILO Conventions so that it applies all projects 
which affect indigenous lands, territories and resources;24 to situations in which cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property (including intellectual property rights, designs, 
artefacts, arts and literature) is taken without free, prior and informed consent being given;25 
and in the case of storage of hazardous waste on indigenous lands.26 Furthermore, UNDRIP 
requires states to consult in order to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous 
peoples before introducing legal or administrative measures which would affect indigenous 
peoples’ lives.27  
 
However, this chapter focuses on Article 32.2 of UNDRIP, which is most pertinent to the topic 
of this thesis. Despite the apparent success of indigenous peoples in including free, prior and 
informed consent in UNDRIP, the final text of Article 32.2 does, however, represent a 
compromise which indigenous representatives were compelled to accept, in the interests of 
UNDRIP being adopted at all.28 The original wording proposed by the WGIP, and adopted in 
1994 by the Sub-Commission, unequivocally read: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies 
for the development or use of their lands, territories and other resources, including 
the right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources, particularly 
in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other 
 
22 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.  
23 SJ Rombouts, ‘The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’ Consultation Rights under the ILO and U.N. Regimes’ 
(2017) 53 Stanford Journal of International Law 169. 
24 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 32.  
25 Ibid., Art 11(2). 
26 Ibid., Art 29. 
27 Ibid., 19. 
28 Luis Enrique Chavez, ‘The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Breaking the Impasse: The Middle 
Ground’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2010).  
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resources. Pursuant to agreement with the indigenous peoples concerned, just and 
fair compensation shall be provided for any such activities and measures taken to 
mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.29    
 
However, in its final version Article 32 states: 
 
32.1 Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies 
for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.  
 
32.2 States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and 
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories 
and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.  
 
32.3 States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such 
activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, 
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. 
 
The impact of the changes to Article 32.2 are two-fold: first, they transform FPIC from a right 
that indigenous peoples can require (and therefore, by implication, may have some control 
over how it is obtained), to a duty of the state to consult (suggesting that the state will control 
the process). Secondly, and crucially, states are not explicitly required to obtain consent 
according to the final text, which requires them to ‘consult in order to obtain consent’. As will 
be explored later in Section 5.3, this more ambiguous wording has led to differing views on 
what is actually required in practice.  
5.3.2 States’ objections to Article 32  
 
The comments of states at UNDRIP’s adoption give insights into the reasons why the text of 
Article 32 had to be watered down. Unsurprisingly, the four States which voted against 
UNDRIP at the General Assembly were vocal in their opposition to FPIC. Their concerns 
included the ‘unworkable’ breadth of FPIC which conferred rights on a national sub-group to 
 
29 Annex to UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res 1994/45 (26 
August 1994) in UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session Geneva 1-26 August 1994’ (28 October 1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1995/2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, Art 30 (emphasis added). 
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‘veto legitimate decisions of a democratic and representative government’30; the potential for 
FPIC to constitute a veto which is ‘fundamentally incompatible with the Canada’s 
parliamentary system’ and provisions regarding land which ‘are overly broad and unclear and 
are susceptible of a wide variety of interpretations, discounting the need to recognize a range 
of rights over land and possible putting into question matters that have already been settled 
by Treaty.’31 New Zealand objected to the provisions on land rights in Articles 26 and 28 on 
the basis that ‘the entire country is potentially caught within the scope of the article’, which 
fails to take into account the competing land rights of other citizens and implying that 
‘indigenous peoples have rights that others do not have’.32 New Zealand further objected to 
Articles 19 and 32(2) stating that they imply ‘that indigenous peoples have a veto over a 
democratic legislature and natural resource management’ and give rise to ‘different classes of 
citizenship’.33 The United States of America denounced the text as ‘confusing’ and stated that 
it ‘risks endless conflicting interpretations and debate about its application’, pointing to the 
many detailed interpretive statements that were being offered by states who voted in support 
of its adoption.34  
 
Concerns were also raised by states who abstained and even amongst those who supported 
UNDRIP. This included South American states such as Suriname, which qualified their support 
for FPIC such that it ‘should not be understood as an encroachment upon the rights and duties 
of the State to pursue society’s interests by developing its natural resources and achieving 
sustainable development and improving the lives of the population as a whole’.35 Colombia, 
abstaining from the vote, noted that as a signatory to the ILO C169, it had led the 
implementation of prior consultation processes, conducting 71 consultations with indigenous 
peoples between 2003 and 2007. Despite supporting the need for effective participation 
mechanisms, Colombia viewed the FPIC provisions in Articles 19 and 32 as ‘a possible veto 
on the exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories in the absence of an 
agreement. That could interfere with processes benefiting the general interest.’36 They also 
raised concerns about the recognition of indigenous ownership of lands and resources, stating  
 
 
30 UNGA Sixty-first Session 107th Plenary Meeting Thursday 13 September 2007, 10 am New York official records 
(13 September 2007) UN Doc A/61/PV.107, (‘UN Doc A/61/PV.107’) 10. See statement of Australia. 
31 Ibid., 12. Statement of Canada.  
32 Ibid, 14. Statement of New Zealand. 
33 Ibid., 14. Statement of New Zealand.  
34 Ibid., 15. Statement of the United States of America. See also ‘USUN Press Release No 204(07): Observations 
of the United States with Respect to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
<https://www.ulapland.fi/loader.aspx?id=3f948c7b-2781-4c8c-bbbd-d137d6963617> accessed 20 February 2021.  
35 Ibid., 27. Statement of Suriname. 
36 Ibid., 18. Statement of Colombia.  
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It is important to stress that many States, including Colombia, constitutionally stipulate 
that the subsoil and non-renewable natural resources are the property of the State in 
order to protect and guarantee their public use for the benefit of the entire nation. 
Therefore, accepting provisions [which acknowledge indigenous ownership of land and 
resources] would run counter to the internal legal order, which is based on the national 
interest.37    
 
The familiar questions of national sovereignty and the place of indigenous peoples within the 
broader national community were key to states’ resistance to FPIC, and as will be seen in 
Chapters 6 and 7, are having impacts on how FPIC is operationalised. Two main themes 
emerge in States’ response to FPIC during the elaboration and adoption of UNDRIP: first, 
national governments must retain the ability to govern their whole territories in the interests of 
the national community in its entirety, and that UNDRIP’s provisions on FPIC are practically 
unworkable and constrain this right; second, they object on the basis that FPIC may create 
different classes of citizenship or unequal and preferential treatment for indigenous peoples 
who form one part of a national community with varied and potentially conflicting interests. 
Consequently, FPIC remained a major stumbling block to UNDRIP’s progress throughout the 
WGDD and its adoption at the General Assembly.38  
 
States’ objections to the originally drafting of Article 32 speak directly to the ongoing conflict 
between indigenous peoples’ self-determination and states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political unity. As will be argued later in this chapter, these unresolved issues are also 
shaping the way that different actors are interpreting Article 32, with significant implications for 
the future of FPIC as a tool of reconciliation.  
 
5.4 Two emerging interpretations of FPIC 
 
5.4.1 Areas of consensus and complexity 
 
Before examining the main points of divergence, it is noteworthy that since UNDRIP’s 
adoption, some areas of consensus have emerged on how free, prior and informed 
 
37 Ibid., 18. Statement of Colombia.  
38 Albert Barume, ‘Responding to the Concerns of the African States’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen 
(eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2009).; Adelpho Regino Montes and Gustavo Torres Cisneros, 
‘The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Foundation of a New Relationship 
between Indigenous Peoples, States and Societies’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the 
Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs 2009). 
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consultation is to be operationalised (as opposed to FPIC). There seems to be general 
agreement that the consultation should be undertaken in good faith, occur prior to any decision 
or action being taken, and in a way that ensures indigenous peoples are properly informed 
about the proposed project and its potential impacts, including sharing information, 
undertaking risk assessments, ensuring adequate technical and financial support for 
indigenous peoples to participate, and ensuring necessary translation or discussions in a 
language that indigenous peoples can understand. Furthermore, in seeking consent the state 
should not use coercion, whether through aggression, criminalisation, or financial means. The 
process of consultation should be culturally appropriate and respect indigenous institutions 
and decision-making processes, and should give indigenous peoples a chance to participate 
effectively and have a meaningful impact on decisions made by the state.39   
 
However, the ambiguity of the final wording of Article 32 has left significant uncertainty as to 
how the need to obtain consent should be interpreted, and a wide range of definitions of FPIC 
is emerging that would have considerably different implications for its implementation.40  At a 
basic level, FPIC is simultaneously described as a right, a duty, a general principle, a 
normative standard, a process and/or a mechanistic safeguard that derives from recognised 
substantive rights, for example to land, resources, culture or self-determination.41 There is also 
considerable variation of opinion in the appropriate methodologies that should be used when 
interpreting an instrument of soft law that is, at the same time as being a General Assembly 
Resolution, also a very detailed document that was subject to decades of negotiation by 
states.42 For example, while Barelli argues for a constructive reading of UNDRIP that is 
compatible with its ‘spirit and normative framework’,43 Newman argues that due to its 
distinctive nature, the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should apply, 
taking first the most obvious meaning of the text, then looking to context, the intent (or ‘object’ 
of the parties, and only then to purpose in order to clarify any ambiguities.44 Newman argues 
 
39 UNPFII  Fourth Session 16-27 May 2005 ‘Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples (New York, 17-19 January 2005)’ (17 February 2005) 
UN Doc.E/C.19/2005/3; Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment of November 28, 2007 (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 172 (28 November 
2007) paras 133.; Doyle (n 18). 268-275; UNHRC Thirty Ninth Session 10-28 September 2018 ‘Free, prior and 
informed consent: a human rights-based approach Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (10 August 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/62. 
40 Mauro Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 
1.; Dwight Newman, ‘Interpreting Fpic in Undrip’ (2020) 27 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 233. 
41 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname, (n 39); UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, James Anaya Extractives industries and indigenous peoples (1 July 2013) A/HRC/24/41, 
paras 27-30; Doyle (n 18). 
42 Newman (n 40). 
43 Barelli (n 18)., 38. 
44 Newman (n 40)., 244. 
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that the methodology chosen to interpret UNDRIP has significant consequences for the way 
that it is understood.  
 
As shall be seen in the following sections, the choice to take a purposive methodology is likely 
to result in a more expansive reading of Article 32 than would a purely textual analysis.45 
Consequently, there is considerable divergence in interpretations of Article 32 between those 
who clearly align themselves with the goals of the indigenous movement and human rights, 
and states who take a more literal and thus restrictive view. The rest of this section argues 
that out of the ambiguity of Article 32, two opposing views of FPIC are emerging.46  
 
5.4.2 The ‘Sliding Scale’ Approach: A Grey Area 
 
An interpretation with increasing momentum in legal analysis of UNDRIP appears to be that 
of the ‘sliding scale’ approach to FPIC, in which it is argued that the duty on states to obtain 
consent will be triggered where the proposed project will have severe impacts on the rights of 
indigenous peoples. This view draws from the significant case of Saramaka v Suriname in the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).  In the case, the Court held that in addition 
to states’ obligation to consult,  
 
major development or investment plans that may have a profound impact on the 
property rights of the members of the Saramaka people to a large part of their territory 
 
45 ibid. 
46 The emergence of two independent interpretations of FPIC is consistent with Erueti’s analysis of the Declaration 
as a whole, in which he argues that there are ‘two narratives’ held within its provisions. According to Erueti, whilst 
indigenous activists, predominantly from the CANZUS countries of the global north, emphasised the need for 
decolonisation and self-determination during the negotiations of the Declaration’s text, indigenous representatives 
from the global south were more focused on the need to secure promotions for their basic human rights. This view 
is also consistent with the voting pattern of states and their comments on FPIC during the 61st General Assembly. 
The CANZUS states interpreted Article 32 as a veto, and voted against the Declaration, whereas the majority of 
states including those in South America initially interpreted FPIC in the light of multiculturalism, the duty to consult, 
and its contribution to democratic governance (although, as will be further discussed in Chapter 7, Canada has 
since interpreted UNDRIP, and FPIC, in line with its existing constitution, which is arguably closer to a multicultural 
model than a nation to nation one.) Given these two different narratives throughout the Declaration, Erueti argues 
for a ‘mixed-model’ interpretative approach, which allows different interpretations of the Declaration to reflect the 
specific needs of indigenous peoples in different contexts On the basis of the above analysis, a mixed-model 
interpretation of FPIC could potentially see the trigger for consent falling in different places along the spectrum, 
depending on whether the decolonization or human rights narrative is adopted in different countries. However, 
despite the different emphases of indigenous representatives during the negotiation process, since UNDRIP’s 
adoption indigenous peoples from outside CANZUS states – and particularly in Latin America – are also claiming 
strong forms of FPIC that rely on a self-determination basis. See Andrew Erueti, ‘The Politics of International 
Indigenous Rights’ (2017) 67 University of Toronto Law Journal 569. See also Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous 
Autonomy in the Americas’ in Tove H Malloy and Francesco Palermo (eds), Minority Accommodation through 
Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy (Oxford University Press 2015).  
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must be understood to additionally require the free, prior, and informed consent of the 
Saramaka, in accordance with their traditions and customs.47  
 
This judgment was followed in the Endorois case before the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights, who also upheld the need for consent to be obtained where the project 
would have a major impact.48 
 
Legal commentators such as Pentassuglia argue that the evolutionary interpretation of FPIC 
by the IACtHR broadly interprets international standards and domestic norms in order to 
practically resolve ambiguities contained within them. As such, the decision ‘informs a 
procedural and contextual management of competing claims in ways which strike a balance 
between the group’s perspective and wider interests’.49 In the same vein, Barelli argues that 
Article 32 imposes ‘stringent duties’ on states to meaningfully consult with the aim of reaching 
agreement, and guarantees effective protection of fundamental human rights.50  In his view, 
the Saramaka decision forms part of a ‘new and dynamic understanding of FPIC’ which fills 
the legal gap left by Article 32 of the UNDRIP by distinguishing between small-scale and large-
scale developments by using a sliding scale approach to participatory rights such as that 
articulated by Pentassuglia.51 Barelli also points out that the Saramaka decision develops on 
the ‘flexible approach’ to FPIC advocated by the Human Rights Committee, and has garnered 
support from the Special Rapporteur.52 However, Barelli also highlights future difficulties with 
this ‘sliding scale’ approach, for example in how ‘large-scale projects’ are defined, and 
questions whether this definition of FPIC adequately considers the cumulative impact of many 
small-scale projects affecting an indigenous territory over time.53 As the next two sections 
show, the Saramaka judgement - like Article 32 – the sliding scale approach is capable of 
being interpreted in two very different ways, with the potential to cause conflict on the ground. 
  
 
47 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname, (n 39), para 134. See also Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname 
Judgment of August 12, 2008 (Interpretation of the Judgement on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 185 (12 August 2008). 
48 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 276/2003 (4 February 2010), paras 
226 and 291.  
49 Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights’ (2011) 22 European 
Journal of International Law 165., 176. 
50 Barelli (n 18)., 37-39. 
51 G. Pentassuglia, Minority Groups and Judicial Discourse in International Law: A Comparative Perspective 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 113. 
52 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya’ (15 July 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, para 47. 
53 Barelli (n 40).See also Marcos A Orellana, ‘Saramaka People v. Suriname’ (2008) 102 American Journal of 
International Law 841.  
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5.4.3 The ‘General Rule’ Approach 
 
The most transformative interpretations of Article 32 are offered by authors who are staunch 
supporters of indigenous peoples, including former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Professor James Anaya, and Cathal Doyle in his monograph Indigenous 
Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The transformative role of free prior and 
informed consent.  Their strong interpretations of FPIC emphasise the right to self-
determination as a basis for FPIC,54 and hold that as ‘a general rule … extractive activities 
should not take place within the territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and 
informed consent’.55 Such an interpretation would represent a significant challenge to existing 
power structures, and confer on indigenous peoples real control over their lands and their 
future development. In defence of this position, Doyle cites pronouncements of the three treaty 
bodies which are most engaged with indigenous rights - CERD, CESCR and HRC, as well as 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights.56 In general, indigenous people tend to support this strict interpretation of 
FPIC as a ‘quasi-veto right’,57 in line with the views of Anaya and his fellow former Special 
Rapporteurs, Rudolpho Stavenhagen and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz.58 Similarly, some NGOs who 
defend indigenous peoples’ rights also characterise FPIC in absolute terms,59 describing it as 
‘including the right to say no’.60   
 
 
54 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples, James Anaya’ (6 July 2012) UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/47, paras 47-53; UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James 
Anaya Extractives industries and indigenous peoples’ (1 July 2013) A/HRC/24/41, para 28;  Doyle (n 18).,101-159; 
UNHRC Thirty Ninth Session 10-28 September 2018 ‘Free, prior and informed consent: a human rights-based 
approach Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (10 August 2018) UN Doc 
A/HRC/39/62, paras 3-5.  
55 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya Extractives 
industries and indigenous peoples’ (1 July 2013) A/HRC/24/41, 27.  
56 Doyle (n 18)., 131. For example, CERD, General Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples (18 August 1997) 
UN Doc CERD/C/51/misc 13/Rev 4.; Angela Poma v Peru Communication No 1457/2006 (27 March 2009) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006, para 7.6;    Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (n 48), para 291. 
57  Megan Davis, ‘Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 439., 465. 
58 UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolpho Stavenhagen’ (21 January 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90; Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, 
‘The Concept of Indigenous Peoples’ Self-Determined Development or Development with Identity and Culture: 
Challenges and Trajectories’ (Tebtebba Foundation 2008) UN Doc CLT/CPD/CPO/2008/IPS/02. 
59 E.g. Survival International, ‘Decolonize Conservation’ <https://www.survivalinternational.org/conservation> 
accessed 20 February 2021. According to Survival International’s interpretation of FPIC, ‘According to international 
law, the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of local communities is required before any projects can take 
place on their land’.   
60 Shona Hawkes, Consent Is Everybody’s Business: Why Banks Need to Act on Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
(Oxfam GB for Oxfam International 2019)., 11.  
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The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples conducted a Study on FPIC which 
supported Anaya’s ‘general rule’ approach to Article 32 in relation to the extractives sector.61 
However, EMRIP’s study has been critiqued by Newman, who highlights the complexities of 
interpreting UNDRIP and advocates for the principles of treaty interpretation to be applied.62 
He notes that there has been little cohesive effort to agree on how UNDRIP should be 
interpreted, with the result that divergent interpretations are emerging. In particular, he notes 
a tendency amongst jurists and rights advocates to interpret each clause individually, rather 
than including adequate substantive discussion of how interpretation may be affected in light 
of other articles such as Article 46, which provides limitations clauses and principles for 
UNDRIP’s interpretation.  In relation to the EMRIP study on FPIC, Newman suggests that it 
does not take a rigorous enough approach to this question: ‘after making some controversial 
unexplained decisions about interpretive methodology, [the study] goes on to mention Article 
46.1 quickly but to rapidly assert requirements within it that are not self-evidently present in 
what was agreed in UNDRIP.’63 Additionally, there is also acknowledgement within the report 
itself that the legal situation is not clear cut. EMRIP’s report itself states that: 
  
A State or stakeholder that decides to proceed after consent is withheld by indigenous 
peoples moves into a legal grey area and exposes itself to judicial review and other 
types of recourse mechanisms, potentially including international, regional and 
national tribunals, and by indigenous peoples’ own institutions.64  
 
One of the ‘grey areas’ surrounding FPIC is how to determine the threshold for consent to be 
required.  The Saramaka judgement, discussed above, is a leading example of a regional 
human rights court attempting to define this ‘legal grey area’. Doyle argues that the IACtHR’s 
interpretation of the Saramaka judgement can be read to support the ‘general rule’ approach. 
He argues that its wording ‘indicates that extensive impacts are synonymous with large-scale 
development or investment projects, and consequently such activities always trigger the FPIC 
requirement.’65 Additionally, he argues that the IACtHR has IACtHR’s reference to the right to 
 
61 UNHRC Thirty Ninth Session 10-28 September 2018 ‘Free, prior and informed consent: a human rights-based 
approach Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (10 August 2018) UN Doc 
A/HRC/39/62, para 32. 
62 Newman (n 40). Newman advocates for the rules of treaty interpretation to be applied to the Declaration. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 
331, Article 31 requires that treaty terms should be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’, including any subsequent practice. Under Article 32, 
preparatory work and context can be used to confirm the meaning of a treaty text that remains ambiguous if 
interpreted in accordance with Article 31.   
63 ibid., 235-236.  
64  UNHRC Thirty Ninth Session 10-28 September 2018 ‘Free, prior and informed consent: a human rights-based 
approach Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (10 August 2018) UN Doc 
A/HRC/39/62, para 28 (emphasis added). 
65 Doyle (n 18)., 151, with reference to Case of the Saramaka v Suriname (n 39) para 17.  
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self-determination in relation to FPIC ‘suggests that the notion of a major impact ... extends 
beyond threats to cultural or physical survival to include limitations on their development 
choices.’66  However, this view is disputed by Pasqualucci, who views the Saramaka 
judgement to limit FPIC requirement to only those projects with profound impacts on a large 
part of the territory, which threaten cultural or physical survival of the indigenous people 
concerned.67   
 
A second debate concerns when it is permissible for the state to proceed with a project in the 
event that the indigenous peoples concerned withhold their consent. Proponents of the 
‘general rule’ approach argue that states should only proceed without consent if proposed 
projects will definitely not have substantial impacts on indigenous rights (said by Anaya to be 
‘mostly a theoretical possibility given the invasive nature of extractive activities’),68 or in rare 
cases where it is permitted in accordance with states’ international human rights obligations, 
according to the limitations set out in Article 46.2 of UNDRIP which reads: 
 
In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in 
this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and 
in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be 
non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just 
and most compelling requirements of a democratic society. 
 
The question, then, is under what circumstances can indigenous rights be lawfully restricted? 
Both the IACtHR and the African Commission have held that indigenous property rights must 
 
66 ibid., 150, with reference to Case of the Saramaka v Suriname (n 39), para 93. Additionally, at para 135, the 
Court referenced the statement of Special Rapporteur Rudolfo Stavenhagen:  
 
The issue of extractive resource development and human rights involves a relationship between 
indigenous peoples, Governments and the private sector which must be based on the full recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands, territories and natural resources, which in turn implies the 
exercise of their right to self-determination. Sustainable development is essential for the survival and 
future of indigenous peoples, whose right to development means the right to determine their own pace of 
change, consistent with their own vision of development, including their right to say no. Free, prior, 
informed consent is essential for the human rights of indigenous peoples in relation to major development 
projects, and this should involve ensuring mutually acceptable benefit sharing, and mutually acceptable 
independent mechanisms for resolving disputes between the parties involved, including the private sector. 
 
UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolpho Stavenhagen’ (21 January 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90, para 66. The Court’s 
reference to this statement seems to support Doyle’s view that the right to determine development priorities is a 
key basis for FPIC. 
67  Pasqualucci (n 18).  
68 UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya Extractives 
industries and indigenous peoples (1 July 2013) A/HRC/24/41, para 31.  
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be balanced against the rights of other third parties, including private for-profit concession 
holders.69 The IACtHR has set out tests that must be met before indigenous property rights 
may be restricted. The restriction must be (a) established by law (b) necessary (c) proportional 
and (d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate aim in a democratic society, including the private 
property rights of third parties.70 Furthermore, the restriction must not prejudice the survival of 
the group and its members, and must be subject to three safeguards, effective participation, 
reasonable benefit sharing, and prior environmental and social impact assessment.71 Xanthaki 
notes that these criteria still provide a considerable degree of protection for indigenous 
peoples’ rights and a higher threshold for infringement of indigenous rights than those of the 
general population.72 Additionally, Doyle notes that if FPIC is also derived from other rights – 
such as the right to culture or the right to life – the ‘public interest’ restriction does not apply 
and the threshold for consent to be obtained is lowered considerably. Consequently, the 
threshold would fall at different points along the sliding scale of impact depending on which 
right was at risk of violation.73  
  
However, the question of what is considered to be a ‘legitimate aim in a democratic society’ - 
and therefore a legitimate reason to restrict indigenous peoples’ right to property – appears to 
be answered broadly by the IACtHR and African Commission. 74 For example, the Case of the 
Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname,75 the IACtHR states that the assessment of whether 
it is appropriate to limit indigenous property rights must be made on a ‘case by case basis’, 
bearing in mind ‘public utility and social interest’,76 and that there is no general rule that 
indigenous property rights will prevail over those of private individuals.77 Furthermore, the task 
of deciding when an infringement is justified is considered by the IACtHR to belong ‘exclusively 
to the state’, because ‘the IACtHR is not a domestic court of law that decides disputes between 
 
69 Case of the Saramaka v Suriname (n 39), paras 211-215; The African Commission has also decided) that 
indigenous property rights can be restricted by the ‘interests of public need or in the general interest of the 
community’, according to Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter).  
70 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment of August 12, 2008 (Interpretation of the Judgement on 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 185 
(12 August 2008), paras 34 and 35. See also The Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
Judgement of June 17, 2005 (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 
125 (17 June 2005).  
71 Case of the Saramaka v Suriname (n 39), paras 127-128. 
72 Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples under the Light of Energy Exploitation Focus: International 
Energy Law’ (2013) 56 German Yearbook of International Law 315. 
See The Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay Judgement of March 29, 2005 (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 146, para 144-147 (29 March 2005). 
73 Doyle (n 18)., 130. 
74 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (n 70), paras 144-145.  
75 The Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname Judgement of November 25, 2015 (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 309 (25 November 2015). 
76 Ibid., para 155. 
77 Ibid., para 158.  
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private individuals.’78 This provides a great degree of scope for the State to determine when 
indigenous lands and resources may be commandeered in the interests of the public good, 
and these decisions will, of course, be made with reference to the state’s own laws  and 
development priorities rather than those of indigenous peoples. Indeed, the case law of the 
IACtHR confirms that, subject to the above safeguards such as consultation, projects for 
environmental protection,79 petrochemical and mineral extraction,80 hydroelectric dams,81 
logging82 and cattle ranching83 may be viewed as ‘legitimate aims’ for infringing indigenous 
property rights.  
 
Consequently, the IACtHR’s approach in Saramaka and other cases arguably still permits far 
more exceptions to the ‘general rule’ than are permitted under Article 46.2 of UNDRIP, and 
there is potential for disagreement and confusion as to where the threshold for consent will 
fall according to how rights violations are categorised. Furthermore, it will be up to states (or 
the Court) to decide what constitutes an acceptable restriction on indigenous peoples’ rights, 
which – as highlighted in the previous chapter – is problematic from the point of view of 
indigenous peoples who may come to a different conclusion as to what is acceptable, and who 
may dispute that the state has legitimate authority to make such a decision on their behalf.   
 
Thus the question of when FPIC is required is indeed a ‘grey area’. To avoid this uncertainty, 
Doyle argues that the self-determination basis for FPIC ‘mandates the indigenous definition of 
the concept and control over its implementation.’84 This view proposes that the responsibility 
for defining the trigger point for FPIC should rest with indigenous peoples themselves, rather 
than being defined by state legislators or the conventional court process. However, the 
amendments to Article 32 which frame FPIC as a state duty rather than a right of indigenous 
peoples seem to work against such an interpretation of the text.  In any case, it is extremely 
unlikely that states would agree to such an approach and Doyle himself has noted that states 
and industry are reluctant to fully respect the self-determination basis for FPIC.85  
 
 
78 Ibid., para 156.  
79 Ibid., para 171. 
80 Case of the Saramaka v Suriname (n 39); Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador 
Judgement of June 27, 2012 (Merits and Reparations) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 245 (27 
June 2012).  
81 Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (n 80);  
The Case of the Kuna of Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members v. 
Panama, Judgement of October 14, 2014  (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No 284 (14 October 2014). 
82 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (n 1); Case of the Saramaka v Suriname (n 
39).  
83 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (n 70). 




The next section articulates the approach to FPIC that states do seem willing to adopt: an 
interpretation of FPIC in the context of human rights based multiculturalism and the operation 
of democratic governance. This presents a radically different view from that espoused by 
proponents of the ‘general rule’. 
   
5.4.4 The Multiculturalist Approach to FPIC  
 
This section argues that states – who are the primary makers of international law – did not 
interpret Article 32.2 as conferring a ‘general rule’ presumption that indigenous consent would 
always be required in the context of extractive projects. On the contrary, both the ordinary 
meaning of the text and states’ subsequent behaviour support a far more restrictive 
interpretation of FPIC under UNDRIP.  
 
Whilst the proponents of the ‘general rule’ approach to FPIC emphasise the right to self-
determination as the basis for FPIC, states have preferred to highlight its role in ensuring that 
indigenous people are able to participate fully and effectively in decision-making within 
multicultural democratic but unified societies, ensuring all citizens are treated equally, and 
preventing discrimination.86 These arguments echo the liberal multicultural rationale for group-
differentiated rights discussed in Chapter 4.   Furthermore, as was discussed in Chapter 3, 
states were extremely reluctant to recognise indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in 
case it posed a threat to states’ political sovereignty and territorial integrity and emphasised 
that the right to self-determination enshrined in UNDRIP was consistent with existing principles 
of international law and applies only to the right of indigenous peoples to exercise internal self-
determination in the context of politically unified states.87 This approach reflects the approach 
of human rights-based multiculturalism in framing indigenous peoples  as minorities within the 
context of the overarching state.  
 
Although UNDRIP was negotiated at length with indigenous representatives, UNGA 
Declarations are, ultimately, adopted by states who are the primary makers of international 
law,88 and therefore states’ express  explanations of vote at the time of its adoption should be 
 
86 See A/61/PV.107 (n 31), particularly the Statements of Colombia, Chile, United Kingdom, Mexico, Liechtenstein, 
Sweden, Thailand, Brazil, Guyana, Suriname,;  
 UNGA, Sixty-first Session 108th Plenary Meeting Thursday 13 September 2007, 3pm New York official records (13 
September 2007) UN Doc A/61/PV.108 (‘A/61/PV.108’) See Statements of Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Nigeria (abstained), Guatamala.  
87 A/61/PV.107 (n 31) see Statements of Argentina, Chile, United Kingdom, Norway, Jordan, Leichtenstein, 
Sweden, Thailand, Brazil, Guyana; A/61/PV.108 (n 86) see Statements of Iran, India, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Philippines, Nigeria (abstained), Egypt, Guatamala, France.  
88 Arnold N Pronto, ‘Some Thoughts on the Making of International Law’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 601. 
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taken into account when interpreting any ambiguity that exists in the text.89 The multiculturalist 
understanding of UNDRIP espoused by states who voted in support of UNDRIP is consistent 
with a narrower interpretation of FPIC, as only a duty to consult with the aim of reaching 
agreement.  It is telling that even states who supported UNDRIP’s adoption did not explicitly 
endorse FPIC as a right of veto, preferring to interpret it as a right to consultation consistent 
with an underlying adherence to human rights based multiculturalism and principles of 
democracy. For example, the representative of Sweden welcomed the adoption of UNDRIP, 
whilst stating that: 
 
the Swedish Government firmly believes that the promotion of the human rights of 
indigenous individuals contributes to the maintenance and development of 
multicultural, pluralistic and tolerant societies, as well as to the creation of stable and 
peaceful democracies built upon effective participation by all groups in society .... 
article 32.2 shall be interpreted as a guarantee that indigenous peoples must be 
consulted, not as giving them a right of veto. 90  
 
Furthermore, states who supported UNDRIP placed made further clarifications which narrow 
the interpretation of FPIC. For example, states confirmed that UNDRIP would be interpreted 
in a way that is consistent with existing domestic and international law91 and noted its non-
binding and aspirational nature.92  Importantly, several states took the opportunity to reinforce 
their overriding control over sub-soil and other natural resources for use in the public interest,93 
and to interpret article 26 (on indigenous peoples’ right to traditional lands, territories and 
resources) in a way that is consistent with property rights established in domestic law, 
including those of third parties.94  For example, Suriname cited its Constitution in its 
explanation of vote, which sets out that   
 
Natural riches and resources are property of the nation and shall be used to promote 
economic, social and cultural development. The nation shall have the inalienable right 
 
89 Newman (n 40).  
90 A/61/PV.107 (n 31), 24. See also the statements by Norway, Finland, Suriname; A/61/PV.108 (n 86) see 
statements of Namibia and Guatemala which interpret the provisions in the Declaration in the light of existing duties 
to consult and/or the need for effective participation in decision-making.  
91 A/61/PV.107 (n 31) statements of Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Thailand, Guyana; A/61/PV.108 (n 86) statements of 
Iran, Namibia, Paraguay, Philippines, France. 
92 A/61/PV.107 (n 31) statements of United Kingdom, Guyana, Suriname; A/61/PV.108 (n 86) statements of Nepal, 
Indonesia, Turkey. 
93 A/61/PV.107 (n 31) statements of Colombia (abstained), Japan, Suriname; A/61/PV.108 (n 86) Philippines, 
Nigeria (abstained), Egypt.  
94 A/61/PV.107 (n 31) statements of Japan, Mexico; A/61/PV.108 (n 86) statement of Paraguay. 
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to take complete possession of the natural resources in order to apply them to the 
needs of the economic, social and cultural development of Suriname.95 
 
Taken together, there is little in the explanations of vote to suggest that States intended Article 
32.2 to confer a duty to obtain consent as a ‘general rule’, even in the context of extractive 
projects. On the contrary, there is much to suggest that they were intent on maintaining 
effective state control over land and natural resources, and to have the ultimate decision-
making power over how to balance indigenous rights against the economic and development 
needs of all citizens.  
 
This view is supported by those who take a more textual (rather than purposive) approach to 
interpreting UNDRIP. For example, Engle has commented that whilst indigenous peoples 
called for the right to FPIC, which is ‘stronger than the right to consultation’, they did not 
achieve this in the final text of UNDRIP. Stressing the words ‘consult in order to obtain consent’ 
in Article 32(2), and comparing it with the 1993 version of the draft declaration [which] 
recognized the right of indigenous peoples to require that states acquire their consent’, Engle 
concludes that ‘what was achieved was less than what was called for’, and that ‘consent is 
only the goal in UNDRIP’.96 Furthermore, Xanthaki has commented that ‘it is noteworthy that 
the text does not recognise explicitly a right to free, prior and informed consent’,97  and 
Newman has concluded that whilst there is no definitive definition of FPIC, the final text of 
Article 32 as well as the travaux préparatoires ‘marks a move towards a textually more limited 
FPIC obligation than often thought in indigenous rights circles.’98 
 
Indeed, Article 32 stands in contrast to Articles 10 (on relocation) and Article 29 (on storage 
of hazardous materials) which both make the need to obtain consent explicit. Luiz Chavez, 
the Chairperson of the WGDD, has confirmed his understanding of the meaning of Article 19 
of UNDRIP, which uses the same formulation of ‘consult in order to obtain consent’. Reflecting 
on the debates in the working group, he recalls:  
 
Put simply, it was a question of establishing whether the declaration could recognise 
a right of veto in relation to state action or not. My assessment was that the WGDD 
could not accept this, neither for practical reasons nor reasons of principle. In practical 
terms, the state could not renounce either its powers or its responsibility when taking 
 
95 A.61/PV.107 (n 31), 27. 
96 Karen Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context 
of Human Rights’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 141. 
97 Xanthaki, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples under the Light of Energy Exploitation Focus’ (n 72)., 322. 
98 Newman (n 40)., 240. 
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decisions on issues of public order. And, in principle, the declaration could not 
recognise indigenous peoples preferential or greater rights than those granted to other 
members of society, as would be the case with a right of veto. The Chairman’s 
proposals therefore established only an obligation regarding the means (consultation 
and cooperation in good faith with a view to obtaining consent) but not, in any way, an 
obligation regarding the result, which would mean having to obtain that consent.99 
 
On the basis of this analysis, it seems that the ‘general rule’ approach was not the intention of 
states during the negotiation process or at its adoption. However, even if Article 32.2 is 
considered to be ambiguous in its ordinary meaning (which is not entirely self-evident), the 
subsequent practice of states does not support the assertion that consent must be obtained 
before approving projects on indigenous territories, at least for the moment.100 The duty to 
consult (stopping short of obtaining consent) has been recognised as a ‘general principle of 
international law’, 101  whereas the duty to obtain FPIC has not. Furthermore, whereas many 
states require indigenous peoples to be consulted, only a tiny minority have implemented a 
requirement to obtain consent in national legal frameworks.102  
 
The multiculturalist approach to FPIC is also apparent in the judgements of the IACtHR. The 
criteria imposed by the Court on permissible restrictions of rights (discussed above) echo the 
arguments put forward by Kymlicka, discussed in the previous chapter. Additionally, again 
echoing Kymlicka, the Court has explicitly recognised the public interest in maintaining diverse 
cultural identities within modern democratic societies,103 and in a Joint Separate Opinion, 
Judges Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Máximo Pacheco Gómez, and Alirio Abreu 
Burelli stated that cultural diversity is essential for realising human rights at national and 
 
99 Chavez (n 28)., 103-104.  
100 Notable exceptions to this are the Philippines and in Australia’s Northern Territories. Both these jurisdictions 
have legislated to require FPIC to be obtained prior to the approval of extractive projects on indigenous territory. 
However, even these examples are imperfect, and in the main states are preferring legal frameworks that require 
consultation, but not a requirement for FPIC to be obtained. See Doyle (n 18). 194-201. 
101 James Anaya, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural Resource 
Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and Resources’ (2005) 
22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 7. At 7, Anaya states that the existence of a  duty to 
consult was generally accepted by states in their contributions to the negotiation of the draft declaration, and that 
‘This widespread acceptance of the norm of consultation demonstrates that it has become part of customary 
international law.’; In the Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (n 80), the Court stated (at 
para 164)  that ‘the obligation to consult, in addition to being a treaty-based provision, is also a general principle of 
international law.’  
102 David Szablowski, ‘Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector? 
Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice’ (2010) 30 Canadian Journal of Development Studies 
/ Revue canadienne d’études du développement 111. Doyle (n 18). 194-201.  
103 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (n 70) para 148; Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Interpretation of the Judgement of Merits, Reparations and Costs Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No 142 (6 February 2006), particularly the Concurring Opinion of Judge A A Cançado 
Trindade, para 10. 
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international levels and that law must be interpreted accordingly.104 What is more, the duty to 
consult has been directly linked to the practice of multiculturalism by the IACtHR. The 
Judgement in the case of the Sarayaku People v Ecuador states: ‘Respect for the right to 
consultation of indigenous and tribal communities and peoples is precisely recognition of their 
rights to their own culture or cultural identity...which must be assured, in particular, in a 
pluralistic, multicultural and democratic society.’105 
 
What is more, in the case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, the Court has now 
controversially linked consultation directly to the right to participate in government under Article 
23 of the American Convention, and in doing so has  further positioned consultation as a facet 
of multicultural democracy.106 The Kaliña case also provided an opportunity for the Court to 
support a more transformative interpretation of the relationship between indigenous peoples, 
the state and land, such as the principle of joint responsibility for land espoused by Borrows107 
and others, which was discussed in the previous chapter.  The Court heard that Suriname had 
designated a part of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples’ land as a nature reserve without adequate 
consultation. The Inter-American Commission requested that the Court require the state to 
either remove the ‘nature reserve’ status or to place the reserve under co-management with 
the Kaliña and Lokono peoples. The Court declined to do so, instead requiring the state to 
ensure that the existence of the reserves did not infringe the indigenous peoples rights without 
meeting the requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality, and the achievement of a 
legitimate purpose.108 In doing so, the Court conformed to its multiculturalist approach, giving 
the state ultimate control of indigenous territories to the exclusion of more transformative 
alternatives that perhaps could realise indigenous self-determination more fully. As discussed 
in the previous section, such an approach places limits on indigenous peoples’ ability to be 
 
104 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (n 1). See in particular the Joint Separate 
Opinion of Judges Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Máximo Pacheco Gómez, and Alirio Abreu Burelli, para 
14.  
105 Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (n 80), para 159.  See also Case of the Case of 
the Community Garifuna Triunfo de la Cruz and its members v Honduras Judgement of October 8, 2015 (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 305 (8 October 2015) paras 158, 261.; 
In Case of the Xákmok  Kásek  Indigenous  Community  v. Paraguay Judgement of August 24 2010 
(Merits,  Reparations,  and  Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 214 (24 August 2010), para 
148, the Inter-American Commission argued that the Court must apply an indigenous understanding of how 
property is used when determining indigenous land rights. Failing this, ‘would render the definition of Paraguay as 
a multicultural and multi-ethnic State illusory, eliminating the rights of thousands of individuals who inhabit 
Paraguay and enrich the country with their diversity’.  
106 Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname (n 75). In a contested judgement, the IACtHR used its iuria 
novit powers to decide that, in failing to adequately consult the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples on the continued 
existence of nature reserves and a mining site, Suriname had violated their right to participate in government under 
Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In the earlier Case of the People of Sarayaku v Ecuador 
(n 80), the Commission asked the Court to decide whether the State, in failing to consult, was in breach of Article 
23 of the American Convention (right to participation), but the Court declined on the basis that the matter was dealt 
with adequately under Article 21.   
107 John Borrows, ‘“Landed” Citizenship: Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participation’, Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press 2000). 
108 Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname (n 75), paras 274 and 286.  
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entirely self-determining. Furthermore, it sets indigenous rights firmly within the bounds of an 
overriding multicultural nation state.  
 
Within this multiculturalist paradigm, the IACtHR has referred to FPIC as a safeguard of 
indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural survival.109 However, viewing FPIC as a safeguard 
in this manner could be criticised as a blunt instrument, which does not impose any meaningful 
additional duty on states beyond their existing duty to respect and protect human rights. Doyle 
notes that indigenous consent must always be consistent with the enjoyment of human rights, 
and must not be used by states to justify human rights violations.110 If FPIC is only required at 
the higher end of the spectrum where impacts may threaten the physical or cultural survival of 
an indigenous people, it could be argued that the human rights obligations of states demand 
that they should not proceed with the project in any event. Thus the key determinant of the 
state’s actions in such a situation would not be the absence of FPIC, but the fact that an 
unlawful human rights violation would occur if the state continues its proposed course of 
action. On this basis, it is questionable whether a principle of FPIC defined in such a way adds 
anything beyond a repetition of states’ existing duties to protect and respect human rights.  
 
5.5 Analysing the Multiculturalist Approach to FPIC 
 
5.5.1 Decolonial analyses of the multiculturalist approach to FPIC 
 
At first glance, multiculturalism and human rights seem to offer a great opportunity for the 
adoption of strong forms of FPIC. Proponents of the ‘general rule’ approach to FPIC have 
recognised the potential for multiculturalism and human rights to support stronger definitions 
of FPIC. For example, CERD’s General Recommendation XXIII places a strong interpretation 
of FPIC within the framework of non-discrimination and the right of minorities to participate in 
the life of the state whilst maintaining their own cultures and traditions.111 Anaya also has 
recognised the potential for multiculturalism and human rights to provide a firm legal basis for 
indigenous peoples’ rights to cultural identity, land, autonomy and participation in decision-
making, and has been a leading proponent of indigenous advocates adopting the human rights 
framework.112 In his view, indigenous groups utilised the framework available to them and 
imbued it with indigenous ideals, providing ‘hope of political ordering that simultaneously 
 
109 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname, (n 39), paras 90, 129-13. 
110 Doyle (n 18)., 256.  
111 CERD, General Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples (18 August 1997) UN Doc CERD/C/51/misc 
13/Rev 4., para 3.  
112 S James Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural State’ 
(2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 13.; S James Anaya, International Human Rights 
and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers 2009).;  
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embraces unity and diversity on the basis of equality’.113 To Anaya, the multicultural model of 
indigenous rights that was developed throughout the late 20th and early 21st century  presents 
a challenge to the ‘previously dominant Western conceptions of the culturally homogenous 
and legally monolithic state.’114 Stavenhagen  states ‘The challenge now is to renew the 
usefulness of a people’s right to self-determination in the era of democratic multiculturalism’,115 
and Morgan cites ‘an administrative culture unaccustomed to multiculturalism’ as one barrier 
to implementation of UNDRIP.116 The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has 
commented, ‘Many of the rights in the Declaration will require new approaches to global 
issues, such as development, decentralization and multicultural democracy.’117  
 
These comments tend to position multiculturalism as part of the solution to successfully 
implementing UNDRIP. However, as the comment by UNFPII shows, these optimistic 
assessments require a reinvention of multiculturalism in a way that better reflects indigenous 
worldviews. As the analysis in the previous chapter demonstrated, liberal theorists of 
multiculturalism have not tended to engage deeply with indigenous political philosophies.  
 
Furthermore, authors who take a decolonial approach to analysing FPIC have contested the 
assumption that multiculturalism and an emphasis on FPIC as democratic participation will 
result in the better inclusion of minorities in state decision-making, better protection of minority 
rights and the reduction of conflict.118 Instead they argue that prior consultations not neutral 
spaces for dialogue between equals, but rather are top-down processes, controlled by the 
state.119  As a result, they suggest that FPIC processes are significantly influenced by power 
asymmetries which reinforce the power of the state and constrain indigenous peoples’ claims 
 
113  Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples’ (n 112)., 61.  
114  ibid., 61. 
115  Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘Making the Declaration Work’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), 
Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009)., 
364.  
116 Rhiannon Morgan, Transforming Law and Institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights 
(Ashgate 2011). ,159.  
117 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf> 
accessed 29 January 2021. 
118 Lisa J Laplante and Suzanne A Spears, ‘Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes 
in the Extractive Sector’ (2008) 11 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 69. Juliette Syn, ‘The Social 
License: Empowering Communities and a Better Way Forward’ (2014) 28 Social Epistemology 318.; Ana Maria 
Esteves, Daniel Franks and Frank Vanclay, ‘Social Impact Assessment: The State of the Art’ (2012) 30 Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 34.; Syn. 
119 Esben Leifsen, Luis Sánchez-Vázquez and Maleny Gabriela Reyes, ‘Claiming Prior Consultation, Monitoring 
Environmental Impact: Counterwork by the Use of Formal Instruments of Participatory Governance in Ecuador’s 
Emerging Mining Sector’ (2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 1092.; Marilyn Machado and others, ‘Weaving Hope in 
Ancestral Black Territories in Colombia: The Reach and Limitations of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation and 
Consent’ (2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 1075.; Jessie Shaw, ‘Indigenous Veto Power in Bolivia’ (2017) 29 Peace 
Review 231.; Gisela Zaremberg and Marcela Torres Wong, ‘Participation on the Edge: Prior Consultation and 
Extractivism in Latin America’ (2018) 10 Journal of Politics in Latin America 29. 
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to self-determination within weak bureaucratic administrative procedures.120 According to 
these authors, FPIC is principally used as a mechanism to legitimise extractivist development 
policies and neutralise indigenous dissent,  at the expense of transformational and 
collaborative reform of institutions and economic development policies.121 Consequently, 
several authors have questioned whether FPIC can lead to reductions in conflict, in the 
absence of institutional reform and the resolution of underlying grievances.122  
 
One leading proponent of this view is Rodríguez-Garavito, who is deeply pessimistic about 
how states are adopting the duty to consult and FPIC within a framework of multiculturalism. 
He views the development of the international legal principle of FPIC as only one part of an 
international  
 
process comprised of the global juridification of difference—a process that I have 
termed ethnicity.gov—which reflects the dominant type of multiculturalism and 
governance that dominates in the era of neoliberal globalization … FPIC’s rise and 
impact in regulations and disputes about indigenous rights have been so profound that 
instead of merely constituting a legal figure, it entails a new approach to ethnic rights 
and multiculturalism, with its own language and rules.  
 
Far from this being a positive development from the perspective of indigenous peoples, 
Rodriquez-Garavito cautions that the approach of states to FPIC will hamper its success.  
Based on his observations of FPIC consultation processes in Colombia, Rodriguez-Garavito 
identifies five common flaws which he considers derive from the interpretation of FPIC through 
the multicultural governance paradigm: (a) consultation processes become focused on 
agreeing procedure, rather than resolving substantive issues (b)  the process is dominated by 
miscommunication, due to ‘a discursive clash, in which claims and different kinds of 
 
120 Szablowski (n 102).; Roger Merino, ‘Re-Politicizing Participation or Reframing Environmental Governance? 
Beyond Indigenous’ Prior Consultation and Citizen Participation’ (2018) 111 World Development 75.; Roger Merino, 
‘The Cynical State: Forging Extractivism, Neoliberalism and Development in Governmental Spaces’ (2020) 41 Third 
World Quarterly 58. 
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Consultation in Social Minefields’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 263.; Rachel Sieder, 
‘“Emancipation” or “Regulation”? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Post-War Guatemala’ 
(2011) 40 Economy and Society 239.; María del Carmen Suescun Pozas, Nicole Marie Lindsay and María Isabel 
du Monceau, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Extractives Industries in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Perspectives from the Ground’ (2015) 2 The Extractive Industries and Society 93. Leah Temper, ‘Blocking 
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122 George Stetson, ‘Oil Politics and Indigenous Resistance in the Peruvian Amazon: The Rhetoric of Modernity 
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‘Conflicting Dilemmas: Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Indigenous Populations in South America’ 
(NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 2014).; Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Riccarda Flemmer, 
‘Conflict Transformation through Prior Consultation? Lessons from Peru’ (2015) 47 Journal of Latin American 
Studies 811.; Merino, ‘Re-Politicizing Participation or Reframing Environmental Governance?’ (n 120). 
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knowledge, based on radically distinct epistemological roots, get crossed.’123  (c) differences 
of opinion develop on what are proper subjects for discussion, and what the appropriate 
normative framework should be; (d) power asymmetries are reproduced in the agreements 
reached, further legitimising existing hierarchies of power; (c) opportunities arise for 
indigenous peoples to mobilise support and to use procedural and legal tactics in order to 
delay or stop projects from proceeding. and generating processes of mobilisation.124  
 
All of these effects call into question the capacity of FPIC processes to build harmonious 
relations and reduce conflict. Rodriguez-Garavito himself characterises FPIC as ‘a last 
recourse—a last inconvenience in the way of death—to which indigenous peoples cling in the 
face of all odds, as the Colombian Embera communities continue to do in their struggle against 
collective annihilation.’125  This characterisation of FPIC presents a picture of FPIC that is miles 
away from the aspirational spirit of UNDRIP to bring about indigenous self-determination and 
a harmonious relationship with the state. 
 
5.5.2 Applying indigenous critiques of human rights based multiculturalism 
 
This section analyses the text of Article 32 with reference to the critiques of Kymlicka’s human 
rights based multiculturalism that were explored in Chapter 4, from the perspective of 
achieving epistemic justice, transforming colonial imbalances of political power, as well as 
challenging the imbalance of economic power. As discussed in Chapter 4, transformation of 
power imbalances is closely tied to the understanding of what citizenship is, and how 
indigenous peoples and states relate to the land.  
 
The content of UNDRIP is largely consistent with Kymlicka’s framework of human-rights based 
multiculturalism, containing group-differentiated rights that enable indigenous peoples to live 
in accordance with their own customs and traditions, in the context of a wider nation state. It 
provides indigenous people with the three categories of rights that Kymlicka identified: self-
government rights, including collective rights to land, autonomy and the right to maintain their 
own institutions; special representation rights, ensuring indigenous peoples have a voice in 
the legal and administrative matters that may affect their rights; and polyethnic rights, enabling 
them to participate in the life of the state free from discrimination.126 The ‘dual aspect’ approach 
 
123 Rodríguez-Garavito (n 121)., 295.  
124 ibid. 
125 ibid., 305. 
126 These polyethnic rights fall outside of the scope of this chapter and so are not discussed in detail here. However, 
they include Articles 2 and 9 which confirm that indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to be free from 
discrimination; Article 5 confirming indigenous peoples’ ‘right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the State’; Article 13 protecting the right to indigenous languages and to 
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to the right to self-determination described in Chapter 3 centres on two of Kymlicka’s group-
differentiated rights – self-government (or ‘autonomy’) and special representation 
(‘participation’). Article 32 provides a particular type of special representation right for national 
minorities that Kymlicka himself supported in some cases.127  
 
In justifying the group-differentiated rights contained in its text UNDRIP draws from both the 
liberal discourse of individual human rights, as well as collective rights, which are advocated 
both by indigenous peoples and Kymlicka. The discomfort expressed by states in relation to 
many of its provisions – and particularly Articles 3 and 32 - is testament to the ability of 
indigenous representatives to push the boundaries of liberal multiculturalism. However, in 
doing so they uncovered its limits - an immovable commitment to the ultimate power of the 
state, and the inability - or unwillingness - of states to imagine alternatives for a more equal 
relationship with indigenous peoples.   
 
It could be said that during negotiations, indigenous representatives were acting in a manner 
consistent with Dale Turner’s ‘word warriors’, seeking to reconcile indigenous values with the 
principles and terminology of international law.128  However the debates the WGIP, WGDD 
and UNGA suggest that Coulthard129 was right to worry about the dangers of engaging in 
asymmetric processes of dialogue that require indigenous peoples to articulate their claims in 
liberal - rather than indigenous - terms. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, a dialogue based on 
established principles of international law led to the narrowing of options for indigenous self-
determination, and reinforced the dominant political power structures and normative 
frameworks. In matters relating to self-determination, PSNR and FPIC, indigenous 
representatives were forced to argue in the existing logic of international law, with the result 
that the final text was watered down in such a way as to remove the most transformative 
elements of the original draft. The text of Article 32 seems to place control of the process in 
the hands of the state, providing cause for concern that FPIC consultations will themselves 
 
‘understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the 
provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means’; Article 15 requiring states to ensure that education and 
public information upholds the dignity of indigenous cultures and traditions and promotes tolerance and non-
discrimination; and Article 16, which requires that indigenous people have access to non-indigenous media and to 
take appropriate and effective measures to ensure that public and private media reflect indigenous cultural 
diversity.  UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007).  
127  Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press 1995)., 109,110, 
126.  
128 This approach is evident in Erica-Irena Daes’ explanations of the concept of ‘internal self-determination’ and 
indigenous PSNR which were relied on to achieve the recognition of indigenous self-determination and rights to 
land, territories and resources. UNCHR (Sub-Commission) Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene A. Daes (13 July 2004) 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30.  
129 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (University Of 
Minnesota Press 2014). See Chapter 3 for discussion.  
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become state-centric processes in which indigenous peoples must argue using the logic of 
the state, rather than their own worldviews, and hence be at a disadvantage.  
 
The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 also highlighted the need to transform the balance of 
economic power if reconciliation is to be achieved. Indigenous representatives ensured that 
UNDRIP does not only focus on civil and political rights and the right to culture, but also 
protects indigenous peoples’ material wellbeing by upholding indigenous peoples’ right to 
develop their own economic systems and their own priorities for development,130 as well as 
the right to the improvement of their economic and social conditions.131  In this regard, it could 
be argued that UNDRIP succeeds where Kymlicka’s model fails, in combining cultural 
recognition with elements of material redistribution132 to tackle both cultural and economic 
inequality. However, as detailed above, UNDRIP’s provisions on land rights do not recognise 
indigenous peoples’ material relationship to land, their legal systems nor their traditional 
institutions for land management, and the discussion on PSNR assumed that states would 
control resources that were not part of traditional indigenous use – meaning that subsoil 
resources are generally considered to be owned by states, and not indigenous peoples. This 
only reinforces the existing imbalance of economic power.  
 
Thus Article 32 operates within the context of a right to self-determination that supports the 
human rights multiculturalist approach and constrains both indigenous political and economic 
power and incorporates indigenous peoples under the authority of the state. This is significant 
for FPIC because it provides the state or the courts with ultimate authority to decide when 
consent is required, applying their own legal frameworks and worldviews to the decision-
making process. Furthermore, the state retains ultimate control over indigenous land and 
natural resources for the benefit of the nation as a whole. This makes it unlikely that FPIC will 
prompt states to fundamentally reconsider their relationship to indigenous peoples or the 
environment in the way that authors such as Borrows have advocated.   
 
Indeed it is clear from both the negotiations at the WGDD and General Assembly, and the 
resulting compromises in the text, that states were not open to considering new models of 
 
130 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 23.  
131 Ibid., Art 21.1 states: 
Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social 
conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, 
housing, sanitation, health and social security. 2. States shall take effective measures and, where 
appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. 
Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, 
children and persons with disabilities. 
132 Nancy Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age, I/212, July–
August 1995’ 1 New Left Review 68. 
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citizenship or partnering to jointly steward land. Instead, as discussed in section 5.1 above, 
they remained preoccupied with the imperative to be able to take unilateral decisions about 
how national resources should be deployed in the national interest. Consistent with Kymlicka’s 
model, Article 32 may provide indigenous peoples with an opportunity to influence specific 
projects that may affect their rights, but a multiculturalist interpretation reinforces the power of 
the state to take decisions unilaterally, according to its own logic and on the basis of weighing 
the different interests within the state. Furthermore, all but the most extreme interpretation of 
the ‘general rule’ approach does not help indigenous peoples where states’ wider development 
priorities systematically and repeatedly impinge on the ability of indigenous peoples to live in 
accordance with their own customs and traditions. This might occur, for example, through a 
succession of small projects whose cumulative impacts have a significant impact.  
 
During negotiations, states insisted on framing their relationship with indigenous peoples by 
incorporating them into the democratic multicultural state,133 rather than recognising their 
‘extra-legal character’. Even the countries which do recognise treaty-based relationships with 
indigenous peoples to some extent, such as New Zealand and Canada, proved unable to 
consider the approach of ‘citizens plural’ during the negotiations. In the discussions on FPIC, 
several states objected on the basis that FPIC would lead to ‘different classes of citizenship’.134 
New Zealand’s comment, which dismissed Article 26 because it could apply to the entire 
territory,135 is particularly telling - it seems to suggest that states to some extent recognise the 
potentially unjust and contested means by which they hold power, but consider it too risky to 
engage in discussions which could prove transformative to the relationship between 
indigenous peoples and the state.  
 
Analysing UNDRIP from the perspective of indigenous critiques of multiculturalism suggests 
caution in adopting a multiculturalist approach of FPIC as a tool for reconciliation. It suggests 
that indigenous worldviews and legal systems may be given less weight than established 
principles of international law, or domestic legal frameworks, and puts doubt on the potential 
of FPIC to provide epistemic justice. Additionally, it reveals that this conceptualisation of FPIC 
is rooted in a form of self-determination which constrains the ways in which indigenous 
peoples can interpret their relationship with the state. It is therefore questionable whether FPIC 
can help to solve the sovereignty/self-determination conflict which persists as the root cause 
of antagonism between indigenous peoples and the state. Finally, UNDRIP does not enable 
indigenous peoples to have full control over their natural resources, nor does it enable them 
 
133 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007)., Art 46(2).  
134 UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 (n 31), 14. Statement of New Zealand. 
135 Ibid.,14.  
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to challenge the wider developmental strategy of the state that results in the frequent need for 




The analysis above shows that two very different interpretations of FPIC are emerging in the 
context of the extractives sector: a ‘general rule’ approach which emphasises indigenous self-
determination and considers that consent must be obtained for the vast majority of extraction 
projects; and a ‘multiculturalist approach’ which emphasises the need for the state to take 
unilateral decisions in the interests of equality and non-discrimination within the context of a 
multicultural, democratic state. Whilst indigenous peoples and their supporters prefer the 
former view, states have adopted the latter. 
 
The ambiguity in Article 32.2 and the wide range of subsequent interpretations poses a 
problem for its implementation. There appears to be a significant possibility that contrasting 
interpretations of FPIC will lead to a conflict over how individual FPIC processes should be 
managed, over their specific objectives, and what the implications of a lack of consent should 
be on the continuation of proposed projects. States are the primary makers of international 
law, and will also exercise the vast majority of control over whether, and how, UNDRIP will be 
implemented in practice. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that FPIC will generally 
be implemented by states within a human rights multiculturalist framework as opposed to one 
that emphasises indigenous self-determination. However, such an implementation may not 
satisfy indigenous peoples who emphasise the self-determination element of FPIC and expect 
to have their decisions respected. Rather than reducing conflict, states’ and indigenous 
peoples’ different expectations of FPIC could lead to an additional layer of conflict in the 
already tense context of projects being proposed on indigenous lands. Furthermore, rather 
than positioning indigenous peoples and states as partners in stewarding the land, current 
approaches to the interpretation of FPIC place states and indigenous peoples as opponents 
who both claim the right to ‘veto’ the other sides’ development objectives.  
 
Chapter 3 argued that in choosing to utilise international legal principles to further their claim 
for self-determination, the indigenous delegates were unable to significantly alter dominant 
power structures and normative frameworks in which indigenous peoples are positioned as 
minority groups within a superordinate nation state. In the discussions on free, prior and 
informed consent and the related issues of rights to land and natural resources examined in 
this chapter, states doubled down on a human rights multiculturalist approach to ensure that 
they retained the upper hand, rather than contemplating alternative ways of relating with 
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indigenous peoples that might challenge the status quo.  From this analysis, it appears that 
warnings about the limitations of multiculturalism and the human rights paradigm seem to be 
well-grounded.  
 
The next two chapters focus on the implementation of FPIC in Peru and Canada, examining 
whether FPIC is being implemented in a manner that reinforces the multicultural paradigm and 
limits the options for indigenous self-determination, or whether indigenous peoples are able to 
utilise even the weak provision on FPIC to further their claims to self-determination. This 
chapter has raised important questions in this regard. For example, will such consultations 
embrace or undermine indigenous epistemologies, institutions and legal systems?  In 
evaluating the impacts of projects in indigenous territory, whose views will be authoritative? 
When determining whether an infringement of indigenous rights to land is legal, necessary, 
proportionate, and for a legitimate purpose, whose legal principles will prevail?  If states can 
infringe indigenous rights in order to pursue the national interest, how is that interest decided 
- on what grounds, by and for whom, and in accordance with whose values? The answers to 
these questions in practice will determine whether FPIC could become a blunt tool which 
repeats historic injustices, or a catalyst to reimagine a more harmonious relationship between 









This thesis has so far argued that reconciliation depends on states’ recognition of indigenous 
self-determination, and that indigenous critiques argue that the liberal model of human rights-
based multiculturalism – which informs UNDRIP - fails to enable indigenous self-determination 
in its fullest form, instead limiting it to a narrow definition. In the same way, the dominant 
interpretation of free, prior and informed consent as enshrined in UNDRIP is consistent with 
human rights based multiculturalism and a narrow understanding of the right to self-
determination. This stands in contrast to many indigenous people’s expectations of how free 
prior and informed consent should be put into practice as an expression of indigenous self-
determination in its fullest form. The analysis thus far conducted in the thesis seems, therefore, 
to suggest that, instead of acting as a tool for reconciliation, FPIC may well result in an 
additional layer of conflict between indigenous peoples and states. To further test this 
hypothesis, the next two chapters will focus on two case-studies with a view to revealing how 
this potential conflict surrounding FPIC could unfold/materialise, particularly in relation to the 
questions of how consultations should be conducted, what their purpose is, and what should 
happen in the absence of indigenous consent.   
 
The next two Chapters of this thesis will examine whether FPIC is being conceived differently 
by states and indigenous peoples in practice, and what the implications are for its potential to 
bring about reconciliation.  They will do so by considering two countries - Peru (in this chapter) 
and Canada (in the next) which have taken an approach to FPIC that is similar in many ways 
to the multiculturalist approach to Article 32 UNDRIP that was described in the previous 
chapter. Chapters 6 and 7 are not intended to provide a comparative analysis, but to provide 
an assessment of the way that FPIC is being implemented in practice, in two countries which 
can be said to subscribe to human rights based multiculturalism. The purpose of this 
assessment is to identify whether the critiques of the multiculturalist approach, developed in 
chapters 3 to 5, are evident in the practice of FPIC and thus constraining its potential as a tool 
for reconciliation on the ground.  
  
These two countries have been chosen for the following reasons: first, both countries have 
indicated their support for UNDRIP. Whilst Peru was a vocal supporter from the beginning, 
proposing the draft declaration for adoption at UNGA, Canada’s support evolved gradually up 
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to 2016 when it indicated its unqualified support. Secondly, both countries are multicultural 
democracies with a history of European colonisation and relatively advanced legal frameworks 
on indigenous peoples’ rights. Thirdly, both countries have histories in which indigenous 
people have suffered from severe violations of their rights, resulting in a relationship of conflict 
with the state. Finally, in both cases, UNDRIP – including FPIC – is viewed as a means of 
reducing conflict and promoting reconciliation. 
 
The first section of this chapter will set out the background to the development of Peru’s Prior 
Consultation Law, and provide an overview of its main provisions, arguing that it replicates the 
multiculturalist interpretation of FPIC that was discussed in Chapter 5. The second section 
reviews three illustrative examples of prior consultation processes in relation to three mining 
projects with original communities in the Andes. These examples have been carried out 
through desk-based research of state and indigenous government reports and statements, 
commentary by non-governmental organisations, and contemporary newspaper and social 
media reports.  The final section will analyse the reconciliatory potential of FPIC in Peru, with 
reference to the critique of the multiculturalist approach to FPIC developed in the previous 
chapter: the lack of epistemic justice during the process; its inability to challenge established 
hierarchies of power and create more equal relations between the state and indigenous 
peoples; and the need to transform the balance of economic power if reconciliation is to be 
achieved.  
 




Peru’s Law on Prior Consultation is celebrated as an example to other countries,1 and Peru 
has been at the forefront of international legal developments on indigenous rights ratifying ILO 
C169 on 02 Feb 1994;2 playing a key role in negotiating the draft Declaration with the African 
Union; and introducing the draft Declaration for adoption at UNGA. Peru has a sizable 
indigenous population, with 55 recognised indigenous and original peoples - 4 in the Andes 
 
1 Riccarda Flemmer, ‘Prior Consultation as a Door Opener: Frontier Negotiations, Grassroots Contestation, and 
New Recognition Politics in Peru’ in Claire Wright and Alexandra Tomaselli (eds), The Prior Consultation of 
Indigenous Peoples in Latin America : Inside the Implementation Gap (1st edn, Routledge 2019). 
2 ‘Ratifications of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)’ (International Labor 
Organization) 
<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314> 
accessed 16 December 2020.  
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and 51 in the Amazon.3 In Peru’s 2017 census, 22.3% of those over 12 years of age self-
identified as Quechua, and 3.6% as part of an indigenous or original people, with 16.4% of the 
population speaking Quechua, Aymara or another indigenous language as their mother 
tongue. Furthermore 60.2% self-identified as mestizo4 - a mixture of indigenous and European 
heritage.   
 
Peru has been described as a weak state that has not been able to successfully navigate 
multicultural integration or equally guarantee political participation for all its citizens.5 
Historically, indigenous people in Peru have suffered from poverty, discrimination, and denial 
of basic rights.6 Policies of ‘mestizaje’ were used as a demographic tool to remove their 
‘backwards’ cultures, so that Andean and coastal communities became more integrated with 
the wider population and became known as ‘peasants’, with only the more isolated Amazonian 
populations being thought of as truly ‘native’.7  In 1993, following a military-backed ‘self-coup’ 
in 1990, President Fujimori introduced a new Constitution8 which recognised the ethnic and 
cultural plurality of Peru’s population.  It secured important rights for indigenous people, 
individually and as collectives, including the right to ethnic and cultural identity;9 the right to 
interpreters when communicating with the state and the recognition of indigenous languages 
as official languages in their regions of use;10 the recognition of indigenous and peasant 
communities as legal persons, with inalienable rights over land, and the right to economic, 
administrative and jurisdictional autonomy, within the bounds of Peruvian Law.11 However, 
Acuna has argued that the Constitution fell short of a decolonial approach, in that it did not 
recognise indigenous communities as nations, did not grant full self-determination, and 
retained for the state the rights over sub-soil natural resources.12 Nor was the approach of the 
Constitution fully inter-cultural: Ilzarbe comments that whilst it made an attempt to 
 
3 ‘Lista de Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios’ (BDPI) <https://bdpi.cultura.gob.pe/pueblos-indigenas> accessed 17 
October 2020. 
4 ‘Peru: Perfil Sociodemografico: Informe National Censuss Nacionales 2017: XII de Poblacion, VII de Vivienda y 
III de Comunidades Indigenas’ (Insituto Nacional de Estatistica e Informatica 2018) 
<https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/publicaciones_digitales/Est/Lib1539/libro.pdf> accessed 16 
December 2020.  
5 Juan Pablo Sarmiento Barletti and Lexy Seedhouse, ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Law of 
Prior Consultation: Obstacles and Opportunities for Democratization and Political Participation in Peru’ (2019) 46 
Latin American Perspectives 111. 
6 Cynthia A Sanborn and Alvaro Paredes, ‘Getting It Right? Challenges to Prior Consultation in Peru’ (Centre for 
Social Responsibility in Mining, Sustainable Minerals Institute, The University of Queensland, Australia 2015) 
Occasional Paper <https://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/media/docs/1141/occassional-p-series-sanborn-paredes-
peru.pdf> accessed 16 December 2020. 
7 Jacob Fried, ‘The Indian and “Mestizaje” in Peru’ (1961) 20 Human Organization 23. 
8 Constitución Política del Perú de 1993. 
9 ibid., Art 2.19. 
10 ibid., Arts 2.19 and 48. 
11 ibid., Arts 89 and 149. 
12 Roger Merino Acuna, ‘Coloniality and Indigenous Territorial Rights in the Peruvian Amazon: A Critique of the 
Prior Consultation Law’ (University of Bath, Centre for Development Studies (CDS) 2015) Working Paper 38. 
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accommodate cultural difference, it did not require the design, evaluation and implementation 
of public policy in partnership with indigenous representatives, or redesign the institutions of 
state to balance unfair economic, social and political structures.13  
 
Despite these reforms and its vocal support for indigenous rights on the international stage, 
Peru did not implement prior consultations for policies, legislative proposals or projects which 
affected indigenous people following its ratification of ILO C169.14 Such consultations as did 
occur were primarily conducted privately by companies, generally in a superficial manner. 
Consequently, the indigenous communities conducted anti-extraction protests and referenda 
to voice their lack of consent to development on their territories.15  In 2009, President Garcia 
attempted to implement Peru’s Free Trade Agreement with the USA through a series of 
legislative decrees which provided access to the Amazon for oil and gas extraction and 
logging, without consulting indigenous peoples.16 Indigenous activists joined forces with 
environmentalists and labour groups in protest,17 and indigenous peoples were portrayed as 
‘dogs in the manger’, who refused to make use of Peru’s natural wealth or allow others to 
benefit from it.18 
 
In April 2009, the indigenous organisation AIDESEP19 declared a national strike to protest the 
decrees, and the government declared a national emergency. Negotiations between 
indigenous representatives and the Public Ombudsman’s office ultimately failed when on 4th 
June 2009 the ruling ADRP party blocked a vote on Legislative Decree 1090, preventing its 
repeal.20 On 5 June 2009, violence erupted when the army and police attempted to clear 
thousands of indigenous and mestizo protestors blocking the ‘Devil’s Curve’ highway near 
 
13 Carmen Ilizarbe, ‘Intercultural Disagreement: Implementing the Right to Prior Consultation in Peru’ (2019) 46 
Latin American Perspectives 143. Ilizarbe argues that interculturality would require, in addition, initiatives to change 
social discourse which is discriminatory and exclusionary.  
14 Sanborn and Paredes (n 6). 
15 Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Riccarda Flemmer, ‘Conflict Transformation through Prior Consultation? Lessons 
from Peru’ (2015) 47 Journal of Latin American Studies 811. 
16 ibid. This action was in contravention of indigenous rights enshrined in the Constitution and ILO C169 and in 
some cases, in defiance of Congress who had previously vetoed similar legislation.  
17 Amelia Alva-Arévalo, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Domestic Standards of the Right to Prior Consultation under 
the UNDRIP: Lessons from the Peruvian Case’ (2019) 23 The International Journal of Human Rights 234. 
18 These slogans simplified and politicised the complex questions about development in Peru, and blamed the 
socioeconomic challenges of Peru on those wishing to preserve the Amazon and traditional ways of life, pitting 
‘400,000 natives’ against ‘28 million Peruvians’. Thus opposition to extractivist economic development was equated 
with being against the national interest. Barletti and Seedhouse (n 5). See also Peter Bille Larsen, ‘“The Dog in the 
Manger”: Neoliberal Slogans at War in the Peruvian Amazon’ in Nicolette Makovicky, Anne-Christine Tremon and 
Zandonai Sheyla S (eds), Slogans: Subjection, Subversion, and the Politics of Neoliberalism (Routledge 2019).  
19 ‘AIDESEP’ <http://www.aidesep.org.pe/> accessed 16 December 2020. 
20 Neil Hughes, ‘Indigenous Protest in Peru: The “Orchard Dog” Bites Back’ (2010) 9 Social Movement Studies 85. 
See also George Stetson, ‘Oil Politics and Indigenous Resistance in the Peruvian Amazon: The Rhetoric of 
Modernity Against the Reality of Coloniality’ (2012) 21 Journal of Environment & Development 76. for a description 
of the content of the legislative decrees, and how it is based in a modernity/coloniality logic which undermines 
indigenous epistemological claims to land, and supports political and economic control of indigenous territory by 
the state.  
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Bagua, 600 miles north of Lima. Hundreds being injured and at least 33 died - including 23 
police, 11 of whom were executed, and 5 indigenous protesters although unofficial reports 
suggest the indigenous death toll was far higher.21  
 
In the immediate aftermath, the Baguazo massacre was blamed on indigenous extremists and 
foreign anti-Peruvian influences.22 However, due to international condemnation and national 
solidarity protests between workers, peasants, indigenous people and students, President 
Garcia suspended the highly unpopular decree LD109023 and reopened negotiations.24  The 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples visited Peru and offered to help 
mediate the conflict and the Prime Minister resigned over the government’s handling of the 
matter.25  On 18th June 2009, Congress repealed two of the most contentious legislative 
decrees - LD1064  and LD101526 -  and admitted that failure to consult was a key cause of the 
conflict.27 The blockades ended, but indigenous organisations continued to call for the 
recognition of indigenous territorial rights. In view of the ongoing tension, the Public 
Ombudsman proposed national legislation be devised to implement the right to prior 
consultation. 
 
6.2.2 Two divergent interpretations of FPIC in the negotiations of the Law on Prior 
Consultation  
 
The proposed text of the draft Law on Prior Consultation stated that it was intended as a 
normative framework to fulfil the right to consultation, as enshrined in ILO C169 as well as 
 
21  Hughes (n 20). It should be noted that unofficial reports suggest more than fifty indigenous protestors were 
killed, and that police disposed of bodies to conceal the killings.  
22  ibid.; Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15). 
23 Decreto Legislativo No 1090 que aprueba la Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre 2008. 
24 According to Ilizarbe (n 13)., the development of the law on prior consultation was part of a wider call on behalf 
of environmental, human rights and indigenous movements towards participatory democracy, resulting in an effort 
to counter growing social conflict with dialogic mechanisms - for example procesos de concertación (deliberation 
and consensual decision processes), mesas de desarrollo (development roundtables), and presupuestos 
participativos (participatory budgets).   
25 ‘Yehude Simon, Peru’s Prime Minister, Will Resign’ (the Guardian, 17 June 2009) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/17/yehude-simon-peru-resign> accessed 9 January 2021.  
26 Decreto Legislativo No 1015 que unifica los procedimientos de las comunidades campesinas y nativas de la 
sierra y selva con las de la costa, para mejorar su producción y competitividad agropecuaria 2008.; Decreto 
Legislativo No 1064 que aprueba el régimen jurídico para el aprovechamiento de las tierras de uso agrario 2008.  
Indigenous organisations decried these Decrees due to their limiting effect on indigenous peoples’ collective land 
rights and right to consultation. For example, LD 1015 facilitated the transfer of indigenous land to private ownership 
by requiring a simple majority of community members to vote in favour, instead of a 2/3 majority as previously 
required. LD 1064 removed rights to consultation and consent in the case of land use for projects concerning mining 
or oil and gas. See Hughes (n 20). 
27 Hughes (n 20). The UN Special Rapporteur later highlighted the failure of the state to consult as a key factor in 
the escalation of violence. See S James Anaya, ‘Observaciones Sobre La Situación de Los Pueblos Indígenas de 
La Amazonia y Los Sucesos Del 5 de Junio y Días Posteriores En Las Provincias de Bagua y Utcubamba, Perú’ 
(2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34/Add.8.   
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UNDRIP. The draft Law on Prior Consultation was discussed in a dialogue table with 
indigenous organisations,28 in which government representatives sought to narrow the scope 
and application of prior consultation, whilst indigenous representatives fought to emphasise 
the standards of UNDRIP to ensure that the Law was widely applicable and included a 
requirement to obtain consent where measures directly affected indigenous territories.29   
 
Although it made clear that free, prior and informed consent was not intended to constitute a 
right of veto, the draft did require that consent be obtained in specific circumstances: in the 
case of relocation of indigenous peoples, for storage or dumping of toxic waste, and 
administrative, legislative or project measures that would have ‘an impact on their lands, 
territories or other resources, particularly in relation with the development, the use or the 
exploitation of natural resources’. The government refused to countenance a duty to obtain 
FPIC in the latter case, highlighting the non-binding nature of UNDRIP and stating that it could 
not endorse in a binding manner a guideline or policy that did not fall within the scope of Peru’s 
own internal legal framework.30 The indigenous representatives affirmed the proposed text, 
saying ‘it should be taken into account that [it] … refers to the serious impact on lands, 
territories and other resources, based on what is stated in paragraphs 135 and 137 of the 
IACHR judgment Saramaka people vs. Suriname’.31 Thus whilst indigenous representatives 
considered that the state should respect their right to say no in the case of major development 
projects, the state viewed FPIC as only an objective in the consultation process. This mirrors 
the division between indigenous and state interpretations of FPIC at the United Nations, 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
6.2.3 The triumph of the ‘multiculturalist’ approach 
 
The final draft of UNDRIP, consisting of 43 articles, was submitted to Congress on 9 April 
2010. Following intense debate, it passed as an abbreviated version of 20 articles on 19 May 
that year. The issues which the dialogue table had been unable to agree on were either 
 
28 The GNCDPA Grupo Nacional de Coordinación para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Amazónicos (National 
Coordination Group for the Development of Amazonian Peoples, GNCDPA), established 11 June 2009 to facilitate 
dialogue. The GNCDPA was presided over by the Minister of Agriculture and was comprised of government officials 
from other ministries, members of regional governments and representatives of Amazonian communities. It 
oversaw four dialogue tables: to investigate the Baguan Massacre (Mesa 1), to improve the contested decrees and 
reform the forestry legislation (Mesa 2), to draft a law on prior consultation (Mesa 3), and to negotiate a 
development plan for the Amazon region (Mesa 4).  See Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15). 
29 ‘Documento Final de La Mesa 3 “Sobre El Derecho de Consulta”’ (Grupo Nacional de Coordinacion para el 
Desarrollo de los Pueblos Amazonicos) <http://www.servindi.org/pdf/Mesa_Dialogo_3.pdf> accessed 16 January 
2021.  
30 ibid. See in particular commentary on draft articles 1.2, 2b) and 19.2 
31 ibid. See indigenous response on draft article 19.2, translation author’s own.  
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removed from the draft, left vague, or resolved in the governments’ favour.32 In its final form, 
the Law references only ILO C169, and states: 
 
The purpose of the consultation is to reach an agreement or consent between the State 
and indigenous or original peoples regarding legislative or administrative measures 
that directly affect them, through an intercultural dialogue that ensures their inclusion 
in the State's decision-making processes and the adoption of measures that respect 
their collective rights.33 
 
Furthermore, it does not require consent to be obtained in any situation, and in the event that 
consent is not forthcoming, the state is permitted to proceed but must ‘adopt all measures that 
are necessary to guarantee the collective rights of the indigenous or original peoples and the 
rights to life, integrity and full development.’34 In this respect, the Law on Prior Consultation 
interprets FPIC in line with a multiculturalist approach, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Whilst the state maintains control over decision-making, it must operate this responsibility in 
a way that includes indigenous peoples in the decision-making process and protects their 
rights.  
 
 Despite its shortcomings, indigenous organisations supported the law, as the best possible 
outcome under the circumstances. However, President Garcia vetoed the law, insisting that it 
should uphold the ‘national interest’ as the overriding criterion for government decisions, 
raising concerns about the chilling effect it would have on foreign investment, and arguing that 
only Amazonian indigenous communities with formal title to land should have consultation 
rights, to the exclusion of Andean and coastal peasant communities.35 Protests in October and 
December 2010 followed; and the draft law was left in limbo as the country  turned to focus 
on its elections.36 
 
In September 2011, one of the first acts of the newly-elected President Humala was to sign 
the Law on Prior Consultation (which had been unanimously passed by Congress) at a public 
 
32 Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15).;  see also Acuna (n 12). for more critique of the Law on Prior Consultation.  
33 Ley No 29785 - Ley del Derecho a la consulta previa a los pueblos indígenas u originarios, reconocido en el 
Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) 2011. 
34 ibid. Art 15, translation author’s own.  
35 Oficio N° 142–2010-DP/SCM Observaciones a la autógrafa de la ‘Ley del derecho a la consulta previa a los 
pueblos indigenas u originarios reconocido en el Convenio Num. 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo’ 
2010. Presidente de la República del Perú, Oficio N° 142–2010-DP/SCM. Observaciones a la autógrafa de la ‘Ley 
del derecho a la consulta previa a los pueblos indigenas u originarios reconocido en el Convenio Num. 169 de la 
Organización Internacional del Trabajo’. Delgado-Pugley, Deborah, ‘Contesting the Limits of Consultation in the 
Amazon Region: On Indigenous Peoples’ Demands for Free Prior and Unformed Consent in Bolivia and Peru’ 
(2013) 43 Revue Generale de Droit 151.  
36 Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15). 
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ceremony attended by indigenous representatives near the site of the Bagua Massacre.  
Humala promised to take a different approach to indigenous matters than that of his 
predecessor, in order to build a ‘great republic that respects all its nationalities.’ He asserted 
the law was a new step in cultural relations, recognising the ‘sovereign will’ of indigenous 
peoples, and the need for joint problem-solving on the development question, in order to 
remove conflict and establish peace through dialogue, for the benefit of all the population and 
nature. He also argued that the Law on Prior Consultation would in fact increase foreign 
investment due to a reduction in social conflict around extractive activities.37 These words 
reflected many of the concerns of those who adhere to the ‘general rule’ approach, reflecting 
recognition of self-determination, and the need for a relationship of equals. However, this 
sentiment was not reflected in the content of the Law nor its Regulatory Decree.  
 
There followed a six-month meta-consultation on a Regulatory Decree presented by the 
Viceministry of Interculturality, and headed by a multi-sectoral commission. Initially indigenous 
organisations hoped that the Regulatory Decree would compensate for the flaws in the Law, 
but in fact it served to further limit participatory rights in keeping with the multiculturalist 
approach to FPIC described in the previous chapter. The six indigenous organisations 
involved in the meta-consultation initially formed a ‘Unity Pact’, setting out ‘Minimum Non-
Negotiable Principles for the realisation of the right to participation, prior consultation and free, 
prior and informed consent’38 as a baseline for the discussions. These Minimum Principles 
drew from UNDRIP, ILO C169, the Saramaka case of the IACtHR as well as a report by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and set out a vision of FPIC that is consistent 
with the ‘general rule’ approach.  
 
The Unity Pact emphasised the need for the state to obtain consent in many situations, 
including in cases where the proposed measure presents a risk to the subsistence of 
indigenous peoples and their physical or cultural integrity, including megaprojects that could 
affect indigenous peoples’ means of subsistence, any decision which could affect, modify, 
reduce or extinguish property rights, military activities, storage of hazardous waste, or 
relocation. It made clear its view that states should not approve a measure in cases where 
indigenous consent was not granted. Not only that, but it also outlined several situations in 
which the state must not approve measures because they would be certain to affect the life, 
integrity or subsistence conditions of indigenous peoples, including damage to historical-
 
37 Ilizarbe (n 13).  
38 Pacto de Unidad, ‘Principios Mínimos Para La Aplicación de Los Derechos de Participación, Consulta Previa y 
Consentimiento Libre, Previo e Informado’. The organisations making up the pact were SIDESEP, CNS, 
CONACAMI and ONAMIAP, Confederation of Amazon Nationalities of Peru (Conap) and the Peasant 
Confederation of Peru (CCP).   
182 
 
cultural heritage, their means of subsistence, and their vision of respecting their habitat. In this 
latter case, the Unity Pact asserted that concessions for extractive activities in natural 
environments such as rivers, glaciers, wetlands, forests, or for measures which would impact 
biodiversity or result in loss of indigenous land, territory or resources.39  Mirroring the views of 
those who propose the ‘general rule’ that consent will always be required for extractive 
projects, this extensive list effectively requires consent for all extractive projects, and 
precludes the possibility that consent would be granted for the vast majority. 
 
In the event, the meta-consultation gravely damaged trust between indigenous peoples and 
the state, and was criticised for being rushed, with inadequate time to digest information and 
consult, and for not being properly representative of indigenous peoples.40  The inability to 
gain concessions from the state also caused a rift between indigenous organisations 
themselves. At the end of the first phase, four of the six national organisations withdrew from 
the process until such time as the Law on Prior Consultation was changed to meet the 
standards set by the Unity Pact.41  The indigenous organizations’ demand for a revision of the 
Law was refused, and the Vice Minister for Interculturality, Iván Lanegra Quispe, accused the 
organisations who had left the process of bad faith.42  The second phase of the consultation 
took place between the two remaining organizations, Confederation of Amazon Nationalities 
of Peru (CONAP) and the Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP) and the representatives of 
18 state vice-ministries: a numerical imbalance which has been said to have dramatically 
limited the negotiating power of the indigenous groups. Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor 
analysed this dialogue concluding that indigenous representatives sought significant 
amendments, whilst government officials were intent on following the process. Furthermore, 
the discussion consisted of technical legal argument, rather than incorporating indigenous 
‘communication repertoires, knowledge forms, values and logics’.43  The way that the meta-
consultation was conducted, and the inability of the two sides to reach consensus, significantly 
undermined the legitimacy of the legal framework on consultation. 
 
 
39 Ilizarbe (n 13).  
40 Various national organisations - e.g. AIDESEP, CONAP - compete to represent their base communities, and due 
to historical differences in legal treatment between Andean and Amazonian indigenous communities, the two 
groups are divided.  
41 The organisations that withdrew were SIDESEP, CNS, CONACAMI and ONAMIAP. See Schilling-Vacaflor and 
Flemmer (n 15). 
42 httpJ/servindi.org/actualidad/60278>.   In an open letter to the indigenous organizations who withdrew, Lanegra 
expressed incredulity and an inability to see a rationale for such behaviour. He argued that the Law on prior 
consultation was a joint achievement of non-indigenous and indigenous peoples to forge consensus, consistent 
with ILO C169, and urged them not to ‘turn their backs on so many Peruvian men and women, indigenous or not, 
who were loyally committed to its approval.’ Thus indigenous representatives who withdrew from the process were 
positioned discursively as irrational and betraying their fellow compatriots.   
43 Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15).  
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The manner in which the decree was finalised reinforced mistrust, further undermining the 
legitimacy of the legal framework, entrenching the multiculturalist framing of FPIC in Peru and 
reducing the potential for future intercultural dialogue. The multi-sectoral commission ended 
with 28 items still in dispute.44 CONAP and the CCP accused the state of acting in bad faith, 
and requested that the Presidency of the Council of Ministers set aside the disputed text which 
was being proposed for the regulations by the multi-sectoral commission.45 However, the 
President and his Council of Ministers approved the Regulatory Decree, unilaterally imposing 
its own view on 24 of the 28 disputed issues, and even reversing several of the binding 
agreements which were reached in the meta-consultation. They also added 13 new provisions 
without discussion, some of which violated the Unity Pact’s minimal principles.46  
 
The resulting Regulatory Decree was published on 3 April 2012,47 and it recognised the need 
to obtain consent in only two circumstances: for relocation, in accordance with Article 16 of 
ILO C169, and in the case of storage or disposal of hazardous waste.48 Otherwise, whilst the 
objective of consultation was to reach agreement or consent, ‘failure to reach this goal does 
not imply infringement of the right to consultation’.  Thus whilst the Unity Pact interpreted FPIC 
in the manner of the ‘general rule’ approach, the resulting legal framework endorsed by the 
state falls firmly within the multiculturalist approach that does not recognise the need to obtain 
consent in the vast majority of cases. This seems to confirm the suggestion that the divergent 
interpretations of FPIC that were observable in relation to Article 32 of UNDRIP are also 
influencing the debate on how it should be implemented in practice, and that the multiculturalist 
approach as endorsed by states at the United Nations is the model of FPIC that is being 
implemented at the domestic level.  
 
6.2.4 The content of the Law on Prior Consultation and its Regulatory Decree 
 
The Law and its accompanying Regulatory Decree set out a prescriptive process for prior 
consultation, which must be completed in a maximum of 120 days.49 In stage 1, the entity 
promoting the measure must identify the proposal that will be consulted upon, and evaluate 
whether it might directly affect indigenous peoples’ rights. In stage 2, the promoting entity - 
 
44 Ilizarbe (n 13).  
45 httpJ/servindi.org/actualidad/60278>. 
46 Delgado-Pugley, Deborah (n 35).;  Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15).; Barletti and Seedhouse (n 5). 
47 Decreto Supremo No 001-2012-MC Reglamento de le Ley No 29785, Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa  a 
los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo 
(OIT) 2012.  
48 Reglamento de le Ley No 29785, Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa  a los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios 
reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) 2012. Art 7.  
49 ibid., Art 24. 
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with input from the Viceministry of Interculturality which maintains the database of recognised 
indigenous groups in Peru - identifies the indigenous people that will be consulted in relation 
to the proposed measure. In addition, it is also possible for indigenous communities to request 
that they are included in a prior consultation, which is decided by the promoting entity or the 
Viceministry of Interculturality on appeal.50  The Consultation Plan is then prepared in 
agreement with the indigenous people, setting out who will take part; roles and responsibilities, 
and the methodology for the  process including languages to be used, and the time and 
location of meetings. In stage 3, the ‘publicity stage’, the promoting entity provides information 
to the communities about the measure to be consulted, and a copy of the consultation plan. 
In stage 4, the ‘information stage’, a meeting is held in which the promoting entity presents 
detailed information about the measure, and in discussion with the community determines 
which indigenous rights would be affected. The promoting entity is required to provide 
technical assistance to the indigenous people in order for them to understand the implications 
of the proposed measure, and the Viceministry of Interculturality is also on hand to advise and 
support both sides on the process. In stage 5, the ‘internal evaluation’, the indigenous 
communities consider their response to the measure, and provide a record of their evaluation 
to the promoting entity. At this stage, if the community agrees to the measure, they proceed 
to Stage 7 - ‘decision’. If the community is not in agreement, the consultation proceeds to 
Stage 6 - ‘dialogue’ - in which the promoting entity and indigenous people discuss any 
proposals the indigenous people have about the measure, with the aim of reaching agreement. 
At the final decision stage, the promoting entity will determine how to proceed on the basis of 
the results of the consultation.51 The process is overseen by a facilitator, and aided by 
translators, all of whom must be trained and registered by the Viceministry of Interculturality. 
 
According to the resulting Law on Prior Consultation and its Regulatory Decree, the framework 
is intended to protect the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted before any administrative 
or legislative measure which directly affects their collective rights, cultural identity, quality of 
life and development. Its aim is for indigenous people and the state to reach agreement on 
the respective measures through intercultural dialogue, including indigenous people in 
decision-making processes with the assistance of registered facilitators and interpreters 
trained in consultation issues.52 It is based on underlying principles of (i) Opportunity for 
consultation prior to the implementation of the measure to be adopted; (ii)  Interculturality, 
which requires that consultation processes recognise, respect and adapt to differences 
 
50 ibid. Art 9.  
51 Ministerio de Cultura, ‘Derecho a La Consulta Previa: Guia Metodologica Para La Facilitacion de Procesos de 
Consulta Previa’ (Ministerio de Cultura 2015). 13.  
52 Barletti and Seedhouse (n 5).;  
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between cultures, and contribute to the recognition and value of each one of them; (iii) Good 
faith, in which the state analyses and assesses the position of indigenous peoples in a climate 
of trust, collaboration and mutual respect, and both the state and indigenous institutions have 
a duty to act in good faith, being prohibited from ‘political proselytizing and undemocratic 
behaviour’;  (iv) Flexibility - carried out through procedures which are appropriate to the nature 
of the proposed measures and the situation of the indigenous people involved; (v) Reasonable 
timeframes to give indigenous people enough time to understand and consider the measure; 
(vi) Freedom from coercion or conditions to enable consent to be given freely; and (vii) 
Complete and timely information provided by the state at the outset of the consultation, to 
ensure that consent is informed.53 The Viceministry of Interculturality has set out a Guide for 
facilitators including specific forms that are to be completed in the meetings.54  
 
6.3 Critiques of the Law on Prior Consultation and its Regulatory Decree 
 
Indigenous groups involved in the meta-consultation vehemently criticised both the Law and 
the regulatory decree, for its failure to embrace an expansive approach to consultation, instead 
opting for a narrow process in which the state retains decision-making power.55 For example, 
the legislative framework includes a restrictive interpretation of the indigenous groups who are 
entitled to be consulted,56 limits the applicability of consultation to those measures which 
‘directly’ and ‘negatively’ affect indigenous people who live in close proximity to the site of 
proposed projects. This excludes communities who may be gravely affected by indirect or 
remote impacts, for example as a result of impacts on rivers.57  The Regulation further narrows 
the scope of consultation by exempting certain projects from consultation altogether, such as 
those for constructing and maintaining public infrastructure for health, education and general 
public services,58 and the Law is not retrospective, and so does not cover measures which 
have been approved prior to its promulgation, or the expansion of blocks which had been 
 
53 Ley No 29785. Art 4. 
54 Ministerio de Cultura (n 51). 
55 Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15). Ilizarbe (n 13). 
56  In a departure from the standards of definition set out in ILO C169, the Law defines indigenous and native people 
with reference to linguistic, cultural and ethnic criteria that mark out the qualifying groups as pre-colonial cultures, 
for example their descent from original peoples, their cultural and institutional separation from the rest of the 
population, and their lifestyles, spiritual and historical links to traditional lands, in addition to subjective self-
identification. Ley No 29785., Art 7. In the Andean context, this definition is potentially exclusive of peasant 
communities that have integrated to a greater degree than the definition imagines. There was uncertainty as to 
whether or not the legislation would apply to Andean and coastal peasant communities, or only to Amazonian 
indigenous peoples, particularly in view of the fact that both Humala and Garcia publicly denied that these former 
communities were indigenous. See Deborah Poole, ‘Mestizaje as Ethical Disposition: Indigenous Rights in the 
Neoliberal State’ (2016) 11 Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 287. The powerful extractives lobby also 
denied that Andean communities should be recognised as indigenous. Sanborn and Paredes (n 6). 
57 Acuna (n 12). 
58 Reglamento de le Ley No 29785. Art 15;  Acuna (n 12). 
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granted prior to September 2011.59 During the negotiations with the state, activists argued that 
consultation should apply to all projects initiated since 1995 when Convention 169 entered 
into force.60  
 
Furthermore, in keeping with the multiculturalist approach to FPIC, the state retains control of 
the process and outcome of the consultations, such that the existing power imbalance 
between indigenous peoples and the state is maintained. The proposal of the Ombudsman, 
supported by indigenous representatives, to have a dialogue to agree on the form that the 
consultation should take was rejected by the executive who instead opted for the prescriptive 
120-day process.  Merino argues that the characteristics of the seven-stage process are 
evidence that ‘the entire process is designed to inform and convince people of a decision that 
has already been made’.61 As discussed above, despite the Law’s commitment to the objective 
of agreement between the state and indigenous communities, its provisions generally fall short 
of a commitment to obtain consent before the measures proceed. Instead, in common with 
the multiculturalist approach to FPIC, where no agreement is reached, the state is empowered 
to make the final decision unilaterally in a way which guarantees indigenous rights and 
balances the diverse interests of the national population as a whole.62  Additionally, the manner 
in which the regulatory decree was altered after the meta-consultation process had ended has 
undermined trust in the state to give due regard to indigenous rights when balancing them 
against the national interest.63  In contrast, the principles agreed in the indigenous 
organisations’ Unity Pact  set out a vision of consultation in which indigenous communities 
had significant power over the process and the outcome, including situations in which the 
securing of consent should be obligatory, and others in which consultations should not go 
ahead if the planned measure would have significant detrimental impacts on indigenous 
rights.64  
 
Additionally, Sanborn-Parades has observed that the process set out for consultations lacks 
independent oversight which could counteract the power imbalance that is integral to the 
process. The responsibility for overseeing any given consultation rests with the Ministry 
proposing the measure - for example, the Ministry for Energy and Mines in the case of mining 
projects or hydroelectric dams. These Ministries tend to be strong institutions, that are 
 
59 Acuna (n 12). 
60 ibid. 
61 Roger Merino, ‘Re-Politicizing Participation or Reframing Environmental Governance? Beyond Indigenous’ Prior 
Consultation and Citizen Participation’ (2018) 111 World Development 75. 79.  
62 Barletti and Seedhouse (n 5).  
63 ibid.  
64 Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (n 15). 
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politically powerful and well-funded. In contrast, the Vice-Ministry for Intercultural Affairs - 
which Sanborn Parades describes as a relatively weak state institution - is given a support 
role, tasked with maintaining the database of indigenous peoples and their representatives, 
registering the results of consultations, and providing lists of official facilitators and translators. 
The Unity Pact argued, in vain, for the establishment of a new Ministry for Indigenous and 
Native Peoples, with a stronger institutional role in government, that could oversee 
consultations and provide a counterbalance to the powerful Ministries which seek to bring 
measures that impact on indigenous peoples.65 Such a proposal would have helped to 
rebalance the power asymmetries which are inherent in the consultation process.  
 
Throughout, there is evidence that indigenous epistemology is not respected on a par with the 
states’ approach – in keeping with critiques of the multiculturalist approach to FPIC. 
Indigenous critics of the Law also highlight the way in which it includes the creation of a 
database of indigenous communities who are eligible for consultation,66 maintaining the 
categorisation of people as ‘indigenous’ or ‘mestizo’, in a way that perpetuates the historical 
practice of categorising indigenous people based on ethnicity.  Poole questions the validity of 
the ‘shared illusion that it is not only possible, but desirable to create a universal metric for 
gauging the purity of identities that are inherently fluid and political’, and notes the approach 
of the Vice-Ministry to privilege so-called reliable (government generated) data on indigenous 
communities, over the ‘untrustworthy disciplines’ of anthropology and history which give 
testament to the richness of Andean culture.67 It could also be said that this approach privileges 
information from Eurocentric methods of data collection over the testimonies and oral histories 
of the indigenous peoples themselves.  
 
Furthermore, details of the legal framework suggest a lack of regard for indigenous institutions 
and a focus on process over meaningful engagement.  Merino argues that the Regulation 
requires consultation with state-recognised indigenous representatives rather than 
emphasising consultation with indigenous assemblies and other decision-making institutions.  
This failure to respect indigenous custom potentially leaves the door open for corrupt 
practices, and for indigenous institutions to be undermined causing conflict within indigenous 
societies.  In support of this suggestion, she highlights the words of the Vice-Minister of 
Territorial Governance, who stated ‘Prior consultation is a means and not an end in itself. Its 
aim is to inform the population about changes and impacts’.68 Indeed, the legislative framework 
 
65 Sanborn and Paredes (n 6). 
66 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), Art 19. 
67 Poole (n 56). 298. 
68 Merino (n 61). 79. 
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does not require consultation before concessions are granted - only prior to exploration and 
exploitation. At the point that a concession has been awarded, it is likely that there is 
considerable financial and political pressure to continue projects, and only minimal opportunity 
for indigenous communities to shape the planned project.69  In this arrangement, the possibility 
for an intercultural discussion on development objectives and priorities, including serious 
consideration of indigenous worldviews and alternatives for development, becomes highly 
unlikely.  
 
The background to the introduction of the Law on Prior Consultation shows both cause for 
optimism and pessimism as to its reconciliatory potential. On the one hand, legislation on prior 
consultation in Peru was introduced in the aftermath of the Baguazo violence by President 
Humala, intended as a means of improving relations between the state and indigenous 
peoples, and in recognition of the need to respect their ‘sovereign will’ in the context of a 
multinational state. On the other hand, the rhetoric around the adoption of the Law on Prior 
Consultation and its Regulation, and the meta-consultation with indigenous representatives, 
gives insight into a competing view that prior consultation is a threat to the national interest 
and the continuation of extractivist development on behalf of the population as a whole. 
Consequently, the scope of prior consultation was narrowed, and the state has maintained 
control of the process and outcome - setting out a prescriptive methodology and relatively 
short timetable through which prior consultations must occur, and excluding the need for 
consent to be obtained in the vast majority of cases. The experience of participating in the 
meta consultation was damaging to indigenous organisations’ unity and damaged trust 
between indigenous peoples and the state. The dialogue was said to operate in technical, 
legal terms and did not engage with indigenous logic and worldviews.  
 
Ultimately, where there was disagreement, the state unilaterally adopted its own preferred 
resolution that was consistent with the multiculturalist approach whilst the indigenous 
representatives considered that the new law fell beneath their interpretation of international 
standards set out in ILO C169 and in Article 32 of UNDRIP, which in their view requires 
consent to be obtained as a ‘general rule’ in the case of extractive projects on indigenous 
territories.  This leaves a large question mark over whether a Law on Prior Consultation that 
itself lacks indigenous support and ownership, is sufficient to broker reconciliation. To examine 
 
69 Servindi, ‘Perú: Observaciones a Ley de Consulta Pueden Plantear Un Quiebre En El Estado de Derecho | 
Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos – Perú’ (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 23 June 
2010) <http://derechoshumanos.pe/2010/06/peru-observaciones-a-ley-de-consulta-pueden-plantear-un-quiebre-




this question further, the next section of this chapter provides three illustrative examples to 
explore the practice of prior consultation in Peru’s mining sector.  
 
6.4  Illustrative Examples 
 
Since the 1980s, Peru has pursued a policy of economic growth based on extractivism, 
privatisation and neoliberal economic principles.70  In order to reconstruct Peru’s economy and 
society in the wake of its internal conflict71, successive Presidents have championed extraction 
of natural resources - in particular metal ores, minerals and hydrocarbons - as the foundation 
for restoring peace, tackling poverty, increasing social investment and making progress as a 
modern state. The impact of these policies on indigenous peoples have been significant - 21% 
of Peru’s land is concessioned for mining;72 over half of indigenous titled communities overlap 
with extraction concessions.73 However, such investments have not resulted in significant 
improvements to living conditions for people living close to extractive projects, and have 
increased social unrest.74  
 
Mining is the largest extractive sector in Peru,75 representing 9.4% of national GDP and 60% 
of the total value of national exports in 2018.76 Requests for mining permits cover 14.3% of 
Peru’s territory,77 and the sector has received considerable overseas investment.78 However, 
the success of the mining sector comes at a cost: the expression ‘Peru is a mining country’ is 
 
70 Roger Merino, ‘The Cynical State: Forging Extractivism, Neoliberalism and Development in Governmental 
Spaces’ (2020) 41 Third World Quarterly 58. 
71  In particular, the Shining Path Maoist movement and the Marxist-Leninist Túpac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement.  
72 ‘Indigenous Peoples in Peru’ (IWGIA - International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs) 
<https://www.iwgia.org/en/peru> accessed 9 January 2021. 
73 Barletti and Seedhouse (n 5).; ‘Indigenous Peoples in Peru’ (n 72). 
74 Peru’s public Ombudsman reported that conflicts associated with the extractive industries increased from 37 per 
month in 2007 to 139 in 2017.  Merino (n 61). 
75 Flemmer (n 1). 
76 Globally, Peru is the second largest producer of copper and one of the main producers of gold, silver, lead and 
zinc. 25° Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú and Perú, ‘Reporte Segundo Semestre 2019’ (Observatorio 
de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú 2019).; ‘Minem prevé el inicio de construcción de seis proyectos mineros durante 
el 2020’ <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/52261-minem-preve-el-inicio-de-construccion-de-seis-
proyectos-mineros-durante-el-2020> accessed 9 January 2021. 
77 ‘MEM destaca nuevo escenario de la minería peruana y las oportunidades para desarrollar proyectos de 
exploración’ (Gob.pe, 4 March 2019) <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/26191-mem-destaca-nuevo-
escenario-de-la-mineria-peruana-y-las-oportunidades-para-desarrollar-proyectos-de-exploracion> accessed 9 
January 2021.  
78 25° Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú and Perú (n 76).; ‘MEM destaca nuevo escenario de la minería 
peruana y las oportunidades para desarrollar proyectos de exploración’ (n 77). ‘The Minister of Energy and Mines, 
Francisco Ísmodes Mezzano, highlighted today at PDAC 2019, the largest mining exploration event in the world, 
that this year the construction of six new projects is expected with a global investment of US $3,441 million, and 
that between 2020 and 2021 another 9 initiatives would be executed with a global investment that exceeds US 
$11.8 billion.’ (Translation author’s own). 
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often used to justify the harmful impacts of mining on indigenous rights,79 and Peru has been 
described as ‘one of the leading producing countries of mining conflicts worldwide.’80 
According to the report of the 25th Observatory on Mining Conflicts in Peru, the state’s 
response to these conflicts has been reactive, and hampered by weak institutions, an inability 
to work in a multi-sectoral manner, and weak presence in remote areas where mining often 
occurs. Furthermore, it reports that the weakening of environmental regulations, and the 
placement of key parts of the environmental impact assessment in the hands of private 
companies, has undermined the perception of the state as a neutral actor whose concern is 
to protect the economic, social and cultural rights of the population as well as environmental 
protections.81   
 
In recognition of the threat of conflict to its social cohesion and international reputation, the 
Peruvian Government launched a multi-stakeholder process to bring government, industry 
and civil society to discuss the future direction of the mining sector.82 This resulted in the 
publication of the report  ‘Vision of Mining in Peru by 2030’ in February 2019, presenting the 
intention that mining should operate within a framework of good governance and including the 
participation of ‘all sectors and levels of government, the private sector, organized society and 
communities; ensuring intersectoral, multilevel and multi-actor coordination …. to prevent, 
manage and transform conflicts into opportunities for development and social peace.’ The 
report highlighted respect for prior consultation, in accordance with existing law, as a 
mechanism for improving participation and inclusion, and ensuring the wellbeing of the 
population. In June 2019, the President announced the formation of a new commission to 
review Peru’s 30-year-old General Mining Law, ‘to fit our reality, providing a clear legal 
framework to investors giving peace of mind and development for all’.83  
 
These recent developments obscure the initial reticence with which the mining sector viewed 
the Law on Prior Consultation. Despite the Law on Prior Consultation coming into effect in 
2012, the first mining consultations did not commence until September 2015. This was due to 
the hostile reception of consultation within the sector, and the refusal of the Ministry of Energy 
and Mines and the National Society for Mining, Petrol and Energy to implement the 
 
79 Armando Guevara Gil and Carla Linares, ‘Mineralizing the Right to Prior Consultation: From Recognition to 
Disregard of Indigenous and Peasant Rights in Peru’ (2019) 20 Global Jurist.   
80 25° Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú and Perú (n 76). 
81 Merino (n 61).; 25° Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú and Perú (n 76). 
82 ‘Peruvian Government Unveils Its 2030 Mining Vision for the Country’ (International Mining, 22 February 2019) 
<https://im-mining.com/2019/02/22/peruvian-government-unveils-2030-mining-vision-country/> accessed 9 
January 2021.; ‘Mining Vision of Peru to 2030’ (PCCC - Peruvian Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 5 April 2019) 
<https://perucanadacc.ca/es/node/61> accessed 9 January 2021. 
83  25° Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú and Perú (n 76). 4. The commission was established 15 
October 2019, in compliance with Supreme Resolution No. 190-2019-PCM. 
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consultation procedures, in particular due to objections at the inclusion of Andean peasant 
communities in the list of indigenous groups to be consulted. Meanwhile, new mining projects 
continued to be authorised.84 As of October 2020, 21 prior consultations have been completed 
in the mining sector,85 with four currently in process.86 
 
The illustrative examples that follow demonstrate how prior consultation is evolving within the 
mining sector. All three take place in Andean Quechua communities. Initially, as demonstrated 
by the Aurora and La Merced cases, the state controlled the process and there was little 
opportunity for indigenous communities to meaningfully influence the design and 
implementation of the project. The Aurora project was chosen because it was the first project 
on which prior consultation had been applied in the mining sector. The La Merced project was 
the first time that a prior consultation had proceeded to the dialogue stage with one of the 
communities concerned, but as will be seen, this did not significantly influence the impact of 
the consultation on the project.  Both these projects were subject to a report by the Public 
Ombudsman, providing a valuable critical analysis of the process in relation to its ability to 
guarantee indigenous peoples’ collective rights, by a first-hand observer of the process. By 
contrast, the case of the Tintaya Antapaccay Extension - Coroccohuayco integration brings 
the analysis up-to-date, showing how indigenous communities are leveraging domestic and 
international law to reassert their own interpretation of FPIC in line with the ‘general rule’ 
approach. In this case, indigenous people challenged the state’s control of the process and 
forced a development in the law by demanding that prior consultation happens in relation to 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), to enable the consultation to have a meaningful 
impact on the scope of the project, and that their decision to grant or withhold consent be 
respected. As such, the Coroccohuayco case study suggests that the struggle between the 
‘multiculturalist’ and ‘general rule’ approach to FPIC is continuing in the context of individual 
FPIC consultations.  
 
6.4.1 Project Aurora 
 
The first prior consultation in Peru’s mining sector took place in relation to the Aurora de Minera 
mining exploration project, with the representatives of the Quechuan campesina community 
of Parobamba in Tanatile district, in the province of Calca, Cusco region. The process was 
 
84 Flemmer (n 1). 
85 ‘Procesos Terminados’ (Ministerio de Energía y Minas) 
<http://minem.gob.pe/descripcion.php?idSector=3&idTitular=8732> accessed 9 January 2021.  
86 ‘En Proceso’ (Ministerio de Energía y Minas) 
<http://minem.gob.pe/descripcion.php?idSector=3&idTitular=8757> accessed 9 January 2021.; see also 
‘Consulta Previa’ (Ministerio de Cultura) <http://consultaprevia.cultura.gob.pe> accessed 9 January 2021. 
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overseen and evaluated by the Public Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) which is a public 
body with a constitutional mandate to (inter alia) protect the rights of indigenous peoples.87   
A preparatory meeting was held on 4th September 2015 to prepare a consultation plan.88 The 
promoting entity was declared to be MINEM and the measure to be consulted was the 
authorisation by MINEM of the start of exploration activities for Project Aurora, by the company 
Minera Focus SAC89 - thus the consultation took place after the Environmental Impact 
Assessment and scope of the project had been approved.90 The Consultation Plan identified 
that this measure may have impacts on the community’s rights to land and territories, to 
choose their own priorities for development, and to conserve their customs and institutions.91 
It set out the timetable in which all stages of the consultation would take place over a two-
month period from September to October 2015.92 The participants were to be the community 
members and representatives of MINEM, with other actors being the facilitators who would 
organise and oversee the process; interpreters; technical advisors; the Vice Ministry Of Inter-
Culturality, who were to offer advice, technical assistance and capacity-building support to 
both the MINEM and the indigenous community during the process; and the Public 
Ombudsman, to supervise public entities in the carrying out of their functions and to ensure 
that fundamental rights were respected.93  
 
In the information phase, information bulletins were provided in Spanish through the radio and 
project information was disseminated on MINEM’s website. Following this, MINEM held an 
information workshop on 4th October 2015.94 According to the Ombudsman’s report, this 
 
87 Constitución Política del Perú, Art 162. The Ombudsman’s report on the Aurora project states that the 
Ombudsman’s role in this context is to supervise public bodies’ conduct of prior consultation, acting as a critical 
observer, providing recommendations and urging corrective measures as necessary to guarantee the right to prior 
consultation. It can make recommendations verbally during the consultation itself, as well as after the event in 
writing. See ‘Evaluación de La Etapa Informativa Del Proceso de Consulta Previa al Proyecto de Exploración 
Minera Aurora’ (Defensoria del Pueblo 2016) Informe No 001-2016-DP/AMASPPI-PPI 
<https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Informe-N-001-A-2016-DP-AMASPPI-PPI-
Aurora.pdf>.  
88 ‘Plan de Consulta Proyecto de Exploración Minera Aurora’ (Ministerio de Energía y Minas 2015) 
<http://minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Consulta%20previa%20-
%20mineria/1_%20Exploracion%20Aurora%20-%20Minera%20Focus%20SAC/1%20-
%20Etapa%20de%20Publicidad/3%20-%20Plan%20de%20Consulta.pdf> accessed 10 January 2021.   
89 Ministerio de Energía y Minas, ‘Resumen de Proyecto Exploracion Aurora’ 
<http://minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Consulta%20previa%20-
%20mineria/1_%20Exploracion%20Aurora%20-%20Minera%20Focus%20SAC/1%20-
%20Etapa%20de%20Publicidad/4%20-%20Proyecto%20de%20Medida%20Administrativa.pdf> accessed 17 
January 2021. 
90 ibid. See also Cooperacción, ‘¿Primera Consulta Previa En Minería? - CooperAcción’ (CooperAcción, 10 
September 2015) <http://cooperaccion.org.pe/primera-consulta-previa-en-mineria/> accessed 10 January 2021.  
91 ‘Plan de Consulta Proyecto de Exploración Minera Aurora’ (n 88). Annex 3.  
92 ibid. Annex 4.  
93 ibid. para 5.  
94 ‘Proyecto de Exploracion Minera “Aurora”: Informe Final de Consulta Previa’ (Ministerio de Energía y Minas 
2015) Expediente No 2437480 <http://minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Consulta%20previa%20-
%20mineria/1_%20Exploracion%20Aurora%20-%20Minera%20Focus%20SAC/4%20-%20Decision/2%20-
%20Informe%20Final%20del%20Proceso%20de%20Consulta%20Previa.pdf> accessed 10 January 2021. para 4 
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meeting was planned to coincide with the communal assembly which took part on the first 
Sunday of every month, and there was a good turn-out including women and older people.95  
At the community’s request MINEM had agreed to include older school children, in accordance 
with the community’s customs, and an interpreter was provided to translate into Quechua.96 
The Ombudsman reported that in the first part of the workshop, MINEM gave an explanation 
of mining exploration, the concept of an administrative measure for the purposes of 
consultation, the collective rights of indigenous or native communities, and how exploration  
could affect them.  Following this, the participants formed small groups of around 20, to answer 
the questions ‘What are the advantages and disadvantages of mining? What are the 
development priorities of the Parobamba community? And what collective rights of the 
community can be affected?’. At the end, a plenary was held which was intended to provide 
an opportunity for each group to ask questions, raise concerns, and receive a response.  
 
On the basis of its participation in the information stage meeting, the Ombudsman criticised 
the consultation on many grounds, which indicated the process failed to provide adequate 
information to the community and did not live up to the requirements of providing a good faith, 
intercultural dialogue. It commented that there was a lack of technical support for the 
indigenous community,  and reported that information about the project was not presented in 
a clear and graphical way,97 nor were the precise locations of project activities mapped to help 
the community evaluate the implications of the project on their rights and way of life.98 The 
Ombudsman noted that the lack of technical support was particularly evident in the small group 
discussion stage, when it also became apparent that those who were mainly Quechua-
speaking did not understand the information they had heard. This failure especially 
marginalised women and the elderly, preventing them from participating in the discussion.99   
 
The Ombudsman also criticised the quality of the dialogue. On a basic level, the language 
used was technical rather than straightforward and easily comprehensible.100 It also noted that 
the official translator (who was accredited by MINCU) was frustrated in his duties, as MINEM 
officials prevented him from translating questions from the Quechuan-speaking attendees in 
 
and ‘Acta Del Taller Informativo Comunidad Campesina de Parobamba: Proyecto de Exploración Minera Aurora’ 
(Comunidad Campesina de Parobamba 2015) <http://minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Consulta%20previa%20-
%20mineria/1_%20Exploracion%20Aurora%20-
%20Minera%20Focus%20SAC/2%20_%20Etapa%20Informativa/1%20-%20Taller%20Informativo.pdf> accessed 
10 January 2021.  
95 ‘Evaluación de La Etapa Informativa Del Proceso de Consulta Previa al Proyecto de Exploración Minera Aurora’ 
(n 87). 2.  
96 ibid., 3.  
97 ibid., para 3.1. 
98 ibid., para 3.5. 
99 ibid. para 3.3. 
100 ibid. para 3.2. 
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the final plenary session, so that their concerns were not heard. The Ombudsman commented 
in this regard, ‘this bad practice is a sign of lack of interest of the MINEM to understand the 
concerns of the indigenous population in relation to mining activity and a demonstration of lack 
of empathy of this entity towards this population.’101 The report also highlighted that even when 
questions were asked, they did not always get a response - for example, in relation to the 
location of access routes and exploration activities,102  and that there was no feedback process 
to evaluate the community’s understanding of the information provided.103 The Ombudsman 
drew attention to a lack of impartiality on the part of the facilitator, who was criticised for 
speaking in a biased way which stressed the benefits to the community whilst downplaying 
the impacts of the proposed exploration activities in contravention on MINCU guidelines.104 
Similarly, in its presentation about the project, MINEM were said to have downplayed the 
possible impacts as ‘small’ and ‘not significant’.105 The Ombudsman’s report also criticises 
MINEM officials for not enabling the four MINCU officials in attendance to fulfil their duties to 
support the consultation so that a meaningful intercultural dialogue could be achieved.106  
 
The consultation process resulted in the community providing its consent to the exploration at 
the information stage.107 Whilst this appears to be encouraging, it could be argued that the 
agreement of the community under such circumstances does not in fact, constitute FPIC. As 
discussed above, there were concerns that the information was incomplete, not fully 
translated, not supported by technical assistance for the community and was provided in a 
biased manner that was intended to diminish negative impacts and emphasise positive 
benefits. Thus the consent cannot be said to be fully informed. Furthermore, the consultation 
was carried out at a late stage, after the EIA had already been approved. It is therefore not 
given prior to significant decisions being made that would materially affect the impacts of the 
project. By presenting projects almost as a fait accompli, the state vastly reduced the 
community’s viable alternatives to granting consent, which also calls into question how free 
the decision really was. Furthermore, the outcome agreement of the prior consultation did not 
demonstrate that the dialogue had any meaningful impact on the project. Rather, the content 
of the agreement was generic, restating existing legal obligations of the government and the 
mining company rather than including community-specific agreements to mitigate harm to their 
 
101 ibid. para 3.8. 
102 ibid. para 3.6. 
103 ibid. para 3.9. 
104 ibid. para 3.7. 
105  Statement by lawyer Maritza León of the General Directorate of Mining Environmental Affairs at the public 
meeting, see ibid. para 3.4. 
106 ibid. 3.10.  
107 ‘Proyecto de Exploracion Minera “Aurora”: Informe Final de Consulta Previa’ (n 94). para 6.2a  
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way of life or providing the community with benefits or compensation.108 Consequently, the 
criticisms of those who suggest that Peru’s implementation of FPIC amounts to a ‘rubber 
stamping exercise’,109 seem to have resonance in this case.  
 
6.4.2 La Merced 
 
The second case study concerns exploration activities at the La Merced mining project, which 
the state considered would impact the Quechua campesina communities of Quilla Ayllu and 
Llactun-Aija in the district of Huacllan, in the Aija province of Ancash. This was the first prior 
consultation in the mining sector to proceed to the dialogue stage. It shows that whilst MINEM 
had responded to a few of the critiques in the Ombudsman’s report on the Project Aurora 
consultation, the consultation process still remained deeply flawed.  
 
According to the consultation plan, the measure to be consulted was the authorisation by 
MINEM of the commencement of mining exploration activities of the ‘La Merced -Phase 1’ 
project by the company Minera Barrick Misquichilca S.A.110 The Ombudsman’s report criticised 
this decision, stating that the start of exploration activities is not the ideal measure to be 
consulted, because at that stage of a mining project the EIA and the various authorisations 
required have already been completed. As a result, it is effectively impossible for the 
consultation to modify aspects of the project that impact on collective rights. Consequently, in 
the Ombudsman’s view, it is proper for the prior consultation to take place during the EIA 
process.111   
 
The project was considered to potentially affect the rights of the Quechuan communities to 
their land and territory, to choose their own priorities for development, and to conserve their 
 
108 ibid. para 6.2b. It noted that the community agreed for the Ministry of Energy and Mines to authorise the 
exploration activities on condition that a) the activities should respect the environment and the community’s 
collective rights; b) the company fulfills its commitments in the environmental impact study, as well as undefined 
‘social’ commitments; c) the state complies with its duty to supervise and control the activities of the mining 
company; d) the community will be continuously informed about the exploration activities.  
109 Cathal Doyle, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences of Resistance, Participation and Autonomy: Consultation and 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent in Peru’ in Claire Wright and Alexandra Tomaselli (eds), The Prior Consultation 
of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America: Inside the Implementation Gap (Routledge 2019). 69. 




%20Proyecto%20de%20Medida%20Administrativa.pdf> accessed 10 January 2021. 
111 ‘Sobre El Proceso de Consulta Previa Del Proyecto de Exploración Minera La Merced’ (Defensoria del Pueblo 
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customs and institutions.112 The consultation was to take place between MINEM, on the one 
hand, and the communities of Quilla Ayllu and Llactun-Aija, on the other. Other parties 
involved were the facilitator, interpreters and technical advisors, as well as the Viceministry of 
Interculturality in an advisory capacity.113 The publicity stage was to take place on 11 May 
2016, with posters, a municipal radio announcement, and publication of information on 
MINEM’s website, and the information and internal evaluation were to take place on the same 
day - 11th June for the Quilla Ayllu community, and 12th June for Llactun-Aija. The dialogue 
stage was programmed to take place on 14 June 2016. 
 
In evaluating the information stage, the Public Ombudsman noted improvements in the 
simplicity of the language used and audiovisual support material used to convey information. 
However, many of the flaws of the Project Aurora consultation were repeated. The information 
was only partly translated into Quechua. This strategy was apparently approved by male 
members of the community, but had the result of again marginalising those who did not have 
proficient Spanish, who were mainly women. Additionally, the consultation did not include a 
mapping exercise to compare the location of mining activities with the community’s own use 
of the land. MINEM did not implement the Ombudsman’s recommendation to use evaluation 
tools to assess whether the information provided had been understood by the community. 
Again, the lack of neutrality displayed by the facilitator was cited as a cause for concern.114    
 
The Ombudsman also noted that the internal evaluation stage took place on the same day as 
the information stage, which did not give the community adequate time to reflect on the 
information they had received, highlighting that Article 13 of the Law of Prior Consultation and 
Article 19 of the Regulations permits up to 30 days between the two stages. Consequently, it 
recommended that future consultations should allow adequate time for reflection and 
deliberation.  The Ombudsman also noted that the minutes of the internal evaluation meeting 
bore a striking resemblance to the other consultations that had been completed previously, 
suggesting that a formulaic approach was being taken which did not allow for specific concerns 
of different communities to be addressed.115  
 
 




%20Plan%20de%20Consulta.pdf> accessed 10 January 2021. Annex 2. 
113 ibid. s4 and s5. 
114 ‘Sobre El Proceso de Consulta Previa Del Proyecto de Exploración Minera La Merced’ (n 111). s3. 
115  ibid. s4. 
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The Ombudsman observed that the information meeting on 12th June 2016 was attended both 
by non-indigenous people who raised concerns that were not related to the collective rights of 
indigenous people, and by representatives of the concession company, Minera Barrick 
Misquichilca S.A., who filmed the informative workshop and took pictures of the minutes of the 
internal evaluation assembly. This involvement contradicted Article 30 of the Law on Prior 
Consultation and Article 12 of the Regulations, which allow the participation of third parties 
only to provide information at the request of the state or the indigenous community 
concerned.116 The Quilla Ayllu expressed their agreement following the internal evaluation 
stage,117 but the Llactun-Aija community continued to the dialogue stage. However, the 
Ombudsman highlighted that the various concerns raised by the Llactun-Aija community, for 
example relating to community health and education, should have been grounds for including 
them in the dialogue as well.118   
 
In any event, the Ombudsman’s report casts doubt on the usefulness of the dialogue with the 
Llactun-Aija community, because the resulting accords were preoccupied with enforcing the 
legal duties of the state and the mining company, rather than mitigating impacts, safeguarding 
collective rights to natural resources, and enabling compensation or community benefits.119 
Similar to the Aurora case, the resulting agreements with both communities reiterated the legal 
obligations of MINEM in relation to the project rather than addressing the specific context of 
the Le Merced project and enabling the community to address their own priorities for 
development. In addition, both communities required that the mining company comply with a 
labour agreement already signed with the communities, and must conduct guided visits of the 
mine site as well as training in environmental monitoring for the community, to allow them to 
monitor the project.120 Following the dialogue stage, the community of Llactun-Aija additionally 
stipulated that MINEM is required to provide a copy of the environmental impact assessment 
to the community; and to transfer complaints to the Agency of Environmental Assessment and 
Control (as well as to the Ministry of Culture and the Public Ombudsman, both of which are 
existing obligations on the state).121 Thus the dialogue stage did not result in agreements which 
 
116  ibid. s3. 
117 ‘Informe Final de Consulta Previa Sobre El Proyecto de Exploración LA MERCED’ (Ministerio de Energía y 




%20Informe%20Final%20de%20CP.pdf> accessed 10 January 2021. s6.2.   
118 Reglamento de le Ley No 29785., Art 19.2. This last rule states that when the representatives of the indigenous 
people consulted submit modifications, contributions or proposals, the dialogue stage should be initiated 
119 ‘Sobre El Proceso de Consulta Previa Del Proyecto de Exploración Minera La Merced’ (n 111). s5.  
120 ‘Informe Final de Consulta Previa Sobre El Proyecto de Exploración LA MERCED’ (n 117). s6.2b. 
121  Ana Leyva, ‘CONSÚLTAME DE VERDAD:  APROXIMACIÓN A UN BALANCE SOBRE CONSULTA PREVIA 
EN EL PERÚ EN LOS SECTORES MINERO E HIDROCARBURÍFERO’ (Oxfam America Inc and CooperAcción 
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altered the project in any meaningful way, to mitigate its impacts on the community or respond 
to requests that were made during the dialogue for education, health and other social 
support.122  
 
The La Merced consultation has marked similarities with Project Aurora, again calling into 
question whether indigenous peoples are adequately informed about proposed projects in the 
course of consultations. Once again, the consultation took place at a late stage, when there 
was very little scope for negotiating changes to mitigate the impact on indigenous rights and 
interests. Although the state took on board some of the Ombudsman’s previous suggestions, 
the absence of a mapping exercise or the use of tools to evaluate what the community had 
gleaned from the information presented calls into question the extent of the state’s 
commitment to a meaningful dialogue.  
 
6.4.3 Tintaya - Antapaccay Extension - Coroccohuayco Integration 
 
The final Peruvian case study concerns the extension of the Tintaya - Antapaccay copper 
mine in Espinar province, Cusco. Unlike the other illustrative examples, which were in relation 
to new mines, the communities concerned were experienced in the impacts of mining on their 
lands. Another key difference is that in the case of Coroccohuayco, the prior consultation 
process has been instigated as a result of community activism. This case demonstrates how 
some indigenous communities are rejecting the formulaic approach described in the Aurora 
and La Merced consultations. Instead, the communities in Espinar are utilising domestic and 
international norms to demand that prior consultation gives them a meaningful role in the 
design of mining projects on their land.  
 
The Tintaya mine opened in 1985, and a further mine site at Antapaccay was opened in 2012, 
utilising the same infrastructure. The proposed US $590 million investment involves the 
construction of a new open pit mine, as well as underground mining in communities that have 
not been impacted by mining in the past, and would require the purchase of community lands, 
resulting in the loss of community facilities and infrastructure.123  The history of mining at 
Tintaya has been dominated by poor relations with local communities, with disputes arising 
 
2018) <https://oi-files-cng-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/peru.oxfam.org/s3fs-
public/file_attachments/17072%20Consultame%20la%20verdad%20web.pdf> accessed 10 January 2021. 
122 ‘Sobre El Proceso de Consulta Previa Del Proyecto de Exploración Minera La Merced’ (n 111). s5.  
123 EJOLT, ‘Glencore in Tintaya Copper Mine in Espinar, Perú | EJAtlas’ (Environmental Justice Atlas) 
<https://ejatlas.org/conflict/tintaya-espinar-peru> accessed 16 October 2020.  These unresolved conflicts have 
been the subject of legal action against the mining companies in respect of injury by police security forces, damage 
to human health and the environment, and communities have also submitted complaints to the UN Special 
Rapporteur for the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation and the UN Working Group on human rights 
and transnational corporations. At times, violent and deadly force has been used by the police to subdue protest. 
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on compensation for land, development opportunities, the unresolved issue of toxic heavy 
metal contamination in humans, animals and the water system. Protests have been met with 
violence at the hands of police security forces, resulting in the deaths of three protesters in 
2012.124   
 
In 2018, the current owner of the Tintaya-Antapaccay mine, Glencore, applied to extend 
mining operations to a new site at Coroccohuayco. MINEM treated this application as a 
modification to the EIA for the Antipaccay mine, which had been agreed in 2010, and therefore 
exempt from prior consultation because it was not a new project. The 13 local communities 
and the Public Ombudsman disagreed with this approach, and called for a right to prior 
consultation in relation to the modification of the EIA (mEIA).125 In September 2018, local 
communities formally requested that the National Environmental Certification Service for 
Sustainable Investments (SENACE)126 undertake a prior consultation on the mEIA. SENACE 
responded that they were not legally required to undertake a prior consultation as part of the 
impact assessment process, and that MINEM bore the duty to consult prior to authorisation of 
the mining activities. SENACE’s decision was referred to the Vice-Ministry of Interculturality of 
the Ministry of Culture, who refused to consider the issue because the community had 
submitted their appeal after the 15-day statutory time frame.127 The mEIA went ahead, without 
any consultation on the baseline data - one of the most contentious issues, given the previous 
contamination of the site. According to NGO the Peru Support Group, the process of 
undertaking the mEIA was characterised by poor communication. Workshops held by 
Glencore on 17 and 18 October 2017 were not well attended by the communities, despite their 
fears that the project may require indigenous communities to relocate.128  
 
 
124  In 2011, a law suit was filed against Xtrata in relation to the contamination, which Xtrata claimed was due to 
the natural ‘mineralisation’ of the area. Xtrata contracted with Peru’s police force to provide security at the mines, 
and in 2012 protests were violently suppressed, resulting in the deaths of 3 protestors and a further case being 
filed in London against Xtrata. The case was eventually thrown out as the court decided that it was time-barred 
under Peruvian law. Vilca & Ors v Xstrata Ltd & Anor [2018] EWHC 27 (QB). See also ‘UK Mining Firm in Court 
over Claims It Mistreated Environmental Activists’ (the Guardian, 31 October 2017) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/oct/31/uk-mining-firm-in-court-over-claims-it-mistreated-
environmental-activists> accessed 11 January 2021.; ‘Vilca & Ors v Xstrata Limited and Compania Minera 
Antapaccay SA’ (Blackstone Chambers) <https://www.blackstonechambers.com/news/vilca-ors-v-xstrata-limited-
and-compania-minera-antapaccay-sa/> accessed 11 January 2021.  
125 Peru Support Group, ‘Espinar: The Opportunity for Serious Community Consultation?’ (Peru Support Group, 30 
November 2019) <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2019/11/espinar-the-opportunity-for-serious-community-
consultation/> accessed 11 January 2021.  
126 ‘Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones Sostenibles - Senace’ 
<https://www.gob.pe/senace> accessed 11 January 2021. Senace is the government body responsible for 
evaluation of environmental impacts of complex investment projects.  
127 Resolución Viceministerial Nro 011-2019-VMI-MC 2019.   
128 Oct 21 and 2017 | Mining, ‘Mining: Unconvincing Efforts at Consultation in Espinar’ (Peru Support Group, 21 
October 2017) <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2017/10/mining-unconvincing-efforts-at-consultation-in-espinar/> 
accessed 11 January 2021.  
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The dispute over the mEIA took place in a changing political context. In March 2018, President 
Vizcarro was sworn into office on a pledge to restore public confidence in political institutions 
in the wake of corruption scandals involving former presidents.129 Under Vizcarro, there is a 
new emphasis on government officials taking the time to visit communities,130 and of ‘dialogue 
to find shared solutions for the development of citizens’ of Peru,131 and a new government 
policy that “where there is wealth in the subsoil, there must be well-being on the surface”. In 
addition to setting aside considerable sums for remediating environmental liabilities,132 in 
September 2019 the Minister for Energy and Mines announced a review of mining regulations 
to provide a ‘comprehensive regulatory framework… to strengthen the competitiveness and 
sustainability of the sector.’133 On 29 April 2019, senior government ministers, including the 
Minister for Energy and Mines, Francisco Ísmodes Mezzano, met with community leaders and 
agreed to a process to identify the indigenous communities who were impacted by the mine, 
with a view to their consultation.134 In addition, four dialogue tables were established, to 
address community concerns regarding infrastructure, health and those affected by toxic 
metals, changes to the Framework Agreement and impacts of the mining corridor.135  
 
On 24 July 2019, the peasant communities Huano Huano, Pacopata and Ruiri Coroccohuayo 
submitted a complaint to the Ombudsman, regarding the actions of the Compania Minera 
Antapaccay S.A. (owned by Glencore plc)136 and SENACE in relation to the mEIA. The 
Ombudsman’s report of 15 August 2019 unequivocally concludes that SENACE, as a 
government body, is bound by the Law on Prior Consultation to carry out prior consultations 
 
129 ‘Peru in Turmoil after President Vizcarra Dissolves Congress’ BBC News (1 October 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49888117> accessed 11 January 2021.  
130 Ministerio de Energía y Minas, ‘Ministro Ísmodes se reunió con comunidades de Espinar para abordar temas 
de consulta previa’ (Gob.pe, 28 June 2019) <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/45193-ministro-
ismodes-se-reunio-con-comunidades-de-espinar-para-abordar-temas-de-consulta-previa> accessed 11 January 
2021.; ‘Ejecutivo Dialogó Con 13 Comunidades de Espinar Sobre Mecanismo de Consulta Previa’ (Agencia 
Peruana de Noticias Andina, 27 August 2019) <https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-ejecutivo-dialogo-13-
comunidades-espinar-sobre-mecanismo-consulta-previa-764845.aspx> accessed 11 January 2021.  
131 ‘Ejecutivo Dialogó Con 13 Comunidades de Espinar Sobre Mecanismo de Consulta Previa’ (n 130). See also 
Ministerio de Energía y Minas, ‘Ministros de Energía y Minas y de Cultura visitaron comunidades originarias de 
Espinar’ (Gob.pe, 9 September 2019) <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/50656-ministros-de-
energia-y-minas-y-de-cultura-visitaron-comunidades-originarias-de-espinar> accessed 11 January 2021.  
132 Statements by Minister of MEM in meeting with communities on 29 April 2019  Ministerio de Energía y Minas, 
‘MEM acuerda empezar labor de avanzada de identificación de pueblos indígenas para proyecto Coroccohuayco’ 
(Gob.pe, 29 April 2019) <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/27948-mem-acuerda-empezar-labor-de-
avanzada-de-identificacion-de-pueblos-indigenas-para-proyecto-coroccohuayco> accessed 11 January 2021.  
133 Ministerio de Energía y Minas, ‘Minem: Inversión en minería alcanzó los US$ 3,011 millones entre enero y julio’ 
(Gob.pe, 4 September 2019) <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/50483-minem-inversion-en-mineria-
alcanzo-los-us-3-011-millones-entre-enero-y-julio> accessed 11 January 2021.  
134  
135  ‘Espinar: comunidades retoman el diálogo con el Estado sobre la consulta previa’ (Observatorio de Conflictos 
Mineros en el Perú, 29 April 2019) <http://conflictosmineros.org.pe/2019/04/29/espinar-comunidades-retoman-el-
dialogo-con-el-estado-sobre-la-consulta-previa/> accessed 20 November 2020.  
136 ‘Major Mines & Projects | Antapaccay Mine’ <https://miningdataonline.com/property/139/Antapaccay-
Mine.aspx> accessed 11 January 2021.   
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on any administrative measure which directly impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights, and 
further pronounces that in order for consultation to be effective, it must occur at the time of the 
EIA, when the impacts on the community can be understood and appropriate mitigation 
measures agreed.137 The Ombudsman recommended that SENACE, the Ministry of the 
Environment, MINEM and the Viceministry of Interculturality all take steps to ensure that prior 
consultation is carried out prior to the approval of the EIA, and further recommended that no 
further activity be taken in relation to the Coroccohuayco project, until SENACE had 
determined whether the approval of the mEIA would impact on the legal rights of indigenous 
peoples so that a prior consultation could be carried out if that was the case.138 
 
Following the publication of the Ombudsman’s report, negotiations took place between senior 
government ministers and community leaders to secure a consultation process.139  The 
indigenous communities demanded that the prior consultation process comply with 
international standards set out in ILO C169 and Article 32.2 of UNDRIP.140 However, mining 
activities on site continued and agreements with the communities were breached.141  
 
The communities instigated an indefinite strike on 12 November 2019 to disrupt Glencore’s 
activities, and a week later a meeting was held comprised of the prime minister, Vicente 
Zeballos, and a number of vice-ministers, the Cuzco regional governor, local mayors and 
representatives of the 13 communities, resulting in agreement to hold a prior consultation.142 
However, hopes for a meaningful consultation on the mEIA were dashed when SENACE 
 
137  ‘El Derecho a La Consulta Previa y La Modificatoria Del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Del Proyecto Minero 
Antapaccay - Expansión Tintaya - Integración Coroccohuayco’ (Defensoria del Pueblo 2019) Informe No 001-2019-
DP-AMASPPI-PPI. The Ombudsman asserted that SENACE’s position, that the appropriate time for consultation 
was at the point of authorisation of the project, in accordance with MINEM’s regulations, contravened the principle 
of ‘prior’ consent because the approval of an EIA itself would impact on the legal position of indigenous peoples, 
and because the authorisation of exploration or exploitation would preclude indigenous peoples from effectively 
influencing the design of the mining project and relevant measures to prevent, mitigate or control social and 
environmental impacts. Consequently, it found that SENACE’s position failed to respect indigenous peoples’ right 
to prior consultation.  
138 ibid. 
139 On 27 August 2019 community leaders met with senior government ministers and vice ministers to request that 
any consultation take place in accordance with the norms of ILO C169, and agreed that MINEM and SENACE 
would monitor the mining activities and verify compliance with environmental regulations.  Follow-up visits were 
made by the Ministers of Energy and Mines, and the Vice-Minister of Interculturality, as well as representatives of 
other government departments, throughout September to better understand the concerns of community members. 
‘Espinar: comunidades retoman el diálogo con el Estado sobre la consulta previa’ (n 135).  
140 Asamblea Multicomunal por la Consulta Previa en Espinar, ‘NUESTROS DERECHOS ANTE TODO. SIN 
LUCHAS NO HABRA VICTORIAS’ (Facebook, 30 January 2020) 
<https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=791165354729095&id=588097581702541> accessed 11 
January 2021.  
141  Fourteen human rights NGOs issued a public letter on 26 November arguing for the need to seize this 
opportunity and take forward a meaningful consultation. ‘Espinar: tras medidas de fuerza de comunidades primer 
ministro Zeballos acepta diálogo’ (Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú, 14 November 2019) 
<http://conflictosmineros.org.pe/2019/11/14/espinar-ministro-zeballos-acepta-dialogo-tras-paro-en-el-corredor-
minero/> accessed 11 January 2021.  
142  Peru Support Group (n 125).  
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approved the mEIA on 17 December 2019,  just two days before the first preparatory meeting 
on a prior consultation process for the project was due to be held.143 As a result of SENACE’s 
approval of the mEIA, there was no immediate administrative measure to consult, so a new 
Ministerial Resolution modified the Unique Text of Administrative Procedures of MINEM to 
enable prior consultation to take place in a wide window of opportunity between the ‘admission 
to process of the EIA’ up to the authorisation of activities.144 As a result of this Resolution, prior 
consultation is now required for the granting or modification of concessions, the authorisation 
of the start of exploration or exploitation activities, and for the granting or modification of the 
mining transport concession. Only one prior consultation has to take place per project, rather 
than there being a requirement for separate prior consultations on the granting of the 
concession and for commencement of activities in relation to a single project. 
 
On 19th December 2019, the first preparatory meeting for a prior consultation on the 
Coroccohuayco project took place between MINEM leadership and the local communities.145 
According to the Multicommunal Assembly for the Prior Consultation in Espinar, talks were 
suspended in January because MINEM officials refused to include community proposals in 
the plan.146 However, dialogue resumed and the prior consultation plan was agreed on 14th 
February 2020,147  despite protests from five other communities who demanded to be included 
in the consultation, but who were not considered by the state to be directly affected by the 
project.148 Significantly, the consultation plan provides for a four week interval between the 
 
143  Cooperacción, ‘¿Estamos Ante Un Acto de Mala Fe Del Gobierno En El Caso Coroccohuayco? - CooperAcción’ 
(CooperAcción, 23 December 2019) <http://cooperaccion.org.pe/estamos-ante-un-acto-de-mala-fe-del-gobierno-
en-el-caso-coroccohuayco/> accessed 16 December 2020.  
144  Resolución Ministerial No 403-2019-MINEM/DM 2019.   
145 The meeting held on Thursday 19 December was attended by the provincial mayor of Espinar, Lolo Arenas; 
representatives of the 13 original communities of Huano, Pacopata, Huini Coroccohuayco, Alto Huancané, 
Huancané Bajo, Tintaya Marquiri, Alto Huarca, Cala, Huarca, Huisa Ccollana, Huisa, Anta Ccollana and Suero 
Cama, as well as officials of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Culture. Ministerio de 
Energía y Minas, ‘Minem avanza en la implementación de la Consulta Previa del proyecto Integración 
Coroccohuayco’ (Gob.pe, 20 December 2019) <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/71244-minem-
avanza-en-la-implementacion-de-la-consulta-previa-del-proyecto-integracion-coroccohuayco> accessed 11 
January 2021.   
146 Asamblea Multicomunal por la Consulta Previa en Espinar, ‘COMUNIDADES ORIGINARIAS DE ESPINAR 
RETOMAN DIALOGO CON EL ESTADO PARA IMPLEMENTACION DE CONSULTA PREVIA’ (Facebook, 12 
February 2020) 
<https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=800278540484443&id=588097581702541> accessed 11 
January 2021.  
147 The communities concerned are Tintaya Marquiri, Huano, Alto Huancané, Huancané Bajo, Alto Huarca, Cala, 
Suero y Cama, Huarca, Huisa Ccollana, Huisa and Anta Ccollana. Jean Pierre Fernandez, ‘Integración 
Coroccohuayco: Minem entregó plan de consulta previa a comunidades de Espinar’ (Revista Energiminas, 14 
February 2020) <https://energiminas.com/integracion-coroccohuayco-minem-entrego-plan-de-consulta-previa-a-
comunidades-de-espinar/> accessed 11 January 2021. 
148 ‘Espinar: crece tensión por aprobación de proyecto Coroccohuayco’ (Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el 
Perú, 21 January 2020) <http://conflictosmineros.org.pe/2020/01/21/espinar-crece-tension-por-aprobacion-de-
proyecto-coroccohuayco/> accessed 12 January 2021.; ‘Distritos de Espinar en paro frente a proyecto 
Coroccohuayco’ (Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú, 3 February 2020) 
<http://conflictosmineros.org.pe/2020/02/03/distritos-de-espinar-en-paro-frente-a-proyecto-coroccohuayco/> 
accessed 12 January 2021.; ‘Espinar: se inicia mesa de diálogo luego del paro por el proyecto Coroccohuayco’ 
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information and internal evaluation stages; and incorporates a six-page document of 
proposals from the community. This document recognises that prior consultation is carried out 
in defence of rights of indigenous peoples that are recognised in ILO C169 and UNDRIP, and 
should be carried out in accordance with these standards in addition to the domestic legal 
framework. Article 32.2. of UNDRIP was specifically cited in the indigenous communities’ 
proposals.149 The Multicommunal Assembly announced on the day that the Consultation Plan 
was agreed that the consultation process ‘will be a space for the defence of our rights, through 
which agreements must be reached and the consent of the communities obtained’, reflecting 
a reading of FPIC as requiring consent, in line with the ‘general rule’ interpretation of UNDRIP 
Article 32.2.  However, the Consultation Plan itself supports a multiculturalist reading of FPIC, 
leaving the final decision to the promoting state entity and requiring only an evaluation of 
indigenous points of view, suggestions and recommendations, and of the impact of the project 
on their rights.150 Consistent with the Law on Prior Consultation and the multiculturalist 
approach, the state views FPIC as the objective of the consultation, that guarantees 
participation but does not require consent in order to proceed.151  
 
Unfortunately, in March 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic forced the consultation process to be 
suspended after the first two communities had conducted their information stage meetings.152 
Disagreements over whether to use money from the mining Framework Agreement to support 
the Espinar communities’ health needs during the pandemic led to strike action from 15th July 
to 7 August 2020 accompanied by forcible responses in which protestors were reportedly shot 
by police.153 On 8th August Minister of Energy and Mines visited Espinar and negotiated a 
 
(Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en el Perú, 4 February 2020) 
<http://conflictosmineros.org.pe/2020/02/04/espinar-se-inicia-mesa-de-dialogo-luego-del-paro-por-el-proyecto-
coroccohuayco/> accessed 12 January 2021. 
149 Ministerio de Energía y Minas, ‘Plan de Consulta Proyecto Minero “Antapaccay Expansión Tintaya - Integracion 
Coroccohuayco”’ (Ministerio de Energía y Minas 2020) 
<http://minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Consulta%20previa%20-
%20mineria/En%20Proceso/4%20Coroccohuayco/Plan%20de%20Consulta.pdf> accessed 18 January 2020. See 
Annex 1 Propuestas de las comunidades originarias para ser incorporadas al plan de consulta previa del proyecto 
antapaccay - expansión Tintaya - integracion coroccohuayco, particularly s1 and 2.  In support of their demands, 
the communities’ proposals highlight  ILO C169 articles  6.1a, 6.2,15.2 & 7.2 and the Declaration, particularly 
articles 32.2 and 32.3, 7.3, 20.1, and 23.  
150 ibid. s9.7. 
151 ibid. s5. 
152 Although the Minister of Economy suggested that consultations could be carried out virtually, this suggestion 
was roundly opposed by indigenous groups - stating that most communities do not have internet access and priority 
should be given to responding to urgent health, social and economic needs of the communities during the 
pandemic, ojopublico, ‘Hay 13 Proyectos Extractivos En Territorios Indígenas Pendientes de Consulta Previa’ (Ojo 
Público, 11 July 2020) <https://ojo-publico.com/1953/hay-13-proyectos-extractivos-pendientes-de-consulta-
previa> accessed 16 October 2020.; Red Muqui, ‘La virtualización por encima de la interculturalidad en la consulta 
previa en proyecto minero de Espinar’ (Red Muqui, 9 July 2020) <https://muqui.org/noticias/la-virtualizacion-por-
encima-de-la-interculturalidad-en-la-consulta-previa-en-proyecto-minero-de-espinar/> accessed 16 October 2020. 
153 ‘Cusco: heridos por conflicto en Espinar esperan investigaciones sobre actos de represión’ (Observatorio de 
Conflictos Mineros en el Perú, 1 August 2020) <http://conflictosmineros.org.pe/2020/08/01/cusco-heridos-por-
conflicto-en-espinar-esperan-investigaciones-sobre-actos-de-represion/> accessed 12 January 2021. 
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short term agreement that Glencore would provide vouchers for food, medicine, protective 
equipment, education and other urgent needs, with further discussions taking place in 
September 2020.154 However, throughout the pandemic mining activities continued at the site, 
in the face of protests by the communities and with the presence of police security forces.155  
 
Between November 9 and 26 2020, information stage meetings took place in each of the 
communities. The records of these meetings indicate a similar form in each one: they 
consisted of an explanation of the stages of consultation by a representative of the Ministry of 
Culture; a presentation by a ‘specialist’ from the Direción General de Minería on the measure 
to be consulted; followed by questions and answers. Afterwards, the Direción General de 
Asuntos Ambientales Mineros provided an explanation of the legal aspects of environmental 
management for mining projects. Finally, specialists from the Oficina General de Gestion 
Social about the possible impacts on collective rights. A Quechuan interpreter was in 
attendance from the Ministry of Culture. The record from some of the communities156 indicates 
that the state delegations left behind a DVD with explanations of the project, as well as two 
maps, and a manual of prior consultation and associated laws. At the end of the meeting, the 
MINEM facilitator read out a meeting record, which was signed by attendees. The form of 
these meeting records uses standardised wording which is adapted for each community. 
Whilst it is perhaps to be expected that in an information meeting, the state representatives 
would dominate the agenda, it is noteworthy that the state representatives were the only ones 
recorded to have spoken at the meeting, and are able, over seven hours, to describe the 
process of the consultation, the collective rights in question, and the project with reference to 
the state’s interpretation of prior consultation and the laws of Peru.157  
 
 
154 Aug 8, 2020 | Human Rights and Mining, ‘New Mines Minister Achieves Breakthrough in Espinar’ (Peru Support 
Group, 8 August 2020) <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2020/08/new-mines-minister-achieves-breakthrough-in-
espinar/> accessed 16 October 2020. ‘A LA OPINIÓN PÚBLICA DE LA PROVINCIA DE ESPINAR’ 
<https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/302461-a-la-opinion-publica-de-la-provincia-de-espinar> 
accessed 16 October 2020.; Ralph Zapata, ‘Conflicto en Espinar: comunidades retoman las negociaciones por las 
demandas no resueltas’ (Ojo Público, 2 September 2020) <https://ojo-publico.com/2047/espinar-retoma-las-
negociaciones-por-las-demandas-no-resueltas> accessed 16 October 2020. 
155 Asamblea Multicomunal por la Consulta Previa en Espinar, ‘ANTE EL INCUMPLIMIENTO DE LOS 
COMPROMISOS ASUMIDOS POR EL ESTADO, ANUNCIAMOS EL INICIO DE LAS MOVILIZACIONES 
COMUNALES PARA GESTAR UN LEVANTAMIENTO DE LAS COMUNIDADES EN DEFENSA DE NUESTROS 
DERECHOS’ (Facebook, 7 October 2020) 
<https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=979219422590353&id=588097581702541> accessed 12 
January 2021. 
156 (including the Tintaya Marquiri and the Huano community)  
157 See ‘En Proceso’ (Ministerio de Energía y Minas) 
<http://minem.gob.pe/descripcion.php?idSector=3&idTitular=8757> accessed 9 January 2021. Taller Informativos 
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The dialogue stage of the consultation was due to take place between 7 and 19 December 
2020,158  but consultation is now proceeding virtually in view of the ongoing coronavirus 
crisis.159 In the meantime, the communities continue to protest for their rights, including respect 
for recognition of their rights to land and water, recognition and repair of damage done to their 
environment by previous extractive activities (including representation on a commission to 
assess the extent of this damage),160 the creation of a communal canon to allow greater 
investment by regional and local government in their communities, and for a share of the 




The implementation of FPIC in Peru is consistent with a multiculturalist approach to FPIC that 
states supported during the adoption of UNDRIP. Rather than requiring consent to be obtained 
before the approval of projects on indigenous territory, consent is positioned as the objective 
of consultation, but is not required for a project to go ahead. However, the state’s view of FPIC 
stands in contrast to that of at least some of the indigenous peoples in Peru, who have 
interpreted Article 32.2 of UNDRIP in accordance with the ‘general rule’ approach that was 
discussed in Chapter 5. This was evident in the development of the Law on Prior Consultation, 
the meta-consultation on the Regulatory Decree, as well as in the statements of the 
Multicommunal Assembly in the Coroccohuayco illustrative example. Given these divergent 
views on what FPIC should look like, and the fact that the state unilaterally imposed its own 
interpretation of FPIC in passing both the Law and its Regulatory Decree without the consent 
of indigenous organisations, it is perhaps not surprising that the implementation of FPIC in 
Peru has been criticised by indigenous people and their allies as merely a box-ticking exercise 
to confirm decisions that the state has already made.162 
 
 
158 Ministerio de Energía y Minas, ‘Plan de Consulta Proyecto Minero “Antapaccay Expansión Tintaya - 
Integracion Coroccohuayco”’ (Ministerio de Energía y Minas 2020) 
<http://minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Consulta%20previa%20-
%20mineria/En%20Proceso/4%20Coroccohuayco/Plan%20de%20Consulta.pdf> accessed 18 January 2020.  
159 ‘Avanzan las coordinaciones para continuar la consulta previa en Espinar, Cusco’ 
<https://www.gob.pe/en/institucion/minem/noticias/340772-avanzan-las-coordinaciones-para-continuar-la-
consulta-previa-en-espinar-cusco> accessed 7 February 2021. 
160 ‘Minem: consulta previa en Espinar por el proyecto minero Antapaccay Expansión Tintaya-Integración 
Coroccohuayco continuará de forma virtual’ (Revista ProActivo, 3 February 2021) 
<https://proactivo.com.pe/minem-consulta-previa-espinar-proyecto-minero-antapaccay-expansion-tintaya-
integracion-coroccohuayco-sera-virtual/> accessed 7 February 2021. 
161 ‘Asamblea Multicomunal Por La Consulta Previa En Espinar - Posts | Facebook’ 
<https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1062064274305867&id=588097581702541> accessed 7 
February 2021. Post dated Jan 27.  
162 Acuna (n 12). Alva-Arévalo (n 17).; Doyle (n 109).  
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This chapter has included two illustrative examples which concluded in the indigenous 
communities concerned expressing their agreement to the proposed project. However, as 
discussed above, the formulaic and shallow approach to FPIC in these examples gives weight 
to the concerns raised in Chapter 4 that a multiculturalist approach would not result in the kind 
of dialogue that eventually leads to meaningful reconciliation, because it lacks epistemic 
justice, fails to challenge hierarchies of power, and does not provoke a reconsideration of 
dominant development paradigms. Furthermore, the rigid process, short timescale and 
restatements of existing obligations in the outcome agreements raise concerns that FPIC in 
Peru is precisely the kind of ‘weak bureaucratic procedure’ that authors such as Rodriguez-
Garavito and Merino163 have warned about – a venue for the state to recognise indigenous 
rights whilst at the same time maintaining the status quo.  
 
From the perspective of epistemic justice, these consultations were structured and organised 
into the prescriptive framework established by the state. The indigenous communities were 
informed of their rights by the Vice-ministry of Interculturality, who framed them exclusively in 
relation to the law of the state, as opposed to providing space for indigenous legal frameworks 
or understandings of rights. Dialogue mainly took place in Spanish as opposed to Quechua, 
and translation was not adequate for all members of the community to engage. Similarly, 
highly technical information was presented without adequate support or evaluation of 
comprehension, questions went unanswered, possible risks were played down by state 
officials and facilitators, and there were no mapping exercises to enable the indigenous people 
to adequately determine what the impact on their way of life might be. The extremely short 
timeframe for consultation also limited the potential for the communities to deliberate at length. 
In Chapter 4, it was noted that the multiculturalist model would require indigenous people to 
engage with discussion on the terms, logic and timeframe established by the state. In these 
illustrative examples, that certainly appears to have been the result. This observation was also 
made in relation to the discussion during the meta-consultation, in which indigenous 
worldviews were side-lined.  
 
The critique of the multicultural model in Chapter 4 also predicted that will be insufficient to 
challenge existing hierarchies of power. As has been noted, the legal framework falls short of 
requiring consent to be obtained, which limits the potential of FPIC to fully realise indigenous 
self-determination. Furthermore, in undertaking the consultations after the EIA had been 
approved, the state retains full control over the scope of the project and severely limits the 
 
163 César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Ethnicity.Gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior 
Consultation in Social Minefields’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 263.; Merino (n 61). 
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opportunity of indigenous people to make meaningful changes to project design as a result of 
the prior consultation process. As was seen in the two cases in which consent was obtained, 
the outcome documents largely reiterated existing legal obligations, and were very similar to 
one another. This lends credence to the idea that consultations are viewed by the state as an 
administrative process, rather than requiring a meaningful negotiation. This falls far short of 
the ‘general rule’ interpretation of FPIC that was discussed in Chapter 5 as a means through 
which self-determination is exercised. Additionally, the power imbalance between indigenous 
people and the state is also encapsulated in the relative influence of state ministries involved 
in the process. Compared with the decision-making roles of MINEM and SENACE, the 
Viceministry of Interculturality has emerged in these illustrative examples as a relatively weak 
institution, which is consistent with Sanborn Parades’ view.164  Its representatives were 
prevented from being effective in the Aurora consultation, and its trained facilitators repeatedly 
displayed bias in performing their duties. Thus the ministries responsible for developing 
projects in the national interest wield greater authority in the process than the vice-ministry 
tasked with protecting the rights of a cultural minority. This is consistent with the multiculturalist 
approach that considers the protection of cultural rights as an objective that can be limited by 
considerations of ‘national interest’. 
 
Additionally, the practice of prior consultation in Peru has not fundamentally reshaped the 
imbalance of economic power. FPIC in Peru has been implemented in the context of a firm 
commitment to extractivist development and state ownership of subsoil resources on 
indigenous lands. The narratives employed by President Garcia in relation to indigenous 
peoples’ opposition to the implementation of the FTA with the USA portrayed indigenous 
people as backwards communities who would not use their land to its potential, or permit 
others to do so, and both President Garcia and the mining sector expressed concern that prior 
consultation would stymie foreign investments in extractive industries. Even the arguments of 
President Humala in favour of prior consultation included that it may in fact encourage foreign 
investments as a result of its ability to reduce social conflict around extractive development 
projects. Thus indigenous peoples have been positioned as barriers in the way of economic 
development, rather than as allies in creating a prosperous future for all. In keeping with the 
multiculturalist approach to FPIC, Peru’s ‘Vision of Mining in Peru by 2030’ recognises the 
importance of good governance, and prior consultation of indigenous peoples as part of wider 
democratic participation in the state’s extractivist development policies, with a view to ensuring 
that development benefits all the country’s citizens. However, there is no evidence in the 
 
164 Sanborn and Paredes (n 6). Sanborn Paredes 
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illustrative examples of a willingness by the state to consider more transformative strategies 
such as co-management of the land.  
 
The Coroccohuayco example gives insight into the longer-term potential of FPIC to provide a 
site of contestation and further conflict in Peru, as is suggested in Chapter 5. In this case, the 
community had experienced severe negative impacts of previous development, and had a 
developed understanding of FPIC that conforms with the ‘general rule’ interpretation of Article 
32.2 of UNDRIP. Consequently, they pushed back against the shallow, multiculturalist 
implementation of FPIC by the state, demanding that consultation allows them a real chance 
to affect the scope and design of the project, and asserting that consent must not only be 
sought, but also obtained.  Whilst the communities at Espinar did achieve a Ministerial 
Resolution that modified the Unique Text of Administrative Procedures of MINEM so that prior 
consultation could take place in a wide window of opportunity between the ‘admission to 
process of the EIA’ up to the authorisation of activities,165 in the event the mEIA was approved 
just before the consultation was due to commence. This adds weight to the argument that the 
state controls the process, reinforcing existing power hierarchies to the detriment of 
indigenous self-determination.  
 
The NGO CooperAccion have called these developments ‘an act of bad faith on the part of 
the state, because the revision to the norms still allows prior consultation to take place after 
the EIA has been approved. CooperAccion suggest that the Ministerial Resolution has even 
worsened the position of indigenous peoples; in the case of Coroccohuayco, the prior 
consultation is now proceeding without a clear scope after the EIA approval, but before the 
mining company have cleared other regulatory approvals which are necessary for the project 
to commence. CooperAccion have warned that indigenous peoples ‘are facing legal tricks and 
ad hoc norms to favour the execution of specific mining projects, such as Coroccohuayco, 
ignoring, without good reason, the demand of the communities to be consulted in ways that 
really guarantee their collective rights.’ Furthermore, the NGO warns that the prior consultation 
could become ‘a mere formality that generates new frustrations and risks the important rights 
that are at stake.’166  Certainly, the differing interpretations of FPIC by the state and indigenous 
peoples seem to be translating into vastly different expectations of how the process should 
unfold, at least in some cases. This, paired with the lack of epistemic justice, state-controlled 
 
165  Resolución Ministerial No 403-2019-MINEM/DM.  
166 Cooperacción, ‘¿Estamos Ante Un Acto de Mala Fe Del Gobierno En El Caso Coroccohuayco? - CooperAcción’ 
(CooperAcción, 23 December 2019) <http://cooperaccion.org.pe/estamos-ante-un-acto-de-mala-fe-del-gobierno-




process, and limited options for self-determination would support the notion that 
multiculturalist interpretations of FPIC may be insufficient to promote reconciliation.  
 
6.6  Conclusion  
 
The analysis of the development of Peru’s legal framework on prior consultation, and the three 
illustrative examples presented in this chapter cast doubt on the potential of the multiculturalist 
interpretation of Article 32.2 of UNDRIP to significantly contribute to reconciliation between 
indigenous peoples and the state. The three critiques of human rights based multiculturalism, 
that were discussed in the previous chapter in relation to Article 32.2 of UNDRIP, equally apply 
to the practice of FPIC in Peru. The mechanism for consultation prescribed in Peru’s legal 
framework is narrow in scope and shallow in its ability to meaningfully engage with indigenous 
concerns. Consequently, it reinforces existing power structures and epistemic injustices, and 
at present does not enable indigenous communities to significantly shape the measures being 
proposed. Instead of providing a space in which two partners can forge consensus, prior 
consultation appears to be viewed by the state as an administrative process to legitimise pre-
approved projects. On the other hand, it would appear that - in the mining sector at least - 
indigenous communities have progressed from viewing consultation as a limited opportunity 
to try to hold states to account for delivering on their existing legal duties, to an approach in 
which they are seeking to regain some control over the process - both in terms of when FPIC 
consultations occur, and how they are carried out. Nevertheless, the prescriptive legal 
framework continues to provide only a limited form of consultation which is unlikely to support 








Chapter 6 provided an insight into the narrow and shallow implementation of FPIC in Peru - a 
country that has adopted a multiculturalist approach to FPIC, consistent with states’ 
interpretation of Article 32 of UNDRIP.  This chapter investigates the current practice of FPIC 
in Canada.  Canada was one of the four countries which voted against the adoption of 
UNDRIP, in a large part due to the fear that FPIC could be interpreted as a right to veto 
important national development projects.1 Furthermore, Canada is not a party to ILO C169. 
 
Canada’s domestic legal framework recognises a duty to consult that is based in case law 
which includes a theoretical recognition of a nation-to-nation relationship between the state 
and indigenous peoples.  However, as shall be discussed, the Courts’ interpretation of a duty 
to consult in the Canadian context treats indigenous peoples not as distinct sovereign peoples 
but as a special minority within a multicultural state, consistent with Kymlicka’s model of 
multiculturalism and the multiculturalist interpretation of Article 32 of UNDRIP described in 
Chapter 5.2 Whilst the term ‘indigenous’ will continue to be used in this chapter, the term 
‘aboriginal’ also appears in relation to specific rights and title, due to the term being used to 
describe the First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples in the Canada Act 1982 that forms part of 
the Canadian Constitution.3 
 
 
1 Canada. (2007). Statement by Ambassador McNee to the General Assembly on the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Retrieved from https://www.cana 
da.ca/en/news/archive/2007/09/statement-ambassador-menee-general-assembly-decla 
ration-rights-Indigenous-peoples.html.; Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent : The 
Politics of Indigenous Participatory Rights in Canada’ (The Prior Consultation of Indigenous Peoples in Latin 
America, 16 August 2019). 272. 
2   It should be noted that Canada’s approach to FPIC in relation to Article 19 of the Declaration concerning 
legislative and administrative measures is far less amenable. In 2018 the Supreme Court decided, without taking 
into account the provisions of UNDRIP, that the Canadian parliament does not have a duty to consult indigenous 
peoples as part of the law-making process. However, detailed discussion of this issue falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40, [2018] 2 SCR 765. 
See also Sasha Boutilier, ‘Free, Prior, and Informed Consent and Reconciliation in Canada: Proposals to 
Implement Articles 19 and 32 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2017) 7 Western Journal 
of Legal Studies <https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/uwojls/article/view/5688> accessed 19 November 2020.; Pam 
Palmater, ‘The Supreme Court Has Just Gutted the Crown’s Duty to Consult First Nations’ (Maclean’s, 11 October 
2018) <https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/the-supreme-court-has-just-gutted-the-crowns-duty-to-consult-first-
nations/> accessed 19 November 2020.;  
3 The Constitution Act, 1982, s35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11. (53) 
S35(2) states ‘In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada. 
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This chapter takes a similar form to the last: in the first section, it analyses the legal basis for 
prior consultation of indigenous peoples in Canada. The second section provides three 
illustrative examples that give insight into some of the more collaborative approaches that 
consultation is being implemented in the Canadian context. The illustrative examples have 
been conducted through desk-based research of state and indigenous government 
documentation, commentary by non-governmental organisations, contemporary newspaper 
reports and journal articles. The final section will analyse the reconciliatory potential of FPIC 
in Canada, again with reference to its contribution to indigenous self-determination; the 
achievement of epistemic justice during the process; the ability of consultation to create more 
equal relations between the state and indigenous peoples; and how it may reframe the 
relationship of the state and indigenous peoples with respect to the land.    
 




Over 1.4 million people in Canada - or less than 5% of the population - identify as indigenous 
(or aboriginal). Around half are ‘registered’ or ‘status’ Indians (First Nations), 30% Métis (of 
mixed indigenous and European ancestry), 15% unregistered First Nations, and 4% Inuit.4 
Canada is viewed as a country that is world-leading in its support for human rights,5 but despite 
this, the aboriginal population of Canada faces human rights violations of ‘crisis proportions’,6 
and lags far behind the rest of the population in measures of health care, housing, education, 
welfare, and social services. Furthermore, the relationship between indigenous peoples and 
the state is strained; even whilst considerable attention is given to the need for reconciliation,7 
indigenous peoples are frequently positioned as obstacles to economic progress.8 
 
Canada is a Federal State with its origins in the colonisation of indigenous territory by the 
British and French Empires from the 16th Century.9 The early occupation and colonisation of 
 
4 UNHRC Twenty-seventh session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James 
Anaya, Addendum The situation of indigenous peoples in Canada (4 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.2. 
5 John McNee, ‘Statement by Ambassador McNee to the General Assembly on the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2013’. 
6 UNHRC Twenty-seventh session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James 
Anaya, Addendum The situation of indigenous peoples in Canada (4 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.2., para 
14.; Papillon and Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 1). 
7 UNHRC Twenty-seventh session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James 
Anaya, Addendum The situation of indigenous peoples in Canada (4 Ju;y 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.2 
8 Terry Mitchell, ‘Realizing Indigenous Rights in the Context of Extractive Imperialism’: (2019) 12 International 
Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies 46. 
9 Ralph R Krueger, ‘Canada | History, Geography, & Culture’ (Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 November 2020) 
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Canada> accessed 19 November 2020.  
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Canada was devastating for the well-being of indigenous peoples.10 After 1701, the Crown 
entered into treaties with some of the First Nations, to define their relationship with the 
indigenous peoples on a nation-to-nation basis.  The Royal Proclamation of 1763 
acknowledged the prior ownership of land of indigenous peoples in North America, and 
required the Crown to enter treaties and gain consent before occupation of indigenous land.11 
The treaties that were formalised  - often following violent conflict or under coercion - generally 
legitimised the British Crown’s sovereignty over the land by surrendering Aboriginal title in 
return for the creation of reserves and providing guarantees of indigenous peoples’ rights to 
hunting and fishing, for example.12  
 
Over time, this treaty model was replaced by a model of de facto sovereignty as the control of 
the Crown over the territories increased.13  In the 19th Century, the British North America Act 
integrated the Provinces of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia into a federal Dominion 
under the British Crown, whilst giving the federal Parliament legislative authority over ‘Indians, 
and Land reserved for the Indians.’14 The Indian Act 1876 consolidated previous colonial laws 
which aimed to assimilate First Nations people and eradicate their culture.15 This Act, although 
amended (most recently in 1985) to address some of its most unacceptable provisions, still 
regulates non-self-governing Indian territories and, in the words of Alexander, was ‘designed 
to break apart pre-existing First Nations governance and replace it with a fiduciary relationship 
with the Crown’.16  
 
 
10 ibid. Particularly in the first 200 years of colonisation, territorial encroachment and foreign disease significantly 
reduced the populations of First Nations and Inuit communities. 
11 Beverley McLachlin, ‘Aboriginal Peoples and Reconciliation’ (2003) 9 Canterbury Law Review 240. 
12 John Borrows, ‘Challenging Historical Frameworks: Aboriginal Rights, The Trickster, and Originalism’ (2017) 98 
Canadian Historical Review 114.   
13 Papillon and Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 1). 
14 The Constitution Act 1867 30 & 31 Victoria c 3 (UK)., s 91(24).  
15 Under the Indian Act, First Nations people were considered wards of the state, as opposed to citizens. They 
were confined to indigenous reserves, unable to own property or vote, unless they renounced their status as 
Indians. The law (and subsequent amendments) gave the government powers over the identification of peoples as 
‘Indian’, as well as over the governance structure of First Nations, and their education. The Act replaced traditional 
indigenous governance structures with elected band councils. Furthermore, it made illegal many key practices of 
First Nations culture, and permitted officials to determine rights and benefits based on judgements of ‘good moral 
character’.  Meanwhile, aboriginals suffered from inadequate access to healthcare, education, water, sanitation 
and employment opportunities. The practice of Indian Residential Schools forcibly removed indigenous children 
from their families in order to ‘kill the Indian within the child’ and forcibly assimilate them into European ways. The 
physical and mental abuse of indigenous children and their families perpetrated by this system - as well as through 
the ‘sixties scoop’ in which indigenous children were fostered or adopted by non-indigenous families -  continued 
until its abolition in 1996, and  its harmful legacy continues for those who were affected. William B Henderson and 
Zach Parrott, ‘Indian Act’ (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 23 October 2018) 
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/indian-act> accessed 20 November 2020.; Rosemary Nagy 
and Robinder Kaur Sehdev, ‘Introduction: Residential Schools and Decolonization’ (2012) 27 Canadian Journal of 
Law & Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société 67.  
16 Doug Beazley, ‘Decolonizing the Indian Act’ (National Magazine, 18 December 2017) 
<http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/in-depth/2017/decolonizing-the-indian-act> accessed 20 
January 2021.  
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The legitimacy of Canada’s sovereignty over indigenous territory and peoples remains a 
contested matter.17 Much of Canada’s territory remains unceded, as the Inuits, and First 
Nations on French-colonised territories, did not enter into treaties with Europeans,18 and the 
Peace and Friendship treaties they entered into did not cede land.19 Consequently, much of 
the land that is now British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nunavut, Quebec and Yukon was never 
the subject of a treaty.20 Furthermore, there remain around 70 pre-1975 treaties that are 
recognised by the Crown, governing the relationship between 364 First Nations representing 
over 600,000 people, and Canada.21 Whether or not these treaties were honoured, indigenous 
peoples in Canada have not yielded their claim to autonomy as nations.  
 
The way in which the state has sought to manage this contested sovereignty is to recognise 
the existence of indigenous peoples whilst incorporating them into the legal framework of the 
state.  In 1973, in the seminal Calder case, the Supreme Court  recognised the existence of 
aboriginal peoples with their own social and political structures before the formation of 
Canada, and ruled that the laws and interests of aboriginal peoples - which predated the 
Crown’s sovereignty - formed part of the common law, and could only be extinguished by a 
specific Act by the Crown.22 Following the seminal decision in Calder, Canada developed the 
Comprehensive Land Claims Policy, by which the Crown entered into modern treaty 
agreements with indigenous groups.23 Modern treaties are intended to form a basis for 
reconciliation, by creating ‘new relationships within the Canadian federation while balancing 
the interests of Indigenous peoples with those of broader society’.24 In 1982, the Constitution 
was amended to include the permanent protection of existing Aboriginal and Treaty rights 
which had not yet been extinguished under s35 (but without specifying their substance).25 In 
addition, in 1995 the Canadian Government set out its Inherent Right policy, to govern 
 
17 John Borrows, ‘Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 537. 
18 Britannica 
19 ‘Fact Sheet on Peace and Friendship Treaties in the Maritimes and Gaspé’ (Government of Canada, 15 
September 2010) <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100028599/1539609517566> accessed 20 January 
2021. The Peace and Friendship Treaties were signed in the period 1726 to 1779, between the British and the 
Mi'kmaq, Maliseet and Passamaquoddy First Nations. They have been described as ‘founding documents for the 
development of Canada’. 
20 Frank Iacobucci and others, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in Canada: Towards a New Relationship with 
Indigenous Peoples’ (Torys LLP 2016). 
21 Papillon and Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 1). 
22 R v Calder, [1996] 1 SCR 660. 
23  Since 1975, 25 additional modern treaties (also called comprehensive land claim agreements) have been 
signed, to delineate the relationship between 97 Indigenous communities (representing about 89,000 Indigenous 
individuals) and the provincial or territorial and federal governments. These agreements cover about 40% of 
Canada’s land mass, covering such topics as land ownership, financial settlements and resource benefits sharing, 
consultation rights, and self-government. Canada, ‘Implementation of Modern Treaties and Self-Government 
Agreements. July 2016-March 2018 Provisional Annual Report.’ (2019) report <https://www.rcaanc-
cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1573225148041/1573225175098#chp2> accessed 26 February 2021. 
24 ibid.  
25 Iacobucci and others (n 20).; Papillon and Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 1).  
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negotiations to implement the right to self-government, as an inherent right under s35 of the 
Constitution.26 Self-government agreements, whether standalone or in conjunction with a 
modern treaty, are intended to establish new intergovernmental relationships between 
indigenous governments and the Government of Canada, setting out governance structures, 
and responsibilities for programs and service provisions. They adopt a ‘concurrent law model’, 
where federal and provincial law applies alongside indigenous law.27 
 
In recent years, Canada has explicitly recognised the need for reconciliation, and the role of 
UNDRIP in achieving it.  In particular, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which 
was active between 1991-1996, revealed the scale of abuse of indigenous people that 
occurred within the residential school system.28 In 2005, the Government announced its 
intention to provide compensation to every survivor, and to form a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to record testimonies and educate Canadians on what had occurred. Its final 
report of 2015 included 94 Calls to Action to promote reconciliation between the Canadian 
State with indigenous peoples, including the recommendation that Canada ‘fully adopt and 
implement’ UNDRIP.29  However, Stanton has argued that the Courts have not applied the 
RCAP’s vision of reconciliation as a ‘mutual process to be engaged in by indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples alike’ differs significantly from the conceptualisation of reconciliation within 
the Canadian legal framework, in which indigenous sovereignty is ‘reconciled’ with that of the 
state through a colonial style of incorporation.30 
 
7.2.2 The triumph of the multiculturalist approach 
 
Due to the unique treaty-based relationship between the Crown and indigenous peoples in 
Canada, Papillon and Rodon argue that ‘Indigenous peoples face a unique legal environment 
in Canada that shapes how FPIC is interpreted and, ultimately, translated in governance 
practices.’31 However, as will be explained in more detail in the next section, the case law on 
the duty to consult positions indigenous peoples firmly within the legal framework of the state, 
as subjects rather than as sovereign peoples, and mirrors the multiculturalist approach to FPIC 
 
26 ‘The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of 
Aboriginal Self-Government’ (Government of Canada, 3 November 2008) <https://www.rcaanc-
cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1539869205136> accessed 26 February 2021. 
27 Canada, ‘Implementation of Modern Treaties and Self-Government Agreements. July 2016-March 2018 
Provisional Annual Report.’ (n 23).  
28 Nagy and Sehdev (n 15).  
29 ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action’ (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada 2015)., Calls to Action 43 and 44.  
30 Kim Stanton, ‘Reconciling Reconciliation: Differing Conceptions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the 
Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (2017) 26 Journal of Law and Social Policy 21. 
31 Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon, ‘Proponent-Indigenous Agreements and the Implementation of the Right to 
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Canada’ (2017) 62 Environmental Impact Assessment Review 216., 218. 
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that states adopted in relation to Article 32 of UNDRIP. Coyle has observed that the duty to 
consult in Canada is not derived from the ‘foundational principle’ of consent which would 
recognise ‘the inherent equality of indigenous peoples and their right to determine their own 
economic, political and cultural destinies in partnership with the state.32 Instead, the duty is 
based on the need to balance indigenous rights with ‘magical assertions of Crown 
sovereignty’33 - a sovereignty that the Courts have so far failed to challenge.34  Hamilton and 
Nicholls have commented that the entire legal framework rests on a ‘thick’ definition of Crown 
sovereignty which falsely presumes that the Crown has sovereignty, legislative power and title 
to indigenous lands and positions  indigenous peoples as ‘subjects’ and ‘cultural minorities 
within Canada’.35  Under this model, the ‘duty to consult’ rests on the Courts’ view, set out in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v  British Columbia,36 that s35 rights should be adjudicated in a manner 
consistent with the states’ fiduciary duty and the reasonable limitations of individual rights set 
out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.37   
 
Authors such as Borrows and Hamilton and Nicholls have argued that to adequately respect 
the self-determination of indigenous peoples and a nation-to-nation relationship, the legal 
framework should apply an interjurisdictional analysis of s35 rights.38 This, it is argued, could 
give rise to a more meaningful ‘duty to negotiate’, following the principles set out in the Quebec 
Secession Reference.39 This approach, which would more fully recognise aboriginal peoples 
as nations with a right to consent and to have their decision respected, is more reminiscent of 
 
32 Michael Coyle, ‘Shifting the Focus: Viewing Indigenous Consent Not as a Snapshot But As a Feature Film’ (2020) 
27 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 357., 360.  
33 Borrows, ‘Sovereignty’s Alchemy’ (n 17)., 596. In Borrow’s view, the duty to consult as elaborated in the 
Delgamuukw decision permits a unilateral extinguishment of aboriginal rights, which if not corrected, could entitle 
aboriginal peoples to a secession claim due to violations by the state of their right to self-determination.  See also 
Gordon Christie, ‘A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation’ (2005) 
23 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 17.  
34 Michael Coyle, ‘From Consultation to Consent: Squaring the Circle?’ (2016) 67 University of New Brunswick Law 
Journal 235. 244. 
35 Robert Hamilton and Joshua Nichols, ‘The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty 
to Consult’ (2019) 56 Alberta Law Review 729. 738. 
36 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 256, paras 138-152.  
37 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11 (‘Canadian Charter’). The Canadian Charter relates to individual rights and minority 
language education rights. s1 states ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society.’ 
38 John Borrows, ‘The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia’ (2015) 48 U.B.C. Law 
Review 701.; Hamilton and Nichols (n 35).;. See also the work of Richard Stacey, who argues that s35 must be 
brought together with federalism to fully recognise indigenous self-government and self-determination. Richard 
Stacey, ‘The Dilemma of Indigenous Self-Government in Canada: Indigenous Rights and Canadian Federalism’ 
(2018) 46 Federal Law Review 669.; Richard Stacey, ‘Honour in Sovereignty: Can Crown Consultation with 
Indigenous Peoples Erase Canada’s Sovereignty Deficit?’ (2018) 68 University of Toronto Law Journal 405. 
39 Hamilton and Nichols (n 35). 
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the ‘general rule’ approach advocated by indigenous peoples and their allies in relation to 
Article 32 of UNDRIP.40  
 
 
However, Canada’s approach to FPIC has also shifted over time away from a ‘general rule’ 
interpretation of FPIC to embrace the multicultural approach. At the time of UNDRIP’s 
adoption, Canada interpreted UNDRIP’s provisions on FPIC as a veto right more in line with 
the ‘general rule’ approach, and said that it was be ‘incompatible with Canada’s parliamentary 
system’.41 Likewise, when in 2010 Canada indicated its qualified support for UNDRIP, it 
emphasised UNDRIP’s status as a ‘non-legally binding aspirational document’ and noted 
again that FPIC, when used as a veto, was incompatible with Canada’s domestic legal 
framework and constitution.42  However, as pressure mounted to fully adopt UNDRIP, Canada 
has moved to interpret FPIC in a manner consistent with the multicultural approach. 
Announcing Canada’s full support for UNDRIP at UNPFII in 2016, the Minister of Indigenous 
Affairs, Carolyn Bennett, stated that the implementation of UNDRIP would be ‘breathing life 
into s35’ and noted that ‘[Canada’s] constitutional obligations serve to fulfil all of the principles 
of the declaration, including free, prior and informed consent.’43 The following year, the 
Government’s Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship With 
Indigenous Peoples interpreted FPIC to merely require consultation ‘aimed at securing 
consent’, rather than as a full right of veto.44   
 
Canada’s change of tone paved the way for an attempt to implement UNDRIP in federal law.45   
In 2016, concerns regarding FPIC were a ‘major roadblock’ to an attempt to implement 
 
40 Discussed further in Chapter 5. 
41 UNGA, Sixty-first Session 107th Plenary Meeting Thursday 13 September 2007, 10 am New York official 
records (13 September 2007) UN Doc A/61/PV.107, 13.  
42 Government of Canada; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, ‘Archived - Canada’s Statement 
of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, November 12 2010’ (29 June 
2011) <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142> accessed 26 February 2021. 
1309374239861/1309374546142. 
43 ‘Fully Adopting UNDRIP: Minister Bennett’s Speech at the United Nations’ (Northern Public Affairs, 11 May 2016) 
<http://www.northernpublicaffairs.ca/index/fully-adopting-undrip-minister-bennetts-speech/> accessed 26 
February 2021.  The Minister of Indigenous Affairs of the new Liberal government confirmed Canada’s full support 
for UNDRIP at the UNPFII, stating that Canada intended to adopt and implement the Declaration in accordance 
with the Canadian Constitution and in doing so would be ‘breathing life into s35 and recognizing it as a full box of 
rights for Indigenous Peoples in Canada.’ Furthermore, Minister Bennett noted that ‘Canada believes that our 
constitutional obligations serve to fulfil all of the principles of the declaration, including free, prior and informed 
consent.’   
44 Department of Justice Government of Canada, ‘Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship 
with Indigenous Peoples’ (14 July 2017) <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/principles-principes.html> accessed 
26 February 2021.; ‘Building Common Ground: A New Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada’ (Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency 2017) program results. 
45 Bill C-262, An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, First Session, Forty-second Parliament, 2016. This private member’s bill was 
sponsored by Romeo Saganash, MP from the Cree Nation of Eeyou Istchee, was placed before the House of 
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UNDRIP in the Senate, and in the wider public debate.46  However, in December 2020, a new 
Bill C-15 was introduced to place a legal obligation on the Government of Canada to ‘take all 
measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and must prepare and implement an action 
plan to achieve the objectives of the Declaration’.47 In doing so, the Government has stated 
that the established duty to consult would not change, but that UNDRIP would ‘inform how the 
Government approaches the implementation of its legal duties going forward’.48 However, Bill 
C-15 has not been subject to consultation with indigenous peoples, and many indigenous 
people in Canada have reacted with concern, arguing that the Bill undermines the self-
determination basis of UNDRIP and instead use ‘only the weaker colonial language of control 
and management’.49  
 
The next section sets out the main content of FPIC in Canada, known as ‘the duty to consult’. 
As will be seen, the ‘duty to consult’ is largely consistent with the multiculturalist approach to 
FPIC discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
7.2.3 The content of the duty to consult 
 
In the absence of legislation, the legal framework governing the duty to consult in Canada is 
established through a ‘well developed’ body of case law on indigenous peoples’ rights which 
has been praised by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.50 
Canada’s legal framework views the duty to consult as arising from the recognition, in s35 of 
the Canada Act 1982, of ‘existing aboriginal and treaty rights’51 and the principle of the ‘honour 
of the Crown’. This principle requires the Crown to act honourably in its dealings with aboriginal 
peoples, to fulfil the purpose of s35 which is ‘the reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
 
Commons, with the aim of establishing a collaborative process to implement UNDRIP. The House voted in favour 
in May 2018 at its third reading, but the Bill was delayed by the Senate so it failed to become law. 
46 Papillon and Rodon, ‘Proponent-Indigenous Agreements and the Implementation of the Right to Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent in Canada’ (n 31).; Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon, ‘Indigenous Consent and Natural 
Resource Extraction: Foundations for a Made-in-Canada Approach’ (Institute for Research on Public Policy 2017) 
IRPP Insight 16.  
47 Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Second 
Session, Forty-third Parliament, 2020.  
48 ‘Backgrounder: Bill C-15 - United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act’ (Government of 
Canada, 26 January 2021) <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/declaration/about-apropos.html> accessed 21 
February 2021. 
49 Russ Diabo, ‘Indigenous Peoples Should Reject Canada’s UNDRIP Bill C-15: It’s Not All That Meets the Eye’ 
(2020) 31 Indigenous Policy Journal <http://www.indigenouspolicy.org/index.php/ipj/article/view/723> accessed 
26 February 2021. 
50 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya’ (4 July 2014) UN 
Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.2, para 6.  
51 The Constitution Act, 1982, s35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11. 
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aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown’.5253  The remainder of this section 
introduces the current legal requirements in relation to the state’s duty to consult, and argues 
that despite the formal recognition by Canada of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies and 
the sui generis nature of their rights,54 the duty to consult rests on a framing of indigenous 
peoples not as sovereign peoples, but as national minorities within a nation state in a manner 
that is consistent with a multiculturalist reading of Article 32 of UNDRIP. 
 
In 1990, the landmark case of R v Sparrow55 considered the conditions on which an aboriginal 
right to fish could be justifiably infringed by the Crown. It stated that the aboriginal rights 
protected by s35 of the Constitution Act 1982 are not absolute, but may be limited by the 
Crown subject to certain tests being met. First, it must be in pursuit of a valid legislative 
objective, which must be specific rather than a general statement of ‘the public interest’. 
Second, the ‘honour of the Crown’ must be observed, and the state’s fiduciary duty to 
aboriginal peoples must be ‘the first consideration in determining whether the legislation or 
action in question can be justified.’56 Within the analysis of whether an infringement is justified, 
the Court set out a non-exhaustive list of questions to be considered, including whether the 
infringement was kept to a necessary minimum; whether compensation is provided; and 
whether consultation has taken place.  These requirements were confirmed in the later cases 
of R v Badger,57 in relation to treaty rights, and in Delamuukw v British Colombia58 in relation 
to aboriginal title.  
 
The principles of R v Sparrow were affirmed in the Van der Peet case, which also considered 
that the nature of the relationship of the Crown to aboriginal peoples ‘is a fiduciary one and a 
generous and liberal interpretation should accordingly be given in favour of aboriginal 
peoples’. However, the same case provided a relatively restrictive interpretation of s35 rights, 
as an activity that is ‘an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive 
culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right.’  In determining whether such a right exists, 
‘The court must take into account the perspective of the aboriginal peoples, but that 
perspective must be framed in terms cognizable to the Canadian legal and constitutional 
 
52 R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, para 31. See also R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771, at para. 41; R v Marshall, 
[1999] 3 SCR 456; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, 2004 SCC 73, paras 
16 and 17; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, para 186. 
53 R v Van der Peet (n 52) para 31; Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 52), para 186; Haida Nation v British 
Columbia (n 52), paras 17, 20 and 25.  
54 See R v Van der Peet (n 52); Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 54). 
55 R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075. See also R v Badger (n 52); Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 54).   
56 R v Sparrow (n 55).  
57 R v Badger (n 52), para 97. 
58 Delgamuukw v British Colombia (n 52), para 168. 
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structure.’59 However, this approach has been criticised by Barsh and Henderson for its 
paternalistic approach in which the Supreme Court has assumed the power to make 
judgements on what is central and integral to aboriginal culture.   Furthermore, they argue that 
the decision effectively extinguishes rights by applying a higher standard in defining aboriginal 
rights, and in requiring that they are consistent with Canada’s legal framework.60   
 
The important case of Haida Nation v British Colombia (Minister of Forests)61 contemplated 
whether the duty to consult also applied where aboriginal rights that were asserted, but not 
yet proven. The Court decided that, provided that there was a prima facie claim that aboriginal 
rights would be impacted by a measure proposed by a provincial or federal government, the 
duty to consult applied. As such, the duty to consult arises ‘ when the Crown has knowledge, 
real or constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates 
conduct that might adversely affect it’, and acts as a safeguard to prevent the Crown 'cavalierly 
run[ning] roughshod’ over asserted rights before they are finally determined, in contravention 
of the reconciliatory purpose of s35.62 The positioning of consultation as procedural - as 
opposed to a substantive - right was confirmed in the case of Mikisew Cree First Nation v 
Canada (First Minister of Canadian Heritage)63 which dealt with treaty rights, and in relation to 
modern treaties in the case of Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation.64 Furthermore, 
the case of Ktunaxa Nation65 stated that the duty to consult constitutes a ‘right to a process, 
not a particular outcome’.   
 
The Haida Nation case was also instrumental in setting out some indicators of how the duty 
to consult must be fulfilled. There is a requirement for the consultation to be carried out with 
procedural fairness.66 This may include providing funding to indigenous groups to enable their 
participation, and provision to accept oral evidence in accordance with indigenous traditions.67 
Furthermore, there is an obligation of good faith on the Crown and the indigenous party. 
Hamilton and Nicholls have argued that the expression of this good faith requirement on 
 
59 R v Van der Peet (n 52). See also David W Elliot, ‘Fifty Dollars of Fish: A Comment on R. v. Van Der Peet 
Case Comments and Notes’ (1996) 35 Alberta Law Review 759. 
60 Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, ‘The Supreme Court’s Van Der Peet Trilogy: Naive 
Imperialism and Ropes of Sand’ (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal. 
61 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52). 
62 ibid. 
63 Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40, [2018] 2 SCR 765. 
64 Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 SCR 103. 
65 Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54, [2017] 2 
SCR 386, para 83. 
66 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52), para 41; Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation (n 64), para 
46.  
67 Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 SCR 1069, para 47; See also 
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41, [2017] 1 SCR 1099.  
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indigenous people - that they ‘outline their claims with clarity’68 and do not take ‘unreasonable 
positions to thwart the Crown from making decisions’69 - requires that they express themselves  
in the language of rights and in a way that is consistent with their ascribed status as Crown 
subjects. Consequently, ‘they must fit themselves into the Constitutional Order that they are 
in fact contesting.’70    
 
The duty to consult in Canada bears a strong resemblance to the multiculturalist approach to 
FPIC discussed in Chapter 5, in which consent is generally not required but may on exception 
be necessary at the very highest end of the impact spectrum. The extent of the consultation 
required rests on an assessment of the strength of claim to the aboriginal right in question, as 
well as the potential severity of the infringement on that right, should the project proceed. Thus 
if the direct impact of the project is minor and the rights claim is weak, the Crown’s duty to 
consult may be discharged by giving notice and information, and to discuss any issues 
raised.71 On the other hand, if there is a strong claim to title or similar right over land, and the 
potential impacts of the project are severe, the duty to consult may require extensive 
engagement and the participation of the communities in decision-making processes 
concerning the project, and written explanations of the outcome and the engagement of third 
parties to resolve disputes in difficult cases.72 The process should be carried out as a 
‘meaningful, two-way dialogue’ at every stage of the project process73 with the intention of 
understanding and taking into account indigenous peoples’ concerns.74  At this more stringent 
 
68 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52), para 36. 
69 Ibid, para 42. ‘At the same time, Indigenous claimants must not frustrate the Crown’s reasonable good faith 
attempts, nor should they take unreasonable positions to thwart the government from making decisions or acting 
in cases where, despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not reached.’ 
70 Hamilton and Nichols (n 35). 739. 
71 In Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation (n 64), a treaty was in place, which surrendered title to the 
land to the Crown. The court held that the duty to consult was at the lower end of the spectrum, considering that 
the grant of a parcel of surrendered land for agriculture would have a minimal impact on aboriginal and treaty rights; 
subsequently there was no duty to accommodate. In this case, the First Nation was informed of the proposal, 
objected by letter, and did not attend a consultation meeting that was held. The court found that this process was 
sufficient to discharge the duty to consult. 
72 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52), para 44. See also Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge 
Pipelines Inc (n 67), para 52. 
73 Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153, [2019] 2 FCR 3, paras 36, 756, 564-574.  
74 Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 52), para 168; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (n 2), para 51. Two high-
profile cases have also underlined this point. In Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 
418, which was brought in relation to the Northern Gateway Project, the court held that Canada had failed to 
‘engage, dialogue and consult’ with the concerns raised by First Nations following the completion of the 
environmental assessment by a joint review panel, and prior to authorisation of the project by the Governor in 
Council. The court noted that to discharge a duty to consult, the state must demonstrate its intention to correct 
errors or omissions, provide meaningful feedback to concerns raised, and a ‘real and sustained effort to pursue 
meaningful two-way dialogue’.  In this case, the post-assessment consultation was hurried, with no apparent 
intention to include additional project conditions if necessary (see paras 329 – 341). In Tsleil-Waututh Nation v 
Canada (n 73) regarding the ‘Trans Mountain Pipeline, the Federal Court of Appeal held, that the consultation 
process had failed at the same stage, stating that the Crown demonstrated a lack of willingness to engage with 
indigenous critique of the Joint Review Board’s environmental assessment, and consider additional 
accommodations. The exercise was simply to record indigenous comments and relay them to the Governor in 
Council, before the project was approved. In both these cases, the Court quashed the certificate authorising the 
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end of the spectrum, the duty to consult may also require the state to make accommodation, 
which has been defined by the Court as the requirement to seek ‘compromise in an attempt 
to harmonize conflicting interests and move further down the path of reconciliation.’ 
Accommodation could include steps to mitigate impacts or avoid irreversible harm until such 
time as the rights claim can be resolved.75 As discussed below, if a claim for title to land and 
resources is ongoing, there is an implied duty for the Crown to consult and accommodate at 
the higher end of the spectrum, in the spirit of reconciliation, and even in the most serious 
cases, to actually obtain consent.76   
 
Case law has also set out some limitations to the scope of the duty to consult. First,  
consultations are not intended to deal with ‘past wrongs, speculative impacts, and adverse 
effects on a First Nation’s future negotiating position’.77 The focus of the consultation must be 
the proposed measure’s impact on the enjoyment of aboriginal rights, as opposed to wider 
concerns about environmental impacts,78 or on the previous adverse impacts of the project in 
question.79 However, when assessing the potential impact on these rights, existing limitations 
on rights and cumulative impacts can be included.80 Furthermore the purpose of consultation 
is not to forge agreement, and there is (with a very limited exception discussed below) no 
requirement to obtain consent.8182  Instead, the purpose is for each side to understand one 
another's concerns, and to ‘substantially address’ them.83  
 
Case law has also addressed the circumstances in which the state may proceed with a project 
in the event that the indigenous people in question withhold consent. In this respect, too, 
Canada conforms to the multiculturalist approach described in Chapter 5, permitting the state 
to infringe indigenous title for reasons that include general public interest, as opposed to 
 
project, and required the state to redo the consultation on the environmental assessment report. This demonstrates 
the importance of the underlying approach taken by Ministers and officials in ensuring that legal frameworks are 
translated into meaningful dialogues with indigenous peoples. 
75 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52), paras 46-48; In the Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia 
[2004] 3 SCR 550, the government was required to consult the Taku River Tlingit First Nation, who had a strong 
prima facie claim to land, at the higher end of the consultation and accommodation spectrum. This was done 
through inclusion of the First Nation as part of the Project Committee, and their full participation in the environmental 
review process. The views of the First Nation were heard by the decision makers, and project approval conditions 
were designed to address the project’s impacts in the long and short term.  
76 Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council [2010] SCC 43; Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52), para 
24; Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 52), para 168. 
77 Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (n76). 
78 Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc (n 67), paras 45 and 51. 
79 Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (n 76), para 53.  
80 Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc (n 67), para 42. 
81 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52), paras 36, 46-48; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (n 75). 
In the latter case, the Court held that ‘The Province was not under a duty to reach agreement with the TRTFN, and 
its failure to do so did not breach the obligations of good faith that it owed the TRTFN.’ (para 22).   
82 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 52), para 36.  
83 Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 52), para 169; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (n 36), para 76.  
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strictly limiting infringement to rare exceptions that are necessary in order to uphold human 
rights. The Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Colombia case held that where the Crown proposes to 
infringe of a proven right of aboriginal title to land - which ‘confers the right to use and control 
the land and to reap the benefits flowing from it’ - it may only do so with consent, or if the 
proposed infringement is ‘justified by a compelling and substantial public purpose and are not 
inconsistent with the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal group’.84  In determining the 
scope of the public interest, the Court referred to Delgamuukw, in which it was decided that: 
 
the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general 
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the 
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement 
of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are 
consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of [A]boriginal 
title.85   
 
Such a statement is not consistent with the views of those who advocate the ‘general rule’ 
approach to FPIC, but instead places emphasis on the state’s freedom to pursue economic 
development strategies without obstruction. In a similar manner to the criteria set for 
infringement of the right to property by the IACtHR in the Saramaka v Suriname case,86 in 
order to justify an infringement of aboriginal title Canada must demonstrate that it is necessary 
to achieve the objective (‘rational connection’); that there must be ‘minimal impairment’ of the 
right; and that the adverse effects on Aboriginal interest must not outweigh the benefits of 
proceeding (‘proportionality of impact’). The state must also show that it has met its duty to 
consult and accommodate before proceeding, with the Court noting that ‘Governments and 
individuals proposing to use or exploit land, whether before or after a declaration of Aboriginal 
title, can avoid a charge of infringement or failure to adequately consult by obtaining the 
 
84 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (n 36)., paras 76-77. The judgement makes clear that this consideration of 
the objective purpose of the infringement is only relevant in cases where title is proven.  
‘Where Aboriginal title is unproven, the Crown owes a procedural duty imposed by the honour of the 
Crown to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate the unproven Aboriginal interest.  By contrast, where 
title has been established, the Crown must not only comply with its procedural duties, but must also ensure 
that the proposed government action is substantively consistent with the requirements of s35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.  This requires both a compelling and substantial governmental objective and that 
the government action is consistent with the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal group.’ 
(para 80). 
85 Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 52), para 165; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (n 36), para 83.  
86 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment of November 28, 2007 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 172 (28 November 2007); Case of 
the Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment of August 12, 2008 (Interpretation of the Judgement on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 185 (12 August 
2008)., discussed in Chapter 5.  
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consent of the interested Aboriginal group.’87 Additionally, if a new aboriginal title is 
established, there may be a need to reassess projects or legislation that were previously 
undertaken without consent, if their continuance would ‘unjustifiably infringe’ Aboriginal title.88 
In practice, Hamilton and Nicholls argue that this recognition of consent is almost irrelevant, 
due to the difficulties in satisfying the high burden of proof to demonstrate aboriginal title, and 
the cost of doing so.89 Coyle reported in 2020 that the Tsilqot’in decision remained the sole 
example of the application of the indigenous consent standard, representing just 0.002% of 
Canada’s territory.90  
 
7.3 Critiques of the duty to consult 
 
Critics have argued that the duty to consult is not intended to facilitate the sharing of authority 
and decision-making, but to legitimise state decisions through an information-sharing process 
which allows indigenous peoples only minimal influence on the outcome.91 This is, in part, due 
to its implementation the environmental impact assessment process. The Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act92 (CEA Act) has been criticised as being unsuitable for prior 
consultation processes, designed for general public consultation rather than for private, 
bilateral engagement with indigenous peoples.93 In 2019, the CEA Act was replaced with the 
Impact Assessment Act (IA Act),94 which explicitly references Canada’s commitment to 
implementing UNDRIP in its preamble. Whilst some critics argued that the IA Act would kill off 
development projects due to its more extensive requirements to consult indigenous peoples, 
others argued that it did not go far enough, drawing heavily on the flawed processes of its 
predecessor, the CEA Act, and falling short of the recommendations made by an Expert Panel 
during its drafting as well as IA best practice.95  
 
87 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (n 36), para 97. Delgamuukw v British Columbia (n 52) established that 
Aboriginal title - an exclusive right to land - is an existing Aboriginal right protected by s35 of the Constitution.  To 
demonstrate title to land, indigenous peoples must demonstrate sufficient evidence of continuous and exclusive 
occupation of the territory from before the time of European colonisation, and the integral link between the land 
and their culture. Furthermore, traditional lands cannot be used in a manner that is incompatible with their 
traditional ways of life; if they wish to use their lands in a way that is not permitted, they must surrender to land to 
the Crown and convert them into non-title lands. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (n 36), para 2.  
88 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (n 36), para 92 
89 Hamilton and Nichols (n 35). 
90 Coyle (n 34)., 246. 
91  Papillon and Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 1)., 268.  
92 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 2012, c19, s52. 
93 For a critique on how the CEA Act restricts indigenous peoples rights, see Denis Kirchhoff, Holly L Gardner and 
Leonard JS Tsuji, ‘The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 and Associated Policy: Implications for 
Aboriginal Peoples’ (2013) 4 International Indigenous Policy Journal 1. 
94 Impact Assessment Act SC 2019 C 28 s1.  
95 Meinhard Doelle and A John Sinclair, ‘The New Federal Impact Assessment Act in Canada: Delivering on Reform 
Expectations?’ (2018) Working Paper <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3290255> accessed 23 November 2020.  
The Act establishes the Impact Assessment Agency as a single coordinating body for impact assessments which 
meet criteria for federal impact assessment, with power to delegate to any provincial or indigenous governing body.  




Critics of FPIC consultations in Canada argue that they are not generally conducive to deep 
inter-cultural conversations, as they are formal procedures, rooted in western science, in which 
indigenous knowledge is not equally valued.96 Furthermore, there is no obligation for 
regulatory bodies to agree to demands or suggestions made within the consultation process, 
so the opportunity for indigenous peoples to influence the design of the process and the 
decisions made is limited.97 Natan Obed, the President of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami,98 has 
commented that ‘our experience has shown us that consultations tend to have predetermined 
outcomes, are rarely collaborative in nature, and by their very orientation situate final decision-
making power with non-Indigenous governments. This is not self-determination.’99 Such flaws 
in the ESIA process increase the ‘potential for conflict, increase the capacity burden on under-
resourced indigenous groups and [minimise] Indigenous concerns and jurisdiction.’100  
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of indigenous Peoples also noted the frustrations 
of indigenous leaders with government-led processes for consultation, stating that flawed 
consultation processes are ‘contributing to an atmosphere of contentiousness and mistrust 
that is conducive neither to beneficial economic development nor social peace.’101 
Commentators have also argued that in Canada, as in Peru, consultation has been 
 
cooperation with indigenous peoples and indigenous governing jurisdictions, ensuring that indigenous knowledge 
is taken into account, and that there is respect for indigenous peoples throughout the process.   For example, there 
is Ministerial discretion to require a federal impact assessment where projects fall below the threshold, including in 
cases where there may be adverse effects to Indigenous peoples, including Indigenous women.  In a new ‘planning 
phase’, indigenous groups as well as the public and governing bodies with any jurisdiction over the project must 
be consulted. If the Agency decides an impact assessment is required, it sets out the scope of the assessment 
which must now consider, in addition to environmental impacts, such considerations as the need for the project; 
alternatives to the project; traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples and community knowledge; impacts on 
Indigenous rights and communities; and the project’s impact on sustainability and climate commitments. Following 
the impact assessment, the Minister must take a decision (or refer to the Minister in Council) as to whether the 
project is in the public interest, considering the extent of the adverse impacts, mitigation measures, impacts on 
indigenous communities and their s35 rights, and the impact on sustainability and climate commitments. It also 
establishes an Indigenous Advisory Committee. The authors comment that the IA Act’s success in promoting 
indigenous involvement will depend greatly on whether Ministerial discretion is exercised in the spirit of the Act and 
the UNDRIP. 
96 Carly A Dokis, Where the Rivers Meet: Pipelines, Participatory Resource Management, and Aboriginal-State 
Relations in the Northwest Territories (Reprint edition, UBC Press 2016).; Aniekan Udofia, Bram Noble and Greg 
Poelzer, ‘Meaningful and Efficient? Enduring Challenges to Aboriginal Participation in Environmental Assessment’ 
(2017) 65 Environmental Impact Assessment Review 164. 
97 Papillon and Rodon, ‘Proponent-Indigenous Agreements and the Implementation of the Right to Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent in Canada’ (n 31). 
98 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami is the national organization championing the rights and interests of the 65,000 Inuit in 
Canada. ‘National Representational Organization for Inuit in Canada’ (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami) <https://www.itk.ca/> 
accessed 21 February 2021. 
99 Natan Obed, ‘Free, Prior & Informed Consent and the Future of Inuit Self-Determination – Northern Public Affairs’ 
(Northern Public Affairs, 2015) <http://www.northernpublicaffairs.ca/index/volume-4-issue-2/free-prior-informed-
consent-and-the-future-of-inuit-self-determination/> accessed 21 February 2021. 
100 ‘Building Common Ground: A New Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada’ (n 44)., 27.  
101 UNHRC Twenty-seventh session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James 




appropriated by government and private companies to limit the decision-making power of 
indigenous peoples, through the operation of restrictive legal norms and processes controlled 
by the non-indigenous party, and which constrain the transformational potential of FPIC. 
Consent gained in such circumstances tends to reflect a cost-benefit/compensation logic 
which does not constitute truly free consent, or reflect the cultural practices and or 
development priorities of indigenous peoples.102 Furthermore, Young argues that the Court’s 
conceptualisation of the duty to consult as a procedural rather than a substantive right may 
simply result in the ‘illusion of efficacious federalism’ in which failed consultation processes 
can be endlessly repeated to legitimate unilateral state decision-making, and draw attention 
away for the resolution of broader socio-economic concerns.103 
 
As is evident from the above, although the duty to consult is viewed by the state as an essential 
part of reconciliation with aboriginal peoples, its critics are less optimistic about its 
reconciliatory impact. In keeping with the indigenous critique of human rights based 
multiculturalism, critics of the Canadian duty to consult argue that it privileges Euro-Canadian 
law and ways of viewing the world, and does not challenge existing hierarchies of power. For 
example, Christie has concluded that ‘contemporary jurisprudence is essentially colonial in 
nature’, and that the Supreme Court has ‘privilege[d] non-Aboriginal visions of land and land 
use’, denying aboriginal sovereignty and ‘constructing a national identity ..that has as its core 
a central vision of Canada as a colonial state’.104 Similarly, John Borrows has argued that the 
Delgamuukw case undermines aboriginal land rights and places Canadian law and values as 
the immutable standard in relation to which aboriginal claims must be judged.105 The 
assumption of Crown sovereignty, the supremacy of state law, the lack of a general duty to 
obtain consent and the conceptualisation of s35 rights as ‘not absolute’ and subject to 
reasonable limitations all confer onto the Crown the significantly greater bargaining power in 
consultation  processes,106 and Coyle observes that consultation processes are not usually 
jointly designed, which may further disadvantage indigenous groups whilst undermining the 
legitimacy of the process itself, increasing the risk of disputes.107   
 
Consequently, indigenous peoples in Canada are mobilising to create their own FPIC 
standards, through strategies of confrontation which challenge existing mechanisms through 
 
102 Papillon and Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 1). 
103 Stephen M Young, ‘The Deification of Process in Canada’s Duty to Consult: Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada 
(Attorney General)’ (2019) 52 U.B.C. Law Review 1065., 1104. 
104 Christie (n 33). 
105 Borrows, ‘Sovereignty’s Alchemy’ (n 17). 
106 Hamilton and Nichols (n 35). 
107 Coyle (n 34). 
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both legal action and civil disobedience; collaboration to maximise the usefulness of existing 
mechanisms in achieving their rights and objectives, and the reappropriation of FPIC through 
parallel indigenous decision making processes.108 The next section of this chapter examines 
three illustrative examples, which demonstrate that even in its most progressive form, a 
multiculturalist approach to FPIC falls prey to the pitfalls of human rights based 
multiculturalism that were highlighted in Chapter 4. 
 
7.4 Illustrative Examples 
 
The absence of a uniform legislative framework for consultation in Canada means there is 
significant variation between the depth and scope of provincial policies and guidelines on 
consultation.109 Consequently, it is not possible for selected cases to provide a representative 
view of prior consultation in Canada.  Whilst there are notable high-profile examples of sub-
standard prior consultations that have not resolved conflict over extractive projects,110 the 
purpose of this thesis is to explore avenues for reconciliation, and therefore illustrative 
examples were sought that provide a best case scenario for the multiculturalist approach to 
FPIC. All three illustrative examples demonstrate ways in which indigenous groups are utilising 
the existing top-down legal framework to assert their traditional knowledge and rights through 
consultation processes, again focusing on the mining sector. Canada’s mining sector is a 
‘mainstay’ of the economy, with a total mineral production of $47.0 billion in 2018. However, 
this industry has a significant negative impact on indigenous territories: since 2009, 
approximately 309 agreements between exploration and mining companies and Indigenous 
communities and governments have been signed,111 but in general terms extractive activities 
have failed to provide significant improvements in indigenous well-being, whilst at the same 




7.4.1 Ajax Mine 
 
 
108 Papillon and Rodon, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 1). 
109 Iacobucci and others (n 20). 
110 See footnote 76 for two notable examples of consultations that have been shown to be inadequate and which 
are the subject of conflict: Gitxaala Nation v Canada (n 76) and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia 
(n 76).   
111 Natural Resources Canada, ‘Minerals and the Economy’ (25 January 2018) <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-
data/science-research/earth-sciences/earth-sciences-resources/earth-sciences-federal-programs/minerals-and-
economy/20529> accessed 23 November 2020. 
112 Anna J Willow, ‘Indigenous ExtrACTIVISM in Boreal Canada: Colonial Legacies, Contemporary Struggles and 
Sovereign Futures’ (2016) 5 Humanities 55. 
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The Ajax Project - co-owned by Poland-based KGHM International and Abacus Mining and 
Exploration Corporation, based in Vancouver - was a proposed $1.5 billion open-pit gold and 
copper mine two kilometres from the outskirts of the city of Kamloops in British Columbia113, 
on traditional Stk’emlupsemc te Secwepemc Nation (SSN) territory.114 If built, it would have 
destroyed 1,700 hectares of rare grasslands and waters, which include Jacko Lake and the 
Pípsell Cultural and Heritage Area, with immense cultural significance to the Secwepemc 
people. The project was subject to a joint environmental review between the Canadian 
Environment Assessment Agency (CEA Agency) and the British Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office (BCEAO).115 Despite the significance of the development and its potential 
impacts on human health and the environment, in 2011 the CEA Agency determined that it 
should be subject to a Comprehensive Study Process, rather than the more comprehensive 
Independent Review, and began consultations with the SSN. The SNN requested that an 
Independent Review Panel be established in view of the significant impact of the project. 
Independent Reviews are the most extensive and independent form of environmental 
assessment under the CEA Act, undertaken on projects that may have significant adverse 
effects that are of public concern. They are initiated at the discretion of the Minister of the 
Environment if it is considered that it is in the public interest to do so. They require the project 
to be assessed by an independent panel of experts, may take up to 24 months for a decision 
to be made by the Minister of the Environment.116 Under a Comprehensive Study, the 
government agency responsible for the project is tasked with undertaking the assessment, 
and a decision must be made by the Minister within a year of the assessment commencing.117 
However, this request for an Independent Review was denied.118    
 
In 2015, in response to the proposed mine, the SSN filed an Aboriginal title claim to the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia for the Pípsell area.119 The British Columbia Environmental 
 
113 ‘BC Government Rejects Ajax Mine’ (MINING.COM, 15 December 2017) <https://www.mining.com/bc-
government-rejects-ajax-mine/> accessed 25 November 2020.  
114 Ashcroft Indian Band, Lower Nicola Indian Band, and Whispering Pines/Clinton Indian Band also asserted their 
traditional interest in the land. ‘Province Denies Environmental Permit for Ajax Open-Pit Mine near Kamloops |’ 
(Georgia Straight, 14 December 2014) <https://www.straight.com/news/1008231/province-denies-environmental-
permit-ajax-open-pit-mine-near-kamloops> accessed 25 November 2020.  
115 ‘Ajax Mine Project: Joint Federal Comprehensive Study / Provincial Assessment Report’ (Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency and British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office 2017) <https://iaac-
aeic.gc.ca/050/evaluations/document/120717> accessed 25 November 2020.  
116 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency Government of Canada, ‘Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency - Review Panels’ (1 January 2007) <https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/010/type5index-eng.cfm> accessed 8 
December 2020. See CEA Act articles 38 – 48. 
117 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency Government of Canada, ‘Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency - Comprehensive Studies’ (1 January 2007) <https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/010/type3index-eng.cfm> accessed 
8 December 2020. See CEA Act Article 27. 
118 ‘Summary Assessment Report (Ajax): With Respect to the Application by KGHM Ajax Mining Inc. for an 
Environmental Assessment Certificate Pursuant to the Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c.43’ (British 
Columbia Environmental Assessment Office 2017). 18.  
119  This title claim is not yet resolved. See Ignace v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2019 BCSC 10.   
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Assessment Office (BCEAO) recognised their ‘strong prima facie claim’, updated their 
assessment in the light of the Tsilhqot’in decision,120 and committed to engage with SSN at 
the ‘deep’ end of the spectrum, following the approach of the court in the Haida case.121 An 
Ajax government-to-government discussion table was established by the Provincial 
government. Described by the BCEAO as an ‘expanded consultation approach’,122 the 
consultation included the collaborative development of a Government-to-Government 
Framework Agreement, covering the EA, permits, negotiating of the accommodations to be 
made, and links to broader initiatives for reconciliation.  They also developed an EA 
Collaboration Plan which addressed how the SSN and the BCEAO would collaborate on 
information sharing, issues management and dispute resolution. This collaborative approach 
led to changes in the standard EA process, including two additional assessments of impact 
on Aboriginal economies and the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes, 
as well as the provision of information relating to the project’s potential impacts on SSN 
governance.123 
 
Despite the collaborative approach, SSN considered that there remained inadequacies in the 
way the EA was being conducted, and commenced their own assessment of the project 
combining western scientific analysis with their own laws, traditions, customs and knowledge, 
involving over 80 technical experts and knowledge keepers, and over 300 submissions.  The 
process established a 46-person panel of elected Chiefs, Counsellors, elders, youth, and 
family representatives. The panel was to review information and make recommendations to 
the SSN Joint Council on how to proceed, considering issues that fell within the government’s 
EA process, and outside of it (for example, the economic opportunities of the mine for the SSN 
community). Funding from the BCEAO and the CEA Agency enabled SNN to participate in the 
EIA process, and funding from the project proponent KGHM Ajax Mining Inc was also provided 
to SSN for participating in the EA and undertaking the separate SSN Assessment Process.124 
Speaking about the need to establish this parallel assessment, Councillor Ed Jensen 
 
120 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (n36). 
121  ‘Summary Assessment Report (Ajax): With Respect to the Application by KGHM Ajax Mining Inc. for an 
Environmental Assessment Certificate Pursuant to the Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c.43’ (n 118). 
17-20. 
122 ibid. 5. 
123 The Ajax Mine Government to Government Framework Agreement, including the EA Collaboration Plan, were 
implemented in practice in early 2016 and formally signed by SSN Joint Chiefs and the Province in September 
2016. ‘Ajax Mine Project Government to Government Framework Agreement’ 
<https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/environmental-
assessments/working-with-other-agencies/eao-mous-and-agreements/eao-government-to-government-
framework-for-ajax-mine.pdf> accessed 21 February 2021. 
124 ‘Summary Assessment Report (Ajax): With Respect to the Application by KGHM Ajax Mining Inc. for an 




commented: ‘we are challenging BC’s current ‘consultation’ assessment model with one 
based on our full informed consent.’125 
 
In February 2017, the Province proposed an accommodation agreement, committing to work 
with SSN to address the social and cultural impacts of the mine; contribute $2 million to build 
SSN’s capacity to engage in a sociocultural working group with the Province; an Economic 
Community Development Agreement which included a transfer of Crown lands with a value of 
up to $8 million and resource revenue sharing of 37.5% of the Minerals Tax Act revenues 
collected by the Province on Ajax; a pilot collaborative stewardship initiative with $100,000 in 
funding for the first year for the Thompson River watershed; and to explore collaboration for 
the management and conservation of sensitive areas. In addition, the mining company 
proposed their own mine benefit agreement, including compensation and a commitment to 
provide employment for community members.126  
 
The SSN’s review determined that the mine posed serious threats to air and water quality, as 
well as irretrievable harm to the Pipsell Cultural Heritage Area, and critiqued the financial 
viability of the project. Considering the short-term economic benefits did not outweigh the long-
term impact on their cultural heritage, in March 2017 SSN announced that it was withholding 
its free, prior and informed consent for the project, in a statement: 
 
“The Ajax Mine Project in its proposed location at Pípsell is in opposition to the SSN 
land use objective for this profoundly sacred, culturally important, and historically 
significant cultural keystone site. 
 
Our decision to preserve and sustain Pípsell and Jacko Lake is for the long-term 
benefit of all Canadians, ensuring the future enjoyment of this special place serves to 
further reconciliation, so that we may all be great and good.”127 
 
 
125 Statement by Councillor Ed Jensen, ‘Stk’emlupsemc Te Secwepemc Nation Implement Its Own Assessment 
Process for the Proposed Ajax Project. Kamloops, BC, September 10 2015.’ 
<https://tkemlups.ca/files/2015/10/2015-Spring-Lexeyem.pdf>. 
126 ‘Ajax Mine Project: Joint Federal Comprehensive Study / Provincial Assessment Report’ (n 115). 
127 ‘Protect Jacko Lake and the Pípsell Cultural Area from Mining – Take Action Now!’ (Mining Watch Canada, 1 
December 2017) <https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2017/12/1/protect-jacko-lake-and-p-psell-cultural-area-mining-take-
action-now> accessed 26 February 2021. 
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The SSN’s review and public statement triggered the public support of more than 30 
organizations across BC and Canada, including the City of Kamloops, who passed several 
motions to formally oppose the project.128  
 
The SSN’s Assessment Report and their Decision Package were provided to the BCEAO and 
the CEAA, and considered in the Joint Assessment Report.  The collaborative approach to 
consultation taken for the Ajax project, according to the BCEAO, ‘resulted in a unique and 
flexible EA process and activities that included timeline changes, additional rounds of 
comments and responses resulting directly from the SSN Assessment Process, over 50 
meetings with SSN, provincial participation in SSN Assessment Process events, and a 
commitment by the EAO to include and consider the results of the SSN Assessment Process 
in the assessment report prepared by the EAO and Agency.’129  
 
In August 2017, both CEAA and BCEAO determined that the proposed project would 
irreversibly and significantly damage the SSN’s cultural heritage, and their ability to use their 
lands and resources.130 However, they also determined that, with appropriate mitigation, the 
project would not have significant environmental impacts: two opposing conclusions that were 
‘simply irreconcilable for the Secwépemc Nation.’ Furthermore, the SSN criticised the process 
and the model used for the environmental assessment, saying that ‘CEAA and BCEAO admit 
that uncertainties are high and confidence levels are low for multiple predicted impacts of the 
mine project, including for water quality, water users, air quality, health risks, and habitat 
losses.’131 Although the environmental assessment included a First Nations consultation plan, 
SSN leaders criticised the approval process for its emphasis on western science and failing to 
take into account SSN traditions and culture.132 As Federal and Provincial Ministers were 
considering their final decision, the SSN called on their supporters to lobby their political 
representatives to deny approval for the mine; work with the SSN to protect the Pipsell Cultural 
Heritage Area for the benefit of all Canadians, and to call for reform to ‘flawed and inadequate 
 
128 ‘31 Groups Join Local First Nations in Opposing Ajax Mine’ (Kamloops This Week) 
<http://www.kamloopsthisweek.com/news/31-groups-join-local-first-nations-in-opposing-ajax-mine-1.23218090> 
accessed 26 February 2021. 
129 ‘Summary Assessment Report (Ajax): With Respect to the Application by KGHM Ajax Mining Inc. for an 
Environmental Assessment Certificate Pursuant to the Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c.43’ (n 118). 
6. 
130 ‘Ajax Mine Project: Joint Federal Comprehensive Study / Provincial Assessment Report’ (n 115).; ‘Summary 
Assessment Report (Ajax): With Respect to the Application by KGHM Ajax Mining Inc. for an Environmental 
Assessment Certificate Pursuant to the Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c.43’ (n 118). 
131 ‘Protect Pipsell’ (Protect Pípsell) <http://protectpipsell.ca/> accessed 26 November 2020. 
132  Maryse Zeidler, ‘First Nation-Led Environmental Review Panel Rejects Ajax Mine in Kamloops, B.C.’ (CBC 
News, 5 March 2017) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/first-nation-led-environmental-review-
panel-rejects-ajax-mine-in-kamloops-b-c-1.4010569> accessed 26 November 2020. 
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federal and provincial environmental assessment laws and processes, in accord with the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.’133 
 
In December 2017, British Columbia Environment and Climate Change Strategy Minister 
George Heyman and Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Minister Michelle Mungall 
declined to issue the environmental assessment certificate to the project company, KGHM 
Ajax Mining Inc. The statement on behalf of BCEAO cited the conclusion that the ‘adverse 
effects of the Ajax project outweighed the potential benefits’ and that there would have been 
‘significant adverse effects to Indigenous heritage and to the current use of lands and 
resources for traditional purposes.’ 134  However, it was the state’s own assessment of the 
potential impact on indigenous cultural heritage, and not the absence of consent, that was the 
decisive factor in declining to issue the certificate.  
 
The Federal Authorities also issued a negative decision on the project proceeding in 2018, 
stating that ‘taking into consideration the Comprehensive Study Report, comments from 
Indigenous groups and the public, and the implementation of appropriate mitigation measures, 
the authorities are of the opinion that the project is likely to cause significant adverse 
environmental effects that cannot be justified in the circumstances.’135  Similar to the provincial 
government’s decision, the Ministers took into consideration the comments of indigenous 
groups in making their decision, but did not base their decision on the absence of their consent. 
The mining consortium did not appeal the decision, but in September 2019 Abacus Mining & 
Exploration Corporation, who own a 20% interest in the project, released a statement to its 
shareholders indicating that they advance the project, including considering strategies for a 
resubmission of an environmental application.136 In September 2020, KGHM reportedly 
appointed a new superintendent to work towards submitting a new application for the project, 
with a priority on engaging with First Nations, the community and the government to that 
end.137 The SSN remains firmly opposed to the project.138 
 
133 ‘Protect Pipsell’ (n 131). 
134 ‘Ministers’ Reasons for Decision, Ajax Mine Project Proposed by KGHM Ajax Mining Inc.’ (British Columbia 
2017).  
135 ‘Ajax’ (KGHM Corporate Website, 29 October 2014) <https://kghm.com/en/our-business/projects-under-
development/ajax> accessed 27 November 2020. Impact Assessment Agency of Canada, ‘Decision’ (27 June 
2018) <https://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/evaluations/document/123178?culture=en-CA> accessed 27 November 
2020.   
136 ‘Abacus Mining: Update on Ajax Project’ (Junior Mining Network, 23 September 2019) 
<https://www.juniorminingnetwork.com/junior-miner-news/press-releases/1316-tsx-venture/ame/67410-update-
on-ajax-project.html> accessed 27 November 2020.  
137 ‘KGHM Hires New Superintendent as Bid to Revive Ajax Mine Ramps Up’ (Kamloops This Week, 2 September 
2020) <https://www.kamloopsthisweek.com/news/kghm-hires-new-superintendent-as-bid-to-revive-ajax-mine-
ramps-up-1.24196668> accessed 23 October 2020.  
138 ‘Will Ajax Mine Application Be Resubmitted?’ (Kamloops This Week, 24 September 2019) 
<https://www.kamloopsthisweek.com/news/will-ajax-mine-application-be-resubmitted-1.23955973> accessed 27 




On the face of it, the Ajax mine case appears to be a great success for indigenous groups. 
However, the SSN considered that despite their own extensive and ground-breaking review 
process,139 their recommendations and findings did not lead to substantive changes in the 
either the provincial or federal EA reports, which did not adequately accommodate their 
interests. Leaders of the SSN also expressed their dismay at the consultation process which, 
in their view:  
 
does not support reconciliation between Indigenous People and Canadians or the 
Canadian Government. The process functions to draw lines and assess significance 
when it does not respect the unique and intimate relationship and responsibility that 
Indigenous People have with their territories. It does not assess and measure impacts 
from a place of respecting the sovereignty, laws, knowledge and history of Indigenous 
people. Much must be changed within this process before it can effectively and 
consistently support reconciliation.140 
  
The Ajax Mine project is an example of a project that falls at the high end of the impact 
spectrum. Despite this, and the clear absence of indigenous consent to the project, the 
provincial and federal governments conformed with a multiculturalist approach and did not 
consider FPIC to be a deciding factor in their decision to decline approval for the project. On 
the other hand, the SNN understood the process as a means to assert their nationhood and 
self-determination. In an interview shortly after the SSN’s announcement that it was 
withholding consent for the project Chief Ron Ignace commented:  
 
The days of colonial authoritarianism are over. It’s time for Canada to recognize that 
we are nations, as nations we have rights to our land, and if we are approached 
honourably, we can sit down and come to a fair and just conclusion. … We’re mad as 
hell and we’re not going to take it anymore. What we are doing is upholding our law, 
 
It’s frustrating that they think they could change our minds. I know that in every single conversation that 
we’ve had it’s always been ‘No.’ It’s not going to be changed. This is something that was community-
driven, through the membership throughout, and we’ve worked with many entities to preserve said lands. 
So it’s not only our voices but the collective voices that stood up and stood firm on that.  
139 Elizabeth McSheffrey, ‘Indigenous Law Banishes a Giant B.C. Mine’ (National Observer, 21 April 2017) 
<https://www.nationalobserver.com/2017/04/21/news/indigenous-law-banishes-giant-bc-mine> accessed 26 
November 2020. 
140 Fred Seymour and Ron Ignace, ‘#Me7ePipsellTa7aAjax (Yes Pípsell, No Ajax)- Respecting the SSN’s Pípsell 
Decision’ <https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/20171023ssntobc-can-letterre-
ssnpipselldecisionministerseadecisionforajaxproject.pdf> accessed 21 February 2021., 7.  
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maintaining and asserting our ownership and jurisdiction on our lands. That's our 
responsibility.141 
 
As yet, the title claim filed in 2015 is unresolved, and it is likely that further applications will be 
made for mining on the site. In this context, the SSN’s struggle to protect the Pípsell area is 
likely to continue, and FPIC will continue to provide a focal point for the conflict between 
indigenous self-determination and the decision-making power of the state.  
 
7.4.2 The Ring of Fire 
 
The Ring of Fire, in the wetlands of James Bay Lowlands in Ontario’s Far North, is marked as 
‘one of the most promising mineral development opportunities in Ontario in over a century’,142 
with potential for long-term production of chromite, nickel, copper, platinum, zinc, gold and 
kimberlite, valued at up to $60 billion.143 Noront Resources Limited is the largest claim holder, 
holding about 85% of the base metals holdings.144 It intends to first develop the Eagles Nest 
nickel mine, as well as chromite mines, and a new ferrochrome processing plant.145 The James 
Bay area falls within Treaty No 9, a treaty signed between First Nations and the Crown in 
1905-6, which ceded land to the Crown in return for the establishment of reserves.146 The 
James Bay area also falls under the Far North Act,147 which sets out a mechanism for joint 
land use planning to support the environmental, social and economic objectives of indigenous 
peoples of Ontario through conservation of environmental and cultural heritage, as well as 
sustainable economic development. The introduction of this Act was opposed by indigenous 
groups in the region, as it granted final decision-making power to the Government and was 
introduced without consultation and considered to be a continuation of colonial policies.148 
 
141 McSheffrey (n 139). 
142 ‘Ring of Fire’ (Ministry of Energy, Northern Development and Mines, 15 May 2012) 
<https://www.mndm.gov.on.ca/en/ring-fire> accessed 27 November 2020. 
143 So far, more than $278 million has been spent on exploration and there are about 13,300 active mining claim 
units, in relation to 2,127 square kilometres of land.  The area is 300km from the nearest paved road, so the Ontario 
government has pledged $1 billion to build new roads and other infrastructure to provide access to the region. 
Kenneth P Green, ‘BLOG: Ring of Fire Breakthrough Can’t Come Soon Enough’ (Fraser Institute, 20 September 
2019) <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/blogs/ring-of-fire-breakthrough-cant-come-soon-enough> accessed 27 
November 2020.  
144  David Godkin, ‘Making Inroads on the Ring of Fire?’ (Canadian Mining Journal, 1 February 2019) 
<https://www.canadianminingjournal.com/features/making-inroads-on-the-ring-of-fire/> accessed 27 November 
2020. 
145 ‘Ring of Fire’ (n 142). Jessica Gamble, ‘What’s at Stake in Ontario’s Ring of Fire | Canadian Geographic’ 
(Canadian Geographic, 24 August 2017) <https://www.canadiangeographic.ca/article/whats-stake-ontarios-ring-
fire> accessed 27 November 2020.  
146 John F Leslie, ‘Treaty 9 | The Canadian Encyclopedia’ (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 16 June 2016) 
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/treaty-9> accessed 27 November 2020.  
147   Far North Act, 2010, SO 2010 C 18.  
148  ‘The Far North Land Use Planning Initiative’ (Ontario.ca) <https://www.ontario.ca/page/far-north-land-use-
planning-initiative> accessed 27 November 2020. Joint planning is carried out through community-based planning 




Matawa First Nations Management is the tribal council that represents nine indigenous 
communities in the region, including Marten Falls First Nation, an Anishinaabe community on 
whose territory the Eagles Nest mine is planned, and Webequie First Nation,149 an Ojibway 
community of around 850 people, whose land falls closest to the main area for development. 
Both these First Nations have established land rights through the establishment of reserves 
under the Indian Act. In addition, other Cree and Ojibwa bands also inhabit the area.150 To 
date, there has been little industrial development in the area, with the exception of some small-
scale mining and forestry activities, and the communities still rely on the land for food, shelter 
and medicines.  According to Gamble, unemployment rates in the communities are around 
90%, and communities lack potable drinking water, have low levels of education, and high 
rates of addiction to prescription opioids.151  
 
As exploration commenced, the Webequie First Nation and Marten Falls First Nation 
conducted blockades of air strips, lifting them only on condition that they were properly 
consulted on the construction of exploration camps and the future development of the area.152 
In 2011, the CEAA decided that a Comprehensive Study Environmental Assessment should 
be undertaken, as opposed to a Joint Review Panel Environmental Assessment which the 
Matawa First Nations had called for since May of that year, to give them ‘a voice in the 
assessment’.153 In response, the Matawa Chiefs publicly withdrew their consent for the 
development, noting that ‘First Nations are not stakeholders in these matters. These are our 
homelands since time immemorial.’154 
 
In July 2013, the Matawa nations requested to enter into a Regional Framework Process, 
which was signed on 26 March 2014, to conduct community-based negotiations between the 
 
knowledge to support planning. See Holly L Gardner and others, ‘The Far North Act (2010) Consultative Process: 
A New Beginning or the Reinforcement of an Unacceptable Relationship in Northern Ontario, Canada?’ 
(International Indigenous Policy Journal, 1 November 2012) <https://doaj.org> accessed 21 February 2021.; Dayna 
Scott and John Cutfeet, ‘After the Far North Act: Indigenous Jurisdiction in Ontario’s Far North’ (Yellowhead 
Institute, 9 July 2019) <https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2019/07/09/after-the-far-north-act/> accessed 27 November 
2020.;   
149 ‘Webequie First Nation - Webequie First Nation’ <http://www.webequie.ca/article/welcome-1.asp> accessed 27 
November 2020. 
150 Gamble (n 145).  
151 ibid. 
152 James Murray, ‘NetNewsLedger - Marten Falls First Nation Starts Blockade on Ring of Fire’ (NetNewsLedger, 
27 January 2011) <http://www.netnewsledger.com/2011/01/27/marten-falls-first-nation-starts-blockade-on-ring-of-
fire/> accessed 27 November 2020.  
153 ‘Removing Our Support, Government Is Not Listening’ (Matawa First Nations, 21 October 2011) 
<http://archive.md/ylRys> accessed 27 November 2020.  
154  See comments of Chief Peter Moonias of Neskantaga First Nation, ‘Matawa Chiefs Fear the Consequences of 
Canada’s Choice to Use Comprehensive Study Environmental Assessment Process in the Ring of Fire’ (Matawa 
First Nations, 13 October 2011) <http://archive.md/ylRys> accessed 27 November 2020. 
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Government of Ontario and the Matawa First Nations Tribal Council on the future of mining 
developments, environmental protection, and community participation and benefits.155 The 
talks were kept confidential, but were described by Neskantaga and Eabametoong 
communities who took part as ‘productive exploratory talks’156, and the nine Matawa First 
Nations described a ‘positive relationship’ with the province’s lead negotiator, Justice Frank 
Iacobucci.157 Nevertheless, in 2018 the government shifted its approach from a consensus-
building approach with all nine communities, to working with only the ‘mining-ready’ 
communities, with a focus on building the new access roads.158  In November 2018, the 
Regional Framework process was suspended by the newly-elected Ford Government. 2019 
the approach was set aside entirely, in favour of negotiating separately with each of the 
communities.159 The sidelining of indigenous groups who were reticent about development 
was a subject of contention, with the Chiefs of the Neskantaga and Eabemetoong communities 
in particular warning they would pursue legal claims should they not achieve a negotiated 
agreement on the future development of the area.160  
 
Meanwhile, in May 2018, the Webequie First Nation,161 and Marten Falls First Nation162 -  both 
of which had already formed terms of reference for community land use planning with the 
 
155 ‘Ontario and Matawa Member First Nations Celebrate Historic Framework for Negotiations on the Ring of Fire’ 
(Matawa, 24 April 2014) <http://www.matawa.on.ca/ontario-and-matawa-member-first-nations-celebrate-historic-
framework-for-negotiations-on-the-ring-of-fire/> accessed 27 November 2020.  
156 ‘Lack of Consultation on Ring of Fire Development Frustrates First Nation Communities’ (Northern Ontario 
Business, 9 November 2018) <https://www.northernontariobusiness.com/industry-news/mining/lack-of-
consultation-on-ring-of-fire-development-frustrates-first-nation-communities-1117466> accessed 27 November 
2020. 
157 ‘MATAWA FIRST NATIONS MANAGEMENT STATEMENT ON REMOVAL OF REGIONAL FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT LEAD-NEGOTIATOR FOR ONTARIO UNDER NEW PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE 
GOVERNMENT’ (Matawa, 5 September 2018) <http://www.matawa.on.ca/matawa-first-nations-management-
statement-on-removal-of-regional-framework-agreement-lead-negotiator-for-ontario-under-new-progressive-
conservative-government/> accessed 27 November 2020.  
158 ‘Province Starts over on Ring of Fire Consultation Process’ (Sudbury.com, 28 August 2019) 
<https://www.sudbury.com/local-news/province-starts-over-on-ring-of-fire-consultation-process-1662256> 
accessed 27 November 2020.  
159 ‘Lack of Consultation on Ring of Fire Development Frustrates First Nation Communities’ (n 156). Earlier that 
year, it was reported that Ford removed Justice Frank Iacobucci from his position as lead negotiator of the 
Framework, during a ‘purge’ of officials appointed during the previous Wynne government’s tenure. Other accounts 
suggest that Iacobucci resigned shortly after Ford’s election. Ian Ross, ‘What’s the Plan for the Ring of Fire?’ 
(BayToday.ca, 8 September 2018) <https://www.baytoday.ca/local-news/whats-the-plan-for-the-ring-of-fire-
1039255> accessed 12 January 2021. ‘Ontario to Pursue Ring of Fire Bilateral Talks with First Nations’ (2019) 92 
Daily Commercial News 1.  
160 ‘Lack of Consultation on Ring of Fire Development Frustrates First Nation Communities’ (n 156). This was not 
a hollow threat - in July 2018, Eabemetoong was victorious in the Division Court of Ontario’s Superior Court of 
Justice, which cancelled a mining permit due to lack of consultation. ‘Court Cancels Mining Permit after Ontario 
Failed to Adequately Consult First Nation Community - The Globe and Mail’ 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-court-cancels-mining-permit-after-ontario-failed-to-adequately-
consult/> accessed 12 January 2021.  
161 ‘Webequie Supply Road Project’ (Ontario.ca, 8 May 2018) <https://www.ontario.ca/page/webequie-supply-road-
project?_ga=2.31741950.1952233397.1579433171-115629062.1579433171> accessed 12 January 2021. 
162 ‘Marten Falls Community Access Road Project’ (Ontario.ca, 8 May 2018) <https://www.ontario.ca/page/marten-
falls-community-access-road-project> accessed 12 January 2021.  
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Province of Ontario under the Far North Act163 - agreed to initiate planning for new all-weather 
roads, which would improve access to their communities, but which did not go far enough to 
connect to the proposed mine sites.164 They had entered a voluntary agreements with the 
Province of Ontario to undertake an Individual Environmental Assessment,165 and a Federal 
Impact Assessment is also being undertaken.166 Whilst complying with Provincial and Federal 
laws and guidelines, the assessments were to be community-led, so that the First Nations, 
supported by technical experts, would lead the development of the access road. As part of the 
process, the government has delegated elements of its procedural responsibility to consult 
other indigenous groups impacted by the project as part of the environmental assessment 
process. In addition, as part of the approvals process, Provincial and Federal authorities will 
also consult these groups in order and take a view whether the consultations have been 
adequate to discharge their duty to consult under s35 of the Constitution.167 Nevertheless, the 
ownership of the project by an indigenous community provides an unusual dynamic, in which 
consultation is as much an inter-indigenous community process, as it is a process of 
negotiation between different indigenous communities and the state.  
 
Indigenous ownership of the project also allows the project to proceed in accordance with 
values set by the community themselves. The Marten Falls First Nation Community168 have 
set their own guiding principles for the project, to honour their traditional land and teachings, 
and these have been incorporated into the Terms of Reference for the Provincial 
Environmental Impact Assessment, which itself was the subject of consultation with 22 
indigenous communities, both at the draft stage and following submission to Ontario’s Ministry 
of Environment, Conservation and Parks.169  
 
163  ‘Land Use Planning Process in the Far North’ (Ontario.ca, 30 May 2014) <https://www.ontario.ca/page/land-
use-planning-process-far-north> accessed 12 January 2021.  
164 ‘Preparing Environmental Assessments’ (Ontario.ca, 10 February 2014) 
<https://www.ontario.ca/page/preparing-environmental-assessments> accessed 12 January 2021.  
165 ‘Environmental Assessment: Designating Regulations and Voluntary Agreements’ (Ontario.ca, 24 January 
2014) <https://www.ontario.ca/page/environmental-assessment-designating-regulations-and-voluntary-
agreements> accessed 21 February 2021. 
166 Impact Assessment Agency of Canada, ‘Notice of Commencement of an Impact Assessment’ (24 February 
2020) <https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/evaluations/document/133939> accessed 21 February 2021. 
167 ‘Indigenous Engagement and Partnership Plan for the Marten Falls Community Access Road Project Impact 
Assessment’ (Impact Assessment Agency of Canada 2020). 
168 Impact Assessment Agency of Canada, ‘Marten Falls Community Access Road Project’ (8 August 2019) 
<https://ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/evaluations/proj/80184?culture=en-CA> accessed 12 January 2021.  
169 ‘Terms of Reference – Marten Falls First Nation’ (Martin Falls First Nation Community Access Road) 
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Similarly, the Webequie Supply Road impact assessment is also proposed and managed by 
the Webequie First Nation itself. The Webequie are also basing their approach on community 
values and traditional knowledge as well as modern protocols. Their approach is summed up 
in their three-tier model, designed to reflect ‘what makes a community work well... how its 
members see the world, and how they can best benefit from roads, resource development and 
ownership of their land.’171 
 
 
170 ‘Guiding Principles – Marten Falls First Nation’ (Marten Falls First Nation Community Access Road) 
<http://www.martenfallsaccessroad.ca/guiding-principles/> accessed 12 January 2021.  
171  ‘Community Approach – The Webequie Supply Road Project’ (Webequie Supply Road) 
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Both First Nations have set up dedicated websites to update the communities on progress and 
provide information - including explanatory videos, newsletters and reports.173 Whilst there has 
been considerable interest and engagement from the communities,174 there has also been 
concern from some Chiefs that the continuation of the consultation despite restrictions due to 
COVID-19 and proposals to use online communication, do not permit indigenous customs to 
be followed and reduces the capacity of indigenous communities to engage adequately with 
the process,175 and according to Chief Dorothy Towedo, delays in funding from the Province 




172  ‘The Webequie Supply Road Project’ (Webequie Supply Road) <https://www.supplyroad.ca/> accessed 12 
January 2021.; Impact Assessment Agency of Canada, ‘Webequie Supply Road Project’ (22 July 2019) 
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175  ibid., see Letter from Chief Dorothy Towedo, Aroland First Nation dated 24 June 2010; Letter from Chief Richard 
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These concerns mirror a recent study of indigenous communities’ understanding and 
experiences of the Matawa First Nations in the Ring of Fire.177 It highlighted the need for 
sufficient independent financing and capacity building to allow them to freely consent, the 
excessive burden of consultations on indigenous communities, and the high volume of 
complex technical information that was not translated into indigenous languages or even plain 
English. Furthermore, the study reported that community members had experienced 
intimidation, coercion and inducement to consent to mining projects in the area, and that the 
timescales for consultation often did not permit indigenous communities to build consensus in 
line with their traditional decision-making practices. Consequently, indigenous communities’ 
experiences of consultation in the Ring of Fire did not live up to their expectations of what 
FPIC under UNDRIP should entail; and they were calling for an equal, relational approach to 
dialogue with the state that adequately reflects indigenous relationship to the land. The 
unequal relationship was reflected in the relative demands placed on under-resourced 
indigenous people and the government during the consultation process: 
 
Matawa members recounted how they were required to develop various capacities to 
understand the perspectives of provincial and territorial governments and industry 
proponents. On the other hand, these members pointed out that governments and 
industry were not building their own capacity to understand Indigenous laws, protocols, 
and languages, and meanings attributed to relationships, nor were these proponents 
building their capacity to apply the principles of free, prior and informed consent.178 
 
It remains to be seen how the piecemeal strategy the government (in separating the 
construction of access roads from the later approval of mine sites) will develop, particularly in 
the context of a recent rolling-back of environmental protections in the Province that was 
received with dismay by the Matawa Chiefs.179 Indigenous groups are calling for an approach 
which ‘entails genuine joint decision-making in which final authority is shared.’180 On the other 
hand, Ontario Premier Doug Ford committed in his election campaign that the full access road 
to Ring of Fire would be built, ‘If I have to hop on that bulldozer myself… The difference 
 
177 Terry Mitchell and others, ‘Towards an Indigenous-Informed Relational Approach to Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent (FPIC)’ (2019) 10 International Indigenous Policy Journal. 
178 ibid. 
179  ‘MATAWA CHIEFS COUNCIL REJECTS THE ONTARIO GOVERNMENT BILL 197 CROWN TACTICS TO 
“TAKE UP THE LAND” AND ACCESS THE RESOURCES AND WEALTH OF THE NORTH’ (Matawa First Nations, 
28 August 2020) <http://www.matawa.on.ca/matawa-chiefs-council-rejects-the-ontario-government-bill-197-
crown-tactics-to-take-up-the-land-and-access-the-resources-and-wealth-of-the-north/> accessed 12 January 
2021.  
180 Dayna Scott and John Cutfeet, ‘After the Far North Act: Indigenous Jurisdiction in Ontario’s Far North’ 
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between us and the Liberals [is] we don't talk. We're doers.’181 Such sentiments suggest that 
there remain significant differences between the expectations of the Matawa First Nations and 
government regarding the nature and purpose of FPIC consultation.  
 
7.4.3 Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act  
 
The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act182 is an example of co-management and 
joint decision-making between First Nations councils and the territorial government of the 
Northwest Territories. The Northwest Territories is one of two Canadian jurisdictions in which 
aboriginal population outnumbers non-indigenous citizens, making up just over 50% of the 
population.183 Oil was first discovered in the region in 1920, leading to the conclusion of Treaty 
No 11 to enable the Canadian government to secure the land. Subsequently, the area was 
also mined for Uranium and gold, and a gas pipeline built. A large oil discovery in 1968 led to 
proposals for a gas pipeline from the Arctic to Alberta, following the Mackenzie River. 184 
 
At the time, the Dene were asserting their rights over territory which they argued did not form 
part of Treaty No 11 and remained unceded. The pipeline project was put on hold while several 
land claims were negotiated. In order to negotiate their claims, the Dene Nation and the Métis 
Association of the NWT formed the Dene/Métis Negotiations Secretariat, with key negotiating 
demands being the co-management of the land use planning, impact assessment, land and 
water management, management of heritage and wildlife.185 The ensuing land claims 
agreements ultimately led to two distinct indigenous jurisdictions over land in the region, the 
Inuvialuit Settlement Region to the North, and the Mackenzie River region.186  
 
 
181 CBC News, ‘Progressive Conservatives Outline Plan for Northern Ontario | CBC News’ (CBC) 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/doug-ford-northern-ontario-1.4579311> accessed 12 January 2021. 
182 Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act 1998, SC 1998, c 25. (‘MVRMA’). 
183 ‘Land Rights’ (Shift) <https://shiftproject.org/resource/the-human-rights-opportunity-in-collaboration-with-
wbcsd/land-rights/> accessed 21 February 2021. 
184 The Mackenzie River is a huge river system running through Canada’s Northwest Territories to the Arctic sea, 
on land that is traditional to the Dene, Inuvialuit, Gwich’in,Sahtu and Dehcho peoples.   ‘Mackenzie River’ (The 
Canadian Encyclopedia) <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/mackenzie-river> accessed 21 
February 2021.  
185 ‘Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act 2016 Workshop Summary Report’ (Dillon Consulting 2016) 
<https://www.lands.gov.nt.ca/sites/lands/files/resources/2016_mvrma_workshop_summary_report_-
_jun_7_16.pdf> accessed 21 February 2020., 6. The land claim agreement with the Inuvialuit (signed in 1984), 
Dene and Métis.  As a result, the Dene/Métis Agreement-in-Principle was concluded in 1989, and following this the 
Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (1992) and the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Agreement 
(1993).  The Tlicho Land Claims and Self-government Agreement was completed in 2003. Each of these 
agreements include rights over surface and subsurface resources in parts of the territory. Areas which are not 
subject to these land claims agreements fall under Treaties 8 and 11, protected by the Constitution.  
186 ibid.  
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The concluded land claim agreements with the Dene/Métis, the Gwich’in and the Sahtu First 
Nations formed the basis for the Mackenzie Valley Resources Management Act 1998 
(MVRMA).187 In keeping with the principles of the land claim agreements, the MVRMA places 
all land and water management, licensing, planning and environmental assessment (including 
that of settler communities) under the control of seven regulatory boards188 which are 
composed of 50% nominated representatives of the land claim groups, and 50% from the 
federal and territorial governments.189 This system is unique in Canada,190 and the Act is 
notable in its recognition of indigenous knowledge as a basis for decision-making alongside 
western science, and in its provision for monitoring and review of the cumulative impacts of 
proposed developments on the region as a whole, including effects on important factors for 
indigenous cultural survival, such as wildlife harvesting, the social and cultural environment or 
on heritage resources.191 
 
The Crown’s duty to consult is delegated to two of the regulatory bodies under the MVRMA, 
the Mackenzie Valley Review Board (MVRB) and the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water 
Boards (MVLWBs).192  MVLWBs regulate land use permits and water licences in the region, 
including on private, Crown and indigenous land. The process of permitting projects is briefly 
as follows: The proponents apply to the MVLWBs who conduct an initial review process, which 
may include expert input and public hearings. If they consider that projects will have a 
significant environmental impact or that there are sufficient community concerns, they refer 
the project to the MVRB for a detailed environmental assessment.193 About 5% of cases 
 
187  ibid.The MVRMA was negotiated through a coordinating group made up of the Government of Canada, the 
GNWT, and the Gwich’in, with the Sahtu acting as observers. It has since been amended to accommodate a new 
agreement with the Tlicho, in 2005, and was amended again in 2013 with the Devolution legislation - which 
transferred surface and subsurface resources rights in relation to large parcels of land to ownership of GNWT from 
Federal Govt of Canada. Canada retains ownership of  legacy contaminated sites, the Norman Wells Proven Area, 
Federal Parks, and reserves.  
188 These are the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board; the Gwich’in Land and Water Board, the Sahtu Land 
and Water Board, and Wek’eezhii Land and Water Board (for Preliminary screening and regulatory oversight); the 
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board; and the Sahtu Land Use Planning Board, and Gwich’in 
Land Use Planning Board.  
189 ‘Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act 2016 Workshop Summary Report’ (n 185). ‘MVLWV Engagement 
and Consultation Policy’ (Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board 2013) 
<https://mvlwb.com/sites/default/files/documents/wg/MVLWB%20Engagement%20and%20Consultation%20Polic
y%20-%20May%2015.pdf> accessed 21 February 2021. 
190 ‘Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act 2016 Workshop Summary Report’ (n 185)., 4.  
191 MVRMA (n 184), s146 and s111. 
192 Such delegation is permitted by law, where the administrative tribunals have the power and authority to fulfil 
the duty, including to ensure procedural fairness and the power required to ensure accommodation where 
necessary. See Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (n 76) and Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum 
Geo-Services Inc (n 67). 
193 ‘About Us’ (Mackenzie Valley Review Board) <https://reviewboard.ca/about> accessed 21 February 2021. The 
MVRB is also capable of requiring an EIA where it has concerns, even where this is not mandated by the law. One 
example in the McTavish Arm of Great Bear Lake mineral exploration project, several Sahtu agencies expressed 
concerns, but the Sahtu Land and Water Board concluded that there would be no significant adverse environmental 
impact and recommended land permit to go ahead.  The MVRB conducted its own screening and ordered an EIA 
to be undertaken. Dokis (n 96)., location 3339.   
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referred to the Land and Water Boards are determined to require an in-depth Environmental 
Assessment, which addresses both the impact on the environment ‘as well as the social, 
economic and cultural well-being of Aboriginal peoples and their way of life.’194 Both direct and 
indirect impacts are considered.195 Through a process of consultation meetings, submissions, 
technical reviews, and public hearings, the Board takes a decision on the likely level of impacts 
and mitigation strategies, and can either recommend the project for approval, rejection, or a 
higher-level assessment called an ‘Environmental Impact Review’.  The Review Board also 
mandates follow-up mechanisms to monitor compliance with its decisions, which usually 
include the establishment of monitoring bodies including indigenous representation.196  
 
The objective of the MBMRA system is to ‘guarantee consultation and participation, by 
providing significant say to Aboriginal groups in the land, water, and environmental 
management decision making process.’197  The MVRB and the MVLWBs follow guidelines on 
consultation and engagement, which are based on Canada’s domestic legal framework on the 
duty to consult.198 Once the environmental assessment process is complete, the MVRB make 
a recommendation to the relevant Federal and/or territorial government ministers, who will 
take the decision as to whether the duty to consult has been adequately discharged, and who 
may invite further comment from indigenous groups on the content of the MVRB’s report, 
before making a decision.  In practice, this gives the MVRB considerable power to influence 
whether, and under what conditions, development takes place. The MRVB has generally 
approved the projects that come before it, albeit with conditions.199 
 
Within this system, the MVLWBs and MVRB are ‘administrative tribunals’ that are regulated 
and operate in accordance with Canadian, rather than indigenous law.200 Crown consultation 
occurs through pre-application and post- application processes, and the Boards are 
 
194 ‘Resource Co-Management in the Mackenzie Valley Workshop 2020: Engagement and Consultation’ (PlanIt 
North Inc 2020) <https://slwb.com/release-final-report-resource-co-management-mackenzie-valley-workshop-
2020> accessed 21 February 2020., 10.; Under the MVRMA, the Guiding Principle of EIA is ‘the protection of the 
social, cultural and economic well-being of residents and communities in the Mackenzie Valley’. (MVRMA (n 184) 
s.115. 
195 Alan Ehrlich, ‘Cumulative Cultural Effects and Reasonably Foreseeable Future Developments in the Upper 
Thelon Basin, Canada’ (2010) 28 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 279.  
196 E.g. ‘Land Rights’ (n 183).; ‘Snap Lake Environmental Monitoring Agency’ <https://www.slema.ca/> accessed 
21 February 2021. 
197 ‘Resource Co-Management in the Mackenzie Valley Workshop 2020: Engagement and Consultation’ (n 
194).Workshop Report, 7.  
198  ‘MVLWV Engagement and Consultation Policy’ (n 189). 
199 The Assembly of First Nations referenced the MVRB in their submission to EMRIPs’ Study on FPIC, noting that 
the Board had approved (albeit with conditions) most of the projects that came before it. ‘Submission of the 
Assembly of First Nations (AFN) on Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (Assembly of First Nations 2018) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/EMRIP/Pages/StudyFPIC.aspx> accessed 21 February 2021.  




empowered to assess whether adequate consultation has taken place to discharge the 
Crown’s duty to consult.201 Innes has commented that the system is designed to produce 
‘procedural justice’, by ensuring that the process of consultation is fair. He distinguishes this 
from ‘substantive justice’, which refers to whether the outcome of the process and the laws 
that are applied to reach that decision is fair in the context.202 Furthermore Innes has stated 
that despite the emphasis of procedural over substantive justice, ‘several important elements 
of UNDRIP and FPIC are fulfilled by the Mackenzie Valley co-management system.’203 
However, as Dokis has observed in her study of consultation in the Mackenzie Valley, different 
peoples’ standards of what is reasonable and fair differ, and in this case it is the state’s view 
that is key.204  
 
In addition, the Canada’s case law on consultation, land claim agreements in the region, such 
as the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (SDMCLCA), also 
require consultation such that proponents provide sufficient information in reasonable time, 
and give ‘full and fair consideration’ of Aboriginal people’s views.205 However, although the 
goal of consultation has been said to be FPIC, there is no requirement for consent to be 
obtained. The SDMCLCA gives aboriginal title to 41,437km2 of land, including 1813km2 of 
subsurface including subsurface minerals. On this basis, according to case law discussed 
above, the requirements for consultation (at least with the Sahtu Dene) must be at the higher 
end of the consultation spectrum, including accommodation and even where impacts are 
severe, consent. Nevertheless, in line with the exceptions for consent for projects substantially 
in the public interest, the regulatory framework and practice of the Boards does not consider 
consent a requirement for decisions to proceed with projects.206  As one participant of a 2020 
workshop reviewing the co-management of the Mackenzie Valley put it: ‘Dene-Canada is 
supposed to be a treaty relationship, but this administrative process, is it fair? They only want 
to consult and accommodate – and do what they were going to anyway. Business as usual.’207  
 
In discharging the government’s duty to consult, the MVLWB/MVRB Guidelines recognise 
traditional knowledge as being equal to western scientific knowledge, and emphasise the 
 
201 ibid., 6.  
202 ibid., 8.  
203 ibid., 9.  
204 Dokis (n 96). 
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importance of meaningful dialogue and engagement in accordance with the MVLWB’s 
principles of shared responsibility between the Proponent, Canada, NWT, Aboriginal 
govts/organisations  and Boards; appropriate disclosure - including the provision of 
information in adequate time and in appropriate languages, respect for culture and traditions, 
inclusiveness- for example engaging with youth, women, and elders), and acting with 
reasonableness and in a spirit of cooperation. 208 The MVRB have published specific 
guidelines on how companies should incorporate traditional knowledge into their applications 
- requiring that indigenous consent be gained for any written record of traditional knowledge - 
as well as guidelines on how to evaluate the socioeconomic impact of projects on indigenous 
communities, including traditional economies. These guidelines highlight the need for 
developers to engage early with indigenous communities, and constantly throughout the 
process. They also stress the importance of reporting traditional knowledge with an 
understanding of its context and cultural sensitivity, observing community protocols and policy 
on the use of traditional knowledge, as well as the need to develop relationships based on 
respect and free, prior and informed consent.209  
 
However, workshops reviewing the functioning of co-management in the Mackenzie Valley 
have highlighted a number of concerns with the process, including difficulties in securing 
adequate participant funding to engage in the consultation processes;210 the need for better 
incorporation of traditional knowledge and science in decision-making; difficulties in ensuring 
all necessary information is available and understandable to participants;211 the lack of respect 
for the right to informed consent;212 and view that indigenous worldviews still take a back seat 
in practice.213 Participants also commented that some indigenous groups - the Metis, Dehcho, 
Akaitcho - are underrepresented; the timescales are often too short to allow full participation 
of communities; and that the system still seems to favour industry.214  The process is also 
considered to be proponent-driven,215 with lack of understanding from project proponents on 
the history of the region and culturally appropriate ways to communicate, often focusing on 
indigenous government organisations which can amplify divisions in the communities.  
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Criticism of the MVRMA system has also noted that developments in the early stages of 
project planning undermine the negotiating power of communities during subsequent 
consultation processes. Participants in the 2020 workshop noted that federal government 
must consult before administering resource rights to ‘shift the dynamics of early engagement’. 
Once resource rights have been granted, in order to gain access to indigenous land, 
proponents require permission by the relevant indigenous land corporation, who usually 
require an impact benefit agreement to be signed in advance. Dokis has noted that in Sahtu 
territory this closed-door process usually occurs without community consultation, because of 
the high number of requests for access and ‘consultation fatigue’, and does not result in 
communities receiving an equal share of the proceeds, nor do the financial proceeds help to 
compensate for the impacts on traditional livelihoods.216 Additionally, participants in a 2020 
workshop noted that they were required to sign confidentiality agreements, which undermined 
a free consultation process.217 Furthermore, once proponents have signed an IBA, the project 
design is well determined and they tend to assume that consent has been given. This prevents 
indigenous communities from being able to significantly alter the project during subsequent 
public consultation during the EIA.218   
 
Armitage has argued that the MVRB has demonstrated evidence of deliberative learning that 
seeks to change worldviews and values, and in so doing, has managed to transform power 
relations within the environmental assessment process.219 However, others take a far less 
optimistic view. White argues that formal, written and rules-bound processes do not reflect 
Aboriginal values or decision-making practices that tend to favour oral communication and 
egalitarian structures, and that it is practically impossible to translate some elements of 
Aboriginal knowledge into English.  Such concerns prevent proper intercultural dialogue, 
instead requiring that indigenous participants adapt to western bureaucratic processes. 220 
Such processes can remove the political nature of discussions, turning them into a 
bureaucratic process.221 Dokis goes even further, arguing that  
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current participatory resource management practice in the Sahtu have legitimated and 
entrenched non-local forms of land tenure, decision making, governance and 
economies,. … a form of cooptation in which the voices and general metaphysics of 
the Sahtu Dene people are reduced to “stories” that may appear as evidence in 
transcripts but are not take seriously in decision making processes.222  
 
Consequently, she argues that the Sahtu Dene are 
 
‘made complicit in resource development decisions through the very act of 
participation … in part because there is an underlying assumption among corporations, 
govt, and regulatory institutions of the inevitability of the expansion of market 
economics, that wage labour will always overtake other ways of making a living, and 
that money is more valuable than anything else.’223  
 
Her perspective is mirrored by Mason Mantla, Tlicho citizen and participant in the 2020 
workshop, who stated ‘the NWT regulatory system is inherently colonial, and that Indigenous 
People have little choice but to participate within it. The system was build using western 
perspectives as a base, with those working within the system trying to apply traditional 




The illustrative examples used in this chapter have been chosen to show what might arguably 
be a ‘best case scenario’ for a multiculturalist model of FPIC. The consultations take place 
over a number of years, and are connected with the environmental and social impact 
assessment that takes place prior to project approval. The absence of prescriptive legislation 
on consultation in Canada has allowed a significant degree of variation and flexibility in the 
way that the duty to consult is implemented, so that it can be adapted to the specific concerns 
and institutional frameworks of the communities involved. This chapter has provided examples 
of how indigenous communities are asserting a degree of agency through innovative 
structures and institutions, so that environmental and social impact assessments are informed 
by indigenous knowledge as well as western scientific expertise.  As a result of this 
engagement, indigenous communities are successfully widening the scope of what is 
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assessed prior to project approval, participating in baseline assessments, developing design 
alternatives and ensuring their involvement in monitoring mechanisms.  Indigenous 
communities are also leveraging consultations on specific projects to open up wider discussion 
with the state on how the region should be developed long-term, in line with indigenous 
principles and land management strategies.  
 
At first glance then, it appears that this chapter has presented an optimistic view of the 
multiculturalist approach to FPIC. It is certainly much better than projects being approved with 
little or no consultation at all. However, it is doubtful whether even these relatively progressive 
examples of consultation are sufficient to support a deep understanding of self-determination 
that is required for reconciliation.  This is because the examples in this chapter ultimately 
substantiate Coulthard’s concern that state-centric administrative negotiation processes will 
be unable to fundamentally transform the relationship between indigenous peoples and the 
state. In all these examples, the state retains its over-arching authority and decision-making 
power. Furthermore, the difficulties in recognising indigenous laws and knowledge on an equal 
basis inherently puts indigenous peoples at a disadvantage within the process, requiring them 
to work within state-designed procedures and to express themselves in terms that are credible 
to the state. As such, these apparently positive examples demonstrate the limits of the 
multiculturalist approach in enabling indigenous self-determination.  
 
Importantly for this thesis, these illustrative examples are consistent with a multiculturalist 
definition of FPIC as a duty to consult with a view to achieving agreement, rather than a duty 
to obtain consent. In all three examples, indigenous consent is not a deciding factor in the 
state’s decision on whether or not to proceed with projects. Therefore it is the state, not 
indigenous peoples, who have the final say on how indigenous land will be used. Whilst 
indigenous communities may leverage innovative mechanisms to expand the amount and type 
of information available for the state to consider in its decision-making, they do not have any 
meaningful control over the outcome, or even an equal say in the final decision.  There may 
be tentative evidence in these examples to suggest that by leveraging innovative mechanisms, 
indigenous communities can increase the scope of the information available to state decision-
makers and thus increase the likelihood that the final decision will be acceptable to the 
communities in question. However, this indirect influence over the outcome does not represent 
real self-determination or a transformation of power relations vis-a-vis the state. Under the 
multiculturalist model of FPIC operating in Canada, the future of indigenous communities and 




Furthermore, where the state did decline to approve projects to which indigenous peoples 
withheld consent, it did so on the basis of its own cost-benefit calculation of environmental and 
social risk, according to its own logic. For example in the Ajax case, the indigenous community 
challenged the rationale of the state’s conclusion that the project would have severe impacts 
on SSN cultural heritage whilst having insignificant environmental effects. The division of 
social and environmental risk in this way was ‘simply irreconcilable’ according to the SSN’s 
way of thinking.  As the Ring of Fire case in particular shows, the logic used by state officials 
to make these decisions is changeable, as political and economic trends influence the 
approach of the government of the day.   
 
The dominance of state-centric logic in decision-making mirrors the concerns of Coulthard that 
dialogic processes will favour the state, because they will be carried out in the terminology 
and logic of the state, undermining indigenous identity and negotiating power. Consequently 
this thesis has argued that epistemic justice is key to operationalising FPIC in a way that 
supports self-determination and is truly reconciliatory. The examples in this chapter illustrate 
the difficulty of ensuring epistemic justice within the multiculturalist framework of FPIC. Despite 
the fact that in all the examples the process recognised the value of indigenous knowledge, in 
each case there is criticism from indigenous participants that western scientific knowledge 
remains prioritised and that the process itself is technical and bureaucratic, and often 
inconsistent with indigenous cultural traditions. As one aboriginal participant of a MVRB 
consultation process explained, ‘The opportunity is provided to participate… but that 
participation is conditional on people being able to act like western bureaucrats, and that is 
the real problem.’225  This may be compounded by an inability of state officials to recognise 
their own specific epistemic location – as Nadasdy has observed, Euro-Canadian frameworks 
for evaluating environmental impact data are viewed as being ‘culture-free’, whereas 
indigenous views seen as being rooted in culture.226  
 
Furthermore, both the Ajax and Ring of Fire cases give insight into some of the difficulties that 
indigenous communities face within the FPIC process, which stem from an apparent 
unwillingness to re-examine the imbalance of power between indigenous peoples and the 
state by giving indigenous peoples the chance to make a free decision on their future. For 
example, indigenous communities may need to fend off repeated applications for projects 
even after their consent has been withheld; ‘divide and rule’ tactics challenge the unity of 
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indigenous communities; piecemeal development strategies are employed to break 
contentious developments into more palatable stages; and provincial legislation reduced 
environmental protections in order to speed the permitting process. Such examples support 
Young’s concern that the duty to consult does not meaningfully support self-government, but 
instead is intended as a bureaucratic process to ensure that development projects are 
eventually approved.227  
 
Furthermore, there is an overriding expectation that indigenous communities will behave in a 
manner that is perceived as reasonable to non-indigenous actors in the process. The 
comments of Doug Ford, and of Alan Coutts, the CEO of Noront Resources, support Coyle’s 
observation that indigenous communities are expected to behave in a manner that is 
‘reasonable’ - which is interpreted by non-indigenous actors as negotiating some modifications 
to projects, but not doing anything that would cause undue delay or that is intended to stop 
the project outright. This, as Hamilton and Nichols note, restricts indigenous peoples’ options 
within the consultation process and undermines their ability to express their self-determination 
as they see fit.228 As will be discussed in Chapter 8, the state’s view on what constitutes 
reasonable and unreasonable behaviour from indigenous communities can have 
consequences for that community’s relative negotiating power within an FPIC dialogue.  
 
In addition to the right to freely consent and to have that consent respected, self-determination 
can also be expressed by exercising control over how the FPIC process is designed and put 
into practice. As the legal framework in Canada stands, there is no systemic mechanism to 
ensure that indigenous communities are included in the design and administration of the 
consultation process.229 All three of these cases are notable and indeed celebrated because 
the indigenous communities wielded an unusual degree of agency within the process of 
consultation and impact assessment.  In both the Ajax and Ring of Fire examples, the 
innovative mechanisms developed as a result of ongoing resistance by the indigenous 
communities together with NGOs and civil society, and is a credit to the strength of indigenous 
community leaders and institutions. The legislative framework, whilst providing enough leeway 
for these processes to evolve, did not by any means encourage their development.  
  
The Mackenzie Valley Review Board provides an example of a system that attempts to 
construct a co-management relationship based on recognition of indigenous government and 
rights to land. However, even in this case dialogue mechanisms must operate within the 
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constraints of the state’s legal architecture, scientific technical approach, and commitment to 
state development paradigms. Consequently even this most progressive of multiculturalist 
approaches to FPIC requires, as Coulthard has noted, indigenous laws and knowledges must 
ultimately express themselves within the terms of a colonial system.  The Mackenzie Valley 
case also draws attention to the difficulties of constructing nation to nation relations within a 
multiculturalist and capitalist system. As Dokis has argued, land claim agreements have been 
used by governments to integrate indigenous communities into the market economy, by 
transforming spiritual relations to land ‘into the language of property law and craft capitalist 
subjects who are compelled to treat their land as a commodity.’230 The inability of a co-
management system to fully respect FPIC (in terms of the right to say ‘no’) even on land held 
with aboriginal title is deeply concerning. As Innes commented, ‘Not all resource management 
issues are best managed by a co-management framework. In certain cases, the rights holder 
should be the sole decision maker, for example when the resource is fully in their 
territory….Co-management is, at best, a compromise’.231  
 
Finally, the three examples also suggest that utilising independent, expert panels may help to 
overcome the historic lack of trust between indigenous peoples and the state and build 
confidence in the FPIC process. In the Ajax and Ring of Fire examples, the indigenous 
communities requested that the federal EIA be carried out through a Joint Review Panel, in 
which an independent panel of experts undertakes the most thorough form of assessment, 
including public hearings. In both cases, the government instead decided to use the less 
stringent Comprehensive Study process, in which the CEA Agency undertakes the 
assessment itself, to the displeasure of the indigenous communities involved.  Indeed, under 
the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act, if the Minister responsible for taking a 
decision about the project intends to reject the recommendations of the MVRB, then an 
independent review panel is established by the MVRB to reassess the project before the 
Minister takes the final decision. This tentatively supports a greater role for intermediaries in 




This thesis postulates that the practical realisation of the right to indigenous self-determination 
is a prerequisite to reconciliation. As Stacey has commented in relation to Canada, ‘if 
indigenous rights and title are to promote reconciliation, it must be shaped and informed by 
 
230 Dokis (n 96)., location 3745. 




the extent to which consultation increases Crown accountability to Indigenous peoples and 
allows Indigenous peoples to act as sovereign, politically autonomous nations.’232 This chapter 
has suggested that although Canada’s unique legal framework on the duty to consult 
professes to respect indigenous peoples as distinct and pre-existing societies, in fact it 
remains trapped in the sovereignty/self-determination conflict that was discussed in Chapter 
3.  Furthermore, the approach that the Courts and state practice have taken to resolving this 
conflict in relation to FPIC mirrors the multicultural approach discussed in Chapter 5. In 
interpreting FPIC through the lens of the duty to consult and accommodate, indigenous 
peoples in Canada are treated as sub-state minority groups rather than self-determining 
peoples. Consequently the underlying assumption that the state has legitimate authority over 
indigenous peoples, laws and lands, remain unchallenged, and the colonial relationship 
between the state and indigenous peoples continues.  
 
This chapter has also deliberately explored three illustrative examples at the deeper end of 
the consultation spectrum, that arguably demonstrate a best-case scenario for the 
multicultural approach to FPIC. However, even these relatively progressive examples suggest 
the validity of Coulthard’s concern that state-centric administrative negotiation processes will 
inherently disadvantage indigenous peoples by failing to recognise their laws, knowledge and 
ways of being on an equal basis. Ultimately, the state retains a firm hold over the process of 
FPIC, as well as over whether a project will proceed in the absence of indigenous consent.   
The next Chapter will use mediation and negotiation theory to explore how these inherent 
limitations of the multicultural model of FPIC work to undermine indigenous negotiating power 
within the consultation process. It also suggests how the use of mediators might help 
ameliorate imbalances of negotiating power, build trust in the process, increase epistemic 
justice, and improve the opportunities for self-determination. 
 
232 Richard Stacey, ‘Honour in Sovereignty: Can Crown Consultation with Indigenous Peoples Erase Canada’s 




Chapter 8: The potential for mediation to increase 





This thesis has argued that two very different interpretations of FPIC have emerged. The first, 
proposed by indigenous people and their supporters, emphasises indigenous self-
determination and the need for states to obtain indigenous consent as a ‘general rule’ prior to 
the approval of extractive projects on indigenous territory.  However, the interpretation adopted 
by states interprets FPIC through the lens of human rights based multiculturalism, and views 
FPIC as only an objective to be aimed for as part of a process of democratic participation 
rather than a requirement to be achieved. Chapters 6 and 7 showed how this multiculturalist 
approach is defining the implementation of FPIC in Peru and Canada, and limiting its potential 
to be a force for reconciliation in the countries. 
 
Central to this analysis is the continuation of colonial hierarchies of power within the 
multiculturalist model, that reinforce the ultimate control of the state over land, resources and 
decision-making processes.  The case studies have highlighted many of the ways that 
maintaining this hierarchy of power affects FPIC consultation processes. They have argued 
that multiculturalist FPIC consultations are dominated by state legal systems, knowledge 
systems and bureaucratic processes that privilege Eurocentric worldviews over indigenous 
ones. Indigenous rights are defined and adjudicated by the state, according to its own legal 
principles. Indigenous communities are excluded from full participation in decision-making as 
a result of a lack of funding, scientific advice, legal expertise and capacity, in the face of 
‘consultation fatigue’. The negotiation positions and strategies of indigenous peoples are 
judged to be ‘reasonable’ or otherwise, by reference to their conformity with state law and 
normative standards, and often indigenous communities are seen as ‘dogs in the manger’, 
standing in the way of beneficial economic development. Politically sensitive issues are dealt 
with through channels that purport to be ‘neutral’, but whose effect is to remove the politically 




On a practical level, indigenous people are presented in FPIC consultations with pre-designed 
projects, at a stage in the project when substantial changes are considered no longer to be 
possible. Timescales are often insufficient to permit proper contemplation of the project in 
accordance with indigenous cultural practices. Indigenous communities must navigate 
consultation processes designed by the state rather than in partnership with the indigenous 
communities concerned. Issues that are considered inextricable in indigenous worldviews are 
siloed into Eurocentric categories, and traditional knowledge is given less weight than 
technical data. Most importantly, indigenous communities have no ‘right to say no’. Given this 
reality, it is unsurprising that FPIC consultations are often undertaken in an atmosphere of 
distrust.  
 
All these factors result in a systemic disadvantage to indigenous peoples within the FPIC 
consultation process. Consequently, this chapter examines the potential for mediation as a 
strategic tool to help mitigate some of the impact. The first section provides some information 
on why western mediation can be considered a suitable process for FPIC consultations, and 
some important caveats. It then evaluates the potential contributions of three models of 
mediation: rights-based, interests-based and narrative mediation.  
 
Ledeyet has noted that recognising the need to obtain indigenous consent is viewed by many 
as an inversion of the existing imbalance of power within consultation processes, in a way that 
gives indigenous peoples unfair power over the state.1 Consistent with the conceptualisation 
of consultation as a negotiation, this chapter reinterprets the obligation to ‘consult in order to 
obtain consent’ as a duty to forge consensus. This is consistent with the approaches of authors 
such as Hamilton and Nicholls,2 who have argued for a ‘duty to negotiate’ in the Canadian 
context, or of Ortiz,3 Coyle4 and Ilizarbe5 who argued that consultation norms should be shifted 
towards ‘consensus’ and away from binary notions of ‘consent’. Viewed in this way, the 
principle of consent is not a unilateral veto in either direction, but a recognition of the need to 
build relationships and work together to find a resolution that both sides can accept. This 
reformulation fundamentally challenges the legitimacy of either side presuming the greater 
power within the relationship, and could help to move beyond a multicultural interpretation of 
 
1 Dominique Leydet, ‘The Power to Consent: Indigenous Peoples, States, and Development Projects’ (2018) 69 
University of Toronto Law Journal 371. 
2 Robert Hamilton and Joshua Nichols, ‘The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty 
to Consult’ (2019) 56 Alberta Law Review 729. 
3 Alejandro Santamaría Ortiz, ‘La consulta previa desde la perspectiva de la negociación deliberativa’ [2016] 
Revista Derecho del Estado 227. 
4 Michael Coyle, ‘Shifting the Focus: Viewing Indigenous Consent Not as a Snapshot But As a Feature Film’ (2020) 
27 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 357. 
5 Carmen Ilizarbe, ‘Intercultural Disagreement: Implementing the Right to Prior Consultation in Peru’ (2019) 46 
Latin American Perspectives 143. 
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FPIC consultation towards a more inter-cultural, nation-to-nation understanding of what FPIC 
entails.  
 
8.2 Mediation as a suitable process for negotiations between indigenous peoples and 
the state. 
 
8.2.1 A brief comparison of western mediation and indigenous peacemaking 
 
Within western legal systems, mediation is a voluntary form of ‘alternative dispute resolution’ 
in which an independent third party facilitates a confidential dialogue process to enable the 
disputants to negotiate a mutually beneficial settlement of their dispute. Mediation is used in 
a wide variety of contexts - for example civil and commercial disputes, family disputes and 
employment disputes - and may be either voluntarily instigated, or increasingly, may be court-
mandated.6  Additionally, mediation has been used to help settle disputes between different 
communities, in international conflicts between states, and in conflicts relating to different 
ethnocultural groups, environmental issues and climate change.7 It is usually a structured and 
semi-formal process viewed as a cost-efficient means of resolving disputes which respects 
the self-determination of the parties, and (in some cases) seeks to enhance the relationship 
between them by building trust and respect.8 Because the outcome is not imposed on the 
parties from an external source of authority, mediation has been described as a ‘bottom-up’ 
and ‘anti-authoritarian’ process.9  An influential advocate of mediation, Lon Fuller, argued that 
mediation has the ‘capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on 
them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a 
perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.’10  
 
Whilst in western legal systems mediation is viewed as an ‘alternative’ to litigation, in many 
traditional and indigenous societies consensus-building approaches are considered the 
primary means to resolve disputes, and ‘today indigenous communities practice their own 
indigenous dispute resolution processes, western forms of ADR, and the Indigenized Western 
 
6 Marjorie Mantle, Mediation: A Practical Guide for Lawyers (Edinburgh University Press 2017) 
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/city/detail.action?docID=5013836> accessed 30 October 2020. 
7 Alexia Georgakopoulos, The Mediation Handbook: Research, Theory, and Practice (Taylor & Francis Group 
2017) <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/city/detail.action?docID=5050260> accessed 30 October 2020. 
8 Robert A Baruch Bush and Joseph P Folger, ‘Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Opportunities’ (2012) 27 
Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 1.; Luísa Brandão Bárrios, ‘European Mediation and Indigenous 
Mediation’ (2020) 115 Teisė 134. 
9 Michal Alberstein, ‘The “Law of Alternatives”: Conflict Resolution as the Art of Reconstruction’, Studies in Law, 
Politics and Society, vol 70 (2016). 
10 Lon L Fuller, ‘Mediation--Its Forms and Functions’ (1970) 44 Southern California Law Review 305. 325.  
255 
 
ADR systems’.11 Whilst many indigenous conflict resolution practices12 may have some 
similarities to western mediation, the two have important distinctions that stem from underlying 
values of reciprocity and relationship. According to Victor, indigenous peace making usually 
occurs within the community, and involves ceremonies, story-telling, ‘saving face’, recounting 
of facts, speaking of emotions, prayer and spirituality. Additionally, the processes tend to be 
more flexible than western models, involving cyclical understandings of time, qualitative 
measurement of success, and a people-focused (rather than solutions-focused) approach.13  
The peace-making process may take a good deal of time so that everyone can express 
themselves sufficiently for healing to occur. Victor observes that the ‘Indian time’ that has been 
so maligned in western culture as time-wasting and laziness, is valued in indigenous 
communities as waiting for when the time is right - i.e., when the relationship is sufficiently 
developed and sufficient trust exists to deal with the conflict.14  
 
As Sauvé noted in a study of mediation with the Guugu Yimithirr in a community justice 
programme in Queensland, Australia, ‘the aboriginal conceptualisation of what ‘mediation’ 
means bears little resemblance to the ‘western’ model,’ and these differences stem from 
opposing views about ‘relating generally and community specifically.’15 Suave argues that 
western mediation’s emphasis on achieving an agreement is too simplistic for aboriginal 
participants, who are seeking a transformation of relationship, spirit and heart at a much 
deeper level than a solutions-oriented agreement.  What requires ‘settling’, in the indigenous 
view, are not the issues at hand, but the transformation of relationship - resulting in 
reconciliation with oneself, with the other disputants, and with the community at large.  Such 
a description emphasises the importance that indigenous peacebuilding places on respect, 
relationships, community, interconnectedness and reciprocity.16  
 
 
11 Brandão Bárrios (n 8). 135. According to Bárrios, ‘“Indigenous Dispute Resolution Processes,” are intuitive, time-
tested and pre-colonial forms and systems of dealing with community problems by coming up with a consensual, 
communal solution.’  
12  Whilst it is problematic to generalise across different indigenous traditions and assume homogeneity or an 
essentialist ideal of indigenous societies, patterns have been observed in how indigenous societies often differ 
from western cultures.  For example, Martinez identifies seven dimensions of difference: the approach to 
individuality; holistic perspectives on life and nature; the concept of time; societal organization and kinship ties; 
guardianship vs ownership of land; leadership; and the principle of reciprocity. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, ‘Study on 
Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations, First 
Progress Report Submitted by Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur’ (UN Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 1992) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/32. 
13 Carlo Osi, ‘Understanding Indigenous Dispute Resolution Processes and Western Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, Cultivating Culturally Appropriate Methods in Lieu of Litigation’ (2008) 10 Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 163.; Wenona Victor, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts: A Critical Review’ 
(Canadian Human Rights Commission 2007) <https://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/alternative-dispute-
resolution-aboriginal-contexts-critical-review> accessed 16 November 2020. 
14 Victor (n 13). 27. 
15 Madeleine Sauve, ‘Mediation: Towards an Aboriginal Conceptualisation’ (1996) 3 Aboriginal Law Bulletin 10. 10. 
16 Osi (n 13). 
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8.2.2 Precedents for the use of mediation in dialogues between indigenous peoples and 
states 
 
Mediation has been described as a ‘logical tool’17 for use to resolve disputes that arise during 
consultation processes. Coyle argues that mediation ‘offers the possibility of enhancing 
communications between the participants and ensuring that the dialogue occurs in an 
atmosphere of respect for all parties' views on the conflict.’18 Furthermore, he suggests that 
mediation is particularly useful in enabling agreements where ‘multiple normative orders’ come 
into play, because it does not require the parties to agree on the norms themselves. Instead, 
mediation can assist the parties to find solutions which are consistent with both sides’ 
normative values and laws.   
 
There is precedent for mediation being used between indigenous peoples and states in 
stakeholder engagement mechanisms and on conflicts relating to natural resource 
management and intellectual property rights.19  Indigenous movements have themselves 
advocated for mediation as a tool for resolving land and resources disputes with states.20 
EMRIP’s Follow up report on Indigenous peoples, decision making and the extractives industry 
recognises the use of mediation within grievance mechanisms in the extractives industry, 
recommending that they should be culturally appropriate, rights-based, and should take into 
account traditional indigenous mechanisms such as justice circles where indigenous peoples 
ask for these.21 ‘In the mining sector, mediation is included in ICMM’s guidance on resolving 
 
17 Coyle, ‘Shifting the Focus’ (n 4)., 372. 
18 ibid., 372. 
19 For example, the UN FAO has released guidance on ‘Negotiation and Mediation Techniques for Natural 
Resource Management’ for practitioners working on participatory natural resource management and rural livelihood 
projects; the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding initiative 
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), have released guidance on ‘Natural Resources and 
Conflict: A Guide for Mediation Practitioners’, and the ICOM-WIPO Art and Cultural Heritage Mediation process 
has been developed to resolve conflicts over cultural heritage, and is open to states, museums, indigenous peoples 
and individuals. See Antonia Engel and Benedikt Korf, ‘Negotiation and Mediation Techniques for Natural Resource 
Management’ (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/3/a0032e/a0032e00.htm#Contents> accessed 16 November 2020.; ‘Natural Resources and 
Conflict: A Guide for Mediation Practitioners’ (United Nations Department of Political Affairs and United Nations 
Environment Programme 2015). ‘ICOM-WIPO Art and Cultural Heritage Mediation’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/art/icom/index.html> accessed 16 November 2020.  
20 See ‘Manila Declaration of the International Conference on Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, Sustainable 
Development and Indigenous Peoples, 6-8 December 2000’ (Tebtebba Foundation 2000).; Joji Cariño, ‘Indigenous 
Peoples Addressing Land and Resource Conflicts’ in Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Joji Cariño (eds), Reclaiming 
Balance: Indigenous Peoples, Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Development (Tebtebba Foundation 2004). 
Augusto Willemsen Diaz, ‘Outside Intervention’ in Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Joji Cariño (eds), Reclaiming Balance: 
Indigenous Peoples, Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Development (Tebtebba Foundation 2004).  
21 UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Fifth Session 9-13 July 2012 ‘Follow-up report 
on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, with a focus on the extractive industries’ (30 
April 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2., para 28(d).  
257 
 
local-level grievances,22 and in their good practice guide on indigenous peoples and mining.23  
Mediation of company-community disputes is also provided by the IFC’s Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman;24 and the OECD’s National Contact Points dispute resolution process,25 and the 
World Bank has also recommended mediation and alternative dispute resolution, including 
traditional dispute resolution methods, when engaging with indigenous peoples.26 Mediation 
has also been used in relation to the settlement of land claims in Canada,27 and in relation to 
a company-community dispute that occurred in around 2002, in relation to the Tintaya 
Antapaccay mine in Peru.28  
 
Mediation is also finding its way into the realm of FPIC consultation.  In 2008, the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia in Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v British Columbia (Minister of Forests)29 agreed to 
the Hupacasath First Nation’s application for an independent mediator to be appointed to 
assist with an ongoing process of FPIC consultation and accommodation. In the Haida case, 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognised the value of third-party involvement in consultation 
processes, stating that where there is a requirement for deep consultation with indigenous 
peoples, ‘the government may wish to adopt dispute resolution procedures like mediation or 
administrative regimes with impartial decision-makers in complex or difficult cases.’30 The 
National Centre for First Nations Governance have also recognised mediation as a tool in 
consultation processes to assist in reaching agreement,31 and have advised that ‘Court 
 
22 ‘Handling and Resolving Local-Level Concerns and Grievances’ (ICMM 2019) 
<https://www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/social-and-economic-
development/191210_publication_grievance-mechanism.pdf> accessed 19 November 2020. 
23 ICMM, Indigenous Peoples and Mining: Good Practice Guide (2nd edn, ICMM 2015) 
<https://www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/social-and-economic-development/9520.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2020.  
24 ‘Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman : How We Work : Ombudsman’ <http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/ombudsman/> accessed 19 November 2020.  
25 ‘National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises - OECD’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/ncps.htm> accessed 19 November 2020. See Cathal M Doyle and Andrew 
Whitmore, Indigenous Peoples and the Extractive Sector: Towards a Rights Respecting Engagement (Tebtebba, 
PIPLinks and Middlesex University). 99-104 for a discussion of OECD National Contact Points in relation to 
indigenous peoples’ rights.  
26 Luis Felipe Duchicela and others, ‘Indigenous Peoples Development in World Bank-Financed Project: Our 
People, Our Resources Striving for a Peaceful and Plentiful Planet. Case Studies Report.’ (World Bank Group 
2015) <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/707481444854126688/WB-IP-Report-Sept-28-2015-final-version.pdf> 
accessed 19 November 2019.  
27 Michael Coyle, ‘Addressing Aborginal Land Rights in Ontario: An Analysis of Past Policies and Options for the 
Future - Part II’ (2005) 31 Queen’s Law Journal 796.  
28 Brooke D Barton, ‘A Global/Local Approach to Conflict Resolution in the Mining Sector: The Case of the Tintaya 
Dialogue Table’ (Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, Tufts University 2005) 
<https://dl.tufts.edu/concern/pdfs/c247f3984> accessed 19 November 2020.; Caroline Rees, ‘Mediation in 
Business-Related Human Rights Disputes: Objections, Opportunities and Challenges’ (John F Kenney School of 
Government, Harvard University 2010) Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No 56.  
29 Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2008 BCSC 1505. 
30 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, 2004 SCC 73., para 44.  
31 ‘Project Report to the National Centre for First Nations Governance: First Nation Consultation Framework’ (Hill 
Sloan Associates Inc 2008) 
<http://www.fngovernance.org/resources_docs/First_Nation_ConsultationFramework.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2020.  
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supervision over court-ordered consultation, accommodation and mediation processes 
between the Crown and First Nations is now a standard remedy in cases challenging Crown 
decisions on the basis that aboriginal or treaty rights have not been accommodated.’ 
Furthermore, where consultations do not result in agreement with the Crown, the NCFNG has 
advocated for new decision-making processes including ‘mediation and/or an independent 
and specialized tribunal consisting of both First Nation and Crown representatives.’32   
 
In addition to the mediation of disputes that arise in FPIC consultation, the practice of engaging 
a facilitator to guide the consultation process is also becoming established. Facilitation is 
closely related to mediation, in that it involves a facilitator assisting two or more parties to 
communicate constructively and work together productively, through the establishment of  
dialogue process, identifying issues for discussion, and managing areas of tension.33  In Peru, 
the Prior Consultation Law and Regulatory Decree requires all FPIC consultations to be 
managed by a trained facilitator, registered by the Vice-ministry of Interculturality.34 In the 
corporate sector, private consultancy firms are now advertising services as ‘neutral facilitators’ 
to help both private and public entities achieve the consent of indigenous peoples.35 
Additionally, in a workshop evaluating co-management in the Mackenzie Valley, Innes referred 
to the frequent disagreements that arise in FPIC consultation processes, including between 
different indigenous participants, and spoke of ‘a need to do dispute resolution to arrive and a 
fair and reasonable result’.36 
 
8.2.3 The need for urgent action as well as caution 
 
In the light of these developments, it is important to consider the potential role of mediators 




32 Maria Morellato, ‘The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal and Treaty Rights: 
Research Paper for the National Centre for First Nations Governance’ (Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP 2008) 
<http://www.fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/maria_marletto.pdf> accessed 19 November 2020.  
33  Janice M Fleischer and Zena D Zumeta, ‘Preventing Conflict through Facilitation’ (Mediate.com, December 
1999) <https://www.mediate.com/articles/zenandflei.cfm> accessed 19 November 2020. 
 
34 Ley No 29785 - Ley del Derecho a la consulta previa a los pueblos indígenas u originarios, reconocido en el 
Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) 2011.; Decreto Supremo N° 001-2012-MC 2012, 
Art 28;  Resolución Viceministerial 001-2012-VMI-MC 2012.; For a detailed description of the role of facilitators, 
see Ministerio de Cultura, ‘Derecho a La Consulta Previa: Guia Metodologica Para La Facilitacion de Procesos de 
Consulta Previa’ (Ministerio de Cultura 2015). 
35 ‘Implementing FPIC Successfully: A Core CCCS Service’ (Cross-Cultural Consulting Services) 
<http://crossculturalconsult.com/services/fpic/> accessed 19 November 2020.  
36 ‘Resource Co-Management in the Mackenzie Valley Workshop 2020: Engagement and Consultation’ (PlanIt 
North Inc 2020) <https://slwb.com/release-final-report-resource-co-management-mackenzie-valley-workshop-
2020> accessed 21 February 2020., 11. 
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Many scholars and practitioners have questioned whether mediation is appropriate for 
disputes which involve a conflict of rights.37 Furthermore, EMRIP has noted that ‘consensus is 
not a legitimate approach if its intention or effect is to undermine the human rights of 
indigenous peoples.’38 It has been noted that in cases where human rights are concerned, 
introducing confidential mediation processes to resolve complaints could act against the public 
interest by undermining procedural fairness, and preventing transparency and public 
disclosure of the outcome.39 Furthermore, participants who are socio-economically 
disadvantaged or who have a limited understanding of their rights could be put at a 
disadvantage, further entrenching systemic injustices.40  Thus consensus-based approaches 
such as mediation must be deployed with awareness of the potential to undermine indigenous 
rights, particularly where power disparities are in play. Nevertheless, FPIC consultation as put 
forward in UNDRIP is, in itself, an exercise in reaching agreement and could equally be 
criticised in the same way. Mediation at least provides the opportunity for independent third 
parties to intervene in the process where differences in negotiating power are threatening to 
negatively affect indigenous rights. 
 
In proposing mediation as a tool for FPIC consultation, it is recognised that some indigenous 
people resent attempts to shoe-horn traditional methods of peace-making into a western 
paradigm, viewing it as another attempt to force ‘Anglo’ or western culture and legal systems 
on to indigenous peoples, in the name of progressive ‘modernisation’ of indigenous practices 
which are still deemed to be backwards or inferior.41 Kahane and Bell flag the risk that attempts 
 
37 Owen M Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 The Yale Law Journal 1073.; Harry T Edwards, ‘Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?’ (1986) 99 Harvard Law Review 668.; Robert A Baruch Bush and Joseph P 
Folger, Promise of Mediation: The Transformative Approach to Conflict (Jossey Bass; 2004). 13-15; Baruch Bush 
and Folger (n 8).; Lorna McGregor, Rachel Murray and Shirley Shipman, ‘Should National Human Rights 
Institutions Institutionalize Dispute Resolution?’ 41 Human Rights Quarterly 32. 
38 UNHRC, ‘Final Report of the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making Report 
of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (17 August 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/42, para 27.  
39 It is noted that consultation processes take place under different degrees of confidentiality, but are largely public 
processes. The case studies from Peru and Canada generally demonstrated that documents such as reports, 
environmental impact assessments, correspondence, transcripts of meetings and meeting minutes are available 
in the public domain, and the parties comment on the process in the media. However, certain processes relating 
to or running alongside the consultation may be confidential, such as the negotiation of the Matawa Framework 
Agreement in the Ring of Fire case, or the communities’ ‘internal discussion’ meetings in the Peruvian cases. 
Furthermore, it is recognised that consultation processes should not be widely open for attendance by the general 
public or mining companies, but should only involve third parties such as technical advisors or an Ombudsman 
who are there in a supporting role. As a voluntary and flexible process, mediation permits the parties to agree 
together what should remain confidential and without prejudice, and what can be disclosed into the public domain. 
In cases that concern human rights issues, the involvement of an Ombudsman may serve as a safeguard to ensure 
that legal rights are not eroded or prejudiced by confidentiality terms.   
40 Heather M MacNaughton, ‘The Role of Mediation in Human Rights Disputes’ in Patrick A Molinari and Ronalda 
Murphy (eds), Doing justice: dispute resolution in the courts and beyond (Canadian Institute for the Administration 
of Justice = Institut canadien d’administration de la justice 2009). 
41 Matt Arbaugh, ‘Making Peace the Old Fashioned Way: Infusing Traditional Tribal Practices into Modern ADR’ 
(2012) 2 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal., Craig Jones, ‘Aboriginal Boundaries: The Mediation and 
Settlement of Aboriginal Boundary Disputes in a Native Title Context’ (2002) 2 National Native Title Tribunal 
Occasion Papers Series 1. 
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to construct hybrid models of dispute resolution will continue ‘the project of colonization by 
adopting only those aspects of indigenous knowledge, values and processes that do not 
conflict with Western values and laws.’42  
 
The following analysis, which is based on western mediation theory, is proposed with the 
crucial proviso that specific mediation processes must always be designed with indigenous 
communities, and implemented with their continued consent. To avoid the pitfalls of imposing 
western or colonial hybrid models of mediation on indigenous people, appropriate models of 
mediation must be designed from the ground up, with a specific conflict or context in mind, 
and in conjunction with the indigenous peoples involved. In order to respect indigenous self-
determination and autonomy, any external mediator should be invited by the proper 
indigenous authorities.43 Additionally, there is evidence of successful mediation processes that 
include a team of mediators, some of whom are external to the conflict, and some of whom 
hold positions of respect within the community itself.44 The design of the process must give 
consideration to a range of issues, including the nature of the dispute, the needs of the parties 
and their existing relationships, cultural difference, gender, power imbalances, trust-building 
and how emotion is treated within the process. Furthermore, it is imperative that the mediators 
recognise the changing nature of culture and avoid stereotypical generalisations which will 
obscure the real experiences and perceptions of the participants.45  
 
The proposal that mediations be co-designed by indigenous peoples and states is consistent 
with UNDRIP’s provisions on the co-design of grievance mechanisms46 and procedures for 
the recognition and adjudication of land rights47 that require joint design of processes which 
respect indigenous laws and customs. It could also be utilised to help fulfil the requirements 
of Article 40, which states that 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and 
fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, 
as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective 
 
42 David Kahane and Catherine Bell, ‘Introduction’ in Catherine Bell and David Kahane (eds), Intercultural Dispute 
Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts (UBC Press 2005). 2. 
43 Diaz (n 20).    
44 Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach, ‘Mediating Conflict in Central America’: (1991) 28 Journal of Peace 
Research 85.; John Beaucage, Alicia Kuin and Paul Iacono, ‘Anishnabe N’oon Da Gaaziiwin: An Indigenous 
Peacemaking- Mediation Nexus’ (2018) 16 Fourth World Journal 49. 
45 Rebecca Ratcliffe and Catherine Bell, ‘Western ADR Processes and Indigenous Dispute Resolution (Draft 
Paper)’ <https://www.coemrp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Final-Western-DR-Systems-.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2020. 
46 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007)., Arts 11.2; 12.2. 
47 Ibid., Art 27. 
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rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules 
and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human 
rights.48  
 
Furthermore, dispute resolution systems which reflect indigenous values are thought to be 
more likely to be perceived as legitimate, and consequently any agreements arising from them 
are more likely to endure.49  
 
However, it is extremely possible that state officials will be more familiar with western 
mediation practices than indigenous peace-making, and therefore may be more open to 
including it in state-designed FPIC processes. Whist there is a need to continue to advocate 
for the state to design dialogue processes in conjunction with indigenous peoples and to 
observe indigenous consultation protocols, there is also a need to take urgent steps to address 
power imbalances in the way that FPIC is currently practiced. On this basis, this chapter will 
evaluate three different models of mediation, that are informed by western theories of 
negotiation and dispute resolution, in order to assess their potential to mitigate the imbalances 
of power that are at play.  
 
8.3 Rights-based mediation 
 
8.3.1 FPIC consultations as fora in which rights are negotiated  
 
FPIC consultations have been described as being largely about  ‘negotiation of rights’ in a 
space of legal pluralism, in which state law, indigenous legal frameworks and international 
norms, in addition to the ‘raw law’ of forcible coercion, all come into play.50 FPIC consultations 
can therefore be conceived of as fora in which the meanings of rights are contested within the 
context of historically-rooted power asymmetries and cultural politics.51 Building on Sally Engle 
Merry’s work on vernacularisation of rights, and the decolonial work of Santos and Rodriquez 
Garavito, Flemmer has concluded that consultation processes are ‘asymmetric arenas of 
struggles over rights’ in which top-down approaches to rights clash with bottom-up 
 
48 Ibid, Art 40.  
49 Jones (n 41).; Coyle, ‘Shifting the Focus’ (n 4). 
50 Marilyn Machado and others, ‘Weaving Hope in Ancestral Black Territories in Colombia: The Reach and 
Limitations of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation and Consent’ (2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 1075.; See 
also Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization from Below: 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press 2005). Rachel Sieder, ‘“Emancipation” or 
“Regulation”? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Post-War Guatemala’ (2011) 40 Economy and 
Society 239.; Viviane Weitzner, ‘“Nosotros Somos Estado”: Contested Legalities in Decision-Making about 
Extractives Affecting Ancestral Territories in Colombia’ (2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 1198.  
51 Machado and others (n 50). 
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interpretations of the law.  Her work in Peru, and that of Rodriguez Garavito in Colombia,52 
observed that indigenous and state participants made reference to the same legal standards 
(for example ILO C169 and UNDRIP) but with vastly different interpretations of their meaning. 
According to Flemmer, the outcome of the epistemic struggle between the different 
interpretations of normative standards will determine the result of the consultations.53 
 
However, for indigenous peoples the notion that their inalienable rights can be negotiated, 
particularly through fora in which the balance of power is against them, is often unacceptable. 
For example, in the Corrocohuayco case study presented in Chapter 6, the indigenous 
communities of Espinar demanded FPIC consultation in relation to the mine’s expansion, but 
made clear that their rights are non-negotiable.  In a press release, the community 
representative stated:  
 
This process [of FPIC consultation] is not understood as a negotiation, because our 
rights are not negotiated, the rights are to be respected and guaranteed, that is the 
obligation of the government and it is our obligation to defend them. We are not willing 
to allow our rights to be violated once again. There have been more than 30 years of 
constant abuses against us, by the mining companies and the State itself.54  
 
However, the analysis in Chapters 3 and 5 as well as the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 
show that in practice, state have overwhelming control over how indigenous rights – including 
their rights to self-determination, land and FPIC - are defined and under what conditions they 
may be restricted. This casts doubt on the likelihood that indigenous peoples will be able to 
win the ‘epistemic struggle’ referred to by Flemmer, in order to influence the outcome of FPIC 
consultations. 
 
8.3.2 The case against rights-based mediation 
 
In ‘evaluative’ or ‘rights-based’ mediation, the mediator provides an early evaluation to each 
party of the strength of their legal position, in order to bring the parties to settle their dispute. 
Such an approach can help to reduce power imbalances where one party is more familiar with 
 
52 César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Ethnicity.Gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior 
Consultation in Social Minefields’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 263. 
53 Riccarda Flemmer, ‘Stuck in the Middle: Indigenous Interpreters and the Politics of Vernacularizing Prior 
Consultation in Peru’ (2018) 23 The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 521. 
54 ‘Espinar: comunidades retoman el diálogo con el Estado sobre la consulta previa’ (Observatorio de Conflictos 
Mineros en el Perú, 29 April 2019) <http://conflictosmineros.org.pe/2019/04/29/espinar-comunidades-retoman-el-
dialogo-con-el-estado-sobre-la-consulta-previa/> accessed 20 November 2020. 
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the law or has greater access to legal advice,55 as is often the case in FPIC consultations. 
However, this section argues that such an approach is disadvantageous in the context of FPIC 
consultation, and may reinforce existing power disparities, particularly where indigenous 
peoples are not content with the legal framework that is being applied. Given that FPIC 
consultation tends to be regulated by top-down legal frameworks which are based in state-
centric rather than indigenous legal principles, the mediator’s definition of rights is likely to be 
firmly rooted in the state’s interpretation of the law. Such an intervention would not assist in 
developing an intercultural dialogue based on epistemic justice, and would be likely to 
reinforce existing power disparities.    
 
Critics have also argued that the focus of rights-based mediation on legal positions are 
inappropriate in the context of serious human rights violations, and in other cases may result 
in zero-sum calculations that reduce the likelihood of collaboration and imaginative solutions.56  
 
In a review of the mediation of human rights disputes at the British Columbia Human Rights 
Tribunal and the British Columbia Human Rights Commission, McNaughton acknowledges 
the criticisms of mediation of human rights violations and argues that safeguards can address 
many of these concerns. These include ‘ensuring that participants can make informed, 
uncoerced and voluntary decisions that do not undermine statutory rights; avoiding processes 
that delay adjudication; and enhancing accessibility for all parties’ as well as ensuring access 
to information and legal or technical advice, ensuring that mediators are qualified to carry out 
their role, and requiring monitoring and review processes to remain in place.57 McNaughton 
argues in favour of mediation in human-rights disputes, including reduced legal and 
enforcement costs, less stress, faster resolution of complaints, privacy, greater flexibility in 
deciding remedies, and increased control for participants over the process - resulting in greater 
acceptance of the final resolution. In her view ‘human rights disputes, which frequently involve 
human misunderstandings of rights, obligations and relative positions in society, are ideally 
suited to a mediated resolution.’58  
 
However, this thesis takes the position that it is not a misunderstanding of rights that is central 
to the conflict between indigenous peoples and states, but the existence of different 
understandings. In this case, a straight-forward application of conventional rights-based 
 
55 Doing Justice: Dispute Resolution in the Courts and Beyond; Mediation as a Tool for Resolving Human Rights 
Disputes: An Evaluation of the B.C. Human Rights Commission's Early Mediation Project Philip Bryden and William 
Black, ‘Mediation as a Tool for Resolving Human Rights Disputes: An Evaluation of the B.C. Human Rights 
Commission’s Early Mediation Project’ (2004) 37 U.B.C. Law Review 73. 
56 Rees (n 28).  




mediation would likely focus on educating indigenous peoples as to the rights that the state 
has set down. Where these are contested, for example because they do not recognise 
indigenous legal systems, this is unlikely to reinforce existing power disparities and will be 
unlikely to result in sustainable agreements that are viewed as being legitimate by the 
indigenous people concerned.  
 
8.3.3 A role for mediators in broadening the conceptualisation of rights 
 
Rees has argued in the context of human rights disputes between companies and 
communities that there is a role for mediators in helping to broaden the conceptualisation of 
rights, and to apply them in a culturally appropriate manner. This, she argues, is particularly 
suitable for those rights that are ‘qualified’, which may relate to land, and social and economic 
rights (as opposed to ‘unqualified’ rights such as the right to life, or freedom from torture). She 
argues that when ‘rights’ are construed broadly and not limited to black-letter legal 
interpretations, mediation processes allow communities the power to decide for themselves 
how their rights should be realised in their own context, in ways that are meaningful to them.  
Additionally, where remedy is concerned, mediations that include discussion of rights and 
interests allow for a flexible approach to deciding on remedies which best fit the communities’ 
own interests and sense of justice - for example remedies which take into account their needs 
for sustainable livelihoods, or to access cultural and religious sites, the need for apologies or 
firm assurances that the violations will not reoccur in future. According to Rees, mediation 
offers a space to understand the different perceptions of justice59 and remedy that go beyond 
financial compensation, or the relatively narrow alternatives (for example, injunctions or 
punitive damages) available to the courts. Furthermore, she argues that mediations can 
empower communities to determine outcomes and so contribute to human dignity.60  
 
Such an approach might increase the ability of indigenous peoples to achieve culturally 
appropriate outcomes in consultation, and to meaningfully impact the proposed project in ways 
that support indigenous self-determination. Mediation offers a means for a third party to step 
in where power disparities are resulting in agreements that are inconsistent with, or which 
undermine, indigenous rights. Furthermore, the focus on rights leads to certain risks that the 
negotiations may break down, if the indigenous peoples and states concerned cannot agree 
 
59 For a discussion of the different understandings of justice between the state and indigenous communities, 
see  for example Michael Giudice, ‘Asymmetrical Attitudes and Participatory Justice In-Print Symposium: The Myth 
of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do What’s Right’ (2006) 4 Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics 
Journal 15.; Meredith Gibbs, ‘Justice as Reconciliation and Restoring Mana in New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlement Process’ (2006) 58 Political Science 15.  
60 Rees (n 28).  
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on the specific indigenous rights that should be consulted, the content of the rights, the 
strength of the indigenous peoples’ claim to those rights, how the project should be altered to 
mitigate their infringement, or the right of the state to proceed in the absence of indigenous 
consent. Mediation provides an opportunity to work through these differences and find a way 
forward.61 
 
8.4 Interests-based mediation 
 
From the above analysis, it seems that a purely rights-based approach to mediation would do 
little to address power imbalances in FPIC consultations, unless mediators can find ways to 
open up narrow definitions of rights to include both indigenous and state perspectives. One 
way of doing this - and a method suggested by authors such as Rees and Coyle62 - is to 
encourage the parties to negotiate on the basis of interests.   
 
Whilst developed for business negotiations, the interests-based approach to negotiation has 
suffused much of the writing on grievance mechanisms for dealing with disputes between 
states or companies, and local communities including indigenous peoples, as well as 
stakeholder engagement literature. 63 The language of interests has also permeated the 
conceptualisation of prior consent in the Canadian Courts - the seminal Haida judgement 
discussed in Chapter 7 refers 27 times to the need to balance aboriginal and societal 
 
61 Michael Coyle, ‘From Consultation to Consent: Squaring the Circle?’ (2016) 67 University of New Brunswick Law 
Journal 235. 238. Coyle comments: ‘However, it has become clear in recent years that more direction is required 
to avoid continuing conflicts over the adequacy of consultation in individual cases. At present, the Crown and 
Indigenous communities are required to listen to and consider each other’s views in good faith. But if, in good faith, 
they seriously disagree about the strength of the community’s rights claim or about the severity of a project’s 
impacts, in a real sense the consultation process will fail. It will fail as a mechanism for consensus-building, it will 
fail as a reliable vehicle for facilitating decisions about resources on traditional lands, and it will fail as a process 
aimed at helping to achieve reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the state.’ 
62 Rees (n 28).; Michael Coyle, ‘Negotiating Indigenous Peoples’ Exit from Colonialism: The Case for an Integrative 
Approach Discourse and Negotiations across the Indigenous/Non-Indigenous Divide’ (2014) 27 Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 283.  
63 For example, the IFC’s CAO states that mediation is a ‘win-win’ approach which attempts to protect the rights 
and interests of both communities and companies. The ICMM’s guidelines for mining companies and indigenous 
peoples states ‘It is important to note that the mediator’s role is not necessarily to reach a consensus agreement, 
but to ensure each party sees its best interests most clearly and can decide on an efficient outcome whereby the 
greatest shared value can be realized.’ ICMM IP guidelines p92 The FAO’s guidance on stakeholder engagement 
draws from Fisher to advise practitioners to help stakeholders such as indigenous peoples focus on mutual interests 
rather than positions. The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School has developed training modules on 
interest-based negotiation of indigenous land rights for government and company representatives. See ‘Office of 
the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman : How We Work : Ombudsman’ (n 24).; ICMM (n 23). 92.; ‘Negotiating 
Indigenous Land Rights’ (PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 2 October 2017) 
<https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/teaching-negotiation-daily/negotiating-indigenous-land-rights/> accessed 21 
November 2020.   
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‘interests’64, as well as ILO C169’s provision on consultation, CERD’s Recommendation XXIII 
and UNDRIP itself.65 
 
This section will draw from negotiation theory, particularly that relating to the ‘integrative’, 
‘interest-based’ or ‘win-win’ model of negotiation, to examine how imbalances in negotiating 
power impact on both the outcome and process of FPIC consultation.66 It then goes on to 
examine the extent to which this kind of mediation might help in balancing the negotiating 
power of states and indigenous peoples during the FPIC consultation process.  
 
8.4.1 Understanding the impact of negotiating power within FPIC consultations 
 
Coyle has observed that in negotiations between indigenous peoples and states, strong 
negotiation power may trump public interest or rights, undermining justice.67 According to 
negotiation theory, power within a negotiation is ‘the relative capacity of each party to influence 
the negotiation outcome’.68 This may be influenced by a variety of things, including access to 
information and expertise; negotiation strategies and tactics; whether or not arguments are 
based on mutually recognised norms and therefore seen to be rational and persuasive; social 
status; even the parties’ relative determination to achieve negotiating goals.69 The impact of 
such factors on the parties’ relative ability to influence the outcome of negotiation depends on 
 
64 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 30). Coyle, ‘From Consultation to Consent’ (n 61)., 252.  
65 International Labor Organization Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) (C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 
Art 15(2) : 
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other 
resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they 
shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would 
be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such 
resources pertaining to their lands. (Emphasis added.)  
CERD, General Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples (18 August 1997) UN Doc CERD/C/51/misc 13/Rev 
4., para. 4(d) calls on states to  
Ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in public 
life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed 
consent’. The preamble to the Declaration states: ‘Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from 
historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories 
and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in 
accordance with their own needs and interests. (Emphasis added.)  
66 Michael Coyle, ‘Transcending Colonialism? Power and the Resolution of Indigenous Treaty Claims in Canada 
and New Zealand’ (2011) 24 New Zealand Universities Law Review 596. This analysis draws on the approach 
taken by Coyle in his assessment of how negotiating power operates in the resolution of indigenous treaty claims 
in Canada and Australia 
67 ibid.  
68 ibid. 602. 
69 ibid. See also Roger Fisher, ‘Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence’ (1983) 27 American Behavioral 
Scientist 149.; Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without 
Giving In (Second Edition, Random House Business Books 1999).; Robert S Adler and Elliot M Silverstein, ‘When 
David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations’ (2000) 5 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 
1.; Rebecca J Wolfe and Kathleen L Mcginn, ‘Perceived Relative Power and Its Influence on Negotiations - 
ProQuest’ (2005) 14 Group Decision and Negotiation 3. 
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the relationship dynamic between them, and how they each perceive both the subject matter 
and their negotiation counterpart.70   
 
FPIC consultations often occur in an atmosphere of distrust, and as the case studies in 
Chapters 6 and 7 exemplified, indigenous communities are disadvantaged by a lack of access 
to information, inadequate translation of documents and discussions into indigenous 
languages, lack of institutional support on negotiation strategies and their legal rights, and lack 
of access to technical expertise. Additionally, indigenous representatives’ views may not be 
seen as persuasive by state officials if they are couched in the language of indigenous 
worldviews, rather than the technical and legal arguments recognised by the state.  Indigenous 
communities are often of a low socio-economic status, particularly compared with the state 
officials who sit across the negotiating table, and often have little control over the design of 
the process, or the appointment of facilitators who (in two of the Peruvian case studies) 
displayed bias in carrying out their role.  Dokis has reported that in the Mackenzie Valley, 
community members felt intimidated even asking questions during consultation processes, 
due to the technical nature of the discussion.71 All these factors will significantly reduce the 
negotiating power of indigenous groups in FPIC consultations, and reduce their chances of 
meaningfully affecting the outcome.  
 
In addition to these disadvantages for indigenous communities, the greatest predictor of each 
parties’ negotiating power is considered to be whether or not they hold a strong alternative to 
a negotiated agreement - something that is usually decided by factors external from the 
negotiating table.72  If a party’s Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is 
acceptable to them, they will feel able to walk away from negotiations, and less inclined to 
make painful compromises in order to come to agreement. Conversely, if a party’s BATNA is 
weak, they will have a strong interest in finding any agreement that is preferable to their 
BATNA. Thus the relative difference in the strength of parties’ BATNAs determines their 
respective negotiating power.73 In addition, the relative negotiating power of the parties is also 
affected by their Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (WATNA) - defined as ‘is a 
 
70 Ilizarbe (n 5). 
71 Dokis 
72 David A Lax and James K Sebenius, ‘The Power of Alternatives Or the Limits to Negotiation In Theory’ (1985) 1 
Negotiation Journal 163.; Wolfe and Mcginn (n 69). 
73 Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 69). 101-111.; James K Sebenius, ‘BATNAs in Negotiation: Common Errors and Three 
Kinds of “No”’ (2017) 33 Negotiation Journal 89. 
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general term for the consequences of not reaching an agreement.’74  The worse a party’s 
WATNA, the more incentive a party will have to enter into an agreement. 
 
In a FPIC consultation under the legal frameworks of Peru or Canada, the state’s BATNA to 
actually achieving consent will often be to demonstrate that an appropriate degree of 
consultation has taken place, and then to proceed with the project if desired. On the other 
hand, the BATNA for indigenous communities is likely to be a process of long-term political 
resistance, possibly accompanied by years of costly legal proceedings to prevent, amend or 
delay the project. Similarly, the WATNA for states is likely to be the risk of disruption to the 
project and legal proceedings (on the assumption that the community are able to fund them), 
the chance that a court may order that the consultation process be re-run to ensure it meets 
legal standards, and the need to manage any reputational impacts of conflict with the 
indigenous community.75 On the other hand, the WATNA for indigenous peoples is the 
decimation of their lands and way of life, criminalisation and violent conflict with security forces, 
and a court finding against them in legal proceedings should the consultation be found to be 
adequate in the eyes of the law.  
 
From this perspective, it becomes clear that as it currently stands, states have far better 
BATNAs and WATNAs, and therefore hold superior negotiating power in the consultation 
process.  Whilst failure to agree may result in serious inconvenience for states, there is far 
greater incentive for indigenous communities to accept what agreements are possible, to 
prevent the worst impacts of proposed projects on their lands and perhaps gain a degree of 
financial benefit sharing or compensation. This imbalance in negotiating power may act as a 
considerable disincentive for states to engage seriously with indigenous concerns, particularly 
on complex and contentious issues. As Fisher and Ury state: ‘If your BATNA is fine, and 
negotiation looks unpromising, there is no reason to invest much time in negotiation.’76  
 
Whereas alternatives to a negotiated agreement establish ‘the baseline for possible 
settlements’,77 they do not determine the specific outcomes of the negotiation. Instead, they 
establish the ‘zone of possible agreement’ or ZOPA - i.e. the space between each sides’ 
 
74 Moty Cristal, ‘Negotiating under the Cross: The Story of the Forty Day Siege of the Church of Nativity’ (2003) 8 
International Negotiation 549. 561.; John Wade, ‘Systematic Risk Analysis for Negotiators and Litigators: How to 
Help Clients Make Better Decisions’ (2001) 13 Bond Law Review Article 12. 
75 FPIC consultations are often accompanied or interspersed with indigenous political and/or physical resistance, 
which has the effect of increasing the reputational impacts and security considerations contingent on failing to 
reach agreement, thus worsening a state’s WATNA and conferring a degree of negotiating power on the indigenous 
group.  
76 Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 69). 172. 
77 Coyle, ‘Transcending Colonialism?’ (n 66). 602. 
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BATNAs or ‘bottom line’ for the negotiation, within which it is better for both parties to find an 
agreement, than walk away from discussions.78  Inside this zone, there are a range of options 
depending on the situation, and the outcome will depend on the ‘interaction and intensity’ of 
the  preferences of each side - where one side has a very strong preference for a particular 
outcome, negotiating power (or leverage) is conferred on the other side.79  In a consultation, 
such preferences may relate to the high cultural and spiritual significance of a particular site 
that indigenous communities want to preserve, the need to preserve a vital means of 
subsistence, or the preference for suitable land over financial compensation on the part of 
indigenous communities. On the part of the state, it may relate to the preference to reduce 
construction costs and time, or the imperative to secure a national development project that 
will achieve economic and political objectives. Whilst the precise preferences and objectives 
will differ across consultations, it could be suggested that indigenous preferences may 
generally be more fixed and intensely held, with fewer means by which to achieve them. For 
example, the preservation of an important cultural site or means of subsistence may require 
specific solutions, whereas there may be many ways of limiting project costs.  This analysis 
suggests that, again, indigenous peoples may find themselves at a disadvantage in influencing 
the precise agreement that is ultimately forged within the ZOPA.  
 
8.4.2 An explanation of the transformative role of consent through the lens of negotiation 
theory 
 
The analysis of FPIC consultation through negotiation theory poses some conceptual 
challenges for FPIC consultation;  such a marked imbalance of negotiating power calls into 
question whether the consents that are obtained from indigenous peoples during consultation 
processes could ever be considered to be ‘freely’ given.80  Additionally, evidence has shown 
that in negotiations in which the parties perceive larger power imbalances, the weaker party 
is likely to resort to more adversarial negotiating tactics, and there is reduced potential for 
 
78 The concept of a ZOPA was first put forward by Howard Raiffa in his monograph Howard Raiffa, The Art and 
Science of Negotiation (Harvard University Press 1982).  See also James K Sebenius, ‘Howard Raiffa: The Art, 
Science, and Humanity of a Legendary Negotiation Analyst’ (2017) 33 Negotiation Journal 283. Richard 
Pennington, ‘The Two Faces of Negotiation’ (2017) 57 Contract Management; McLean 64.  
79 Coyle, ‘Transcending Colonialism?’ (n 66). 
80 For examples of how economic imperatives and the use of the threat of or actual violence by states constrains 
the ability of indigenous communities to give free consent, see for example Rodríguez-Garavito (n 52). Elisabet 
Dueholm Rasch, ‘Citizens, Criminalization and Violence in Natural Resource Conflicts in Latin America’ [2017] 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del 
Caribe 131.; Machado and others (n 50).; Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Jessika Eichler, ‘The Shady Side of 
Consultation and Compensation: “Divide-and-Rule” Tactics in Bolivia’s Extraction Sector’ (2017) 48 Development 
and Change 1439.; Alexander Dunlap, ‘“A Bureaucratic Trap:” Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Wind 
Energy Development in Juchitán, Mexico’ (2018) 29 Capitalism Nature Socialism 88. Gisela Zaremberg and 
Marcela Torres Wong, ‘Participation on the Edge: Prior Consultation and Extractivism in Latin America’ (2018) 10 
Journal of Politics in Latin America 29.  
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finding collaborative and creative solutions.81 This undermines any potential for FPIC 
consultations to promote positive relationships between the state and indigenous peoples.  
 
The analysis above also demonstrates why it is so important that states recognise a duty not 
only to consult, but to obtain consent from indigenous peoples. The legislative framework that 
regulates consultation processes sets the negotiation power of the state and indigenous 
peoples.82  Recognition of indigenous consent would radically transform both the BATNAs and 
their WATNAs within the negotiation, and would create significant leverage for indigenous 
peoples to be able to influence the outcomes of FPIC consultation processes and widen the 
ZOPA to encompass a far greater range of possible solutions. Under a legal framework that 
recognised the need to obtain consent, the state’s BATNA would likely be the need to come 
back to the negotiating table to agree significant accommodations to the project in order that 
consent be achieved. In a worst-case scenario, the project may not proceed at all. For 
indigenous communities under a consent framework, a BATNA is likely to be that the project 
does not proceed, or that they come back to the negotiating table to discuss improvements to 
the scheme. At worst, the state could ignore the need for consent and proceed with the project, 
but the indigenous community would have a far greater chance of legal proceedings finding in 
their favour, were the standard of consent (rather than consultation) to be applied. 
 
A requirement for the state to not only seek but to obtain consent fundamentally shifts the 
balance of negotiating power to a much more level footing, enabling the communities to freely 
consent not out of fear of the alternatives, but out of a more genuine choice having considered 
their own priorities for development. However, as Chapter 5 showed, for this very reason 
states were unwilling to accept this obligation in Article 32 of UNDRIP, preferring to interpret 
FPIC within the multiculturalist paradigm.  
 
8.3.3 The role of interests-based mediation to mitigate imbalances in negotiating power 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 highlighted that indigenous communities were often unable to shape the 
outcome of FPIC processes to a meaningful degree. The previous two sections have 
explained, from the point of negotiation theory, why this is the case. ‘Facilitative’ or ‘interests-
based’ forms of mediation may help to mitigate the impacts of negotiating power disparity, 
 
81 Peter H Kim, Robin L Pinkley and Alison R Fragale, ‘Power Dynamics in Negotiation’ (2005) 30 The Academy 
of Management Review 799. 
82 Hamilton and Nichols (n 2).  “Consultation” is a form of negotiation...It is a negotiation, however, in which the 
bargaining power of the parties remains titled by the legal doctrine governing the proceedings.’ at 756.   
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enabling indigenous peoples greater capacity to shape the outcome of discussions within the 
ZOPA.   
 
The ‘interests-based’ approach to mediation is based on Fisher and Ury’s seminal work, 
‘Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In’.83 In order to overcome differences 
in the parties’ relative BATNAs (and therefore differences in negotiating power), Fisher and 
Ury advocate a method of ‘Principled Negotiation’, with four key strategies. First, the 
negotiators must ‘separate the people from the problem’, attempting to overcome ego and 
emotional responses, practicing perspective-taking, and viewing the other party as a 
negotiating partner rather than an adversary. The second principle is a ‘focus on interests’, in 
which the parties identify the needs and interests which underlie their original bargaining 
positions, remaining future-focused rather than dwelling on past events, and being open to 
investigating different ways in which their interests could be met. The third principle is to ‘invent 
options for mutual gain’, in which the parties brainstorm different ‘win-win’ solutions which 
could meet both their stated interests. The key to reconciling interests is for the parties to trade 
options which are low-cost to them, but of high value to the other side.  Finally, where their 
interests directly conflict, the parties ‘use objective criteria’ to evaluate the different options. 
These criteria are agreed jointly, based on (for example) scientific evidence, legal precedent 
or professional standards. There is an onus on each participant to justify the standards they 
deem appropriate, and to keep an open mind.84 In a mediation, the mediator can utilise various 
tactics to help the parties apply these principles within their negotiation.  
 
This interests-based negotiation approach is often incorporated into what is known as 
‘facilitative’ mediation processes.85 This technique is widespread and entails the mediator 
acting as a neutral and independent third party, who controls the process of the mediation, but 
not the outcome. The mediator may develop a process which begins with an opening stage, 
in which the mediator helps the parties to agree the rules and objectives of the mediation; an 
information-finding stage, in which the mediator helps the parties ‘reality test’ their own 
positions, understand the underlying issues of the dispute, and brainstorm options; a 
negotiation and bargaining stage, in which (perhaps together with experts) the parties 
negotiate solutions; and a settlement or closing stage, in which the agreement is recorded or 
next steps discussed should an agreement not have been made.86  The mediator works with 
 
83 Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 69). 
84 Mantle (n 6). Carole J Brown, ‘Facilitative Mediation: The Classic Approach Retains Its Appeal’ (2003) 4 
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 279. 
85 Brown (n 84). 




the best interests of both parties in mind, in joint and individual sessions, helping them to clarify 
their interests and the consequences of failing to reach agreement, broadening the range of 
possible options and eliminating from discussion non-specific demands or those that are 
emotional or otherwise counter-productive to agreement.87  
 
The interest-based model of mediation provides two theoretical means in which disparities of 
negotiating power can be moderated as states and indigenous peoples negotiate inside the 
ZOPA to agree specific consultation outcomes. The first is to encourage the agreement of 
objective norms by which to evaluate options for settlement where their interests cannot be 
reconciled, instead of reverting to positional bargaining which will disadvantage the weaker 
party.88 On this basis, Coyle has advocated for indigenous peoples and the state to employ 
interest-based strategies in the negotiation of land agreements in Canada,89  arguing that 
‘relying on objective norms of fairness to resolve disputes rather than the underlying power 
relations of the parties seems particularly important in the context of indigenous claims against 
the state.’90  However, he acknowledges that in indigenous-state negotiations, this could prove 
problematic because the choice of norms agreed upon by the parties may simply reflect 
existing power relations affecting how claims are framed, as well as assessed.91 Nevertheless, 
he argues that mediation may still be well suited in cases where multiple normative orders are 
at play, because it is sufficient ‘after sharing those diverse normative understandings, for the 
parties to agree on an outcome that is compatible with norms of each’.92  The interests-based 
approach could therefore be adapted to  assess each proposed option against dual criteria to 
ensure that they comply with the norms of both indigenous peoples and states, bringing a 
greater degree of epistemic justice to the process.  
 
A second benefit to facilitative approaches is that the mediator is said to control the process,93 
and can use this role to ensure that different cultural values are included within the design of 
the dialogue, and ensuring that FPIC consultations are carried out in a manner that is 
‘culturally appropriate’.94 Fisher and Ury argue that their general principles are generally 
applicable and adaptable to different contexts. However, they addressed the difficulties of 
cross-cultural negotiation, recommending that negotiators should consider the values, 
 
87 Susan S Silbey and Sally E Merry, ‘Mediator Settlement Strategies’ (1986) 8 Law & Policy 7. 
88 Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 69).  
89 Coyle, ‘Negotiating Indigenous Peoples’ Exit from Colonialism’ (n 62). 
90 Coyle, ‘Transcending Colonialism?’ (n 66). 
91 ibid., 616.  
92 Coyle, ‘Shifting the Focus’ (n 4)., 372. 
93 Tony Bogdanoski, ‘The Neutral Mediator’s Perennial Dilemma: To Intervene or Not to Intervene’ (2009) 9 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 26. 
94 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment of November 28, 2007 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 172 (28 November 2007)., para 133. 
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perceptions and behavioural norms of their negotiating counterparts, and make efforts to ‘get 
in step’ with them, adjusting the timescales, formality of the negotiation process, the venue, 
negotiating teams and the mode of communication accordingly. Furthermore, they warn 
against stereotyping, warning that negotiators must respect the culture of their negotiating 
partners whilst paying attention to the personal characteristics of individual negotiators. These 
words of advice mirror international guidance on FPIC consultation, in which it is recognised 
that processes of consultation should be culturally appropriate.  
 
8.4.3 Limitations of the interests-based approach 
 
Despite its positive attributes, various authors have highlighted the challenges of applying 
interest-based models of negotiation to cross-cultural situations. These include a perception 
of rights as a ‘barrier to solutions’; limitations in accommodating cultural difference; and the 
inability to overcome the structural power disparities which define the ZOPA – even potentially 
entrenching existing imbalances by maintaining a fallacy that the mediator is neutral in relation 
to systemic hierarchies of power.  
 
Rees observes that interest-based models of mediation may lead to the perception of human 
rights as a ‘barrier to solutions’, and suggests that a combined approach incorporating both 
rights and interests is more appropriate in the context of company-community mining disputes: 
‘The interplay of rights and interests in dispute resolution is not a zero-sum equation. Rather 
they may be mutually supportive, with interests closely informing the experience of human 
rights in practice and suggesting how balances between competing rights can best be struck. 
95 
 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that as a western framework, interests-based mediation 
is not appropriate for disputes concerning indigenous peoples. It has been argued that 
interest-based methods assume that individuals’ prime motivation is material self-interest, 
rather than a deeper need for the recognition of and respect for their cultural identity96 
Furthermore, its individualist theoretical framework presumes autonomy of individuals, 
conceiving of conflicts as private matters distinct from the wider cultural context.97 
Consequently, some authors have argued that problem-solving approaches that attempt to 
‘separate the people from the problem’ are unlikely to produce lasting settlements in conflicts 
 
95 Rees (n 28). 22. 
96 Baruch Bush and Folger (n 37). 
97 Baruch Bush and Folger, 2004 
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that relate to issues of identity.98  or where collectivist cultures prioritise relationships above 
problem-solving.99  - as is often the case in FPIC consultation.  Coyle has identified this as an 
issue in the use of interest-based negotiation between indigenous peoples and the state, 
arguing that the relationship between the two is a fundamental part of the ‘problem’ that must 
be solved, and must be considered alongside more practical, substantive issues in dispute.100  
 
Coyle has argued that although interest-based mediation is rooted in western culture, this 
does not mean that it is fundamentally incompatible with indigenous approaches nor would it 
automatically place indigenous negotiators at a disadvantage. Instead, he argues in support 
of the interest-based approach for state-aboriginal negotiations, ‘provided that the process is 
developed jointly and in a manner that respects indigenous values’.101  One way that mediation 
could help to ameliorate relationships is to better integrate cultural values into the interest-
based mediation process. Drawing from Hofstede’s work on cultural difference, Barkai 
proposes that mediators take steps to manage a number of ‘cultural dimension interests’ that 
may impact on how the parties communicate, frame the issues in dispute, and make decisions 
in the negotiation.102 For example, people from different cultures may communicate more or 
less directly, value individual or group-based methods of decision-making, favour aggressive 
or collaborative negotiation tactics, or place different emphases on the time needed to build 
relationships and rapport.103 Mediators that are trained to manage these differences may be 
valuable in ensuring that consultation processes are culturally appropriate, allow adequate 
time for building relationships and group decision-making processes, and are not de-railed by 
differences in the negotiating approach of state officials and indigenous communities.   
 
Whilst the use of interest-based, facilitative approaches to mediation may have some merit in 
FPIC consultations, in particular mitigating some of the perils of cross-cultural communication 
and helping the parties to apply principled negotiation techniques to develop win-win options 
and alternatives, it is limited in its ability to overcome entrenched power disparities. Because 
 
98 Allan Edward Barsky, ‘Cross-Cultural Issues in Community Mediation: Perspectives for Israel’ (2000) 12 Jewish 
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for a New Heuristic’ (2006) 89 Marquette Law Review; Baruch Bush and Folger (n 8). 
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Conflict and the Need for a New Heuristic’ (2006) 89 Marquette Law Review 567.; David Kahane, ‘Dispute 
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it is focused on the generation of win-win options in the ZOPA, interest-based mediation has 
limited ability to overcome the primary source of power differences in negotiation - the relative 
difference in the parties’ BATNAs, which are generally fixed by external factors. Consequently, 
whilst interest-based negotiation may have potential to improve the chances of a better 
agreement for indigenous peoples within the established hierarchy of power, it does not offer 
the chance to overcome the structural power hierarchy itself.104 This seems to be supported 
by O’Faircheallaigh’s analysis of Impact Benefit Agreement negotiations between indigenous 
communities and mining companies, which concluded that structural factors - as opposed to 
negotiation tactics - are decisive in determining negotiation outcomes.105  
 
Fisher and Ury recommend that parties in a weak negotiating position seek to improve their 
BATNA.106 The ability of indigenous communities to apply political pressure on the state 
outside of the negotiations is a factor which could impact on the BATNAs of both parties, by 
increasing the reputational and financial costs to the state of failing to reach agreement. This 
could explain O'Faircheallaigh’s finding that community organising was key to indigenous 
peoples improving their negotiation outcomes,107 and Machado et al’s observation that the 
strength of indigenous political organisations was  ‘the most significant variable’ in 
consultations resulting in tangible benefits for the communities in their study.108 However, 
within top-down legal frameworks of consultation that do not require consent, there is a limit 
to how much indigenous communities are able to realistically enhance their BATNA.  
 
Additionally, it has been argued that the theoretical conceptualisation of mediators as 
unbiased or impartial is a fallacy in practice, and that mediation could even entrench existing 
power disparities.109 Studies have shown that mediators have an impact on the outcome 
agreements, for example through the use of subtle tactics to pressure the parties into 
compromise based on their own perceptions of the parties and their positions, or by imposing 
 
104 Coyle, ‘Negotiating Indigenous Peoples’ Exit from Colonialism’ (n 62). Coyle argues that for interest-based 
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the substantive norms by which options are evaluated.110 The decisions that the mediator 
makes, for example pertaining to the venue, who may be present with the participants, control 
of the agenda and timings, or the use of authoritative references or experts, will all be taken 
in the context of the mediator’s own understanding of the world, and will likely give advantage 
to one or other party.111 Furthermore, it has been argued that mediators’ own pre-existing 
cultural understanding of the world will inevitably have an impact on their ability to manage 
harmful cultural stereotypes and interpretative frameworks that replicate wider societal 
discrimination against disadvantaged groups within the mediation process.112 These questions 
highlight the importance of the indigenous party having influence over the choice of mediator, 
and raises the possibility of employing indigenous mediators either instead of, or alongside, 
non-indigenous ones.113  
 
8.5 Narrative Mediation 
 
Whilst interest-based mediation may have some potential, it also has its limitations for cross-
cultural dialogue. This section analyses the potential contribution of narrative mediation, which 
focuses more explicitly on the impact of cultural discourse in creating, sustaining and resolving 
conflict.  In contrast to rights-based and interests-based methods, which are described as 
methods of finding solutions to specific disputes, narrative mediation is a ‘transformative’ 
technique which focuses on the long-term relationship between the parties.114 
 
8.5.1 FPIC consultations as a ‘discursive clash’ 
 
As has been discussed above, various authors have highlighted the role of FPIC consultations 
as sites in which the meaning of rights is contested.115  Rodriquez-Garavito has described 
FPIC consultation as a ‘a discursive clash, in which claims and different kinds of knowledge, 
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based on radically distinct epistemological roots, get crossed’. Furthermore, indigenous 
scholars have pointed to the way that narratives (i.e. the stories that are ingrained in a culture 
and that shape the way that individuals within that culture understand the world) play a role in 
perpetuating colonial hierarchies of power. Maori scholar Linda Smith, points to the ingrained 
nature of the colonial conflict story when she writes: ‘The ‘talk’ about the colonial past is 
embedded in our political discourses, our humour, poetry, music, storytelling, and other 
common sense ways of passing on both a narrative of history and an attitude about history’.116 
Gagnon has pointed to the significant effects of narrative on the wellbeing of indigenous 
people, arguing in relation to Canada that popular discourse on the perceived need to ‘civilise’ 
aboriginal peoples in the 19th century and on economic and social development in the 21st 
century demonstrate the same mechanisms of contempt,  positioning the indigenous people 
inferior, attacking their (or their social groups’) honour, physical and social integrity, with 
resulting damage to their self-esteem and self-confidence.117  
 
In order to counter these impacts, Alfred and Corntassel call attention to the need to de-centre 
the colonial narrative: ‘[T]here is a danger in allowing colonization to be the only story of 
Indigenous lives. It must be recognized that colonialism is a narrative in which the Settler’s 
power is the fundamental reference and assumption, inherently limiting Indigenous freedom 
and imposing a view of the world that is but an outcome or perspective on that power.’118 
Corntassel and T’lakwadzi have called for the ‘restorying’ of the narrative of Canadian history, 
in ways that challenge the state’s narratives of colonization and reconciliation by asserting 
indigenous narratives about the same events.119 Narrative mediation provides a framework 
within which the parties to a conflict can explore their different stories about their relationship 
and work together to construct a shared narrative.   
 
8.5.2 The principles of narrative mediation and their relevance to FPIC consultation 
 
Narrative mediation was developed by Winslade and Monk, inspired by narrative family 
therapy and in response to feminist, indigenous and other critiques of interest-based models 
as rooted in western ideologies.120 It is used primarily to resolve family disputes, employment 
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disputes, but it has also been used in disputes involving indigenous people in the USA, 
Canada, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand,121 including in the negotiation of native title 
disputes in Australia.122 Whilst Winslade and Monk are non-indigenous, Jarratt has argued that 
its emphasis on narrative is complementary to the emphasis on story-telling in indigenous 
peace-making.123  
 
Rather than focusing on the satisfaction of interests, narrative mediation aims to bring about 
‘the construction of a respectful and equitable relational context that can serve as the basis of 
an ongoing relationship’.124  The role of the mediator in narrative mediation is to help the parties 
reassess narratives in which they view themselves as being in conflict with one another, and 
develop together an ‘alternative story’ of collaboration which is incompatible with the 
continuation of conflict. The process is focused on the relationship between the parties, 
beginning with each party meeting separately with the mediator, and then coming together in 
a joint session. Unlike interest-based mediation, the conversation does not begin with an 
analysis of the nature of the problem, but with the parties speaking about what they hope to 
accomplish from the meeting, in terms of their values and ideals. By employing the nine 
‘hallmarks’,125 the mediator helps the parties to articulate how they would like to better relate 
to one another in future, and prompts the parties to identify any instances of positive 
interactions in the past, however small, from which to build such a relationship. The mediator 
then explores with the parties the ways in which this positive relationship is being hindered by 
the continuation of the conflict. Through attention to ‘discursive positioning’ in the dialogue, 
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the mediator helps to open up possibilities for the parties to more frequently position each 
other in a positive light. 
 
Furthermore, by reframing ‘rights’ or ‘interests’ as ‘perceived entitlements’, narrative mediation 
questions underlying cultural assumptions that have been taken for granted as objective 
reality, ‘opening them to scrutiny, debate and challenge.’126 This may be particularly useful in 
cases in which the indigenous community disputes the legitimacy of state law or its sole 
authority over the FPIC consultation process.127 The objective of the mediation is therefore not 
an agreement, but the development of an ongoing relationship that can navigate future conflict. 
According to the theory of narrative mediation, the success of any agreement that is reached 
will depend on whether it is supported by a narrative of relationship which can influence the 
parties actions after the mediation has ended.128 This stands in contrast to a rights-based 
analysis which may view the long-term success of agreements as being a function of the 
perceived legitimacy of the process, or an interest-based approach which places emphasis on 
the extent to which the agreement meets the respective needs of the parties.  
 
Crucially, narrative mediation does not aim to sweep stories of conflict under the carpet, but 
suggests that these important conflict stories can coexist with an alternative narrative of 
cooperative relationship.  The mediator encourages the parties to ‘externalise’ the conflict, as 
if it were a separate character in the story that has harmed both sides - although not 
necessarily to the same degree. On this basis, grievances can be discussed in a way that 
shifts the conversation away from blame, and towards what can be done to repair the damage, 
whilst recognising the very real negative impacts of the conflict. In doing so, it aims to 
strengthen the narrative of cooperation so that future interactions between the parties are less 
likely to end in further conflict.  
 
This approach, which may be seen to absolve perpetrators of abuse of responsibility, could 
be considered problematic in cases of rights abuse and may be conceptually unacceptable to 
some indigenous people. However, in cases where indigenous groups are open to it, this 
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approach may enable indigenous people to discuss past grievances within the consultation 
process and to gain recognition of their suffering in a way that states will be more likely to 
accept. At present, states often use their control over the process to entirely exclude 
discussion of grievances, resulting in dissatisfaction with the process or the breakdown of 
dialogue.129 Furthermore, an approach that does not centre blame and punishment may be 
considered consistent with some indigenous peace-making processes.130  In any case, 
mediation does not prevent indigenous peoples from pursuing justice in other fora.  
 
In the narrative approach, the achievement of FPIC is not held up as the sole objective of the 
consultation process. Instead, success is based on whether or not the dialogue improved or 
jeopardised the relationship, and whether appropriate procedures are in place to continue 
dialogue so that the parties can work together in future to create a positive and shared 
relationship story. This could bring in wider engagement with issues of reparation, redress, 
social and economic needs, and help connect individual FPIC consultations with wider 
institutional change, as Schilling-Vacaflor and others have advocated.131 Such an approach 
also helps to reinforce the practice of FPIC as an iterative and ongoing process, that must be 
continually revisited.  This may include specific actions within the mediation to ensure proper 
records of discussions and agreements that reflect the statements of both sides (as opposed 
to one-sided reports undertaken by state officials), mechanisms and timetables for follow up 
of agreements made, and a greater understanding of how FPIC contributes to the long-term 
relationship between the indigenous community and the state.  
 
8.5.3 The impact of narrative mediation on power relations 
 
Narrative mediation theory analyses the continual construction of power within negotiations 
through the parties’ use of discourse and discursive positioning within the negotiation dialogue. 
These features could have benefits in the context of FPIC consultation. The discussions which 
occur between indigenous peoples and the state in FPIC consultation processes do not only 
concern indigenous rights and interests, but also the matter of the preservation of indigenous 
values and identity.132 In contrast to the interest-based approach whose effectiveness in the 
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281 
 
context of identity conflicts is questioned,133 the narrative approach has been said to be most 
effective ‘when the issues in dispute involve threats to social values, shared beliefs, social 
identity, and cultural meaning’.134   
 
In analysing power relations between the parties, narrative mediation theory takes a 
constructionist approach, inspired by the work of Foucault,135 who viewed power not as a static 
commodity vested in certain people or structures, but as a component of relationships, which 
is able to be produced, transmitted and reinforced - but also exposed and undermined - 
through individuals’ use of discourse.   This approach both gives credit to the idea that 
individuals can use their influence through their use of discourse, but also recognises that - 
due to dominant discourses which reinforce discrimination - some individuals will find it easier 
to wield discursive power than others.136 Gunning argues that the domination of narratives 
which benefit powerful groups within society often weakens the position of participants from 
disadvantaged groups within the mediation itself. This is because they need to justify 
themselves with reference to negative stereotypes, and have fewer positive positions to take 
up within the dominant meta-narrative. Furthermore, their own meta-narratives may not be 
recognised by the other party to the mediation, resulting in a lack of understanding or 
insufficient weight being placed on their negotiating stance.137 This was particularly evidenced 
in the Peruvian case study, but also in the case of Canada - indigenous peoples may be 
positioned as ‘barriers to development’ by predominant narratives in politics and the media, 
and may themselves view states as untrustworthy. Furthermore, indigenous forms of 
knowledge and legal systems may be dismissed as less persuasive than those of the state. 
These pre-existing narratives can be expected to impact on the way that parties express 
themselves in a negotiation, and also how they respond to the statements of the other.  
 
From this theoretical perspective, power is evidenced and wielded through the parties’ use of 
‘discursive positioning’. Winslade and Monk argue that in order to reveal and better manage 
the power dynamics at play, explicit attention should be drawn to the way in which meaning is 
negotiated and constructed during dialogue between the parties.138 Discursive theory139 argues 
that the parties to a dialogue take up ‘discursive positions’ in relation to an existing discourse 
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during conversations, and in so doing, offer the respondent a position or positions from which 
to respond. For example, one person saying ‘I am only trying to be reasonable’ has the effect 
of positioning them on the side of logic, temperance and virtue, whilst also implicitly placing 
the respondent in the position of being ‘unreasonable’ - emotional, illogical or otherwise 
behaving in a difficult manner. The respondent is therefore placed in a position which is viewed 
- at least in western society - as behaving in a way that is illegitimate, reducing their discursive 
power and requiring them to justify their reasonableness from a disadvantageous position of 
being labelled ‘unreasonable’.  
 
Hamilton and Nicholls observed discursive positioning at play in the Haida Nation case, in 
which Chief Justice McLachlin stated: ‘As for Aboriginal claimants, they must not frustrate the 
Crown’s reasonable good faith attempts, nor should they take unreasonable positions to thwart 
government from making decisions or acting in cases where, despite meaningful consultation, 
agreement is not reached.’140 Hamilton and Nicholls point out that the assumptions of the 
Supreme Court regarding the Crown possessing a thick form of sovereignty and title over 
aboriginal lands, will determine the bounds of what is considered ‘reasonable’ when assessing 
aboriginal claims and indigenous communities’ behaviour during a consultation process. The 
authors also demonstrate this process at work in the Ktunaxa Nation case, when the Supreme 
Court determined that the Ktunaxa Nation’s decision in adopting an absolute position against 
any development on a site of great spiritual importance was ‘unreasonable’. Thus ‘If an 
aboriginal claimant chooses to speak the language of inherent jurisdiction, shifting the 
relationship to a nation-to-nation basis, their claim is presented as being ‘unreasonable’ and 
so it falls on tin ears.’141   
 
Within consultation processes, state requirements for arguments to be based in ‘facts’ and 
‘science’ could place indigenous representatives in a weak discursive position when seeking 
to use oral history or indigenous worldviews as a justification for their demands, or if they 
express themselves in emotional rather than logical terms.142  According to Winslade, 
discursive positioning can result in patterns of dialogue which entrench conflict further unless 
alternative narratives can be constructed. Indeed, Pichler et al reported on a community 
dialogue table in the mining sector in Peru failed because whilst the company involved viewed 
it as a dispute over financial resources, the community sought proper recognition of their 
suffering. Consequently, the two sides viewed one another as behaving unreasonably and 
 
140 Haida Nation v British Columbia (n 30), para 42. 
141 Hamilton and Nichols (n 2). 749. 
142 Victor (n 13). 78-81.  
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failing to take the process seriously and in good faith.143 In the meta-consultation on Peru’s 
Regulatory Decree discussed in Chapter 6, the state and indigenous representatives accused 
one another of betrayal and bad faith when talks broke down after the first stage, due to their 
differing understandings of the purpose of the consultation and the negotiating history that had 
preceded it.144 In a study of a FPIC consultation in Mexico, Dunlap observed that the Mexican 
state used discursive strategies, such as describing opposition to the project as an 
‘insurgency’, to undermine the indigenous community’s public standing and reduce support 
for their cause.145  
 
The role of the mediator within this dynamic is to help the parties make ‘discursive shifts’, 
which move the parties away from narratives of conflict and towards a collaborative 
relationship.146 The mediator therefore takes an active role in shaping the dialogue so that it 
deconstructs underlying assumptions that reinforce power hierarchies and conflict narratives.  
For example, Cobb observed that the first person to speak in a mediation establishes narrative 
control, and determines the dominant discourse to be used within the dialogue. From her 
research she concluded that in 75% of mediations, the discourse used by the first speaker 
influences the outcome of the discussion.147  
 
The case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 indicate that the state overwhelmingly controls the terms 
of the discussion within a FPIC consultation process. In the Peruvian case studies, the 
regulated process for consultation requires that the state representatives be the first to speak, 
 
143  Melanie Coni- Zimmer, Annegret Flohr and Andreas Jacobs, ‘Claims for Local Justice in Natural Resource 
Conflicts: Lessons from Peru’s Mining Sector’ in Melanie Pichler and others (eds), Fairness and Justice in Natural 
Resource Politics (1st edn, Routledge 2016) <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/> accessed 22 November 2020.  Coni-
Zimmer, Flohr and Jacobs have illustrated the importance of recognition in resolving local community conflicts over 
mining. They analysed a state-organised dialogue table to resolve a local conflict over mining between the 
community of Ilo, in the Moquegua Region of Peru, and Southern Copper Corporation mining company. Their study 
concluded that the different understandings of justice between the community and the company involved were 
instrumental in the failure of the dialogue mechanism to resolve the conflict. Using Nancy Fraser’s distinctions of 
three types of justice claim - redistribution, recognition and representation -  they noted that whilst many resource-
based disputes are viewed by those in positions of power as being about “greed” or claims for redistribution of 
financial wealth, the local communities often perceive the conflict in terms of justice claims for recognition (for 
example of a community’s suffering through apology and taking steps to ensure that violations do not continue in 
future) and representation (for example, in decision-making power through consultation processes). Where the two 
parties in a dialogue have different ideas about how justice is required to be fulfilled, they may view each other as 
behaving irrationally, ignoring sensible offers to resolve the conflict, and failing to take the process seriously and in 
good faith. Thus offers of social contributions under a benefits-sharing arrangement may be viewed by the 
community as insufficient to satisfy claims for recognition of past grievances through compensation. 
144  Ilizarbe (n 5). 
145  Alexander Dunlap, ‘Counterinsurgency for Wind Energy: The Bíi Hioxo Wind Park in Juchitán, Mexico’ (2018) 
45 The Journal of Peasant Studies 630.; Dunlap 2019; 
146 For an example of how mediators elicited a discursive shift from a rights-based framing of a conflict to one that 
explored the parties’ different understandings and expectations of correct social behaviour, see Sally Engle Merry, 
‘Culture, Power, and the Discourse of Law’ (1992) 37 New York Law School Law Review 209. 
147 Sara Cobb, ‘A Narrative Perspective on Mediation. In J. P. Folger & T. S. Jones (Eds.),  (Pp. ). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.’ in Joseph P Folger and Tricia S Jones (eds), New directions in mediation: Communication research 
and perspectives (Sage). cited in Winslade and Monk (n 128). 54.  
284 
 
setting the terms of the dialogue with reference to the Law on Prior Consultation, and 
describing the purpose of the consultation as being to provide information on the proposed 
measure, assess how it will directly impact on indigenous rights, and consider ways to avoid 
or mitigate these impacts.  Similarly, in the case of Canada, consultation is framed as a 
process in which to consider the impacts of a project on established s35 rights, and to make 
reasonable accommodations if required by the law. The EIA process developed by the state 
establishes the terminology to be used and scope of the impacts to be addressed. Cobb’s 
study suggests that such a process design would put indigenous communities at an immediate 
disadvantage.  On the other hand, if consultation processes were to be understood as a means 
of establishing whether and how a proposed project could be delivered in a way that respects 
indigenous self-determination and the wellbeing of the land, the parameters of the dialogue 
may likely shift, with consequent shifts in the consultation outcome itself.   
 
In view of this analysis, in order to mitigate the greater negotiation power of the state, a 
narrative mediator might choose to use their control of the process to enable indigenous 
communities to set the terms of the dialogue, or use their own discursive power to frame 
consultation in a consensual manner. Additionally, a narrative mediator could intervene in 
dialogue to highlight the parties’ underlying assumptions, beliefs and desires, so that they can 
be made visible and potentially challenged or deconstructed. The mediator could also draw 
attention to attempts by the parties to use discursive positioning to assert power over the other 
side as well as emphasising instances of positive discursive positioning that support the 
alternative relationship story. These methods are intended to encourage the parties to make 




8.5.4 How narrative mediation could support meaningful inter-cultural dialogue 
 
Studies of FPIC consultations - such as those in Chapters 6 and 7 and in the work of other 
authors - indicate that they have tended to marginalise indigenous knowledge and rely heavily 
 
148 Winslade and Monk (n 128). 50. One important strategy the narrative mediator can use to disrupt established 
power relations is that of deconstructive questioning, in which the mediator asks questions that explicitly draw out 
the parties’ unexpressed culturally-held beliefs and assumptions, which are contributing to the continuation of 
conflict. This helps to ‘externalise’ the conflict, as discussed above, bringing the conversation away from personal 
blame and into the realm of cultural values and narratives, enabling explicit discussion of the different ways that 
the parties see the world - as well as the areas of overlap. This exercise can help to diffuse difficult conversations, 
and to identify opportunities to build a relationship on shared values, or demonstrate respect for difference. The 
mediator can also listen out for the moments during dialogue in which the parties are seeking to position themselves 
more favourably in relation to the other, and ask a question about a specific word that has been used to do so. In 
so doing, the attempt to utilise discursive positioning as a means of asserting power can be called out, and the 
parties have an opportunity to establish a different discursive position from which to continue the conversation. 
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on technical scientific terms and state-centric legal standards. Consequently, FPIC 
consultation is generally failing to foster intercultural dialogue.149  In contrast, the non-
essentialist conceptualisation of culture in narrative mediation theory encourages ‘border 
thinking’ - in which alternative ways forward for the future are discovered through the 
complexity and the gaps between cultural identities - and encourages a dialogue more akin to 
the transmodern, intercultural approach proposed by decolonial thinkers such as Dussel.150   
 
At a theoretical level, narrative mediation recognises the complexity and fluid nature of culture 
and identity, rejecting cultural essentialism and the idea that cultures are closed units and an 
individuals’ culture of birth is an essential part of their nature.  Instead, it views individuals as 
being influenced by many cultural narratives, some of which are more dominant, and some of 
which may even be contradictory.151 Following the constructionist view, it also views culture as 
a performative action, in which individuals associate themselves more closely with different 
narratives at different times. Thus, individuals can simultaneously hold different identities, and 
identify more strongly with one or another of them dependent on context.  Each of these 
identities draws on a different set of cultural narratives and discourses, and individuals may 
align themselves more closely with different identities at different stages of the negotiation. 
Taking a more complex view of culture and identity is said to help make progress in disputes 
‘frozen by a unitary analysis of cultural differences.’152 As John Borrows stresses, indigenous 
culture is not fixed: ‘indigenous peoples are traditional, modern, and postmodern.’153   
 
Narrative mediation views different knowledge systems as valuable to the process of 
establishing relationships for the future.  Referring to an employment-based mediation 
involving Maori participants, Winslade, Monk and Cotter observed that ‘Narrative mediation in 
this context needs to invite forward the local knowledges that are indigenous to the community 
and needs to treat them as valuable resources to be drawn on in the process of finding a way 
forward.’154  Such an approach could help to centre indigenous knowledge as a source of 
solutions to project design challenges in the FPIC process, as well as a framework for 
evaluating different options. In seeking not just to manage cultural difference (as in the 
 
149 Flemmer and Schilling‐Vacaflor (n 10); Machado and others (n 50)., Roger Merino, ‘Re-Politicizing Participation 
or Reframing Environmental Governance? Beyond Indigenous’ Prior Consultation and Citizen Participation’ (2018) 
111 World Development 75.; Ilizarbe (n 5).  
150 Enrique D Dussel, ‘Transmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Philosophy of 
Liberation’ (2012) 1 TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 
<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6591j76r> accessed 19 February 2015. 
151 Winslade and Monk (n 128).  -109.  
152 ibid. 107. 
153 John Borrows, ‘A Separate Peace: Strengthening Shared Justice’ in Catherine Bell and David Kahane (eds), 
Intercultural Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts (UBC Press 2005)., 348.  
154 Winslade and Monk (n 128)., 200. 
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interests-based approach) but to constructively engage with it, narrative mediation offers a 
route to develop what Pearce and Littlejohn have referred to as ‘transcendent dialogue’, in 
which the parties commit to try to recognise and understand difference.155 This approach 
moves away from insistence that one or other party accommodates the cultural norms of the 
other, or even the goal of mutually influencing one another’s values. Instead, the question 
becomes ‘how can I understand the moral order and social reality that leads you to think that 
way?’.156 
 
Another important contribution of the narrative approach is its recognition of the non-neutral 
status of any chosen mediator. Recognising the limitations of the interest-based approach in 
assuming that the mediator can be neutral or objective, Gunning and Harper argue that 
mediators should abandon the pretence of impartiality, and strive for an ‘activist’ model of 
mediation in which the mediator seeks to ensure both procedural and substantive justice and 
fairness.157 This activist approach may provide a response to the comments of Innes in relation 
to FPIC processes in Mackenzie Valley that they provide procedural fairness, but not 
substantive fairness.158  The pursuit of substantive justice requires mediators to take on a 
‘reflective neutrality’, recognising their own biases and seeking to manage them, as well as 
actively intervening to ensure principles of equality and protection of the vulnerable.159  
 
Whilst the calls for self-reflection and the duty to uphold substantive fairness sounds beneficial 
at first, in the context of state-indigenous dialogues the question arises - whose notion of 
fairness and justice is to be enforced by the mediator? Such an approach, particularly were 
the mediator to be from a non-indigenous background, is likely to impose non-indigenous ways 
of thinking onto the parties, undermining the importance of indigenous knowledge and legal 
systems. Furthermore, ascribing an activist role for the mediator is thought by some to be 
problematic in itself, as it may undermine the self-determination of the parties and disempower 
them from finding their own resolution.160  
 
In narrative mediation, the mediator is not conceived of as a neutral party, but as an active 
participant with the parties to resolve the conflict, positioned discursively within the dialogue 
 
155 W Barnett Pearce and Stephen W Littlejohn, Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide (1st edition, SAGE 
Publications, Inc 1997). 
156 Julie Macfarlane, ‘Commentary: When Cultures Collide’, Intercultural Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts 
(UBC Press 2004). 
157 Gunning (n 111). 
158 2020 report 8 
159 Diener and Khan (n 110). 
160 Bush and Folger 2004; Tony Bogdanoski, ‘The Neutral Mediator’s Perennial Dilemma: To Intervene or Not to 
Intervene’ (2009) 9 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 26. 
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as it unfolds. It is important for the mediator to consider his own epistemic location, and to be 
continually curious and open-minded about their own opinions and beliefs, as well as those of 
the parties.161 Furthermore, in view of his non-neutral status, the narrative mediator does not 
take charge of the design of the mediation, as a facilitative mediator would normally do.  
Instead, narrative mediation defers to the parties on how they would like to manage procedural 
issues.162 This approach may provide more opportunity for consultation processes to be 
designed in ‘conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned’, in the manner of Article 27 of 
the Declaration.163 Furthermore, this awareness of the mediator’s own bias may result in a 
degree of curiosity and scepticism that can help the parties to explore their own cultural 
assumptions and expectations together.  
 
Whilst the concept of a mediator acting in a non-neutral manner may be controversial for 
western audiences, there are precedents within indigenous peace-making for disputes being 
mediated by third parties who are not wholly independent and impartial.  Suave describes how 
certain indigenous peace-making processes are overseen by a ‘peacemaker’ who is usually 
a respected elder, chief or other community leader, who will likely have lifelong relationships 
with the parties in dispute with the community as a whole.164  The peacemaker draws on his 
knowledge of the parties and their lives, and acts as a teacher, healer, bearer of indigenous 
wisdom and traditional knowledge.165 They will often make suggestions or directions to the 
parties, with a view to transforming the relationships and the individuals in the conflict, bringing 
about reconciliation and personal or spiritual growth.166 Furthermore, Harper has argued that 
business-like, formal practice of western mediation has ‘strayed too far from its roots’; what 
began as a community-based forum to achieve reconciliation, peace, empowerment and 
justice became subsumed into adversarial justice systems and competitive commercial 
contexts, losing its reconciliatory essence in the haste for quick, cost effective solutions.167 He 
argues that models of mediation that focus on transforming relationships, and in which the 
 
161 Winslade and Monk (n 128). 113. Drawing from Foucault’s work on governmentality, Winslade and Monk argue 
that the mediator is in a position of governing, or exerting a degree of control over, the lives of the parties to the 
mediation, for example in intervening in discourse in order to help establish a new relationship or agreement for 
the future. This understanding means that it is not as important to ask ‘whether the mediator is neutral with regard 
to the content of the dispute, but from which discursive position the mediator will work. What moral stance will 
inform the mediator’s work? And how transparent will that stance be?’ These questions require the mediator to 
consider his ‘epistemic location’, accept that there are likely to be limits to his ability to understand the experiences 
and viewpoints of people who operate from within different cultural narratives, and to be continually curious and 
open-minded about their own opinions and beliefs, as well as those of the parties.  
162 ibid. 201. 
163 UNDRIP, UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007)., Art 27. 
164 Sauve (n 15).; Victor (n 13). 
165 Osi (n 13). 
166 Sauve (n 15). 
167 Harper (n 111)., 595. 
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mediator takes an activist role, will better support community empowerment, justice and 




This thesis has argued that the conceptualisation and implementation of FPIC through a 
multicultural model (as opposed to a nation-to-nation model) has a limited potential to bring 
about indigenous self-determination, and hampers reconciliation between indigenous peoples 
and the state. In particular, the general reluctance of states to embrace consent, rather than 
a consultation standard, and the top-down regulation of FPIC consultation processes that 
permits states to control the content of indigenous rights and the process and scope of FPIC 
consultations has left indigenous peoples in a relatively weak position to protect their rights 
and achieve their own priorities for development. In this context, this chapter has used 
negotiation and mediation theory to argue that mediation holds potential for improving the 
negotiating power of indigenous peoples and implementing FPIC in a more intercultural way.  
 
The analysis of PFIC through the lens of mediation and negotiation theory prompts a shift in 
the understanding of its purpose. Rather than aiming for a consent, which may be conceived 
by the parties as constituting a unilateral veto, this chapter has argued that the principle of 
FPIC consultation should be seen as conferring a duty to forge consensus. This reframing of 
the duty could help to reposition FPIC outside of the multicultural model, and encourage the 
adoption of a nation-to-nation implementation of FPIC consultation that would better support 
indigenous self-determination and reconciliation between indigenous peoples and the state.  
 
Consultation processes can be conceived as negotiations of rights in an asymmetric and non-
neutral space. Rights-based mediation, applied in its strictest sense, is likely only to replicate 
existing power disparities by reinforcing the state’s legal interpretation of indigenous rights and 
the duty to consult. However, there is potential for mediation to open up a discussion that asks 
how rights can be interpreted more broadly, to better reflect indigenous legal understandings 
and worldviews. ‘Interests-based’ or ‘facilitative’ mediation may present one way of doing this. 
An analysis of FPIC consultation through this lens suggests that this kind of mediation may 
help indigenous peoples assert greater negotiating power in developing options and 
alternatives that will shape the content of any consensus reached. Thus, it would help 
indigenous communities to have a more meaningful opportunity to shape projects proposed 
by the state on their land.  Furthermore, a mediator who is sensitive to cross-cultural 





However, integrative negotiation theory suggests that the range of options for settlement, or 
‘ZOPA’ is established by the parties’ best and worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. 
These alternatives are generally determined by wider structural features, such as the legal 
framework of consultation, particularly states’ ability to proceed without indigenous consent in 
the vast majority of cases.  Furthermore, the interests-based approach would need to ensure 
that the objective standards used to evaluate options do not reinforce existing power 
disparities. This analysis has highlighted both the limitations of the interests-based approach, 
as well as the crucial need for states to recognise indigenous consent if they are serious about 
reconciliation. Without a consent standard enshrined in law, the ability of indigenous 
communities to freely give their consent is called into doubt, and their ability to determine their 
own priorities for development is greatly undermined.  
 
Narrative mediation theory offers a complementary analysis of power within FPIC 
consultations. By attending to the way that states and indigenous peoples draw from 
underlying cultural stories about the conflict, and their use of discursive positioning to assert 
power, a narrative mediator can help to expose power dynamics and help guide the parties 
towards a new story of collaboration from which to build a relationship. This approach values 
the contributions of both parties’ epistemic perspectives as a source of solutions, and as such 
could help to counterbalance the marginalisation of indigenous knowledge within FPIC 
consultation, fostering epistemic justice and a more genuine intercultural dialogue. Narrative 
mediation also recognises the ability of individuals to simultaneously hold multiple conflicting 
narratives and identities, which could help reduce stereotyping and existentialist assumptions 
within the negotiation process, and requires that the parties design the process together, 
giving indigenous peoples a greater degree of control of the FPIC consultation process. 
However, the open acknowledgement of the mediator as taking an active role in shaping the 
dialogue may be unacceptable, particularly to states more used to facilitative styles of 
mediation. 
 
The use of mediation in FPIC consultation processes is already happening, to a limited degree. 
This Chapter provides an argument in favour of adoption of mediation in FPIC consultation 
processes – particularly interests-based and narrative styles, which could be used in tandem 
to attempt to moderate the structural imbalances of power faced by indigenous peoples within 





Crucially, mediation must be designed and implemented with the full consent and participation 
of the indigenous community concerned. Additionally, mediation may not be suitable for all 
cases, particularly those concerning violations of unqualified rights, such as the right to life. 
Safeguards should be put in place (again, through jointly-designed institutions or mechanisms) 
to ensure that mediated outcomes do not erode indigenous rights, prevent transparency, or 
constrain the ability of indigenous people to seek justice in other fora. However, if introduced 
on a voluntary basis and designed in partnership, mediation offers a variety of complementary 
tools to highlight, challenge and potentially shift imbalances of power between indigenous 










This thesis set out to examine whether FPIC can support reconciliation between indigenous 
peoples and the state in multicultural societies, focusing on the implementation of FPIC as 
enunciated by UNDRIP in relation to extractive projects on indigenous territories. It has 
approached this question from a theoretical and a practical perspective, in order to shed light 
on the theoretical assumptions that underlie both the developing international norm of FPIC 
as well as consequences of these assumptions on how FPIC is being put into practice.  Deeper 
understanding of this topic will, it is hoped, provide insights into how to improve the future 
implementation of FPIC. Insights of this kind are particularly important in view of the facts that 
conflict over resource extraction continues unabated,1 and that there is a growing sense of 
frustration that FPIC – as currently implemented – is not living up to its promise as a means 
of reducing conflict and enabling indigenous peoples to realise their right to self-
determination.2  
 
As will be discussed below, the conclusions of this thesis indicate that this disillusionment 
concerning FPIC is, in part, due to a lack of attention to the continuing unresolved issue of 
how indigenous peoples and states can navigate their respective claims to self-determination 
and sovereignty. This thesis has argued that this longstanding question was not resolved by 
the adoption of UNDRIP, despite three decades of negotiation, but rather remains a live issue 
that is being constantly renegotiated on a case-by-case basis during FPIC consultations. It 
indicates that whereas indigenous peoples have tended to emphasise their right to self-
determination, states have adopted a multiculturalist approach to FPIC that fundamentally 
misunderstands the central claims of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples fought hard for 
international recognition of FPIC in UNDRIP’s text, even in a compromise form, and it would 
be a great loss if the lack of engagement with the divergent ways that indigenous peoples and 
 
1 ‘Global Report on the Situation of Lands, Territories and Resources of Indigenous Peoples’ (Indigenous Peoples 
Major Group for Sustainable Development 2019). 
2 UNPFII, Sixth Session 14-25 May 2007 ‘Report on the sixth session’ (25 May 2007) UN Doc E/2007/43 
E/C.19/2007/12.; UNHRC Thirty Ninth Session 10-28 September 2018 ‘Free, prior and informed consent: a human 
rights-based approach Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (10 August 2018) UN 
Doc A/HRC/39/62; Doyle (n 34).; Claire Wright and Alexandra Tomaselli (eds), The Prior Consultation of 
Indigenous Peoples in Latin America (1st edn, Routledge 2019). 
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states are conceptualising FPIC by indigenous peoples and states were to undermine the 
opportunity that it undoubtedly presents for enabling constructive dialogue. 
  
9.2 Thesis conclusions 
 
This research adopted a decolonial theoretical framework. Chapter 2 examined the merits of 
postcolonial and decolonial writing for research on matters relating to indigenous peoples, and 
selected decolonial writing as the main theoretical framework of this thesis, due to its 
engagement with indigenous philosophies and a history of colonialism in the Americas. It also 
highlighted key methodological implications of taking a decolonial approach, particularly in 
relation to ensuring epistemic justice.  
 
Chapter 3 argued that at the root of the conflict between indigenous peoples and states lies 
an unresolved issue of how state sovereignty, territorial integrity and political unity can coexist 
with indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. It traced the developments in international 
law that have exemplified the various ways that this question has been (unsatisfactorily) 
answered over the course of five centuries. It concludes that UNDRIP has been unable to 
resolve the fundamental tension, instead replicating it within its recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ right to internal self-determination, within the boundaries and political authority of the 
existing state. The interpretation of this right to self-determination through the lens of human 
rights was a strategic move by the indigenous movement to ease this recognition, but came 
at a cost. A human rights framing the right to self-determination has the potential to tame its 
unique political nature, and risks conflating it with economic, social and cultural rights that are 
already protected by human rights law.  
 
Chapter 4 examined Kymlicka’s model of human rights based multiculturalism, which remains 
a prevalent and influential strategy adopted by liberal states and institutions to reduce 
intrastate conflict and promote human rights. In keeping with a decolonial approach, it drew 
on the critiques of indigenous political philosophers to examine further the problems that 
treating indigenous peoples as special minorities within the overall authority of the state could 
pose for the task of reconciliation. It concluded that human rights based multiculturalism is 
unable to significantly alter the hierarchies of epistemic, political and economic power that 
indigenous peoples have been struggling against for so long. It also presented some examples 
of how indigenous ideas of citizenship could help to transform the relationship between 




From this theoretical analysis, Chapter 5 turned attention to the focus of this thesis: FPIC in 
the context of mining projects on indigenous territory. Through an analysis of UNDRIP’s 
provisions on land rights and the heavily contested Article 32, Chapter 5 demonstrated two 
very different interpretations of FPIC have emerged from Article 32’s ambiguous compromise 
text. Indigenous people and their supporters interpret FPIC in the light of the right to self-
determination, as a means to assert indigenous peoples’ control over their territories and their 
future development as peoples. On the other hand, states have conceptualised FPIC as 
special procedural mechanism for including indigenous people in participatory democracy on 
a basis of equality with non-indigenous citizens. Crucially, whilst indigenous peoples 
understand the normative framework to require states to obtain FPIC ‘as a general rule’ in the 
case of extractive projects, states generally view FPIC as an objective of consultation that is 
not required to be achieved, except perhaps in the most extreme cases.  Due to the privileged 
position of states in international law, and their de facto control over how FPIC is being put 
into practice, the view of FPIC espoused by states will determine how FPIC develops as an 
international norm.   
 
Drawing on the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, as well as the work of decolonial authors, it was 
argued that this multiculturalist framing of FPIC constitutes a doubling down on a paradigm of 
human rights based multiculturalism that reinforces the conceptualisation of indigenous 
peoples as ‘multicultural citizens’ rather than ‘citizens plural’.  Consequently, if implemented 
in accordance with this approach, FPIC will be unlikely to be effective in promoting deep forms 
of reconciliation because it maintains existing hierarchies of epistemic, political and economic 
power. The differing views of states and indigenous people on such issues as indigenous self-
determination, land rights and citizenship suggest there remains significant work to be done 
in unpicking divergent narratives and understanding how they impact the relationship between 
states and indigenous peoples today.  
 
The next chapters of this thesis focused on how the adoption of a multiculturalist approach to 
FPIC is defining the practical implementation of FPIC in Peru and Canada.  
 
Chapter 6 analysed Peru’s development of the Law on Prior Consultation and the three 
illustrative examples of FPIC consultations under this legal framework. It concluded that the 
state’s approach to FPIC is in line with the multiculturalist interpretation of FPIC outlined in 
Chapter 5. The prescriptive legal framework maintains state control of the process, and the 
consultations that do occur are taking place at the ‘narrow and shallow’ end of the spectrum 
and do not require consent to be obtained. The analysis of the meta-consultation on prior 
consent and the illustrative examples seem to indicate a pattern of dialogue which fails to be 
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truly inter-cultural in nature, instead heavily on the state’s framing of indigenous rights and the 
view of prior consultation as a rigid state-controlled administrative process which confers only 
limited opportunities for indigenous peoples to influence the outcome.  
 
In particular, the Peru case study underlines the importance of consulting at an early stage, 
when the outcomes of consultation have a meaningful chance of being reflected in the design 
of the project or measure in question. It also highlights the need for attending to bias within 
the process, whether in the behaviour of facilitators, or the willingness of the state to ensure 
full translation and to respond to all questions raised. Public narratives of indigenous peoples 
as barriers to development, rushed processes and the use of violence to quell opposition have 
been highlighted as some of the challenges that indigenous peoples face in asserting their 
rights through the FPIC process. However, as the Corrocohuayco illustrative example showed, 
indigenous peoples are leveraging the legal framework that does exist to insist that the state 
engages more fully with indigenous concerns at an earlier stage in the process. Nevertheless, 
the way that FPIC is being implemented in Peru, in a way that is tightly regulated and controlled 
by the state, is not capable of prompting significant transformations of epistemic, political or 
economic power imbalances. 
 
Chapter 7 analysed FPIC in the Canadian context. Analysis of the case law reveals that 
underneath a veneer of respect for a nation-to-nation relationship, the duty to consult in 
Canada is also reminiscent of a multicultural approach to indigenous rights, in which the 
authority of the state over indigenous peoples’ lives and territories remains unchallenged, and 
Eurocentric legal principles and worldviews are privileged above those of indigenous peoples.  
Canada’s legal framework on FPIC allows for more flexibility and variation in the way that FPIC 
consultations are conducted, and the illustrative examples in this chapter were chosen to 
present a best case scenario under the multiculturalist approach. The Canadian approach to 
consultation has led to novel institutional arrangements, such as parallel impact assessments 
conducted by indigenous governments, indigenous governments conducting the impact 
assessment as project proponent, or playing a role alongside state officials in managing land 
and administering the assessment process. However, even in these best-case scenarios, 
there remained the familiar criticisms of FPIC as a de-politicised bureaucratic process, which 
did not require consent to be obtained, or suitably address existing epistemic, political or 
economic hierarchies of power.   
 
One particular feature of the multiculturalist approach to FPIC that has been observed is that 
it prioritises procedural fairness over substantive fairness. Whilst it is certainly true that 
indigenous peoples had little control over the outcome of FPIC consultations which were 
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determined by the state according to its own rationale and logic, it was also evident that the 
procedures were also far from fair, prioritising western processes and knowledge. The many 
flaws identified in the multiculturalist implementation of FPIC in Peru and Canada have 
significant consequences for indigenous bargaining power and their ability to influence the 
outcome.   
 
Given that states are largely in control of implementation of FPIC and seem intent on adopting 
the multiculturalist approach, what can be done to mitigate power imbalances within the 
process? The first, and obvious answer is for states to agree to obtain indigenous consent 
prior to approving projects on their lands. Whilst indigenous peoples and their supporters will 
no doubt continue to demand this, such an agreement may be a long way off. For this reason, 
Chapter 8 took a pragmatic look at how mediation might be a useful tool to improve both 
procedural and substantive fairness in FPIC consultations as they currently exist.  
 
Chapter 8 evaluated three models of mediation for their suitability and usefulness in FPIC 
consultations. The right-based model presented concerns, due to its likely exclusion of 
indigenous legal systems and understandings of rights. However, the interests-based model 
showed more promise, particularly for enabling indigenous peoples greater influence over the 
outcomes agreed during the FPIC process. However, it can do little to overcome the systemic 
power imbalances that largely determine the range of possible outcomes, and may even 
reinforce them through the assumption of mediator neutrality. Narrative mediation may offer a 
more transformative approach, in focusing on the long-term relationships as opposed to one-
off expressions of consent, and inculcating a greater aware of the perils and opportunities of 
epistemic difference.  
 
The use of mediation in prior consultation processes is already happening, to a limited degree. 
The analysis in Chapter 8 supports the wider adoption of mediation in prior consultation 
processes, subject to some important caveats - it must be designed and implemented with the 
full consent and participation of the indigenous community concerned, subject to safeguards 
that ensure indigenous rights are not undermined, and may be unsuitable for some cases, 
particularly where there have been violations of unqualified rights.  The mediation tools 
discussed in this thesis are non-indigenous in origin, and therefore it is for indigenous 
communities themselves to decide whether they are consistent with their own dispute 
resolution approaches. However, it has been suggested by several authors, including 
indigenous authors, that mediation may be consistent with indigenous peace-making 
processes, and could be adapted into bespoke processes jointly designed between 




9.3 Implications for developing a reconciliatory approach to FPIC 
 
This thesis has concluded that FPIC, as interpreted and implemented according to a 
multiculturalist approach, has significant shortcomings as a tool for reconciliation because it is 
unable to sufficiently transform epistemic, political and economic imbalances of power 
between indigenous peoples and the state. Nevertheless, it also reveals some avenues for 
improving FPIC’s reconciliatory potential.  
 
The first condition would be the adoption, in law, of the requirement for agreement (or 
consensus) between indigenous peoples and the state before projects can proceed. As has 
been discussed in Chapter 8, in the absence of a requirement for consent, indigenous peoples 
suffer from an imbalance of power that will severely restrict their ability to influence the 
outcome of prior consultation processes. Furthermore, the consensus approach implicitly 
recognises a horizontal, rather than vertical, relationship between indigenous peoples and the 
state. Framing the requirement for ‘consent’ in the UNDRIP as a duty to negotiate, agree, or 
forge consensus, has the advantage of improving indigenous peoples’ negotiating power 
whilst at the same time, reconceptualising the relationship between indigenous peoples and 
the state as one of equals and collaborators and emphasising the need for agreements that 
will support reconciliation in the long term.  
 
This approach is consistent with the approaches of authors such as Hamilton and Nicholls,3 
who have argued for a ‘duty to negotiate’ in the Canadian context, or of Ortiz, Coyle and 
Ilizarbe who argued that consultation norms should be shifted towards ‘consensus’ and away 
from binary notions of ‘consent’.4  Viewed in this way, the principle of consent is not a unilateral 
veto in either direction, but a recognition of the need to build relationships and work together 
to find a resolution that both sides can accept. Indeed, both the ‘general rule’ approach and 
the multiculturalist approach view FPIC in terms of whether it is the state, or indigenous 
peoples, who will have the final say on whether a development may go ahead. Reformulating 
FPIC as a duty to forge consensus fundamentally challenges the legitimacy of either side 
presuming the greater power within the relationship, and could offer a means of moving 
beyond a multicultural interpretation of prior consultation towards one that builds a more equal 
‘nation to nation’ relationship. 
 
3 Robert Hamilton and Joshua Nichols, ‘The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty 
to Consult’ (2019) 56 Alberta Law Review 729. 
4 Alejandro Santamaría Ortiz, ‘La consulta previa desde la perspectiva de la negociación deliberativa’ (Revista 
Derecho del Estado, 15 June 2016); ‘Shifting the Focus: Viewing Indigenous Consent Not as a Snapshot But As a 




Second, it may be necessary to move away from the concept of multiculturalism as a rationale 
for FPIC, and give greater emphasis to the need for ‘intercultural’ dialogue.5 Intercultural 
discussion, by definition, requires that indigenous epistemologies and worldviews are valued 
equally with those of the state. Currently, this research and many other studies indicate that 
this is not the case in practice. Mediation techniques present one possible option for 
encouraging the collaborative redesign of the consultation process to better reflect indigenous 
peace-making, legal frameworks, knowledges and ways of seeing the world. Mediation theory 
offers insights into how to smooth communication problems across cultural divides, but also 
to help parties appreciate how their own cultural narratives impact on their own behaviours, 
expectations and negotiation positions. This ability to encourage self-reflection and awareness 
of the impact of different cultural narratives may help prior consultations to be resilient in the 
face of disagreements - for example over the relevance of past grievances to the consultation.  
 
Finally, the analysis of indigenous critiques of multiculturalism suggests that there is a need 
to have a broader conversation about the nature of citizenship and the duty of governments 
and citizens towards the natural world. The climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have 
recently brought the consequences of an economic system that does not account for its cost 
to the natural environment into sharper focus on the global stage.6 For decades, the 
indigenous movement has been sounding the alarm, and has been an active participant in 
global dialogues on biodiversity, climate change and the sustainable development goals, and 
indigenous people are calling for their epistemic perspectives and experience to be given more 
weight in the search for sustainable solutions to the world’s challenges.7 This research raises 
questions about how such conversations can be engaged at the national level. Whilst prior 
consultation may help mitigate the impacts of specific projects instigated by the state in the 
name of economic and social development, it remains, ultimately a ‘safeguard’ or a ‘defence’, 
unable to shift the systemic cause of many infringements of indigenous rights - an economic 




5 For example, Dussel, ‘Transmodernity and Interculturality’ (n 205). 
6 ‘Biodiversity and the Economic Response to COVID-19: Ensuring a Green and Resilient Recovery’ (OECD 2020).; 
Making Peace With Nature: A Scientific Blueprint to Tackle the Climate, Biodiversity and Pollution Emergencies 
(United Nations Environment Programme 2021). 
7 Priscilla Claeys and Deborah Delgado Pugley, ‘Peasant and Indigenous Transnational Social Movements 
Engaging with Climate Justice’ (2017) 38 Revue canadienne d’études du développement 325.; Jérémie Gilbert and 
Corinne Lennox, ‘Towards New Development Paradigms: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as a Tool to Support Self-Determined Development’ (2019) 23 The International Journal of 
Human Rights 104. 
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9.4 Generalisability and the need for future research 
 
This thesis has focused on prior consultation in the context of multicultural states, with a 
geographical focus on Canada and Peru, drawing from literature that has explored FPIC 
consultation mainly in Canada and Latin America. As Webley has noted, it would not be 
appropriate to make the claim that the conclusions of research based on specific small-scale 
case studies is capable of universal generalisation.8 The conclusions of this thesis are 
therefore most applicable to the countries in question, although many empirical studies of prior 
consultation in Latin America have also set out similar criticisms of prior consultation’s flawed 
procedures and inability to transform power imbalances or end conflict between indigenous 
peoples and the state.9 This suggests that the conclusions may also apply further afield, in 
countries that have experienced European colonisation and currently take a similar human 
rights based multicultural approach to questions of indigenous peoples’ rights. However, as 
Kingsbury has noted, African and Asian countries may take a different approach to the 
conceptualisation of the place of indigenous peoples in national society, and therefore this 
research may not be as applicable in these contexts.  
 
There are many potential avenues for further research. Deeper engagement between liberal 
multicultural theories and indigenous political theories could provide new notions of 
sovereignty and self-determination, and help to redefine the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and the state outside of the entrenched self-determination/sovereignty conflict as 
currently understood by international law and enshrined in UNDRIP. In particular, this thesis 
suggests that these different bodies of work could be engaged to develop on the normative 
ideal of negotiation and consensus. In order to develop the possibility of co-management of 
land and power sharing, it would be useful to gather further examples of co-management of 
land between indigenous peoples and states to illustrate the variety of alternatives as well as 
the challenges and successes of these models. Initiatives such as the World Bank’s National 
Indigenous Peoples Development Plans could be evaluated from the indigenous perspective, 
to understand their potential as an avenue for a deeper discussion between indigenous 
peoples and states on national priorities for development.  
 
In relation to prior consultation, the theoretical analysis of mediation’s potential should now be 
tested in practice, through detailed case studies of the use of mediation in prior consultation 
 
8 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press 2010). 
9 Rodríguez-Garavito (n 55).; Riccarda Flemmer and Almut Schilling‐Vacaflor, ‘Unfulfilled Promises of the 
Consultation Approach: The Limits to Effective Indigenous Participation in Bolivia’s and Peru’s Extractive Industries’ 
(2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 172.; Acuna (n 679). 
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processes. Integrative negotiation theory and discourse analysis could be employed in 
analyses of specific prior consultation meetings, to better understand the dynamics of power 
within the conversations that take place. More research would also be useful on indigenous 
protocols for prior consultation and the development of hybrid models, to understand the 
differences between state-centric approaches and indigenous ambitions for the 
implementation of prior consultation, and how these can be reconciled.   
 
Finally, this thesis has argued that there is a role for dispute resolution tools such as mediation 
to help integrate prior consultation with the resolution of historic grievances and human rights 
abuse, as well as to promote epistemic justice and greater respect for indigenous knowledge 
and worldviews.10 Further research is needed to understand how the implementation of FPIC 
can respond to the imperative to ensure that ‘any process of reparation and reconciliation must 
be approached from an indigenous perspective’.11 Additionally, it may be useful to investigate 
how institutions can be developed to support dispute resolution within the prior consultation 
process, and to bring a greater degree of accountability and transparency in the way that it is 
being implemented.  In 2000, indigenous representatives from across the world called for an 
‘Independent International Commission of Indigenous Peoples for Mediation and Conflict 
Resolution … to promote and defend the rights of indigenous peoples and to expose and 
denounce aggression and abuses of the rights of indigenous peoples in different parts of the 
world.’12 It may be constructive to examine the potential of different existing institutional 
models, for example exploring national conflict resolution mechanisms or international 
institutions such as the Office of the Compliance Ombudsman of the IFC, that provides 
mediation for disputes concerning social and environmental impacts of IFC-funded projects.13  
 
9.5 Final thoughts 
 
This thesis has been written by its non-indigenous author with a view to critiquing the current 
approach to interpreting and implementing FPIC in order to expose its ‘fragile architecture’ so 
that it may fulfil its reconciliatory potential.  In proposing these conclusions, the author 
acknowledges that indigenous people are the experts and leaders of their own struggles for 
 
10 ‘Conflict, Peace and Resolution’ (United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2016) 
<https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/2016/Docs-updates/backgrounderC1.pdf> accessed 21 
February 2021.  
11 UNHRC Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Twelfth Session 15-19 July 2019 ‘Efforts to 
implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: recognition, reparation and 
reconciliation’ (2 September 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2019/3/Rev.1, para 72.  
12 ‘Manila Declaration of the International Conference on Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, Sustainable 
Development and Indigenous Peoples, 6-8 December 2000’ (n 255)., para 1.  
13 ‘Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman : How We Work : Ombudsman’ <http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/ombudsman/> accessed 21 February 2021. 
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self-determination. It is hoped that the analysis and particularly the proposals for how 
mediation could mitigate power imbalances may be useful to those who are at the forefront of 
protecting indigenous rights.  
 
It is intended that in engaging indigenous author’s writing on reconciliation, multiculturalism 
and FPIC, this thesis learns from, rather than appropriates, the wisdom of indigenous authors 
who have painfully experienced the effects of colonisation in a way that is unimaginable to a 
British academic.  In completing this thesis, the author recognises the debt of gratitude that is 
owed to indigenous writers for their intellectual and emotional efforts which are primarily 
intended for the benefit of an indigenous audience. Indeed, one of the most important effects 
of this thesis has been that it has initiated a process of ‘unlearning’14 in the mindset of its 
author - which remains an ongoing work-in-progress. It is hoped that this thesis contributes to 
the growing recognition of western researchers and practitioners that their own epistemology 
is inherently limited, contextualised, and one amongst many alternative ways of viewing the 
world. In engaging across epistemologies, we can more clearly see our own strengths and 
weaknesses, and stand in support of the social movements - many of which are from the 
global south - who engage with international law to seek justice on their own terms.  
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